Veve v. Sanchez, 226 U.S. 234 (1912)
U.S. Supreme CourtVeve v. Sanchez, 226 U.S. 234 (1912)
Veve v. Sanchez
Argued November 7, 1912
Decided December 2, 1912
226 U.S. 234
While a tract may be so well known by name that it can be described and conveyed without other designation, ordinarily designation by name will yield to the more definite by metes and bounds, and in this case the latter rule should apply.
The construction of the description in a mortgage should not depend on the amount of land owned by the mortgagor, but on the specific boundaries.
The general rule in determining what is included in a conveyance is that general calls for quantity must yield to the more certain and locative lines of the adjoining owners which are, or can be made, certain.
Nothing in this case warrants a departure from this long established and necessary rule of title.
In ejectment, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and cannot prove by parol that a part of the land conveyed was not included in the grant; a contrary rule would make every grantee liable to have what had been conveyed to him taken away by word of mouth.
The rule prohibiting written contracts from being varied by parol is not confined to the common law, but was in force in Porto Rico in 1885 and since then.
The statement in a conveyance that the grantor is the owner of the property described estops the grantor from denying his right to convey, and, if not the owner at the time, his subsequent acquisition inures to the benefit of the vendee.
4 P.R. 329 reversed.
The facts, which involve the rights of a mortgagee under a mortgage of land in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.