The repugnancy of the Safety Appliance Law to the Constitution
is not now open to controversy; it has been held constitutional.
Southern Railway Co. v. United States, ante, p.
222 U. S. 20.
Where the constitutional question is not advanced by the
defendant until the trial, it does not give jurisdiction of an
appeal to this Court from the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Macfadden v. United States, 213 U.
S. 288.
Where the cause of action is based on a statute of the United
States, there is an appeal to this Court from the judgment of the
circuit court of appeals.
Although there may be jurisdiction because the cause of action
rests on a statute of the United States, where none of the
contentions directly invokes the interpretation of the statute, but
merely the question whether, on the evidence, there was a right of
recovery, the case is of the character of case in which it was the
purpose of the Judiciary Act of 1891 to make the judgment of the
circuit court of appeals final, and this Court will only examine
the record to see if plain error has been committed, and if that is
not apparent, it will, as in this case, affirm the judgment.
169 F. 372 affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action to recover for personal injuries, begun in a
Page 222 U. S. 223
state court, was removed to a circuit court and there decided
for the plaintiff. To obtain a reversal of a judgment affirming,
the case is here upon an assumption that a constitutional question
is involved which gives jurisdiction. It is admitted that such
question -- that is, the repugnancy of the Safety Appliance Law to
the Constitution -- is now not open to controversy because of a
recent decision.
Southern Railway Co. v. United States,
ante, p.
222 U. S. 20. Yet,
as the case is here, other errors relied upon, it is urged, must be
decided. But even conceding that the constitutional question was
not wholly frivolous when first advanced, as it arose only at the
trial, it does not give jurisdiction.
Macfadden v. United
States, 213 U. S. 288. But
this is negligible, since, by the pleadings, the cause of action
was based on a statute of the United States -- the Safety Appliance
Law -- which gives jurisdiction.
Macfadden v. United States,
supra. The damage thus arose: after cutting out some cars from
an interstate freight train at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago,
the train could not be recoupled because of a broken knuckle on the
coupler of one of the cars. The plaintiff, a switchman, secured a
new knuckle, and, going between the cars to put it in place of the
broken one, was crushed by a backward movement of the train which
brought the uncoupled cars together. The movement was ordered by
the train conductor with the purpose of shoving the train back
several city blocks to where it was proposed to repair the
coupler.
Coming to consider the contentions, although they seemingly
involve many propositions, they all are reducible to the assertion
that the plaintiff was so clearly guilty of contributory
negligence, in one aspect or the other, that it was the duty of the
court to instruct a verdict for the defendant. Indeed, this is
expressly stated in the argument to be the result of all the
propositions except two, relating to an instruction given and to
one refused. But these
Page 222 U. S. 224
two instructions, when rightly considered, are of the same
character, as they also rest ultimately upon the contention that
the proof on particular subjects was such as to necessitate a
binding instruction for the railway company.
The following, therefore, as to all the contentions, is clearly
apparent: first, hat while they may in a general sense involve the
Safety Appliance Law, none of them directly invoked the
interpretation of that law; second, that while the contentions,
from an ultimate point of view, present a question of law -- that
is, was there any substantial evidence to go to the jury? -- in
their primary aspect, they call for an examination of the entire
evidence to determine whether it had any substantial tendency to
establish the right of the plaintiff to recover; third, that
although we have jurisdiction to review, because the cause of
action, as stated in the pleadings, rested upon the Safety
Appliance Law, the questions now presented, in a broad sense, are
of a character which ordinarily it was the purpose of the Judiciary
Act of 1891 to submit to the final jurisdiction of the circuit
court of appeals.
Under the conditions just stated, we do not think we are called
upon to scrutinize the whole record for the purpose of discovering
whether it may not be possible, by a minute analysis of the
evidence, to draw therefrom inferences which may possibly conflict
with the conclusion of the courts below as to the tendencies of the
proof. We are of this opinion because, in this and cases like it --
that is, in cases where the conditions are in all respects
identical with those here presented, we think our whole duty will
be performed by giving to the record such examination and
consideration as may be necessary to enable us to determine whether
plain error was committed by the court below in any of the
particulars complained of. In the discharge of such duty in this
case, in view of the full opinion of the circuit court of appeals,
and in the light of the adequate examination which we have made of
the
Page 222 U. S. 225
record, as we find nothing giving rise to a clear conviction on
our part that error has resulted from the action of the courts
below, it follows that the judgment of the circuit court of appeals
must be, and it is, affirmed.
Affirmed.