Legislation requiring the prompt furnishing of cars by carriers
and the prompt loading of same by shippers and prescribing damages
and penalties for failure on the part of either is properly within
the police power of the state; in that respect, such legislation
differs from that which simply imposes penalties on the carrier for
failure to pay a specified class of debts.
Gulf, Col. &
S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150,
distinguished.
A police regulation is, the same as any other statute of the
state, subject to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Page 238 U. S. 57
That guarantee, while not preventing proper classification, does
entitle all persons and corporation within the jurisdiction of the
state to the protection of equal law, including police
regulations.
A state statute which imposes reciprocal burdens on both carrier
and shipper, but which provides that, in the case of delinquency on
the part of the carrier, the shipper may recover an attorney fee,
but, in the case of delinquency on the part of the shipper, does
not provide that the carrier may recover an attorney fee, denies
the carrier the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Such a classification is not a reasonable one, and there is no
ground on which a special burden should be imposed on one class of
litigants and not on another class identically situated.
89 Kan. 114 reversed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the reciprocal
demurrage law of Kansas of 1905 under the equal protection
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, are stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal question involved in this case is concisely stated
in the opening paragraph of the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Kansas (89 Kan. 114), whose judgment we have under review:
"Chapter 345 of the Laws of 1905, as amended by Chapter 275 of
the Laws of 1907 [Gen.Stat. 1909, ยงยง 7201
et seq.],
concerns the furnishing of cars by railway companies to shippers of
freight. When cars applied for under this statute are not duly
furnished, the railway company is liable to the shipper for all
actual damages suffered, for a penalty of five dollars per day for
each car not supplied, and for a
Page 238 U. S. 58
reasonable attorney fee. Shippers who fail to use cars placed at
their disposal are subject to a penalty for their detention, but
are not liable for attorney fees. The plaintiff [Vosburg] recovered
a judgment against the defendant for a violation of this statute,
including an attorney fee, and the defendant appeals on the ground
that the provision relating to attorney fees denies it the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the federal Constitution."
Upon a review of certain decisions of this Court,
viz.,
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.
S. 150;
Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad v.
Matthews, 174 U. S. 96;
Fidelity Mutual Life Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U.
S. 308, and
Farmers' &c. Ins. Co. v.
Dobney, 189 U. S. 301, the
state court held (p. 130) that, since the act in question is a
police regulation prescribing duties properly enforceable by
penalties in the form of
per diem forfeits and attorney
fees recoverable in suitable actions, and because of the control of
railroad companies over their cars, their capacity to disturb and
obstruct trade, and the helplessness of shippers when cars are
carelessly or arbitrarily withheld, railroad companies might
properly be placed in a class by themselves for the purpose of
securing sufficient car service, and that the equal protection of
the law required no more than that all railway companies should be
penalized alike. The court, in conclusion, said:
"It is true that shippers may offend somewhat by failing to make
expeditious use of cars when furnished them. Whether or not they
too shall be penalized, and if so to what extent, is a fit subject
for legislative consideration. But the railroad companies cannot
complain if the legislature chooses to exempt shippers from any
punishment, or chooses to prescribe some penalty suitable to the
nature of their delinquency, but different from that imposed upon
the companies themselves."
The enactment in question is commonly called the "reciprocal" or
"mutual" demurrage law. (82 Kan. 260,
Page 238 U. S. 59
85 Kan. 282.) It provides that a railway company failing to
furnish cars upon proper application shall pay, to the party
applying,
"$5 per day for each car failed to be furnished as exemplary
damages, . . . and all actual damages that such applicant may
sustain for each car failed to be furnished, together with
reasonable attorney fees."
At the same time, it requires the applicant to load the cars
within forty-eight hours after they are placed,
"and upon failure to do so he shall pay to the company the sum
of $5 per day for each car not used, while held subject to the
applicant's order. . . . And if the said applicant shall not use
such cars so ordered by him, and shall so notify the said company
or its agent, he shall forfeit and pay to the said railroad
company, in addition to the penalty herein prescribed, the actual
damages that such company may sustain by the said failure of the
said applicant to use said cars."
We agree that this legislation is properly to be regarded as a
police regulation, and in that respect differs from the act that
was under consideration in the
Ellis case,
supra,
which simply imposed a penalty upon railroad corporations for a
failure to pay certain debts. But we cannot at all agree that a
police regulation is not, like any other law, subject to the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing to that
effect was held or intimated in any of the cases referred to. The
constitutional guaranty entitles all persons and corporations
within the jurisdiction of the state to the protection of equal
laws, in this as in other departments of legislation. It does not
prevent classification, but does require that classification shall
be reasonable, not arbitrary, and that it shall rest upon
distinctions having a fair and substantial relation to the object
sought to be accomplished by the legislation. Thus, in
Atchison, Topeka &c. R. Co. v. Matthews, supra, the
responsibility imposed upon railroad companies for attorneys' fees
in addition to damages was sustained
Page 238 U. S. 60
because designed to enforce care on the part of those companies
to prevent the communication of fire and the destruction of
property along their lines -- a duty imposed upon them, and not
upon the owners of the property. We need not review the decisions,
the subject being so familiar that extended discussion is
unnecessary.
The precise question now presented is: what is there in the
object of the legislation under consideration that furnishes a
ground of distinction between railway company and shipper upon
which it is reasonable to say that the latter should be allowed to
recover attorney fees when it successfully sues the former, and not
vice versa? The statute recognizes that the duty of the
company to furnish cars, and the duty of the shipper to promptly
use them, are reciprocal, and for a breach of either duty the
delinquent is penalized in favor of the other party in precisely
the same amount -- five dollars per day per car. The shipper may
also recover his actual damages, if any. The company recovers
actual damages, in addition to the penalty, only under special
circumstances. No complaint is now made that this is a denial of
equal protection, and we lay no stress upon it. But the statute
clearly recognizes that either party may be obliged to sue the
other in order to recover the penalty, or damages, or both. No
reason is suggested, and none occurs to us, why the railroad
company, when plaintiff in such an action, will not require the
services of an attorney as well as the shipper when he is
plaintiff. There is nothing in the nature of the cause of action
that renders the burden of preparation more onerous, as a rule, to
the shipper when he is plaintiff than to the company when it is
plaintiff. There is nothing discernible, therefore, in the purposes
of the legislation -- which are to require the prompt furnishing of
cars for use, and the prompt use of cars when furnished, and to
redress a disregard of either of these requirements by suit when
necessary -- to give ground for a distinction granting
attorney's
Page 238 U. S. 61
fees to the shipper when he sues, and denying attorney's fees to
the company when it sues. In short, it is erroneous to test the
classification by its supposed relation to the object of securing
adequate car service, because it really relates rather to the
object of securing adequate prosecution in court of actions
respecting car service.
In
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade,
233 U. S. 642,
233 U. S. 650,
we had under consideration a Texas statute respecting claims of
certain classes against persons or corporations doing business in
the state, which provided that, if any such claim were not paid
within a limited time after presentation, suit might be instituted
thereon, and if plaintiff obtained judgment for the full amount of
the claim as presented, he should recover the amount claimed and
costs, and in addition a reasonable amount as attorney's fees. In
sustaining the act, we said (p.
233 U. S.
650):
"If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact
that attorney's fees are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and
not to successful defendants, does not render the statute repugnant
to the 'equal protection' clause. This is not a discrimination
between different citizens or classes of citizens, since members of
any and every class may either sue or be sued.
Actor and
reus differ in their respective attitudes towards a
litigation; the former has the burden of seeking the proper
jurisdiction and bringing the proper parties before it, as well as
the burden of proof upon the main issues, and these differences may
be made the basis of distinctive treatment respecting the allowance
of an attorney's fee as a part of the costs."
(Citing
Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad v. Matthews,
supra, and
Farmers' &c. Ins. Co. v. Dobney,
189 U. S.
301.)
The present case is essentially different, for in the Kansas
statute, the distinction is not rested upon the fact that the
plaintiff, whether shipper or company, has a special burden in the
litigation that may reasonably be compensated
Page 238 U. S. 62
by allowance of attorney's fees; on the contrary, the act, while
recognizing the existence of such burden, allows compensation for
it in favor of one class of litigants, but does not allow like
compensation to the other class when subjected to the like burden.
This, in our opinion, is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.