While the territorial condition lasts, the governmental power of
Congress over a territory and its inhabitants is exclusive and
paramount, except as restricted by the Constitution.
An act of Congress, regulating railway charges of a railway in a
territory until a state government is formed and providing that
thereafter such state shall have authority to regulate the charges
ceases to be of force on the admission of such state into the
Union, and thereafter the state can fix such charges subject only
to the constitutional rights of the railway, and so
held
as to §§ 1-4 of the Act of July 4, 1884, c. 179, 23 Stat. 73.
A state, in its corporate capacity, has no such interest in the
rights of shippers as to entitle it to maintain an original action
in this Court against the carrier to restrain it from charging
unreasonable rates within its jurisdiction.
Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U. S. 1.
The original jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution on this
Court does not include every cause in which the state elects to
make itself a party to vindicate the rights of its people or to
enforce its own laws or public policy against wrong done
generally.
The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States conferring original
jurisdiction on this Court in controversies in which a state is a
party, are stated in the opinion.
Page 220 U. S. 282
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an original suit in this Court by the State of Oklahoma
against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, a
corporation of Kansas.
The case as
made by the allegations of the bill, in
connection with acts of Congress and with the Constitution and laws
of Oklahoma, is substantially as will be now stated.
The Treaty of April 30th, 1803, between the United States and
France, by which the Territory of Louisiana was ceded to the United
States, provided that the inhabitants of that territory should be
incorporated into the Union and admitted as soon as possible,
according to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the
enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens
of the United States, in the meantime to be maintained and
protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the
religion they profess. Art. III. The State of Oklahoma was formed
out of a part of this ceded territory.
By an Act of Congress of July 4th, 1884, the Southern Kansas
Railway Company of Kansas was empowered to locate, construct, own,
equip, operate, use, and maintain a railway, telegraph, and
telephone line through the Indian Territory, over a specified
route. The act forbade the company to charge
"the inhabitants of said territory a greater rate of freight
than the rate authorized by the laws of the State of Kansas for
services or transportation of the same kind,"
and provided that "passenger rates on said railway shall not
exceed three cents per mile." And Congress expressly reserved the
right to regulate the charges for freight and passengers on the
railway as well as messages on telegraph and telephone lines,
"until a state government or governments shall exist in said
territory,
Page 220 U. S. 283
within the limits of which said railway or a part thereof shall
be located, and then such state government or governments shall be
authorized to fix and regulate the cost of transportation of
persons and freights within their respective limits by said
railway."
Congress also reserved
"the right to fix and regulate at all times the cost of such
transportation by said railway or said company whenever such
transportation shall extend from one state into another, or shall
extend into more than one state:
Provided, however, That
the rate of such transportation of passengers, local or interstate,
shall not exceed the rate above expressed."
§§ 1, 4, c. 179, 23 Stat. 73, 74.
The above grant was accepted by the Southern Kansas Railway
Company, and the road now controlled by the appellee, the Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, in Oklahoma, is operated
under that grant. The bill alleged
"that ever since the defendant company took over the operation
of said line of railway under said grant, it had continuously
violated the above condition, in that it has charged the
inhabitants of said territory a greater rate of freight than that
authorized by the laws of Kansas for services or transportation of
the same kind,"
and that the company's tariffs of freight charges show in detail
said excessive charges. After setting forth the rates charged in
Oklahoma and Kansas, respectively, for carrying, for the same
distances, lime, cement, plaster, brick, crude oil and refined oil,
the bill proceeds:
"That the State of Oklahoma at this time has about two million
inhabitants, is developing and building towns, villages, and
individual farmhouses, and that lime, cement, plaster, brick, and
stone are very essential to its growth; that at this time in the
State of Oklahoma there are very large and extensive petroleum oil
wells, and the manufacture or refining of the same is an industry
continually growing in said state; that the transportation rates on
crude and refined oil, lime, cement, plaster, brick, and stone are
very
Page 220 U. S. 284
important and essential to the development of said state, and
that the violation by said respondent of the said conditions of
said grant is a menace to the future of said state."
The state further alleged that, if the defendant was permitted
further to operate the railroad in violation of the condition of
the grant, it would be a hindrance to the growth of the state, as
well as an injury to the property rights of its inhabitants.
The relief asked was that the grant contained in the above act
of Congress be cancelled and the property granted by it confirmed
and decreed to be in the State of Oklahoma as
cestui que
trust; that the defendant be perpetually enjoined and
restrained, and, pending the determination of this action, be
enjoined and restrained, from charging the inhabitants of the State
of Oklahoma a greater rate of freight than that authorized by the
laws of Kansas for services or transportation of the same kind, and
from charging "for lime, cement, plaster, brick, stone, crude and
refined oil, the rates specified" in its tariff insofar as the same
are greater than those authorized for like transportation by the
laws of Kansas until the determination of this cause, and that, for
the continual violation of the terms of the grant, it be
perpetually enjoined and restrained from operating a railroad in
the State of Oklahoma. The bill also contains a prayer for such
further or different relief as may be required by the nature of the
case, and be agreeable to equity and good conscience.
The railroad company filed a demurrer upon the ground that the
bill did not show that the state was entitled to the relief asked,
nor set forth any controversy between the state and the defendant
within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
The difficulty in the way of granting the relief asked by the
state is, in our judgment, insurmountable. The Act of 1884 appears
to have had in view primarily the protection of the inhabitants of
the Indian Territory from being
Page 220 U. S. 285
charged unreasonable rates by the railway company when using its
right of way through that territory. Congress undoubtedly supposed
that it would be safe at least for a time, to adopt as a test of
the reasonableness of rates in Oklahoma, on domestic shipments,
those which Kansas had prescribed as between its people and the
corporation it had created; in other words, the inhabitants of the
territory were to have the same rights, in respect to
railroad rates, as Kansas had prescribed for its corporations and
people. But, that the railway company might not act unjustly
towards the inhabitants of the territory, Congress reserved the
right to regulate charges to be made by the railway company for
freight and passengers transported on the railway in question.
This, of course, Congress could have done without regard to any
rates allowed by or in Kansas at any particular time, for, while
the
territorial conditions lasted, the governmental power
of Congress over the territory and its inhabitants was exclusive
and paramount, there being no restrictions upon the exercise of
that power except such as were imposed by the supreme law of the
land. It is to be observed, however, that the regulations
prescribed by the Act of Congress were to exist and be in force
"
until a state government or governments shall exist in
said territory within the limits of which said railway or a part
thereof shall be located, and
then such
state
government or governments shall be authorized to fix and regulate
the cost of transportation of persons and freights within their
respective limits by said railway."
So, when Oklahoma was organized as a state and admitted into the
Union "on an equal footing with the original states" (34 Stat. 267,
271, § 4, pt. 1), the clause in the act of 1884 prescribing the
Kansas rates as the test for rates that might be charged against
the inhabitants of the territory necessarily ceased to be of any
force in the state, and the whole subject of rates in domestic or
local business passed under the full control of
Page 220 U. S. 286
the state in its corporate capacity, subject, of course, to the
fundamental condition that it should authorize only such rates as
were legal, and not inconsistent with the constitutional rights of
the railway company. If, after Oklahoma became a state, the company
still charged the Kansas rates on local business in Oklahoma, and
if those rates would have been illegal under any state regulations,
or were, in themselves, unreasonable and purely arbitrary, a
controversy, in the constitutional sense, would have arisen between
each shipper and the company which could have been determined by
suit brought by the shipper in the proper state court, or even in
the proper federal court, where the controversy, by reason of the
grounds alleged by the shipper, was one of which the latter court,
under the statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, could take judicial cognizance. But, plainly, the
state, in its corporate capacity, would have no such
interest in a controversy of that kind as would entitle it to
vindicate and enforce the rights of a particular shipper or
shippers, and, incidentally, of all shippers, by an original suit
brought in its own name in this Court to restrain the company from
applying the Kansas rates, as such, to shippers generally in the
local business of Oklahoma. The opposite view must necessarily rest
upon the ground that the Constitution, when conferring
original jurisdiction on this Court "in all cases
affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls
and those in which a state is a party" (Art. III, § 1),
intended to include any and every judicial proceeding of whatever
nature which the state may choose to institute in this Court for
the purpose of enforcing its laws, although the state may have no
direct interest in the particular property or rights immediately
affected or to be affected by the alleged violation of such laws.
In the present case, the state seeks to enjoin the defendant
company from charging more than the Kansas rates on the
transportation of lime, cement,
Page 220 U. S. 287
plaster, brick, stone, crude and refined oil. But the state, as
such, in its governmental capacity, is not engaged in their sale or
transportation, and has no property interest in such commodities.
Is seeks only, as between the railway company and shippers, by a
general, comprehensive decree to enforce certain rates and to
compel the railway company to respect the rights of
all of
the people of Oklahoma who may have occasion to ship such
commodities over the railway.
Upon this general subject, the case of
Louisiana v.
Texas, 176 U. S. 1, is
instructive. The State of Louisiana, by an original suit in this
Court against the State of Texas, her governor and health officer,
sought to restrain the latter state from enforcing by its officers
certain quarantine regulations it had established, which Louisiana
alleged were illegal and discriminative against it and injurious to
the trade and business of its people, particularly interstate
commerce as conducted between New Orleans and Texas. There was a
demurrer to the bill upon these grounds: 1. that, within the
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, the controversy
was not one between Louisiana and Texas; 2. that the controversy
was between Texas or her officers and certain persons in Louisiana
engaged in interstate commerce, and did not concern Louisiana as an
aggregate, corporate body or state; 3. that, by the suit brought in
this Court, Louisiana was only lending its name to certain
individuals in New Orleans, who were the real parties in interest;
4. that it appeared from the face of the bill that
"the State of Louisiana, in her right of sovereignty, is seeking
to maintain this suit for the redress of the supposed wrongs of her
citizens in regard to interstate commerce, while under the
constitution and laws the said state possesses no such sovereignty
as empowers her to bring an original suit in this Court for such
purpose;"
5. That
"no property right of the State of Louisiana is in any manner
affected
Page 220 U. S. 288
by the quarantine complained of, nor is any such property right
involved in this suit as would give this Court original
jurisdiction of this cause."
This Court, speaking by Chief Justice Fuller, after referring to
the provisions of the Constitution enumerating the cases and
controversies to which the judicial power of the United States
extended and of which the circuit courts of the United States could
take original cognizance, and to numerous adjudged cases, said:
"In order, then, to maintain jurisdiction of this bill of
complaint as against the State of Texas, it must appear that the
controversy to be determined is a controversy arising directly
between the State of Louisiana and the State of Texas, and not a
controversy in the vindication of the grievances of particular
individuals. . . . Inasmuch as the vindication of the freedom of
interstate commerce is not committed to the State of Louisiana, and
that state is not engaged in such commerce, the cause of action
must be regarded not as involving any infringement of the powers of
the State of Louisiana, or any special injury to her property, but
as asserting that the state is entitled to seek relief in this way
because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large.
Nevertheless, if the case stated is not one presenting a
controversy between these states, the exercise of original
jurisdiction by this Court as against the State of Texas cannot be
maintained. . . . But, in order that a controversy between states,
justiciable in this Court, can be held to exist, something more
must be put forward than that the citizens of one state are injured
by the maladministration of the laws of another. The states cannot
make war or enter into treaties, though they may, with the consent
of Congress, make compacts and agreements. When there is no
agreement whose breach might create it, a controversy between
states does not arise unless the action complained of is state
action, and acts of state officers in abuse or excess of their
powers cannot be laid
Page 220 U. S. 289
hold of as in themselves committing one state to a distinct
collision with a sister state."
These doctrines, we think, control this case, and require its
dismissal as not being within the original jurisdiction of this
Court, as defined by the Constitution. Under a contrary view that
jurisdiction could be invoked by a state's bringing an original
suit in this Court against foreign corporations and citizens of
other states, whenever the state thought such corporations and
citizens of other states were acting in violation of its laws to
the injury of its people generally or in the aggregate, although an
injury, in violation of law, to the property or rights of
particular persons through the action of foreign corporations or
citizens of states, could be reached, without the intervention of
the state, by suits instituted by the persons directly or
immediately injured.
We are of opinion that the words in the Constitution conferring
original jurisdiction on this Court in a suit "in which a state
shall be a party" are not to be interpreted as conferring such
jurisdiction in every cause in which the state elects to make
itself strictly a party plaintiff of record, and seeks not to
protect its own property, but only to vindicate the wrongs of some
of its people, or to enforce it own laws or public policy against
wrongdoers generally.
Other questions of interest and importance have been elaborately
discussed by counsel, but we deem it unnecessary to extend this
opinion by an examination of them. What had been said is quite
sufficient to show that the demurrer is well taken, and that the
bill must, in any event, be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in
this Court to entertain it by original suit on behalf or in the
name of the state.
Dismissed.