Adams Express Company v. Croninger, ante, p.
226 U. S. 491,
followed to the effect that the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn
Act of June 29, 1906, regulating liability of interstate carrier,
superseded all state regulation on the same subject.
85 Neb. 458 reversed.
The facts, which involve the validity under the Carmack
Amendment of schedules of rates based upon value and the extent of
the liability of the carrier on bills of lading, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 226 U. S. 517
MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case, as in
Adams Express Company v.
Croninger, just decided, is whether the provisions of § 20 of
the Act of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 386, c. 104, as amended by
the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591, constitute an
exclusive regulation of contracts for interstate shipments of
property by railroad common carriers, superseding all state
regulations upon the same subject.
The action in this case was to recover the full value of a
stallion shipped from a point in Iowa to a point in Nebraska, under
a valued livestock contract. The loss occurred in the State of
Nebraska through the negligence of the carrier, and the suit was in
a court of that state.
The receipt or bill of lading placed a value upon the animal of
$100, and was signed by the shipper's agent. It recited that the
schedules of rates and regulations filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission provide alternative rates of charges
proportioned to the value of the stock delivered for
transportation, as declared by the shipper, and that the recovery
of the shipper in case of loss or injury should not be in excess of
the value thus agreed upon for the purpose of determining the
rate.
The plaintiff's claim that the stallion was in fact of the value
of $2,000, and that the limitation of recovery stipulated is void
under a statute of Iowa, where the contract was made, and also
illegal and invalid under a clause in the Constitution of Nebraska,
the state in which the loss occurred, and of the forum.
The company relies upon the provisions of the Act of 1906 as an
exclusive rule regulating every contract for an interstate
shipment, and declaring the liability of the carrier, and contends
that the regulations provided by the § 20 of that act operate to
supersede the legislation of both Iowa and Nebraska insofar as they
applied to interstate shipments.
Page 226 U. S. 518
This defense was overruled in the trial court, and the agreement
in the plaintiff's bill of lading, limiting any recovery in case of
loss or damage, to the value declared for the purpose of obtaining
the lower or alternative rate of freight, was held to be illegal
both under the law of Iowa and Nebraska, and judgment was rendered
for the full value of the animal. This judgment was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, that court ruling that the case was
controlled by the state regulations referred to, and that these
regulations had not been superseded by acts of Congress regulating
interstate commerce. For this the court cited and relied upon
certain decisions by the Nebraska courts, and the cases of
Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.
S. 133, and
Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes,
191 U. S. 477.
Both of the cases decided by this Court were decided prior to the
extensive amendment of the act regulating interstate commerce of
1887 by the Act of June 29, 1906.
In
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra, we reached
the conclusion that, by the provisions of the § 20 of the latter
act, Congress had manifested a purpose to take possession of the
subject of the liability of a carrier by railroad for interstate
shipments, and that the regulations therein had superseded all
state regulations upon the same subject. This case is therefore
controlled by that judgment.
It follows that the Supreme Court of Nebraska erred in applying
to the contract here involved the provisions of the Iowa statute,
and of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska, and in refusing
to apply the exclusive regulation prescribed by § 20 of the Act of
1906, as that provision has been construed by this Court in the
Croninger case, above referred to.
The judgment is accordingly reversed and remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.