In a habeas corpus proceeding in extradition, it is sufficient
if the count in the indictment plainly shows that the defendant is
charged with a crime. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.
Where a guaranty goes not to newness but to fitness of articles
furnished, it is a material fraud to furnish old articles even if
they can meet the test of the guaranty, and the fact that the
purchaser may rely on the guaranty does not exclude the possibility
that the purchase price was obtained by false representations as to
the newness of the articles.
A state may punish one committing crimes done outside its
jurisdiction for the purpose of producing detrimental effects
within it when it gets the criminal within its power.
Commission of the crimes alleged in this indictment -- bribery
of a public officer and obtaining public money under false
pretenses -- warrants punishment by the state aggrieved even if the
offender did not come into the state until after the fraud was
An overt act becomes retrospectively guilty when the
contemplated result ensues.
One who is never within the state before the commission of a
crime producing its results within its jurisdiction is not a
fugitive from justice within the rendition provisions of the
Constitution, Hyatt v.
Page 221 U. S. 281
188 U. S. 691
but, if he commit some overt and material act within the state and
then absent himself, he becomes a fugitive from justice when the
crime is complete, if not before.
Although absent from the state when the crime was completed in
this case, the party charged became a fugitive from justice by
reason of his having committed certain material steps toward the
crime within the state, and the demanding state is entitled to his
surrender under Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution of the United
States and the statutes providing for the surrender of fugitives
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order on habeas corpus discharging the
respondent Daily from custody under a warrant of the Governor of
Illinois, directing his extradition to Michigan as a fugitive from
justice from that state. Daily, it appears, had been indicted in
Michigan for bribery and also for obtaining money from the state by
false pretenses, and a requisition had been issued to which the
warrant of the Governor of Illinois was the response. The district
judge who issued the habeas corpus was of opinion, however, that
the facts alleged in the indictment for obtaining money by false
pretenses did not constitute a crime against the laws of Michigan,
and that the evidence showed that Daily was not a fugitive from
justice. We will consider these two questions in turn.
The third count of the indictment is the only one that needs to
be stated, although all the counts allege a false representation
that certain machinery, to be sold to the state, was new, whereas
in fact it was second-hand and
Page 221 U. S. 282
used, and the obtaining from the state of $10,000 by means of
such representation. The third count alleges that one Armstrong was
warden of the Michigan State Prison at Jackson, and, in conjunction
with the Board of Control of the prison, authorized to buy
machinery for a cordage plant in the prison; that he was authorized
to accept the machinery and to pay for it from the funds of the
state under his control; that said board and Armstrong contracted
with the Hoover & Gamble Company, acting through Daily, the
agent, and one Eminger, the secretary of the company, for the
purchase of such machinery, all of which, by the contract, was to
be new; that Armstrong, Daily, and Eminger had agreed beforehand to
substitute old, worn, and second-hand machinery of less value for
that which was contracted for, the board being ignorant of their
intent and being deceived and defrauded by the substitution; that
the second-hand machinery having been substituted, Armstrong,
Daily, and Eminger, with intent to cheat the state, to-wit, on the
first day of May, 1908, falsely pretended that the machinery so
furnished was the new machinery required by the contract, and
rendered bills for the same at the contract prices; that the bills
were audited and allowed by Armstrong, and the machinery paid for
as new machinery, and that Armstrong, Daily, and Eminger, by means
of the false pretenses set up, obtained from the State of Michigan
money, to-wit, $10,000, the state and the Board of Control relying
upon the false pretenses and being deceived thereby. We sum up the
count thus broadly because, although considerable ingenuity was
spent in pointing out defects that would occur to no one outside of
the criminal law, yet whatever may be thought of the criticisms in
Michigan, it is plain that the count shows that the defendant "was
substantially charged with a crime," and upon habeas corpus in
extradition proceedings that is enough. Pierce v. Creecy,
210 U. S. 387
210 U. S. 405
Page 221 U. S. 283
It would seem, although the record is otherwise, that the judge
below really went on the ground that the terms of the contract
excluded a reliance upon the false representation alleged. The
contract, after stating that it was for "all new machinery to be
manufactured by the Hoover & Gamble Company," contained a
guaranty that the machinery should be "constructed in a thorough
manner, free from any defects of machinery or workmanship, and
finished in a first-class manner." It also provided for the
retention of the last quarter of the price
"until the machinery is all installed and tested and operating,
so as to fulfill the guaranty above given, to the satisfaction and
approval of C. G. Wrentmore, Cons. Engr. of the Board of
The case is not to be tried on habeas corpus. Therefore it is
enough to say that the guaranty and testing clauses do not exclude
the possibility that the money was obtained by the false pretenses
alleged. The guaranty goes, not to newness, but to workmanship and
freedom from defects, and the approval of the consulting engineer
is required only to show that the guaranty is fulfilled. The
guaranty does not exclude other representations and undertakings.
As has been seen, it was expressed in the contract that the subject
matter of the guaranty was machinery to be manufactured and new. If
old machinery was put in and represented to be new, it was a
We come, then, to the other question, whether the facts show
that the defendant is a fugitive from justice. The bribery is laid
under a videlicet as taking place on May 13, 1908; the false
pretenses are averred to have been made on May 1, of the same year.
On both of these dates, the defendant was in Chicago. What
happened, in short, was this: Daily had tried to sell second-hand
machinery in which he had an interest to the state, and it was
rejected. At the time of receiving notice, or afterwards, but
within ten days before July 22, 1907, he had a conversation with
Armstrong in Chicago in which he said it was
Page 221 U. S. 284
a mistake not to accept his proposition; that he thought it
could be arranged, and that there would be a nice present in it for
Armstrong, which he said would be "$1,000 anyway." In the affidavit
of Armstrong accompanying the requisition, it is stated explicitly
that the present was offered if Armstrong would let Daily
substitute his old machinery for new in case a contract should be
On July 22, 1907, the successful bid of the Hoover & Gamble
Company was sent in. It was signed by Daily, and Daily was with the
Board of Control in Michigan, accompanying it, when it was
considered and accepted. He had made a previous visit to the Board
in the spring, and he was there in November to see the machinery
and to delay shipment. At the latter date, he told Armstrong that
Eminger, the secretary of the company, had objected to the word
"new" in the contract, and was afraid they would have trouble with
the consulting engineer, but Armstrong replied that he did not
think they would have any trouble with him. Finally, in April,
1908, Daily was at the prison again, in further execution of the
program arranged by him and Armstrong, as the judge below properly
found. Armstrong's affidavit states that Daily did substitute his
old machinery, that it was understood that Armstrong was not to
communicate the fact to the proper officer of the state or to the
Board of Control, that the plant was put in, that the contract
price was paid in full, and that thereafter Daily paid Armstrong
$1,500, as he had agreed. But it may be assumed, for the moment,
that Daily personally did no act in Michigan in any way connected
with his plan otherwise than as we have stated above.
If a jury should believe the evidence, and find that Daily did
the acts that led Armstrong to betray his trust, deceived the Board
of Control, and induced by fraud the payment by the state, the
usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing
him although he
Page 221 U. S. 285
never had set foot in the state until after the fraud was
complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect if the state should succeed in getting him within its power.
Commonwealth v. Smith,
11 Allen, 243, 256, 259;
Simpson v. State,
92 Ga. 41; American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347
213 U. S. 356
Commonwealth v. Macloon,
101 Mass. 1, 6, 18. We may assume
therefore that Daily is a criminal under the laws of Michigan.
Of course, we must admit that it does not follow that Daily is a
fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.
, 188 U. S. 712
On the other hand, however, we think it plain that the criminal
need not do within the state every act necessary to complete the
crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be
a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents
himself from the state and does the rest elsewhere, he becomes a
fugitive from justice when the crime is complete, if not before.
In re Cook,
49 F. 833, 843-844; Ex Parte
180 F. 240, 243; In re Sultan,
115 N.C. 57.
For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a
state into a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the
state after having incurred guilt there, Roberts v.
Reilly, 116 U. S. 80
his overt act becomes retrospectively guilty when the contemplated
result ensues. Thus, in this case, offering the bid and receiving
the acceptance were material steps in the scheme, they were taken
in Michigan, and they were established in their character of guilty
acts when the plot was carried to the end, even if the intent with
which those steps were taken did not make Daily guilty before.
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
, 196 U. S.
We have given more attention to the question of time than it is
entitled to because of the seeming exactness of
Page 221 U. S. 286
the evidence. But a shorter and sufficient answer is to repeat
that the case is not to be tried on habeas corpus, and that when,
as here, it appears that the prisoner was in the state in the
neighborhood of the time alleged, it is enough.
Judgment reversed, prisoner remanded.