Newman v. Lynchburg Investment Corp.,
Annotate this Case
236 U.S. 692 (1915)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Newman v. Lynchburg Investment Corp., 236 U.S. 692 (1915)
Newman v. Lynchburg Investment Corporation
Argued March 3, 1915
Decided March 22, 1915
236 U.S. 692
The fact that a statute requiring notice has been construed in a number of cases in the jurisdiction as meaning the method used in the case is an important element to be considered by the courts in construing it.
The notice required by § 491c of subd. 1 of c. 15 of the Code of the District of Columbia requiring public notice of not less than twenty days to be given of the institution of a condemnation proceeding construed as meaning that notice shall be given twenty days before the time set, and not that it shall be given on twenty distinct days before that time.
This Court assumes that a special act directing condemnation proceedings adjudicates the benefits as a whole and leaves open all questions as to any particular lots. It is error for the trial court not to instruct that the burden is on the District to establish by preponderance of evidence the extent of special benefits accruing to a particular parcel.
The jury in a condemnation proceeding should be instructed as to their duty in regard to considering dedications of land taken.
Assessments for benefits cannot be separated, and error in charging in that respect cannot be corrected by reversal of the judgment in part.
Although the intermediate appellate court may have erred in basing its reversal of the lower court on the matter of most general importance in a case in this Court on certiorari, if its judgment was correct on other points, it should be affirmed.
40 App.D.C. 130 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.