While a tract may be so well known by name that it can be
described and conveyed without other designation, ordinarily
designation by name will yield to the more definite by metes and
bounds, and in this case the latter rule should apply.
Page 226 U. S. 235
The construction of the description in a mortgage should not
depend on the amount of land owned by the mortgagor, but on the
specific boundaries.
The general rule in determining what is included in a conveyance
is that general calls for quantity must yield to the more certain
and locative lines of the adjoining owners which are, or can be
made, certain.
Nothing in this case warrants a departure from this long
established and necessary rule of title.
In ejectment, the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his
own title, and cannot prove by parol that a part of the land
conveyed was not included in the grant; a contrary rule would make
every grantee liable to have what had been conveyed to him taken
away by word of mouth.
The rule prohibiting written contracts from being varied by
parol is not confined to the common law, but was in force in Porto
Rico in 1885 and since then.
The statement in a conveyance that the grantor is the owner of
the property described estops the grantor from denying his right to
convey, and, if not the owner at the time, his subsequent
acquisition inures to the benefit of the vendee.
4 P.R. 329 reversed.
The facts, which involve the rights of a mortgagee under a
mortgage of land in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1885, Jose Avalo Sanchez mortgaged to Dona Maria Diaz y Siaca
a sugar plantation in Porto Rico, known as Bello Sitio, described
as containing 400 cuerdas, and bounded on the north, south, east,
and west by the colindantes, or adjoining landowners, whose names
were given. Suit to foreclose was instituted in 1889, and, at the
end of three years, the mortgagee obtained a decree which,
however,
Page 226 U. S. 236
instead of ending the controversy, was the beginning of
litigation in the Spanish courts which is said to have been the
most protracted and bitter in the history of the Island of Porto
Rico.
The record of the various proceedings is involved and
complicated, but it appears that Mrs. Diaz purchased at the
foreclosure sale, and, apparently in accordance with Spanish custom
(
Graham v. United
States, 4 Wall. 261), was put in possession on
October 30, 1891. But before she received the judicial deed,
attachments were levied on Bello Sitio, on a lot afterward called
Sauri, "in the center of the same," and on certain personalty, as
the property of Sanchez. About the same time, a concurso of
creditors, in the nature of bankruptcy proceeding, was begun
against him. The trustee apparently went through the form of taking
possession of all property of Sanchez, including Bello Sitio,
though without actually evicting Mrs. Diaz. Sanchez himself later
instituted proceedings to cancel the mortgage and judicial deed
under which Mrs. Diaz claimed title. He failed in this suit, but
the other branches of the litigation continued for sixteen years,
and, after the death of Mrs. Diaz, finally terminated in 1907, when
the Supreme Court of the Island held that the attachment should be
released, the bankruptcy proceedings dismissed, and all the
property returned to Sanchez except Bello Sitio, which was to
remain at the disposal of the heirs of Mrs. Diaz.
Both parties seem to have considered this a decision in their
favor -- the plaintiff claiming that it adjudged to him everything
that was not Bello Sitio, and the defendants that it restored to
them all that was included in the mortgage.
In the meantime, Sanchez (in 1906) filed a bill in the United
States court for Porto Rico, in which, as appears from statements
in the opinion of the court, he attacked all of the proceedings in
the Spanish tribunals as fraudulent, and asked that the mortgage
foreclosure be set
Page 226 U. S. 237
aside and himself declared to be the owner of Bello Sitio.
Whether any issue was therein presented, or legally involved, as to
the boundaries of the land cannot, in the absence of a copy of the
pleadings, be determined. On demurrer, this bill was dismissed for
laches and want of equity.
Sanchez then brought the present suit for the recovery of 134
cuerdas of land (lying within the exterior limits of Bello Sitio)
and $60,000 as damages for improvements destroyed, crops removed,
and mesne profits, from 1891 to 1907, during which time he alleges
that the defendants and their ancestor, Mrs. Diaz, had usurped the
premises by means of false and fraudulent claims instituted in the
Porto Rican courts. On demurrer, the court held that the suit
should be treated solely as an action in ejectment.
The defendants plead
res judicata, title by
prescription, and title under the mortgage foreclosure. We need
only consider the question presented by the claim in the answer
"that the 400 cuerdas, known as the Hacienda Bello Sitio, includes
the several parcels of land described in the plaintiff's
complaint."
On the first hearing, there was a mistrial. On the second,
plaintiff offered evidence to show that, between 1878 and 1880, he
purchased three small lots forming a part of the tract mentioned in
the complaint; that, on January 5, 1880, he bought Bello Sitio from
Monserrate Garcia at the same time occupying, as lessee, the lot
called Sauri. He admitted that "the land for which he is now suing
was in the middle of what was formerly Bello Sitio," but claimed
that Mrs. Diaz knew, or ought to have known, that the mortgage,
dated May 28, 1885, did not convey Sauri, because he did not then
own that place, and did not purchase it until June 15, 1885, three
weeks later. There was evidence that, in 1892, during the
bankruptcy, a survey was made with a view to marking the lines
between Bello Sitio and the land now sued for; that the agent
of
Page 226 U. S. 238
Mrs. Diaz was present and assented to the correctness of the
survey. But if his admissions at that time could have bound the
principal, or if he had authority to establish a new line by parol,
the agreement was never executed by any change in possession, the
complaint itself alleging that Mrs. Diaz and her heirs had been in
possession since 1891. Plaintiff also relied on the records in the
Spanish courts, which showed that, from the time Mrs. Diaz took
possession in 1891, he, his creditors, and the trustee in
bankruptcy had persistently claimed that Sauri and the other land
now sued for formed no part of Bello Sitio, and was not included in
the mortgage. On the other hand, the defendants insisted that a
single, not a divided, tract, was conveyed by the mortgage, which,
as translated, described the land as being
"a sugar cane plantation known as Bello Sitio . . . composed of
400 cuerdas of land, equivalent to 157 hectares, 21 areas, and 59
centiares, and its buildings . . . and other appurtenances used in
its cultivation. Said land being bounded on the north by the
property of Isabel Siaca and by lands of the plantation 'Convento,'
belonging to Pilar Becerril y Torres; on the east by land of
Nicolas Telemaco and by lands of Benigno and Sebastian de Santiago;
on the south by the property called 'Ausubal' belonging to the
Succession of Alejandrina Becerril y Torres, with lands belonging
to Concepcion Lopez, and by the property belonging to the
Successors of Alberto Western and the Luquillo-Fajardo Road, and on
the west by land belonging to Enrique Garcia and those of Nicolas
Perez and of Gervasio Rivera."
A plat of Bello Sitio made in 1907 showed that it contained
exactly 415 cuerdas, and the defendants contended that, if the 134
sued for were excluded, only 279 would be left, although the
mortgage purported to convey 400 cuerdas. The plaintiff denied that
the plat made in 1907 correctly represented the land which he had
conveyed in 1885, insisting that, excluding Sauri, he bought 400
cuerdas
Page 226 U. S. 239
from Monserrate Garcia, and had conveyed that quantity to Mrs.
Diaz. He claimed that, if there was any present deficiency, it was
due to encroachments by the adjoining landowners. He did not,
however, establish what, if any, change had been made, while the
surveyor testified that he followed the boundaries of Bello Sitio
as indicated by ditches, fences, trees, stakes, and the documents
of the adjoining landowners, all of whom were present when the
survey was made and assented to its correctness. The landowners
were also examined. Some of them had known the property from the
date of the mortgage, and others, who were younger, for a shorter
time. But all testified that they knew of no change in the
lines.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. A motion for a new
trial was overruled. The case is here on assignments which relate
to rulings in admitting and excluding testimony, in charging and
refusing to charge the jury, and in failing to direct a verdict for
the defendants.
The plaintiff's testimony established that he was in possession
of Bello Sitio as owner, and of Sauri as lessee, when he made the
mortgage on May 28, 1885. Three weeks later, he purchased Sauri and
established a title on which he was entitled to recover unless it
and the other three lots sued for were included in the mortgage
which described the property by name (Bello Sitio), by quantity
(400 cuerdas), and by colindancias or adjoiners on the north, east,
south, and west.
A tract may be so well known by name that it can be described
and conveyed without other designation. And there are cases where,
in the sale of a ranch, or of an island, or of a well known
plantation, the limits described by name have prevailed when there
was a discrepancy between it and other descriptive terms set out in
the same deed.
Lodge v. Lee,
6 Cranch 237.
Ordinarily, however, designation by name will yield to the more
definite description by metes and bounds. In
Page 226 U. S. 240
this case there was nothing to show that "Bello Sitio" was
understood to mean or describe a hacienda of clearly defined
limits, and there was no basis for a charge as to the conditions on
which such designation could prevail over the other calls in the
mortgage. No instruction on that subject was given, but the court
did charge the jury as to the effect of a description by quantity,
telling them that they might consider the terms of the mortgage and
all documents referred to in it, the condition of the property and
circumstances surrounding the transaction, and if they found that
at the time the mortgage was signed, the plaintiff did not own 400
cuerdas, and afterwards acquired sufficient to make up what Mrs.
Diaz believed and had reason to believe was included in the
mortgage, then the law will hold that such land is included, and
they must find for the defendants so as to make up the full
quantity of land. Conversely, they were instructed that
"if, when Sanchez made the mortgage, he was in possession of a
tract bought from Monserrate Garcia that contained 400 cuerdas,
then they must find, under the language of the descriptive clause
of the mortgage, that he did not convey to her any of the tracts he
now sues for."
This makes the construction of the mortgage depend not upon its
language, but upon the quantity of land the mortgagor owned at the
date of its execution, and required the jury to make designation by
cuerdas prevail over description by specific boundaries. This is
contrary to the rule that calls for quantity must yield to the more
certain and locative lines of the adjoining owners. Such lines are
certain, or they can be made certain, and may be platted so as to
show the exact course and distance. They are treated as a sort of
natural monument, and must prevail over the more general and less
distinct designation by quantity.
Bartlett Land & Lumber
Co. v. Saunders, 103 U. S. 316;
Whiting v. Dewey, 15 Pick. 428, 434;
Cox v.
McGowan, 116
Page 226 U. S. 241
N.C. 135, 21 S.E. 108;
Reed v.
Proprietors, 8 How. 289;
Leonard v.
Forbing, 109 La. 220.
2. It was argued that this rule was not applicable to Porto
Rican deeds, made at a time when loose and indefinite methods of
describing land were used.
Doolan v. Carr, 125
U. S. 632. But we find nothing in this case to warrant a
departure from a rule long established and necessary to the
protection of titles. The mortgage adopted a common method of
bounding land. If there had been any error in describing what had
been conveyed, it became manifest when Mrs. Diaz took possession in
1891. If there was a mutual mistake, proceedings could have been
brought to reform the mortgage, and on such trial, most of the
evidence upon which plaintiff now relies might have been relevant.
But, in this action of ejectment, he must recover on the strength
of his own title, and cannot prevail against those who hold under
an instrument signed by him, and which in unambiguous terms
conveyed not two separate tracts, but a single body of land with
definitely described continuous exterior boundaries. To permit a
grantor, on the claim that an ambiguity existed, to prove by parol
that a lot in the center of such a tract had not been conveyed
would make every grantee liable to have what had been conveyed in
writing taken away by word of mouth.
3. The rule prohibiting written contracts from being varied by
parol is not confined to the common law, but was of force in Porto
Rico when this mortgage was made, and its enforcement in construing
the descriptive clause according to accepted rules governing
boundaries preserves the rights of the parties here. Sanchez was in
possession of Sauri as lessee when the mortgage was made. That
possession was itself a
prima facie indication of title.
He conveyed 400 cuerdas bounded by the adjoining land lines. There
is a claim, not established proof, that these lines had been
changed. The slight excess of fifteen
Page 226 U. S. 242
cuerdas, shown by a later and accurate survey, is not
inconsistent with defendants' right to 400 cuerdas, but
confirmatory of their contention (Civil Code, Porto Rico 1471),
while, if plaintiff recovers, the defendants will be left in
possession of only 279 cuerdas when the mortgage conveyed their
ancestor 400.
4. Following the descriptive clause in the mortgage was a
statement that Sanchez was the owner of the land. In addition to
this recital, which, according to
Van
Renesselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297,
52 U. S.
322-326, would be equivalent to a covenant of warranty
and ownership, it was claimed that, under the laws of Porto Rico
(Civil Code 1474), a warranty was implied in all conveyances of
real estate. Apparently in accordance with this view, the judicial
deed made in pursuance of the foreclosure sale contained a
provision that "the debtor, Jose Avalo Sanchez, remains bound under
the present sale to guarantee the title in accordance with law."
These facts estopped Sanchez from denying that he had the right to
dispose of all the property which the mortgage purported to convey.
For, having received the money on the faith of the statement that
he was the owner of the property, he was bound to repay that sum,
or, failing that, to perfect the title on which the money had been
advanced. So that, when he acquired what is now called Sauri, but
which had been originally included in the land conveyed by the
mortgage, the title inured to the benefit of his vendee.
Amonett v. Amis, 16 La.Ann. 225;
Lee v. Ferguson,
5 La.Ann. 533;
Stokes v. Shackleford, 12 La. 172;
New
Orleans v. Riddell, 113 La. 1051;
Partida v. Tv., L.
51;
ib., T. XIII, L. 50;
Van
Renesselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297,
52 U. S.
322-326;
Bush v. Cooper's
Adm'r, 18 How. 82,
59 U. S. 85;
Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.