Where this court finds nothing giving rise to a clear conviction
that error has resulted from the action of the court below, it
should not reverse the judgment.
Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v.
King, 222 U. S. 215.
The contention of plaintiff in error that the court below
construed a statute adversely to his interest in certain respects
will not avail if it appear that, as a matter of fact, he was
accorded the benefit he claimed under such statute in those
respect, and the right of the other party were made dependent on
the questions involved.
Where the record show that there was evidence that the cars on
which the accident occurred and which were being transferred by a
switching engine were loaded with merchandise destined for a port,
to be there transshipped to destination in another state, and the
court instructs the jury that the plaintiff can only recover under
the Employers' Liability Act of 1908 in case it finds that he was
engaged in interstate commerce, this Court will not, in the absence
of clear conviction of error, disturb the judgment based on the
verdict.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Memorandum opinion, by direction of the court, by MR. CHIEF
JUSTICE WHITE:
The defendant in error sued to recover damages for injuries
sustained on October 6, 1909, while in the employ
Page 228 U. S. 434
of the railway company as a foreman of switch engines, in being
thrown from an alleged defective step or footboard of a switch
engine. The case was submitted to a jury upon a single count of the
declaration. The jury was specially instructed that it was the duty
of the plaintiff to prove the existence of the defect complained
of, that it was a defect of such a character as to cause its
existence to be a negligent failure of the defendant to properly
equip its engine, that the defect was the proximate cause of the
injury, and that the plaintiff was, at the time he was injured,
"engaged in interstate commerce." The jury was also instructed that
the burden of proof was upon the railway company to establish the
truth of defenses interposed by it of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. A judgment entered for the plaintiff upon a
verdict in his favor was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
in a brief opinion, and this writ of error was then prosecuted.
The matters pressed upon our attention on behalf of the
plaintiff in error embrace assertions of the commission of error by
the circuit court of appeals in deciding that the trial court
rightly refused to give instructions asked on behalf of the railway
company, covering the various issues raised by the pleadings. Based
upon a statement made in the opinion of the court below to the
effect that the case of
Second Employers' Liability,
223 U. S. 1, was
decisive of the constitutionality and applicability to the case of
the Employers' Liability Law, and, moreover, disposed of a number
of contentions urged in the assignments of error filed below, it is
pressed upon our attention that the court decided and erred in
deciding that the Employers' Liability Law abolished, as to all
cases coming under its provisions, the defense of assumption of
risk, and also that a railroad employee injured in the course of
his employment could avail of the benefits of the statute although,
at the time he sustained the injury, he
Page 228 U. S. 435
was not actually engaged in interstate commerce. But we think it
is plain that the contentions last stated are without merit, and
that the only even pretext afforded of the opinion below, which, we
think, despite its meager and maybe inadequate examination of the
case, nevertheless on its face rebuts the inferences which the
contentions attempt to draw from it. It is unnecessary to recur to
the text of the opinion to demonstrate the conclusion just stated,
because, in any event, the contentions must be overruled, since the
benefit of the defense of assumption of risk was accorded to the
railway company at the trial, and the right of the plaintiff to
recover was made dependent upon his establishing that, at the time
he was injured he was actually engaged in interstate commerce.
Indeed, in a bill of exceptions, certified by the trial judge, it
was stated that there was evidence tending to show that the freight
train in question was engaged in hauling two freight cars which
were loaded with lumber "destined to be shipped to the terminal of
the Tampa Northern at Hooker's Point, near Tampa, and there
unloaded, and to be afterwards shipped by schooner to a point in
the State of New Jersey." Coming to consider the errors alleged to
have been committed in sustaining refusals of the trial court to
give requested instructions, we content ourselves with saying,
after an adequate examination of the record, and in the light of
the various bills of exceptions therein set forth, containing the
"substance and effect" of the evidence, that we think the charge as
given by the trial court fully and correctly stated the applicable
law. As "we find nothing giving rise to a clear conviction on our
part that error has resulted from the action of the courts below,"
the judgment of the circuit court of appeals must be affirmed.
Chicago Junction R. Co. v. King, 222 U.
S. 222.
Affirmed.