Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.
S. 642, followed to effect that the Texas Statute of
1909 allowing an attorney fee in certain cases for claims of less
than a specified amount is not unconstitutional under the due
process or equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A state police regulation designed to promote the payment of
small but well founded claims and to discourage litigation in
respect thereto, and which only incidentally includes claims
arising out of interstate commerce, does not constitute a direct
burden on interstate commerce, and is not, in the absence of
legislation by Congress on the subject, repugnant to the commerce
clause or otherwise in conflict with federal authority.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Mazursky, 216 U.
S. 122.
When Congress has exerted its paramount legislative authority
over a particular subject of interstate commerce, state laws upon
the same subject are superseded.
The mere creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the
grant to it of a measure of control over interstate commerce, does
not, in the absence of specific action by Congress or the
Commission, interfere with the police power of the states as to
matters otherwise within their respective jurisdictions and not
directly burdening interstate commerce, even though such commerce
may be incidentally affected.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid,
22 U. S.
424.
While the Carmack Amendment supersedes state legislation on the
subject of the carrier's liability for loss of interstate
shipments, it does not interfere with a state statute incidentally
affecting the remedy for enforcing that liability, such as a
moderate attorney fee in case of recoverable contested claims for
damages.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. 186,
distinguished.
The Texas Statute of 1909 allowing a reasonable attorney's fee
as a
Page 234 U. S. 413
part of the costs in suit on contested but proper claims of less
than $200 is not unconstitutional a applied to claim for loss on
interstate shipments, nor is it inconsistent with any of the
provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of
the State of Texas allowing an attorney's fee in certain actions
based on claims for small amounts against railway companies, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 234 U. S. 415
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, the plaintiff below (now defendant in error)
recovered a judgment for $3.50 damages for loss of certain freight
that was shipped from St. Louis, Missouri, consigned to plaintiff
at Como, Texas, and delivered by the initial carrier to defendant
for transportation to destination, the loss having occurred on
defendant's line in Texas. The judgment includes an attorney's fee
of $10, allowed by virtue of the local statute approved March 19,
1909, Laws, p. 93, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. 1911, Arts. 2178 and 2179,
which was under consideration in
Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, and
is set forth
verbatim in a marginal note to the opinion in
that case. The controversy turns upon the allowance of the
attorney's fee, the same federal questions having been raised in
the state court and in this Court that were raised in the
Cade case. So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, our opinion in that case renders further discussion
unnecessary. But since the claim of the present plaintiff was based
upon freight lost in interstate commerce, we must now pass upon the
question whether the allowance of an attorney's fee in such a case
pursuant to the Texas statute is repugnant to the commerce clause
of the federal Constitution, or the Act to Regulate Commerce and
amendments thereof.
By way of preface, we should repeat that the state court of last
resort has construed the act as relating only to the collection of
claims not exceeding $200 in amount; that, by its terms, it applies
to claims
"against any person or corporation doing business in this state,
for personal services rendered or for labor done, or for material
furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for any
claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed or injured
by such person or corporation, its agents or employees,"
and
Page 234 U. S. 416
that, in the
Cade case, we have held it to be a police
regulation designed to promote the prompt payment of small but well
founded claims, and to discourage unnecessary litigation in respect
to them, and have held it, in its general application, to be not
repugnant to either the "equal protection" or the "due process"
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such being the character of the statute, and its having a broad
sweep which only incidentally includes claims arising out of
interstate commerce, it follows that it cannot be held to
constitute a direct burden upon such commerce, and hence repugnant
to the commerce clause of the Constitution, or otherwise in
conflict with the federal authority, in the absence of legislation
by Congress covering the subject. To this extent, the case is
controlled by the decision in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122,
where it was held that a South Carolina statute which required
common carriers doing business in the state to settle claims for
loss or damage to property while in the possession of the carrier
within forty days, in case of shipments wholly within the state,
and within ninety days, in case of shipments from without the
state, and that failure to adjust and pay a claim within the
prescribed period should subject the carrier to a penalty of $50 in
case the full amount claimed was recovered, as the statute was
applied to a claim for loss or damage to interstate freight while
in the possession of the carrier within the state, was not an
unwarrantable interference with interstate commerce, in the absence
of legislation by Congress, but was rather a regulation in aid of
the performance by the carrier of its legal duty. The decision was
rested upon the authority and reasoning of
Sherlock v.
Alling, 93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S. 104;
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465,
124 U. S. 476;
Nashville &c. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S.
96;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James,
162 U. S. 650,
162 U. S. 660;
Chicago, Mil. & St.P. Ry. v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133,
169 U. S. 137;
Pennsylvania
Page 234 U. S. 417
R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477,
191 U. S. 491;
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U.
S. 612,
211 U. S. 623.
And see Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Milling Co.,
218 U. S. 406,
218 U. S. 416;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Crovo, 220 U.
S. 364;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352,
230 U. S. 402,
230 U. S.
408-410.
But the "Act to Regulate Commerce" (Act of February 4, 1887, 24
Stat. 379, c. 104) is now invoked, together with its amendments,
and especially that part of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, known
as the Carmack Amendment (34 Stat. 584, 595, c. 3591), and it
remains to be considered whether the Texas statute, as applied to
claims for loss or damage to interstate freight while in the
possession of the carrier in the State of Texas, is repugnant to
this federal legislation. It is, of course, settled that, when
Congress has exerted its paramount legislative authority over a
particular subject of interstate commerce, state laws upon the same
subject are superseded.
Northern Pacific Ry. v.
Washington, 222 U. S. 370,
222 U. S. 378;
Erie Railroad Co. v. New York, 233 U.
S. 671. But it is equally well settled that the mere
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the grant to it
of a measure of control over interstate commerce, does not of
itself, and in the absence of specific action by the Commission or
by Congress itself, interfere with the authority of the states to
establish regulations conducive to the welfare and convenience of
their citizens, even though interstate commerce be thereby
incidentally affected, so long as it be not directly burdened or
interfered with.
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Mills,
211 U. S. 612,
211 U. S. 623;
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.
S. 424,
222 U. S.
437.
In the
Larabee Mills case, it was held that the
railroad company, by engaging in the business of a common carrier,
had become subject to certain duties imposed upon it by general
law, including the obligation to treat all shippers alike; that the
enforcement of this duty and the regulation of matters pertaining
to it were within the authority
Page 234 U. S. 418
of the state, although interstate commerce was thereby
indirectly affected, and that, until specific action by Congress or
the Commission, the control of the state over such incidental
matters remained undisturbed. Hence, a decision by the Supreme
Court of Kansas awarding a mandamus to require the company to
restore the service of transferring cars between the lines of
another railroad and the Larabee Mills and Elevator, in aid of
interstate and intrastate shipments alike, was affirmed. This case
arose after the enactment of the Hepburn Act.
On the other hand, it was held in the
Reid case that,
since Congress had taken control of the subject of the making of
rates and charges, and by § 2 of the Hepburn Act had forbidden the
carrier to engage or participate in transportation unless the
rates, fares, and charges had been filed and published in
accordance with the provisions of the act, a state law requiring
railroad companies to receive freight for transportation whenever
tendered at a regular station, and to forward the same over the
route selected by the person offering the shipment, under a penalty
of fifty dollars a day, besides all damages incurred, was in
necessary conflict, since it required the carrier to do the very
things forbidden by the federal law.
So, in
Chicago, R.I. &c. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator
Co., 226 U. S. 426, it
was held that, since, by the Hepburn Act, Congress had legislated
concerning deliveries of cars in interstate commerce by carriers
subject to the act, specifically requiring the carrier to provide
and furnish "transportation" (cars being embraced within the
definition of the term) upon reasonable request, the authority of
the State of Minnesota to legislate upon the subject of the
delivery of cars when called for to be used in interstate traffic
was superseded.
And see Yazoo & Mississippi R. Co. v.
Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1.
These cases recognize the established rule that a state law
enacted under any of the reserved powers -- especially
Page 234 U. S. 419
if under the police power -- is not to be set aside as
inconsistent with an act of Congress, unless there is actual
repugnancy or unless Congress has at least manifested a purpose to
exercise its paramount authority over the subject. The rule rests
upon fundamental grounds that should not be disregarded. In
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137,
187 U. S. 148,
the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, said:
"It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or
by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the
states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that
result is clearly manifested. This Court has said, and the
principle has been often reaffirmed, that"
"in the application of this principle of supremacy of an act of
Congress in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a
reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and
positive, so that the two acts could not be reconciled or
consistently stand together."
"
Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How.
227,
63 U. S. 243."
In
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S. 533,
the Court said:
"When the question is whether a federal act overrides a state
law, the entire scheme of the statute must, of course, be
considered, and that which needs must be implied is of no less
force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of the act
cannot otherwise be accomplished -- if its operation within its
chosen field else must be frustrated and its provisions be refused
their natural effect -- the state law must yield to the regulation
of Congress within the sphere of its delegated power [citing
cases]. But the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of
its police power as to matters not covered by the federal
legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress
has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited
field. In other words, such intent is not to be implied unless the
act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the
law of the state. [Citing many cases.]"
With respect to the specific effect of the Carmack
Page 234 U. S. 420
Amendment (set forth in the margin
*), it has been
held, in a series of recent cases (
Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U. S. 491;
C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.
S. 513;
Chicago, St. P. &c. Ry. v. Latta,
226 U. S. 519;
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U.
S. 469;
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl,
227 U. S. 639;
Missouri, Kans. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman,
227 U. S. 657;
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U.
S. 490;
Great Northern Ry. v. O'Connor,
232 U. S. 508;
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S.
97) that the special regulations and policies of
particular states upon the subject of the carrier's liability for
loss or damage to interstate shipments, and the contracts of
carriers with respect thereto, have been superseded.
But the Texas statute now under consideration does not in any
wise either enlarge or limit the responsibility of the carrier for
the loss of property entrusted to it in transportation, and only
incidentally affects the remedy for enforcing that responsibility.
As pointed out in the
Cade
Page 234 U. S. 421
case,
supra, it imposes not a penalty, but a
compensatory allowance for the expense of employing an attorney,
applicable in cases where the carrier unreasonably delays payment
of a just demand and thereby renders a suit necessary. In fact and
effect, it merely authorizes a moderate increment of the
recoverable costs of suit in the large class of cases that are
within its sweep, among which are incidentally included claims for
freight lost or damaged in interstate commerce.
It is true that, in
Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside
Mills, 219 U. S. 186,
219 U. S. 208
(a case arising since the Hepburn Act), it was held that § 8 of the
Act of February 4, 1887, does not authorize the allowance of a
counsel or attorney's fee in an action for loss of property
entrusted to the carrier for purposes of transportation. But that
is far from holding that it is not permissible for a state, as a
part of its local procedure, to permit the allowance of a
reasonable attorney's fee, under proper restrictions. In claims of
this character, based upon the ordinary liability of the common
carrier, although regulated by the Commerce Act, the state courts
have full jurisdiction, and some differences respecting the
allowance of costs and the amount of the costs are inevitable as
being peculiar to the forum. And we think that where a state, as in
this instance, for reasons of internal policy, in order to offer a
reasonable incentive to the prompt settlement of small but well
founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless defenses,
establishes by a general statute otherwise unexceptionable the
policy of allowing recovery of a moderate attorney's fee as a part
of the costs in cases where, after specific claim made and a
reasonable time given for investigation of it, payment is refused,
and the claimant succeeds in establishing by suit his right to the
full amount demanded, the application of such statute to actions
for goods lost in interstate commerce is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Commerce Act and its amendments. The local
Page 234 U. S. 422
statute, as already pointed out, does not at all affect the
ground of recovery, or the measure of recovery; it deals only with
a question of costs, respecting which Congress has not spoken.
Until Congress does speak, the state may enforce it in such a case
as the present.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to
a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such
property may be delivered, or over whose line or lines such
property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation
shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company from the liability hereby imposed;
Provided, That
nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or
bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under
existing law."
"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover
from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on
whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained
the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to
pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any
receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof."