United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913)
U.S. Supreme CourtUnited States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913)
United States v. Winslow
Argued January 10, 1913
Decided February 3, 1913
227 U.S. 202
On appeals under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the interpretation of the indictment by the lower court, United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, and if that court has construed the count as alleging a combination of a particular date to be in violation of the Sherman Law, without regard to subsequent acts, this Court cannot pass upon the validity of those acts.
A combination for greater efficiency does not necessarily violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Where each of several groups is carrying on a legal business of making patented machines which do not compete with each other, although the machines of all the groups are used by manufacturers of the same article, such as shoes, a combination of the several groups does not violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Exclusion of competitors from making the patented article is of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent.
Where the share in interstate commerce does not appear in the record, and the machines in question are not alleged to be types of all the machines used in manufacturing the article for which they are made, the government cannot claim that a specified proportion of the business was put into a single hand.
The disintegration aimed at by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act does not extend to reducing all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree.
The Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, is a special provision and, as it is not mentioned in the repealing section of the Judicial Code of 1911 and is not superseded by any other regulation of the matter, it was not repealed by the Judicial Code. United States, Petitioner, 226 U. S. 420.
The district court rightly held that the counts under review of the indictment against various persons for combining their businesses of
manufacturing patented machines for making different parts of shoes, and not competing with each other, did not constitute an offense under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
195 F. 578 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and determining whether the combination charged in an indictment thereunder of various manufacturers of patented shoe machinery constituted a violation thereof, are stated in the opinion.