Under §§ 8, 9 and 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, all
damages properly attributable to the exaction of excessive rates by
carriers in interstate commerce may be awarded in a proceeding
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and, when damages
because of such rates have been so awarded, and satisfied, further
damages resulting from the same cause may not be recovered through
independent proceedings in court.
161 Ky. 212 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 242 U. S. 289
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit brought by the defendant in error in 1911 against
the railroad company to recover for injury to business and other
damages alleged to have been caused by the railroad's acts. The
most important feature at this stage is that the railroad
maintained and collected a higher rate for cross-ties than it did
for lumber when they were carried between states, although the
State Commission required the same rate upon both for carriage
within the state, and although, as the railroad knew, the
Interstate Commerce Commission repeatedly had decided that the
rates for cross-ties and lumber should be the same. It is alleged
that these and the other acts complained of were done for the
purpose of getting rid of the plaintiff as a competitive buyer,
and, in that sense, maliciously. The plaintiff tried to meet the
higher rate by directing delivery within the state of ties intended
to go beyond, which attempt the defendant encountered by refusal to
carry them except on its interstate tariff, and hampered the
plaintiff by declining to let its cars leave its road, by
deliveries at points requiring a haul by wagon, and so forth, and,
in short, it may be assumed that the railroad did other acts to
further the alleged end not necessary to be stated here.
Shortly before bringing this suit, the plaintiff complained to
the Interstate Commerce Commission in respect of charges collected
upon ninety-one carloads of ties, and in 1912 obtained an order
that the railroad pay to it $6,198 as reparation for unreasonable
rates, and establish a rate for ties not to exceed its
contemporaneous one for lumber of the same kind of wood. This order
was pleaded by an amendment to the petition, and it appeared at the
trial that the sum awarded had been paid. As the damage alleged was
attributed mainly to the publication and exaction of excessive
charges, the defendant insisted at
Page 242 U. S. 290
the trial and before the court of appeals upon its rights under
the Act to Regulate Commerce, and those rights were passed upon by
the court, so that there is no doubt of the jurisdiction here,
although some questions were raised that we think it unnecessary to
discuss.
The defendant contended and asked for a ruling that in this
action no damages could be allowed
"on account of defendant's having charged to and collected from
plaintiff unreasonable rates of freight for the carriage of
interstate shipments of cross-ties,"
and other rulings to similar effect. It also asked an
instruction that, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, it was
required to collect the rates fixed by its tariff on file and in
effect. These requests were refused, and the jury were told that,
if they believed that the rates found by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to be unreasonable were willfully and maliciously
maintained with intent to injure the plaintiff's business, and that
the defendant knew them to be unreasonable, and that, by its acts,
it tied up a part of the plaintiff's capital, and so damaged the
plaintiff's business, then upon this, as well as on several other
possible findings stated, they would find for the plaintiff. The
jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for certain itemized
expenses and for $50,000 damage to plaintiff's business and credit,
as mentioned in the above instruction. Judgment on the verdict was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 161 Ky. 212.
The Court of Appeals decided that the Act to Regulate Commerce
committed to the Interstate Commerce Commission only the granting
of special relief against the making of an overcharge, and that the
satisfaction of the Commission's award still left open an action in
the state courts to recover what are termed general damages -- such
as are supposed to have been recovered in this case. In this we are
of opinion that the court was wrong.
By § 8, a common carrier violating the commands of the act is
made liable to the person injured thereby "for the
Page 242 U. S. 291
full amount of damages sustained in consequence" of the
violation. By § 9, any person so injured may make complaint to the
Commission or may sue in a court of the United States to recover
the damages for which the carrier is liable under the act, but must
elect in each case which of the two methods of procedure he will
adopt. The rule of damages in one hardly can be different from that
proper for the other. An award directing the carrier to pay to the
complainant the sum to which he is entitled is provided for by §
16. By the same section, if the carrier does not comply in due time
with the order, the complainant may sue in a state court, which
implies that, if the order has been complied with and the money
paid, no suit can be maintained. It is to be noticed, further, that
reparation before answer is contemplated as possible by § 13, and
in that case the carrier shall be relieved of liability to the
complainant, though only, of course, for the particular violation
of law. The decisions say that whatever the damages were, they
could be recovered (
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal
Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184,
230 U. S.
202-203;
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
236 U. S. 412,
236 U. S.
429), and that the statute determines the extent of
damages (
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Bros. Coal Mining
Co., 238 U. S. 456,
238 U. S.
472). We are of opinion that all damage that properly
can be attributed to an overcharge, whether it be the keeping of
the plaintiff out of its money, dwelt upon by the trial court, or
the damage to its business following as a remoter result of the
same cause, must be taken to have been considered in the award of
the Commission and compensated when that award was paid.
If, at a new trial, the plaintiff can prove that the defendant
unjustifiably refused cars or caused it other damage not
attributable to the overcharge of freight, our decision does not
prevent a recovery, but it is evident that the present judgment
embraces elements that cannot be allowed.
Judgment reversed.