Section 237 of the Judicial Code is in effect but a reenactment
of § 25 of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, and § 709 of
the Revised Statutes.
In an action against an initial carrier for damage caused by its
negligence and negligence of connecting carriers to goods of the
plaintiff shipped in interstate commerce on a through bill of
lading, the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by
the Carmack Amendment (§ 20 of the Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591,
34 Stat. 584), and claims of the carrier that failure to give
notice as required by the bill of lading relieved it from
liability, and of the shipper that the requirement was illegal but
was substantially complied with, are claims of rights arising under
that statute as to which the decision of a state court may be here
reviewed under § 237 of the Judicial Code.
When a carrier sued in a state court for damages to an
interstate shipment alleges in its answer that notice was not given
as required by the bill of lading, the attention of the court is
sufficiently challenged to a claim of federal right based on a
federal statute,
viz., the Carmack Amendment.
And when in such case the state court decides that the
requirement of the bill of lading is not controlling, it
necessarily denies the claim of federal right in the sense of
Judicial Code, § 237.
A stipulation in a bill of lading that the carrier's liability
for damage to goods shall be contingent upon notice being given by
the consignee is valid if the terms are reasonable, and whether
they are reasonable will depend on the circumstances in each
case.
What constitutes a reasonable time in which notice may be
required by the carrier depends on the nature of the goods; in the
case of very
Page 243 U. S. 593
perishable fruit, thirty-six hours after the consignee has been
notified of arrival at the place of delivery is not
unreasonable.
Neither is it unreasonable to require that the notice shall be
in writing in a case where, by force of the Carmack Amendment, the
initial carrier is made liable for the defaults of connecting
carriers and the delivering carrier is the initial carrier's agent
for the purpose of receiving the notice.
In a case of interstate shipment of fruit governed by the
Carmack Amendment, before passage of the Act of March 4, 1915, c.
176, 38 Stat. 1196, the bill of lading stipulated that claims for
damages must be reported by the consignee in writing to the
delivering line within thirty-six hours after notice to the
consignee of the arrival of the freight at the place of delivery,
and that, if such notice were not there given, neither the initial
carrier nor any of the connecting or intermediate carriers should
be liable. The consignee, after learning of the arrival of the
fruit in badly damaged condition, had time and opportunity to serve
notice on the agent of the delivering carrier but did not do
so.
Held:
(1) That the stipulation merely required the consignee to give
notice within the time fixed of intention to claim damages, without
ascertaining and specifying the amount.
(2) That the stipulation was reasonable, and that noncompliance
therewith excused the initial carrier from liability.
(3) That verbal notice to a dock master of the delivering
carrier did not satisfy the stipulation.
118 Ark. 485 affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion is made to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground
that no federal question was properly raised in the state court.
The disposition of this motion requires a consideration of § 237 of
the Judicial Code, which section
Page 243 U. S. 594
is in effect but a reenactment of § 25 of the Judiciary Act of
September 24, 1789, and § 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States.
This suit was brought by Miller, and revived by his
administrator, to recover against the initial carrier, the St.
Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern Railway Company, for its
negligence and that of connecting carriers in failing to properly
refrigerate certain carloads of peaches, shipped from a point in
Arkansas to the City of New York, over the lines of the initial and
connecting carriers, and in the last-named city delivered upon the
dock of the Pennsylvania Company, and found to be in a bad
condition. Each shipment was interstate, and, upon a through bill
of lading, the bill containing, among other things, a stipulation
that the carrier should not be liable for damages unless claims for
damages were reported to the delivering line within thirty-six
hours after the consignee had been notified of the arrival of the
freight at the place of delivery. In the answer filed in the case,
making one of the issues upon which the case was tried and decided,
the defendant set up this clause in the bill of lading and the
failure of the plaintiff to comply with it.
Without now reciting other provisions of § 237, it is enough to
say that a case is reviewable in this Court where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is claimed under a statute of the United
States and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or
immunity especially set up or claimed by either party under such
statute.
We have therefore to determine three propositions: (1) was there
a right involved which is the creation of a federal statute?; (2)
was it sufficiently set up and called to the attention of the state
court so as to be "especially set up or claimed" within the meaning
of the act?; (3) was the decision against the right set up or
claimed under the federal statute? If these requisites are complied
with, the case is reviewable here.
Page 243 U. S. 595
1. On June 29, 1906, Congress passed the so-called Hepburn Act
(34 Stat. 584), by § 20 of which it undertook to provide for the
liability of carriers in interstate commerce and to subject them,
as to interstate shipments, to certain obligations which should
supersede the varying requirements of the states through which
interstate transportation might be conducted. The construction of
this act came before this Court in
Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U. S. 491,
and, upon full consideration, it was held that the effect of the
Carmack Amendment was to supersede all legislation in the
particular states, and to embrace the liability of the carrier in
interstate transportation. It was there said that almost every
detail of the subject had been completely covered, and that there
could be no rational doubt that Congress intended to take
possession of the subject and lay down rules and regulations upon
which the parties might rely and have their rights determined by a
uniform rule of obligation. Among other things, the act required
that the initial carrier should issue a receipt or bill of lading
whenever it received property for transportation from a point in
one state to a point in another state, and the initial carrier was
made liable not only for the results of its own negligence, but
also for loss, damage, or injury to the property occasioned by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which the
property should be delivered and over whose line or lines the
property might pass, and it was provided that no contract, receipt,
rule, or regulation should exempt such initial carrier from the
liability imposed by the act.
As the shipment in this case was interstate, there can be no
question that, since the decision in the
Croninger case,
supra, the parties are held to the responsibilities imposed by
the federal law, to the exclusion of all other rules of obligation.
Since the Carmack Amendment, the carrier in this case is liable
only under the terms of that
Page 243 U. S. 596
act of Congress, and the action against it to recover on a
through bill of lading for the negligence of connecting carriers as
well as of itself was founded on that Amendment.
Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.
S. 186,
219 U. S.
196.
This principle has been so frequently recognized in the recent
decisions of this Court that it is only necessary to refer to some
of them. In
Southern Railway Co. v. Prescott, 240 U.
S. 632,
240 U.S.
636, this Court said:
"As the shipment was interstate, and the bill of lading was
issued pursuant to the federal act, the question whether the
contract thus set forth had been discharged was necessarily a
federal question. . . . Viewing the contract set forth in the bill
of lading as still in force, the measure of liability under it must
also be regarded as a federal question. As it has often been said,
the statutory provisions manifest the intention of Congress that
the obligation of the carrier with respect to the services within
the purview of the statute shall be governed by uniform rule in the
place of the diverse requirements of state legislation and
decisions."
In
Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.
S. 612,
240 U. S. 614,
this Court said:
"Manifestly, the shipment was interstate commerce, and, under
the settled doctrine established by our former opinions, rights and
liabilities in connection therewith depend upon acts of Congress,
the bill of lading, and common law principles accepted and enforced
by the federal courts."
To the same effect,
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall,
241 U. S. 87,
241 U. S. 91-92;
Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling
Co., 241 U. S. 190;
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Rankin, 241 U. S. 319.
2. As to the part of § 237 which deals with rights of this
character, it requires that the right, privilege, etc., must be
especially set up or claimed in order to make a decision
Page 243 U. S. 597
of the state court a proper subject of examination by writ of
error from this Court.
It would be superfluous to review the many decisions in which
this Court has had occasion to consider the effect of this
provision, which has been in the law ever since the passage of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 in practically the terms in which it is now
embodied in § 237.
It is manifest that the object of the provision is to require
that the alleged right of a federal character must in some way be
drawn to the attention of the state court so that it may know, or,
from the nature of the pleadings, be held to have known, that a
federal right was before it for adjudication.
The Carmack Amendment is a federal statute regulating interstate
commerce. It was passed under the power conferred by the
Constitution upon Congress to regulate such commerce, and is
applicable throughout the United States, and at once became the
rule of law governing such shipments in all the courts of the
country.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130,
93 U. S. 136;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1.
Since the passage of the Carmack Amendment, the state court must
be held to have known that interstate shipments were covered by a
uniform federal rule which required the issuance of a bill of
lading, and that that bill of lading contained the entire contract
upon which the responsibilities of the parties rested. This is the
result not only of our own holdings, but is universally held in the
state courts.
*
Page 243 U. S. 598
The federal right is not required to be pleaded in any special
or particular form. It is enough that it be relied upon and in a
proper manner called to the attention of the court. Section 237 of
the Judicial Code does not require that the statute creating the
federal right shall be especially set up. The courts take judicial
notice of the statute. It is the right, privilege, or immunity of
federal origin which must be brought to the attention of the state
court.
This question has been frequently dealt with in the decisions of
this Court; under the Judiciary Act of 1789, a case arose which
required a consideration of § 25 and the requirements to be
observed in order to bring a case within its provisions --
Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368. In that case, the
requirements of the Judiciary Act and the former decisions of this
Court were reviewed by Mr. Justice Story. Dealing with this feature
of the law, he said:
"That it is not necessary that the question should appear on the
record to have been raised, and the decision made in direct and
positive terms,
ipsissimis verbis, but that it is
sufficient if it appears by clear and necessary intendment that the
question must have been raised, and must have been decided in order
to have induced the judgment."
It is to be noticed, as to the manner of pleading a federal
right, that Mr. Justice Story observed that all that is
Page 243 U. S. 599
essential is that it must appear by clear and necessary
intendment to have been raised. When the answer in this case set up
the requirement of the bill of lading upon which the suit was
brought, and the failure to comply with it, that was all that was
necessary to fairly challenge the attention of the state court to
rights existing by virtue of a federal statute as to carriers in
interstate commerce.
In speaking of the necessity of especially setting up federal
rights under § 709 of the Revised Statutes, now § 237 of the
Judicial Code, this Court said, in
Green Bay & Mississippi
Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S.
58,
172 U. S.
67:
"But no particular form of words or phrases has ever been
declared necessary in which the claim of federal rights must be
asserted. It is sufficient if it appears from the record that such
rights were specially set up or claimed in the state court in such
manner as to bring it to the attention of that court."
". . . In
Roby v. Colehour, 146 U. S.
153,
146 U. S. 159, it was said
that"
"our jurisdiction being invoked upon the ground that a right or
immunity, specially set up and claimed under the Constitution or
authority of the United States, has been denied by the judgment
sought to be reviewed, it must appear from the record of the case
either that the right so set up and claimed was expressly denied or
that such was the necessary effect in law of the judgment. . . . If
it appear from the record, by clear and necessary intendment, that
the federal question must have been directly involved, so that the
state court could not have given judgment without deciding it, that
will be sufficient."
"
Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S.
433,
150 U. S. 440;
Sayward
v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180;
Chicago,
Burlington &c. Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S.
226."
In
Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424, it
appears that the complainant asserted a copyright in a certain play
under
Page 243 U. S. 600
the common law and defendant set up the copyright for the play,
the performance of which was sought to be enjoined, which copyright
was issued under the laws of the United States. The state court
enjoined the defendant from using that copyright, and it was held
that was sufficient to show that a federal right had been set up
and denied, as the copyright of the defendant was derived under the
federal law. That the controversy raised a federal question was
held by this Court, and the contrary contention disposed of in the
following language:
"The defendants in error contest the jurisdiction of this Court
upon the ground that the bill was based entirely upon a common law
right of property, and insist that the upholding of this right by
the state court raises no federal question. But the complainants
sued not simply to maintain their common law right in the original
play, but, by virtue of it, to prevent the defendant from producing
the adapted play which he had copyrighted under the laws of the
United States. They challenged a right which the copyright, if
sustainable, secured. Rev.Stats. § 4952. It was necessary for them
to make the challenge, for they could not succeed unless this right
were denied. Ferris stood upon the copyright. That it had been
obtained was alleged in the bill, was averred in the answer, and
was found by the court. The fact that the court reached its
conclusion in favor of the complainants by a consideration, on
common law principles, of their property in the original play does
not alter the effect of the decision. By the decree, Ferris was
permanently enjoined 'from in any manner using, . . . selling,
producing, or performing . . . the said defendant's copyrighted
play hereinbefore referred to for any purpose.' The decision thus
denied to him a federal right specially set up and claimed within
the meaning of § 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
This Court therefore has jurisdiction.
Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U.S.
Page 243 U. S. 601
561,
200 U. S. 580-581;
McGuire
v. Massachusetts, 3 Wall. 382,
70 U. S.
385;
Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U. S.
483,
135 U. S. 486;
Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1,
152 U. S.
9;
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Colburn,
164 U. S.
383,
164 U. S. 385-386;
Green
Bay &c. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U. S.
58,
172 U. S. 67-68."
In
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.
S. 246,
225 U. S. 258,
the defendants were enjoined from using their corporate name, and
it was held that, as this right or privilege was derived under a
statute of the United States authorizing the incorporation, the
case was reviewable here under § 237 of the Judicial Code.
In
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v.
McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265,
where a suit was brought to recover for a death occurring while
plaintiff's intestate was engaged in interstate commerce, it was
held that the question of the amount of evidence necessary to
establish a liability was inherently of a federal character, and
that this Court might review the decision of the state court for
that reason.
3. The other requisite essential to bring the case within § 237
of the Judicial Code is that the alleged federal right must be
denied. It has never been required that a federal right must be
denied in terms, but it has been uniformly held that it is
sufficient if the state court necessarily denied it in the judgment
rendered. If the plaintiff, in bringing this suit to recover
against the initial carrier not only for its own negligence, but
for that of the intervening carriers in the failure to care for and
deliver the several cars of peaches, had said in terms that the
suit was thus brought upon a through bill of lading because of the
federal statute giving the right to thus prosecute the action, no
one would doubt that the federal question was brought to the
attention of the state court; when the plaintiff set forth facts
which necessarily showed that a suit could only be maintained
because of rights given under the Carmack Amendment, upon a bill of
lading required by that
Page 243 U. S. 602
act, it was unnecessary to further label the cause of action by
specific reference to the federal statute.
Jones National Bank
v. Yates, 240 U. S. 541,
240 U. S.
550-551. So, when the defendant set up the breach of the
through bill of lading, and insisted that it had not been complied
with, he would have made his case no stronger for the purposes of
review here had specific reference been made to the federal statute
which made this bill of lading the sole rule of obligation between
the parties.
This record presented a suit which showed that it was
necessarily brought under rights conferred by a federal act, the
defendant specifically pleaded the failure to keep the obligation
of the contract whose force was binding by virtue of such act, and
the state court, in stating in its decision that this bill of
lading had been issued, and would be controlling in the absence of
special facts which it found as to the effect of verbal notice
given to certain agents of the Pennsylvania Company in New York,
necessarily denied the contention of federal right made by the
defendant that the provision of the bill of lading was conclusive
of the rights of the parties in this case, and required written
notice within thirty-six hours after notice to the consignee of the
delivery of the goods.
For these reasons, the case is properly reviewable here.
The stipulation reads:
"Claims for damages must be reported by consignee, in writing,
to the delivering line within thirty-six hours after the consignee
has been notified of the arrival of the freight at the place of
delivery. If such notice is not there given, neither this company
nor any of the connecting or intermediate carriers shall be
liable."
Five of the cars arrived at Jersey City and were lightered over
to Pier 29 in the evening, where they were opened and unloaded by
the longshoremen of the Pennsylvania Company. The record shows that
the course of business at the dock where these peaches were
delivered is: at
Page 243 U. S. 603
midnight, a bulletin is put up showing the car numbers and
consignees. At one o'clock in the morning, the dock is opened to
the dealers, usually present in large numbers, who then go upon it
and find their shipments. Miller testified that he had to get
trucks to take the peaches to his store, and then had to get extra
men to sort and repack them so that they could be sold the
following day, and that he could not tell within two or three days,
and until his bookkeeper had figured up what was going to be lost
on each car, what the amount of the damage was, and in some cases
it would be three or four or five days after the car arrived before
he knew.
Miller further testified that, by reason of a warning from the
Health Department that it would destroy ensuing shipments of fruit
if they arrived in as bad condition as those in preceding cars, he
had the railroad company, upon the arrival of the other five cars
in Jersey City, unload them and take the peaches to the Merchants
Refrigerating Company's plant, where he had them sorted and
repacked and then loaded on cars and taken over to Pier 29 for
sale. He testified that he was notified of the cars' arrival, and
went over to the Refrigerating Company; that he put a lot of men at
work sorting and repacking the peaches; that it would take from two
to four days to do this, and another day to put them on board the
cars and get them over to Pier 29 and sold, and it would be another
day before the reports of sale could be made up.
The state court held that the stipulation, in view of the
perishable character of these shipments, was a reasonable one, but,
as there was proof in the case to show the knowledge of the
superintendent of the dock of the Pennsylvania Company, where
delivery was made, as to five cars of peaches, that, as to such
cars, the necessity of notice was dispensed with, notwithstanding
the requirement of the bill of lading. As to the other cars
involved in the cross-writ of error, Case No. 796, the court held
that the only
Page 243 U. S. 604
knowledge of the condition of the peaches was that of
longshoremen working on the dock and not under duty to inspect the
fruit, and that, as to such cars, the action must fail.
Stipulations of this character have not infrequently been
inserted in bills of lading, and, where reasonable in their terms,
have been sustained by this Court.
Express
Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264;
Queen of the
Pacific, 180 U. S. 49.
Whether such stipulations are reasonable or not depends on the
circumstances of each case.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Shearer,
75 Ohio St. 249. We agree with the Supreme Court of Arkansas that,
in view of the highly perishable nature of this shipment and the
necessity of giving notice promptly in order that the carrier might
have an opportunity to examine the same and determine the nature
and extent of the injury thereto before the fruit was sold or
destroyed, the stipulation requiring notice of such intention
within the time named in the bill was not unreasonable. What
constitutes reasonable time in which notice may be required must
depend on the nature of the freight; and, if such notice is to be
of service in cases like the present, it must be given promptly. In
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall, supra, this Court dealt
with the requirement of a bill of lading that the shipper must, as
a condition precedent to his right of recovery for injury to cattle
in transit, give notice in writing to some officer or agent of the
initial carrier before the cattle were removed from the place of
destination, and held that such requirement must be complied with
by giving notice to the agent of the delivering carrier, as the
Carmack Amendment makes such carrier for this purpose the agent of
the initial carrier.
And see Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v.
McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142. The
Carmack Amendment requires the receiving carrier to issue a through
bill of lading, and makes that bill of lading the contract of
shipment, and the initial carrier is made liable for injuries
in
Page 243 U. S. 605
the course of transit over connecting lines. The requirement
that notice in writing of a claim for damages shall be given in
such cases to the delivering carrier, who is the agent of the
initial carrier for the purpose of completing the shipment, is but
reasonable. In
Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish
Mill. Co., 241 U. S. 190, it
was held that a stipulation of this kind was complied with when the
notice in writing was given by telegram within the time named in
the bill of lading.
It is not difficult for the consignee to comply with a
requirement of this kind, and give notice in writing to the agent
of the delivering carrier. Such notice puts in permanent form the
evidence of an intention to claim damages, and will serve to call
the attention of the carrier to the condition of the freight, and
enable it to make such investigation as the facts of the case
require while there is opportunity so to do.
In this case, no attempt was made to give such notice in writing
to the agent of the delivering carrier. The record shows the
delivering carrier had a freight agent at the place of delivery in
charge of the docks upon which the peaches were delivered, and he
testifies without contradiction that no such notice was given to
him; that he was acquainted with Adam Miller, the consignee, a
commission merchant in New York City, and that he never heard of
any claim for damages until after the beginning of the present
suit. The fact that the peaches were greatly depreciated was known
to the consignee very shortly after arrival, and within sufficient
time to have enabled him to give notice in writing within the time
fixed of his intention to claim damages.
It is true that the record contains testimony tending to show
that it would take more than thirty-six hours to separate the good
peaches from the bad, and to recrate and sell the good ones. But
the bill of lading in this case only requires that "claims for
damages must be
reported
Page 243 U. S. 606
by the consignee, in writing, to the delivering line" within the
time named. This bill of lading contained no stipulation requiring
a specific claim to be filed within thirty-six hours fixing the
amount of damages to be claimed. It was entirely consistent with
this requirement, on discovery of the bad condition of the peaches,
to have given notice within the time stipulated of the intention to
make a claim for damages, although the exact amount of the claim
might not have been ascertained. This would have given an
opportunity for the delivering carrier to make the examination
which it was the principal purpose of the stipulation to afford.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall, supra; St. Louis &c. R.
Co. v. Keller, 90 Ark. 308, 313. As was said in the
Keller case:
"The contract of shipment in this case specifically provided
that, before a recovery could be had, a notice in writing must be
given of loss or damage within thirty hours after the arrival of
the peaches at destination and their delivery; that is to say, a
notice of the intention to claim damages must be so given. And. in
this case. such notice was not given."
Compliance with the requirement of the bill of lading in this
respect would leave a right of recovery within the period named by
the Statute of Limitations if the shipper has a good cause of
action.
Pennsylvania Co. v. Shearer, 75 Ohio St. 254,
supra.
We find nothing unreasonable in the stipulation concerning
notice, and there was no attempt made to comply with it. We
therefore think the Supreme Court of Arkansas erred in holding that
verbal notice to the dockmaster of the condition of the peaches was
a compliance with the terms of the contract.
We may note that this case arose before the passage of the Act
of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1196, regulating, among other things,
this feature of a bill of lading issued under the Carmack
Amendment.
On cross-writ of error, No. 796, a reversal is sought of
Page 243 U. S. 607
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas as to the five
cars where the damaged condition of the peaches was shown to be
known to the longshoremen. This cross-writ involves the liability
of the carrier under the bill of lading, and it is assigned for
error that the stipulation in question violates the act of Congress
known as the Hepburn Act and the Carmack Amendment, and there are
other reasons assigned for the alleged invalidity of the
stipulation in the bill of lading. This Court has jurisdiction upon
the cross-writ. As to these cars, we think the conclusion reached
by the Supreme Court of Arkansas was a correct one, and upon the
cross-writ of error the judgment is affirmed. As to No. 275, the
writ sued out by the railroad company, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this
Court.
*
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v.
Faulkner, 111 Ark. 430;
Gamble-Robinson Commission Co. v.
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 262 Ill. 400;
Johnson Grain Co. v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 177 Mo.App. 194;
Clingan v.
C.C.C. & St.L. Ry. Co., 184 Ill.App. 202;
Kansas City
& Memphis Ry. Co. v. Oakley, 115 Ark. 20;
Mitchell v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 15 Ga.App. 797, 84 S.E. 227;
Bailey v. Missouri P. R. Co. 184 Mo.App. 457, 171 S.W. 44;
Spada v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N.J.L. 187;
St. Louis
& S.F. Ry. Co. v. Bilby, 35 Okl. 589;
M., K. & T.
Ry. Co. v. Hailey, 156 S.W. 1119;
American Silver Mfg. Co.
v. Wabash R. Co., 174 Mo.App. 184;
Wabash R. Co. v.
Priddy, 179 Ind. 483;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Thomasville Live Stock Co., 13 Ga.App. 102;
Ford v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 123 Minn. 87;
Joseph v.
C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 175 Mo.App. 18;
Barstow v. New
York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 143 N.Y.. 983;
M., K. & T.
Ry. Co. v. Walston, 37 Okl. 517;
St. Louis & San
Francisco R. Co. v. Zickafoose, 39 Okl. 302;
Texas &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Langbehn, 158 S.W. 244;
Cincinnati, N.
O. & T. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 153 Ky. 730.