A finding of mineral character made in allowing an entry under
the placer mining law is subject to be reconsidered and reversed by
the Land Department at any time before the patent issues, upon due
notice to the parties interested.
Where land embraced in conflicting placer and homestead entries
is found, upon hearing in the Land Department, to be nonmineral and
therefore is patented to the homesteader, the finding does not
conclude a claimant under the placer entry who was not notified and
given opportunity to be heard; a trust might be declared in his
favor if he proved the land mineral; but not when the evidence
confirms the Department's finding.
35 S.D. 620 affirmed.
Page 245 U. S. 226
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit to quiet the title to a small tract of land in
South Dakota which had been the subject of conflicting claims under
the public land laws. One claim was made under the placer mining
law, and the other under the homestead law. Both claims embraced
other lands, the tract in question being all that was common to
both. It was subject to disposal under the placer mining law if
valuable for placer mining, and under the homestead law
* if valuable only
for agriculture. Whether it was valuable for the one purpose or the
other was a question of fact to be determined by the officers of
the Land Department. The claim under the placer mining law was
first brought to the attention of those officers and, upon
ex
parte proofs presented in support of that claim, they found
the tract to be valuable for placer mining and permitted it to be
included in a placer entry. The homestead claim was next brought to
their attention and, upon
ex parte proofs presented in
support of that claim, they found the tract to be valuable only for
agriculture and permitted it to be included in a homestead entry.
Thus, the findings upon the
ex parte proofs were
inconsistent,
Page 245 U. S. 227
and the tract was included in conflicting entries. This was
discovered before either entry was passed to patent, and so a
hearing was ordered to determine the true character of the land.
The placer entry had been made by two brothers, and, through some
inadvertence, one of these was not notified of the hearing. The
other brother and the homestead entryman appeared, and the hearing
proceeded as if all parties in interest were present -- that is to
say, there was no reference to the absence of the placer claimant
not notified. Upon the proofs produced at this hearing, the land
officers found the tract to have no value for placer mining and to
be valuable only for agriculture, and, as a result of the finding,
the tract was eliminated from the placer entry and the homestead
entry was passed to patent. The patentee afterward sold and
transferred the tract to the plaintiff, who knew that a right to it
was still being asserted under the placer entry.
By their answer, which was in the nature of a cross-bill, the
defendants, who were the placer claimants, asserted that they had
located and were entitled to the mining claim before mentioned,
that the tract in question was lawfully included in that claim and
was valuable for placer mining, that the entry of the claim at the
land office was lawful and entitled them to a patent, and that the
subsequent elimination of the tract from that entry was unlawful
and violative of their rights, because the earlier finding that the
tract was valuable for placer mining was conclusive upon that
point, and, if not conclusive, could not be recalled or disturbed
except upon due notice to both placer claimants and after giving
them a reasonable opportunity to sustain their entry by evidence
and otherwise. The right of the homestead claimant to have the
tract patented to him was questioned on other grounds, but these
need not be noticed, for they plainly were such as could not be
urged by the defendants. The answer concluded
Page 245 U. S. 228
with a prayer that the plaintiff be decreed to hold the title to
the tract in trust for the defendants and compelled to convey the
same to them.
At the trial, the evidence bearing upon the character of the
tract disclosed, without any contradiction, that it had no value
for placer mining, but was strictly agricultural land, and that its
only use by the placer claimants had been for farming purposes.
The plaintiff was given a decree, which was affirmed, 35 S.D.
620, and the defendants seek a review here.
A statement of the case leaves little to be said, for the
pertinent rules of decision are well settled and easily
applied.
The original finding respecting the character of the tract was
not, in itself, final or conclusive, but essentially interlocutory.
It was only a step in the proceedings looking to the ultimate
disposal of the title, and, until the issue of a patent, was as
much open to reconsideration and reversal as are the interlocutory
orders or decrees of a court of equity until the entry of a final
decree.
New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U.
S. 261,
147 U. S. 266;
Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.
S. 589,
168 U. S. 592;
Hawley v. Diller, 178 U. S. 476,
178 U. S. 488.
In the last case, this Court said:
"The Land Department has authority at any time before a patent
is issued, to inquire whether the original entry was in conformity
with the act of Congress."
Without any doubt, both placer claimants were entitled to notice
of the intended reconsideration of the character of the tract and
to an opportunity to sustain the original finding by evidence and
otherwise.
Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U. S.
89,
164 U. S. 91,
and cases
supra. One was not notified, and so was not
accorded the opportunity to which he was entitled. This
irregularity prevented the ultimate finding, upon which the
homestead patent rested, from being conclusive of the character of
the tract, as against him.
Thayer v. Spratt, 189 U.
S. 346,
189 U. S. 351.
He
Page 245 U. S. 229
therefore was entitled in this suit to assert and show if such
was the fact, that the tract was valuable for placer mining, as
originally found by the land officers, and, had he shown that this
was its real character, he would have been entitled to a decree
charging the title with an appropriate trust for his benefit.
Guaranty Savings Bank v. Bladow, 176 U.
S. 448,
176 U. S.
453-454;
Thayer v. Spratt, supra. But no such
showing was made at the trial. On the contrary, the evidence
established that the tract was strictly agricultural, and therefore
not subject to entry or acquisition under the placer mining law.
Thus, it appears that the irregularity complained of was not
prejudicial, and did not result in the issue of a patent to one
when it should have gone to another.
See Bohall v. Dilla,
114 U. S. 47;
Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408;
Johnson v. Riddle, 240 U. S. 467,
240 U. S.
481.
Judgment affirmed.
* The tract was in the Black Hills Forest Reserve, and, if
agricultural land, was brought within the operation of the
homestead law by the Acts of March 3, 1899, c. 424, 30 Stat. 1095,
and April 15, 1902, c. 507, 32 Stat. 106.