Mandamus will not issue from this Court to compel a subordinate
court to make a particular decision. The jurisdiction of this Court
in that regard is no greater in a case in which the lower court's
decision is by law made final than in those in which decisions are
reviewable in the ordinary ways.
The Court of Customs Appeals decided that, under the last clause
of paragraph I, § 3, of the Tariff Act of 1913, c. 16, 38 Stat.
114, 184, the collector was required to assess certain goods upon
their entered
Page 245 U. S. 83
value unless directed otherwise by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and that the Secretary's refusal to give a contrary
direction was discretionary, and not reviewable by the Board of
General Appraisers or by the Court of Customs Appeals, and, upon
these grounds, affirmed the Board's decision.
Held that
the court had taken jurisdiction and decided the case upon its
merit, and that mandamus would not lie to compel it to inquire into
and pass upon the Secretary's refusal.
Rule discharged.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the judges
of the United States Court of Customs Appeals to take jurisdiction
of a certain cause and to consider and decide the same upon its
merits. The rule to show cause having issued, the judges made
return, and set forth the proceedings in the Court of Customs
Appeals, and averred that the court had decided the case of the
petitioner, and, if the writ of mandamus issued, it would only
require the court to do that which it had already done.
From the return and the record attached to the petition, it
appears: Park & Tilford, petitioner, imported certain
merchandise at the port of New York under the Tariff Act of 1913.
The collector of customs assessed and liquidated the duties at the
entered value. The importer claimed assessment at the value decided
upon on final reappraisement, which was less than the amount of
the
Page 245 U. S. 84
entered value. This claim was made under paragraph I of § 3 of
the Act of 1913, which provides:
"The duty shall not, however, be assessed in any case upon an
amount less than the entered value, unless, by direction of the
Secretary of the Treasury in cases in which the importer certifies,
at the time of entry, that the entered value is higher than the
foreign market value and that the goods are so entered in order to
meet advances by the appraiser in similar cases then pending on
appeal for reappraisement, and the importer's contention shall
subsequently be sustained by a final decision on reappraisement,
and it shall appear that the action of the importer on entry was
taken in good faith, after due diligence and inquiry on his part,
and the Secretary of the Treasury shall accompany his directions
with a statement of his conclusions and his reasons therefor."
The importers entered the goods upon an invoice which stated the
gross price and allowed 15% deduction therefrom; at entry, the
importers advanced the value by reducing the deduction to 6%. At
the time of entry, the importer in each case made an addition to
the invoice value to make market value, stating the additions were
made to meet advances in similar cases then pending upon appeal for
reappraisement.
On appeal for reappraisement, the goods were appraised at a
value which differed from the invoice value, being 2 1/2% more than
invoice price of the goods and 6 1/2% less than the entered
value.
The petitioner requested the Secretary of the Treasury to
reliquidate the entries; this the Secretary refused to do, stating
his reasons as follows:
"You are advised that, in all cases where the importer has
failed to make a specific contention as to market value, the
department regards the contention as being for the invoice value,
and where the final reappraised value is below the entered value,
but not as low as the value
Page 245 U. S. 85
contended for by the importer, it is the practice of the
department to decline to authorize a reduction of the entered value
on the ground that the importer's contention has not been
sustained. This practice is based upon the department's knowledge
of the purpose and intent of the law, and is of such longstanding
that it will not make any change therein."
"You are advised, therefore, that, if the entries enumerated
within your petition come within the class mentioned above, the
department's final action with reference thereto would necessarily
be in accordance with its practice outlined above."
In a subsequent letter, the Secretary reiterated this view, the
petitioner protested, and the protest was submitted to the Board of
General Appraisers and was overruled, and the importer appealed to
the Court of Customs Appeals.
An inspection of the opinion of the court which accompanies the
petition makes it apparent that the court did take jurisdiction of
the case and decided it, placing its decision upon the ground that
the statute requires the assessment made by the collector in the
absence of a direction of the Secretary of the Treasury to the
contrary. The court held that the Secretary's refusal to so direct
the collector was not reviewable by the Board of General Appraisers
nor by the Court of Customs Appeals, that neither the board nor the
court could control the discretion lodged by the statute in the
Secretary, and affirmed the decision of the Board.
It is elementary that the writ of mandamus will not issue to
require the court to make a particular decision, and may only be
invoked where the purpose is to require action of a court of
competent jurisdiction where such court has refused to exercise the
power of decision with which it is invested by law. We think it
clear that the Court of Customs Appeals did take jurisdiction of
the
Page 245 U. S. 86
case of the petitioner on appeal from the order of the Board of
General Appraisers, and decided it according to its interpretation
of the statutes of the United States. These facts warrant the
statements of the respondents in their return that, if the writ
should issue requiring a decision of the case, they could only
repeat the decision which they have already made.
The fact that the law makes the decision of the United States
Court of Customs Appeals final in this class of cases does not
broaden the authority of this Court to issue writs of the character
now invoked; it follows that the rule must be discharged.
And it is so ordered.