As a general principle, the test of admiralty jurisdiction in
tort in this country is locality.
Admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit
in personam by an
employee of a stevedore against the employer to recover for
injuries sustained through the negligence of the latter while
engaged in loading a vessel lying at the dock in navigable
waters.
The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of
obvious principle or of very accurate history,
The
Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, and
quaere whether the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a
case where the tort is not of a maritime nature although committed
on navigable waters.
A tort committed on a vessel in connection with a service
thereto may be maritime even if there is no fault on the part of,
or injury to, the ship itself.
Page 234 U. S. 53
Stevedores are now as clearly identified with maritime affairs
as are the mariners themselves.
Whether the employer failed to provide a safe place to work is a
question properly determinable by the circuit court of appeals in
last resort, and this Court will not disturb such a finding if
concurred in by both courts below and justified by the record.
193 F. 1019, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States courts over suits for personal injuries sustained on
a vessel in port while being loaded by a stevedore, and questions
of negligence of the stevedore, are stated in the opinion.
Page 234 U. S. 56
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel to recover for personal injuries sustained by
the libellant as a stevedore in the employ of the Atlantic
Transport Company (the petitioner), which was engaged in loading
the
Pretoria, belonging to the Hamburg-American Steam
Packet Company, while lying in the port
Page 234 U. S. 57
of Baltimore. The libel was brought against both the owner of
the ship and the stevedore company. It was dismissed as to the
former, but a recovery against the latter was allowed by the
district court (190 F. 229) and sustained by the circuit court of
appeals (193 F. 1019). This writ of certiorari was granted.
The libellant was one of a gang engaged in loading and stowing
copper. He was working on the ship, under one of the hatches. The
covers of the hatch were in three sections, the division being made
by two movable iron beams placed athwart the ship. The coverings of
the middle section had been removed and placed on top of the fore
and after sections. On the dock, the copper was piled upon a rope
mat which was lifted by a winch, swung over the hatch, and lowered
into the hold. On one of its return trips, the mat caught under the
after cross beam, which was instantly jerked out of its support,
and, with the lengthwise timbers resting on it and the hatch
covers, fell into the hold, severely injuring the libellant. The
district court (referring to the petitioner, the Atlantic Transport
Company, as the stevedore) said:
"There would have been no accident had the entire hatch been
uncovered. To uncover a hatch takes time and labor. If bad weather
comes, it must be covered. Unnecessary uncovering is to be avoided.
It is easy to make a partially covered hatch absolutely safe. The
cross beams of the hatch have holes in their ends. There are
corresponding holes in the hatch combings. Pins can be put through
these holes. It takes about five minutes to put them in. When in
place, an accident such as gave rise to this case cannot happen.
The ship's carpenter of the
Pretoria keeps the pins when
not in use. Accidents often happen because an opened hatch has been
left unguarded, or because the hatch coverings fall into the hold.
When they do, there is usually a dispute as to whether the ship or
the stevedore is to blame. In the case at bar, the ship and the
stevedore were represented
Page 234 U. S. 58
by the same proctors and by the same advocates. The stevedore
acquits the ship. . . . The stevedore proved that, when the ship
came into port, it took complete charge of the hatches. It
uncovered so much of them as it saw fit. If the pins were in and it
wanted them out, it took them out. It laid them on the deck. The
ship's carpenter gathered them up. If the pins were out and it
wanted them in, it told the ship's carpenter. He put them in."
For its failure to use due diligence in seeing that the
libellant had a safe place in which to work, the district court
held the Transport Company liable.
The principal question is whether the district court had
jurisdiction -- that is, whether the cause was one "of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." Const. Art. III, § 2; Rev.Stat. § 563;
Judicial Code, § 24; Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. XX, § 9, 1 Stat. 73,
77. As the injury occurred on board a ship while it was lying in
navigable waters, there is no doubt that the requirement as to
locality was fully met. The petitioner insists, however, that
locality is not the sole test, and that it must appear that the
tort was otherwise of a maritime nature. And this was the view
taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
affirming a decree dismissing a libel for want of jurisdiction in a
similar case.
Campbell v. Hackfeld & Co., 125 F.
696.
At an early period, the court of admiralty in England exercised
jurisdiction "over torts, injuries, and offenses at ports within
the ebb and flow of the tide, on the British seas and on the high
seas."
De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 406, 464, 474. While
its authority was denied when the injurious action took place
infra corpus comitatus, it was not disputed that
jurisdiction existed when the wrong was done "upon the sea, or any
part thereof which is not within any county." (4 Inst. 134.) The
jurisdiction in admiralty of the courts of the United States is not
controlled by the restrictive statutes and judicial
prohibitions
Page 234 U. S. 59
of England (
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441,
46 U. S.
457-458;
Insurance Co. v.
Dunham, 11 Wall. 1,
78 U. S. 24;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 576),
and the limitation with respect to torts committed within the body
of any county is not applicable here.
Waring v. Clarke, supra;
61 U. S. The
Magnolia, 20 How. 296. "In regard to torts," said Mr. Justice
Story in
Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 1, 9,
"I have always understood, that the jurisdiction of the
admiralty is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act.
The admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately claimed
to have, any jurisdiction over torts except such as are maritime
torts -- that is, such as are committed on the high seas or on
waters within the ebb and flow of the tide."
This rule -- that locality furnishes the test -- has been
frequently reiterated, with the substitution (under the doctrine of
The Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443) of navigable waters for
tidewaters. Thus, in the case of
The
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. Co. v. The Philadelphia
& Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Co., 23 How.
209,
64 U. S. 215,
the Court said:
"The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in matters of contract
depends upon the nature and character of the contract, but in torts
it depends entirely on locality."
Again, in the case of
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20, where jurisdiction was denied upon the ground that the
substance and consummation of the wrong took place on land, and not
on navigable water, the Court said:
"The jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not
depend upon the wrong having been committed on board the vessel,
but upon its having been committed upon the high seas or other
navigable waters. A trespass on board of a vessel, or by the vessel
itself, above tidewater, when that was the limit of jurisdiction,
was not of admiralty cognizance. The reason was that it was not
committed within the locality that gave the jurisdiction. The
vessel itself was unimportant. . . . The jurisdiction of the
admiralty does not depend upon the
Page 234 U. S. 60
fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the
locality -- the high seas or navigable waters where it occurred.
Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a
vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance."
See Manro v.
Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473;
Waring
v. Clarke, 5 How. 459;
The
Lexington, 6 How. 344,
47 U. S. 394;
The Commerce,
1 Black 574,
66 U. S. 579;
The Rock Island
Bridge, 6 Wall. 213,
73 U. S. 215;
The Belfast, 7
Wall. 624,
74 U. S. 637;
Ex Parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68,
95 U. S. 72;
Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626,
105 U. S. 630;
Panama Railroad v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U.
S. 280,
166 U. S. 285;
The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361,
195 U. S.
365-367;
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v.
Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U. S. 316,
208 U. S. 319;
Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191;
The Neil Cochran, Fed.Cas. No. 10,087;
The
Ottawa, Fed.Cas. No. 10,616;
Holmes v. O. & C.
Ry., 5 F. 75, 77;
The Arkansas, 17 F. 383, 384;
The F. & P.M. No. 2, 33 F. 511, 513;
The H. S.
Pickands, 42 F. 239, 240;
Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill
Co., 69 F. 646, 647;
The Strabo, 90 F. 110; 2 Story
on the Constitution, § 1666. It is also apparent that Congress, in
providing for the punishment of crimes committed upon navigable
waters, has regarded the locality of the offense as the basis for
the exercise of its authority. Act of April 30, 1790, c. IX, § 8, 1
Stat. 112, 113; Act of March 3, 1825, c. LXV, 4 Stat. 115;
Rev.Stat. §§ 5339, 5345, 5346; Criminal Code, § 272, 35 Stat. 1088,
1142;
United States v.
Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336,
16 U. S. 387;
United States v.
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76;
United States v.
Rodgers, 150 U. S. 249,
150 U. S.
260-261,
150 U. S. 285;
Wynne v. United States, 217 U. S. 234,
217 U. S.
240.
But the petitioners urge that the general statements which we
have cited with respect to the exclusiveness of the test of
locality in cases of tort are not controlling, and that, in every
adjudicated case in this country in which the jurisdiction of
admiralty with respect to torts has been sustained, the tort, apart
from the mere place of its occurrence,
Page 234 U. S. 61
has been of a maritime character. It is asked whether admiralty
would entertain a suit for libel or slander circulated on board a
ship by one passenger against another.
See Benedict,
Admiralty, 4th ed. § 231. The appropriate basis, it is said, of all
admiralty jurisdiction, whether, in contract or in tort, is the
maritime nature of the transaction or event; it is suggested that
the wider authority exercised in very early times in England may be
due to its antedating the recognition by the common law courts of
transitory causes of action, and thus arose by virtue of
necessity.
We do not find it necessary to enter upon this broad inquiry. As
this Court has observed, the precise scope of admiralty
jurisdiction is not a matter of "obvious principle or of very
accurate history."
The Blackheath, supra. And we are not
now concerned with the extreme cases which are hypothetically
presented. Even if it be assumed that the requirement as to
locality in tort cases, while indispensable, is not necessarily
exclusive, still, in the present case, the wrong which was the
subject of the suit was, we think, of a maritime nature, and hence
the district court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction. The
petitioner contends that a maritime tort is one arising out of an
injury to a ship, caused by the negligence of a ship or a person,
or out of an injury to a person by the negligence of a ship; that
there must either be an injury to a ship or an injury by the
negligence of the ship, including therein the negligence of her
owners or mariners, and that, as there was no negligence of the
ship in the present case, the tort was not maritime. This view we
deem to be altogether too narrow.
The libellant was injured on a ship lying in navigable waters
and while he was engaged in the performance of a maritime service.
We entertain no doubt that the service in loading and stowing a
ship's cargo is of this character. Upon its proper performance
depend in large measure the
Page 234 U. S. 62
safe carrying of the cargo and the safety of the ship itself,
and it is a service absolutely necessary to enable the ship to
discharge its maritime duty. Formerly the work was done by the
ship's crew, but, owing to the exigencies of increasing commerce
and the demand for rapidity and special skill, it has become a
specialized service devolving upon a class "as clearly identified
with maritime affairs as are the mariners."
See The George T.
Kemp, 2 Lowell 477, 482;
The Circassian, 1 Ben. 209;
The Windermere, 2 F. 722;
The Canada, 7 F. 119;
The Hattie M. Bain, 20 F. 389;
The Gilbert Knapp,
37 F. 209;
The Main, 51 F. 954;
Norwegian Steamship
Co. v. Washington, 57 F. 224;
The Seguranca, 58 F.
908;
The Allerton, 93 F. 219; Hughes, Adm., 113; Benedict,
Adm., 4th ed. § 207. The libellant was injured because the care
required by the law was not taken to protect him while he was doing
this work. We take it to be clear that the district court, sitting
in admiralty, was entitled to declare the applicable law in such a
case, as it was within the power of Congress to modify that law.
Waring v. Clarke, supra; The Lottawanna, supra. The fact
that the ship was not found to be liable for the neglect is not
controlling. If more is required than the locality of the wrong in
order to give the court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to
maritime service, to navigation, and to commerce on navigable
waters was quite sufficient. Even with respect to contracts where
subject matter is the exclusive test, it has been said that the
true criterion is "whether it was a maritime contract, having
reference to maritime service or maritime transactions."
Insurance Company v.
Dunham, 11 Wall. 1,
78 U. S. 26. The
Constitution provides that the judicial power shall extend "to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," and the act of
Congress defines the jurisdiction of the district court, with
respect to civil causes, in terms of like scope. To hold that a
case of a tort committed on board a ship
Page 234 U. S. 63
in navigable waters by one who has undertaken a maritime service
against one engaged in the performance of that service is not
embraced within the constitutional grant and the jurisdictional act
would be to establish a limitation wholly without warrant.
The remaining question relates to the finding of negligence. It
is urged that the neglect was that of a fellow servant, and hence
that the petitioner was not liable. Both courts below, however,
concurred in the finding that the petitioner omitted to use proper
diligence to provide a safe place of work.
Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368,
149 U. S. 386.
As the question belongs to a class which, under the distribution of
judicial power, is determinable by the circuit court of appeals in
last resort, we shall not undertake to discuss it at length or to
restate the evidence.
Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King,
222 U. S. 222,
222 U. S. 224;
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 229 U.
S. 317,
229 U. S. 320;
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S.
42,
233 U. S. 50. It
is sufficient to say that we are satisfied, from an examination of
the record, that the ruling was justified.
Affirmed.