Petitions for writs of certiorari are at the risk of the parties
making them, and whenever in the progress of the cause facts
develop which, if disclosed on the application, would have induced
a refusal, the court may, upon motion by a party or
ex mero
motu dismiss the writ. Such petitions should be carefully
prepared, contain appropriate references to the record, and present
with studied accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever is essential
to ready and adequate understanding of points requiring the court's
attention.
When the real situation is not set forth by the petition, a duty
rests on opposing counsel to reveal it in their reply.
Writ of certiorari to review 215 F. 859 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 242 U. S. 431
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The writ of certiorari was improvidently granted, and must be
dismissed. We should have denied the petition therefor if the facts
essential to an adequate appreciation of the situation had then
been brought to our attention. Petitions of this character are at
the risk of the party making them, and whenever, in the progress of
the cause, facts develop which, if disclosed on the application,
would have induced a refusal, the Court may, upon motion by a party
or
ex mero motu, dismiss the writ.
United States v.
Rimer, 220 U. S. 547;
State v. Water Commissioners, 30 N.J.L. 247.
In February, 1912, the Yang-Tsze Insurance Association, Limited,
filed its libel in the district court at New York against Furness,
Withy & Company, Limited, owner of the
Pomaron, to
recover damages consequent upon the sinking of the
Alleghany. A judgment for libellant, rendered June 13,
1913, was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals in June, 1914,
and on October 5, 1914, the
Pomaron's owner instituted a
proceeding in the same district court for limitation of liability,
and the steps customary in such causes were regularly taken. April
12, 1915, the petitioner presented an original application here for
a writ of certiorari to bring up the judgment of the circuit court
of appeals in the damage cause, and this was denied April 19th.
Page 242 U. S. 432
It now appears that, on April 22, 1915, a final decree
containing the following recitals was entered by the district court
in the limitation proceedings:
"Whereas the petitioner and all the claimants herein have
compromised and settled the issues between them, and in
consideration of the said compromise and settlement it has been
agreed between the petitioner and all the claimants: [The terms
follow.] Whereas, in consideration of the said compromise and
settlement, the several claimants herein by agreement have fixed
and adjusted the amounts of their several losses consequent on the
said collision at the following sums, to-wit: [The amounts are
specified.] Now on the subjoined admissions of correctness of the
foregoing recitals and the subjoined consents and waivers of
settlement in respect of the entry of this decree, made by the
proctors for all claimants herein . . . , it is ordered, adjudged,
and decreed,"
etc.
The following, signed by all the proctors, is subjoined to the
decree:
"The undersigned proctors, for all the parties herein, hereby
admit the truth of the recitals contained in the foregoing decree
and consent to the entry thereof, without further notice."
Petitioner's second application for certiorari, which was
presented June 15, 1915, and granted, contains these
statements:
"On May 10, 1915, as your petitioner is informed, this Court
granted a writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upon the petition of Olaf Lie, master of the
Norwegian steamship
Selja, in a suit between said Olaf
Lie, master, etc., and the San Francisco & Portland Steamship
Company, etc. . . . Your petitioner now renews its application for
certiorari for the reason that the questions presented by its
petition are identical with those presented by the petition of Olaf
Lie. The principal question is whether, under this Court's decision
in
The
Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125, a
Page 242 U. S. 433
privileged vessel, which, before a collision with a burdened
vessel, ported her helm in violation (
prima facie, at
least) of Article 21 of the International Regulations, may be held
responsible for the collision. . . ."
"Subsequent to the decision of the circuit court of appeals,
your petitioner instituted proceedings for limitation of liability
which, after the denial by this Court of the original petition,
were prosecuted to a decree under which payments were made to the
respondents by the clerk of the district court. As these payments
were made under compulsion, they would be recoverable by your
petitioner in the event that this Court should reverse the decision
of the circuit court of appeals."
In their memorandum opposing the second petition for certiorari,
counsel for the Insurance Association said: "The case is settled
and closed." And, after referring to steps taken in the limitation
proceeding and quoting from the decree therein dated April 22,
1915, they added:
"All the claimants have been paid the respective proportions of
the fund ascertained to be due them, and have executed receipts of
discharge in the terms provided by the decree. The case is
therefore finally closed and settled as between all the parties,
and such settlements have been made without any reservation of
rights on the part of the petitioner."
We were not advised by petition of June 15, 1915, or memorandum
opposing it, that the final decree in the limitation proceedings
was based upon an express compromise agreement; otherwise, the writ
would not have been allowed. At the hearing, counsel expressed
different views concerning the ultimate effect of that decree and
the reasons for its form, and they made it quite plain that there
was no purpose to mislead us. Nevertheless, in the circumstances,
we think it was incumbent upon counsel for both sides to see that
the petition and reply thereto disclosed the real situation. The
oversight has resulted
Page 242 U. S. 434
in unfortunate delay and needless consumption of time.
During the last term, one hundred fifty-four petitions for
certiorari were presented and acted upon. Because of recent
legislation -- Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726 --
their number hereafter may greatly increase. Such petitions go
first to every member of the Court for examination, and are then
separately considered in conference. This duty must be promptly
discharged. We are not aided by oral arguments, and necessarily
rely in an especial way upon petitions, replies, and supporting
briefs. Unless these are carefully prepared, contain appropriate
references to the record, and present with studied accuracy,
brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to ready and adequate
understanding of points requiring our attention, the rights of
interested parties may be prejudiced, and the Court will be impeded
in its efforts properly to dispose of the causes which constantly
crowd its docket.
Dismissed.