In order to warrant a direct appeal to this Court under § 5 of
the Court of Appeals Act of 1891, the jurisdiction of the federal
court as such must be involved.
Whether title to the assets outside the state passed to a
receiver of a corporation under an order of the court in the state
of organization depends upon the law of that state, and a decision
by a federal court in another state having custody of assets
through a receiver that no title passed and dismissing a petition
of the first named receiver to intervene does not involve the
question of jurisdiction of the federal court and warrant a direct
appeal to this Court.
In such a case, the judge denying the petition to intervene is
right in certifying that no question of jurisdiction exists.
In such a case, the federal court has jurisdiction over the
intervention whether it has jurisdiction as a federal court of the
principal case or not, and until final decree in the principal
case, the question of jurisdiction is not open.
The facts, which involve questions of jurisdiction of the
federal court, are stated in the opinion.
Page 226 U. S. 401
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the circuit court, taken by an intervener
on the ground that the court never had obtained
Page 226 U. S. 402
jurisdiction over the defendant. The petition to intervene was
dismissed, the decree declaring that the court had jurisdiction,
that there was no equity in the petition, and that the petitioner
was not entitled to any of the relief prayed for. The court allowed
the appeal, but certified that, in its opinion, no question of
jurisdiction was involved. The appellant contends that the contrary
appears on the face of the record.
United States v.
Larkin, 208 U. S. 333;
The Jefferson, 215 U. S. 130,
215 U. S. 137;
Herndon-Carter Co. v. James N. Norris, Son & Co.,
224 U. S. 496.
The material facts are these. On February 1, 1909, there was
filed in a local court of West Virginia a bill for the dissolution
of the American Guaranty Company, a corporation of that state. The
corporation appeared and consented, and on the same day a decree
was entered dissolving the corporation, appointing a receiver to
whom Keatley is successor, and directing him to take the steps
necessary to secure possession of the company's property within the
jurisdiction of the court. By the charter of the company, its
principal office was to be in Chicago, and in fact its bank
deposits, bonds, etc., were almost wholly there. On February 2, the
suit now before this Court was brought in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of Illinois on the ground
that the West Virginia receiver had no authority outside of his
state, praying for a receiver and the distribution of the assets
collected. There was an appearance and consent in the name of the
corporation, a receiver was appointed, and he proceeded to collect
the assets. It is stated by the judge in his opinion that more than
7,000 out of the 7,030 claims against the company had been
presented in the cause. On October 27, 1909, the West Virginia
receiver filed his petition of intervention, setting up that the
corporation, having been dissolved, could not appear in the
suit.
Page 226 U. S. 403
Whether the exception to the general rule concerning
jurisdiction of appeals like this, established by
Shepard v.
Adams, 168 U. S. 618, and
Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co.,198 U.S.
424, applies to the present case, and what may be the merits of
the argument against the right to appear in the name of the
corporation, if the question is open, cannot be considered until
the petitioner's right to present that argument is made out. On
that matter, we will assume that, if the petitioner had a case
below, the denial of the right to intervene was not a discretionary
decision, and final on that ground.
Credits Commutation Co. v.
United States, 177 U. S. 311,
177 U. S.
315-316. But, of course, the petitioner's standing in
the lower court depended on his having title, and was not a
consequence of his Virginia appointment alone, unless at least he
got a title by virtue of it, as it was provided by statute in
express terms that the receiver should, in
Relfe v.
Rundle, 103 U. S. 222.
See Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, 198 U.
S. 561,
198 U. S. 574.
The effect of such a provision need not be considered in this case.
In some instances, at least, it would be enforced outside of the
state.
Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.
S. 516,
206 U. S. 534;
Converse v. Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Co.,
212 U. S. 567;
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243,
224 U. S. 257.
See Chipman v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 156 Mass.
147-149;
Haskell v. Merrill, 179 Mass. 120, 124. The
statute of West Virginia, on the other hand, provides for the
appointment of receivers to "take charge of and administer" the
assets, and for the bringing of suit and the conveyance of property
in the corporate name thereafter. Code, c. 53, §§ 58, 59. It seems,
to be sure, that in September and October, the local West Virginia
court purported to authorize and confirm a deed by a special
commissioner to the receiver, but if the statute did not itself
constitute the receiver the universal successor of the corporation,
see Chipman v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 156
Page 226 U. S. 404
Mass. 147-149, 30 N.E. 610, it may be doubted whether the deed
had extraterritorial effect.
See Fall v. Eastin,
215 U. S. 1. The
argument is strong to support the judgment of the court below that
no title passed.
Right or wrong, that was the decision of the circuit court, and
it is obvious that a dismissal of the petition on that ground does
not warrant a direct appeal, whether the court had jurisdiction or
not. The court had jurisdiction over the intervention, and decided
against it on the merits. That question logically and
chronologically preceded any question of jurisdiction in the
principal case. The question of jurisdiction in the principal case
was not yet open, as there had been no final decree therein, and
as, by virtue of the decision that the intervener had no standing,
the question could not be raised by him. The form of the decree
really made it impossible for this appeal to be entertained, but we
have discussed the case and stated the facts more at length in
order to explain that the judge was right in his certificate, and
could not have acted otherwise upon his view of the West Virginia
law.
Appeal dismissed.