The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for purposes of
proceedings in error; the jurisdiction under the writ is confined
to determining from the record whether the petitioner is deprived
of his liberty without authority of law.
Hyde v. Shine,
199 U. S. 84;
Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249,
distinguished.
A collateral attack on the judgment under which petitioner in
habeas
Page 218 U. S. 443
corpus proceedings is detained is only permitted where the
objections if sustained would render the judgment not erroneous,
but void. Under the statutes of the United States relative to the
terms of the circuit court, the term of court at which the
petitioners were convicted was properly held.
Objections to the order impaneling the grand jury on the ground
that the judge was not in the district at the time, although within
his circuit, must be raised by proper pleas in the court of
original jurisdiction; they cannot be raised on habeas corpus after
conviction. Objections that competent testimony was not presented
to, or that the indictment under which petitioner was convicted was
not regularly found by, the grand jury, cannot be made for the
first time in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Where the sentence exceeds the authority of the court, at most
only the excess will be void; the legal portion of the sentence
cannot be attacked on that ground in habeas corpus proceedings.
The facts, which involve the validity of the conviction and
sentence of the appellants and the power of the court to review the
proceedings nn habeas corpus, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals are from judgments rendered in the circuit court
of the United States for the Northern District of Florida,
discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoners to
the custody of the United States marshal.
The petitioners in the original habeas corpus proceedings,
appellants here, were convicted in the United States Circuit Court
for the Northern District of Florida of conspiring to hold, arrest,
and return one Rudolph Lanninger to a condition of peonage in
violation of § 5440
Page 218 U. S. 444
of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The offense of
returning to a condition of peonage is defined by § 5526 of the
Revised Statutes. Petitioners were sentenced to imprisonment for
different terms and to pay pecuniary fines.
The record discloses that the original cases in which appellants
were convicted and sentenced were taken to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upon writs of error, and the
judgments of conviction affirmed. Afterwards, petitions for writs
of certiorari to bring the cases to this Court from the circuit
court of appeals were denied in this Court (214 U.S. 519).
Thereafter, the prisoners, being in the custody of the United
States Marshal under the sentences imposed, filed their petitions
for writs of habeas corpus, and, the cases being heard in the
circuit court of the United States, a judgment was entered
dismissing the writs. 180 F. 119. The cases were then brought here
by appeal.
From this statement it will appear that the appellants were
convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of the alleged
offense charged in the indictment; that a trial was had before a
court and jury, which was reviewed by proper proceedings in error
in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and that
this Court declined to grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment of the latter court.
The cases have been earnestly and elaborately argued here by
counsel for appellants upon the theory that, in a proceeding of
this character, the court may inquire into the facts put in
evidence at the trial at least, so far as is necessary to determine
whether there was any inculpating testimony, and for that purpose
may examine the bill of exceptions, which it appended to the
petition, and which was originally taken for the purpose of
bringing the voluminous testimony in the cases into the record in
order that a review might be had by the appellate court.
Page 218 U. S. 445
It is contended that an examination of the bill of exceptions
will disclose that the alleged conspiracy was not formed in the
Northern District of Florida, as laid in the indictment; that there
is a total lack of evidence to connect the petitioners with any
such conspiracy; that the petitioners (notably the petitioner
Harlan) are not shown by any competent testimony to have been
concerned in any overt act for the carrying out of the alleged
conspiracy; that it is not shown that there is any condition of
peonage in which Lanninger had been detained, and to which he could
be returned, in violation of § 5526 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States. In other words, in this feature of the case, this
Court is asked to review the testimony adduced at the trial with a
view to determining the lack of evidence in the record to support
the verdict and judgment, although such matters were properly
reviewable, and were in fact reviewed, in the error proceedings
already referred to.
It is the settled doctrine of this Court, often affirmed, that
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for the purpose of
proceedings in error, and that the jurisdiction under that writ is
confined to an examination of the record with a view to determining
whether the person restrained of his liberty is detained without
authority of law.
Gonzales v. Cunningham, 164 U.
S. 612,
164 U. S. 621;
In re Schneider, 148 U. S. 162;
Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132,
202 U. S. 136;
Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542,
212 U. S. 548;
In re Wilson, 140 U. S. 575,
140 U. S.
582.
But it is contended that two recent cases in this Court are
authority for the proposition that, in a collateral attack by a
habeas corpus proceeding, while the weight of testimony cannot be
examined into, the record may be investigated with a view of
determining whether there is any testimony to support the
accusation, and where there is an entire lack of evidence, the
court may order a discharge, and language to this effect is
referred to in the
Page 218 U. S. 446
opinion in
Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.
S. 84, wherein the learned Justice delivering the
opinion of the Court said:
"In the federal courts, however, it is well settled that, upon
habeas corpus, the court will not weigh the evidence, although, if
there is an entire lack of evidence to support the accusation, the
court may order his discharge."
That case was a proceeding in habeas corpus to attack the
validity of an order made under § 1014 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States for the removal of the petitioner from the State
of California to the District of Columbia for trial upon an
indictment found in the District. In that case, it was contended
that, inasmuch as § 1014 requires proceedings for the removal of
persons from one district to another to be agreeable to the usual
mode of process against defendants in such state, and as in the
State of California, where the prisoner was arrested, the supreme
court had held that the question of probable cause of the
prisoner's guilt might be considered upon the writ of habeas
corpus, it necessarily followed that such should be the course of
procedure in the federal courts. In answer to this contention, the
language above quoted was used. In so stating, the learned judge
speaking for the Court was but affirming the rule well established
under § 1014, that there must be some testimony before the
commissioner to support the accusation in order to lay the basis
for an order of removal, otherwise the accused could be discharged
upon habeas corpus, although the court would not weigh the evidence
where the record shows that some evidence was taken. This was the
construction of § 1014 in
Greene v. Henkel, 183 U.
S. 249,
183 U. S. 261.
In
Greene v. Henkel, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the
Court, said:
"There must be some competent evidence to show that an offense
has been committed over which the court in the other district had
jurisdiction, and that the defendant is the individual named in the
charge, and that there is probable cause for believing him guilty
of the
Page 218 U. S. 447
offense charged."
In the case of
Hyde v. Shine, the justice was but
declaring the rule already recognized and enforced under § 1014 of
the Revised Statutes.
So, in the other case relied upon,
Tinsley v. Treat,
205 U. S. 20, it
was held, under the circumstances shown, that a prisoner would be
released upon habeas corpus where the proceedings were under § 1014
of the Revised Statutes. It was held that, while an indictment
constitutes
prima facie evidence of the offense, when the
defendant offered to show that no offense had been committed
triable in the district to which removal was sought, the exclusion
of such evidence was not mere error, but a denial of a right
secured under the federal Constitution to be tried in the state and
district where the alleged offense was committed, and therefore
reviewable under habeas corpus proceedings. Neither
Hyde v.
Shine nor
Tinsley v. Treat is authority for the
proposition that a writ of habeas corpus can be made the basis of a
review of the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction where
proceedings were had under a constitutional statute giving the
court authority to examine into the charges, and to convict or
acquit the accused, when the proceedings show no attempt to exert
the jurisdiction of the court in excess of its authority.
The learned counsel for appellants rely upon a number of cases
which are said to warrant the court in habeas corpus proceedings in
examining the bill of exceptions with a view to determining such
matters as are herein presented. But an examination of these cases
will show that, where collateral attacks have been sustained
through the medium of a writ of habeas corpus, the grounds were
such as attacked the validity of the judgments, and the objections
sustained were such as rendered the judgment not merely erroneous,
but void. In
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163, the court undertook to impose
a second punishment where it had already exhausted its power in
Page 218 U. S. 448
imposing one of the alternative penalties allowed by law. In
In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274, the
record disclosed that it was sought to impose a second punishment
for the same offense. In
Ex Parte Bain, 121 U. S.
1, it was held that the court was without power to order
an amendment of the indictment without a submission of the case to
the grand jury, and that subsequent proceedings upon an indictment
thus changed were without jurisdiction. In
In re Nielsen,
131 U. S. 176, it
was held that the court exceeded its authority in undertaking to
pass the particular sentence imposed. We find nothing in these
cases to conflict with the well established rule in this Court that
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a
writ of error.
If such would be its effect, then this Court could readily be
converted into an appellate court in criminal proceedings, a
jurisdiction denied to it by the statute. No attack can be
successfully made upon the right and authority of the circuit court
of the United States to take jurisdiction of the offense charged in
the indictment. No objection is made to the constitutionality of
the statute, or the right and authority of the court to consider
and determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for that
purpose to weigh and determine the effect of the testimony offered.
The contention is that, in the respects pointed out, the testimony
wholly fails to support the charge. The attack is thus not upon the
jurisdiction and authority of the court to proceed to investigate
and determine the truth of the charge, but upon the sufficiency of
the evidence to show the guilt of the accused. This has never been
held to be within the province of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon
habeas corpus, the court examines only the power and authority of
the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions.
See, among other cases in this Court,
Ex Parte
Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38;
Ex Parte Terry,
128 U. S. 289,
128 U. S. 306;
Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333;
Page 218 U. S. 449
Ex Parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18,
93 U. S. 22-23;
Kazio v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146,
211 U. S.
148.
We will proceed, then, to examine such of the objections as go
to the authority of the court to try and sentence the accused. It
is insisted that the trial in the Circuit Court of the United
States at Pensacola, Florida, was without jurisdiction because the
trial took place when the court had no lawful authority to sit, as
it was not held at any legal term of court. It is contended that
the right to hold a term at Pensacola because of the proceedings
disclosed in the record had ended before the accused were tried at
the session beginning in November, 1906. It appears that the
regular term of court at Pensacola commenced on March 3, 1906,
continued in session until May 12, 1906. The clerk of the court
testified that the court was in session in Tallahassee, held by the
same judge as held the court at Pensacola, on May 13, 14, 15, and
16, 1906. It appears that the clerk was in the habit of using a
rubber stamp for the purpose of evidencing the adjournments of the
court, and also the adjournments from day to day when the court was
not present. These adjournments appear to have been in accordance
with a rule of the court which provides that, during the temporary
absence of the judge, the court shall be deemed open daily at each
of the clerk's offices in the district for the transaction of
business on the equity side of the court, and also for the filing
of papers, and the transaction of business of a general character
in court, and the clerk shall be present, in person or by deputy,
and the record of the same shall be entered upon the minutes of the
court.
Such adjournments were had from June 6, 1906, the last day the
judge was present at Pensacola, until he returned to the Circuit
Court for the Northern District of Florida in November, 1906,
subsequent to which time the indictment, trial, and conviction of
the appellants took place. The argument of the appellants comes to
this,
Page 218 U. S. 450
that as there was no legal adjournment of the term at Pensacola
to a day certain when the court proceeded to hold the term at
Tallahassee, there was no legal authority to resume the sitting of
the court at Pensacola in November, and consequently there was no
legal term of the court at which the proceeding resulting in the
conviction of the accused could be had.
But we cannot agree to this contention. The statutes of the
United States provide for two terms of the United States Circuit
Court for the Northern District of Florida, the one beginning on
the first Monday of February at Tallahassee, the other the first
Monday in March at Pensacola. 1 U.S.Comp.Stats. 1901, p. 531.
Section 612 of the Revised Statutes provides that the circuit
courts of the United States can be held at the same time in
different districts of the same circuit. Section 672 provides that,
if neither of the judges of the circuit court be present to open
and adjourn any regular or adjourned special session, either of
them may, by a written order, directed alternatively to the
marshal, and, in his absence, to the clerk, adjourn the court from
time to time, as the case may require, to any time before the next
regular term. We think the purpose of the law was to provide for
statutory terms of court for the Northern District of Florida,
beginning on the first Monday of February and March, respectively,
which term should continue until the beginning of the next term,
unless finally adjourned in the meantime. Such is the general and
recognized practice in the circuit courts of the United States.
East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 F.
446.
There was certainly no adjournment of the court for the term
when the judge was absent, holding court at Tallahassee, or was out
of the state. There was an attempt, at least, to keep the court
open pending the absence of the presiding judge by the adjournments
in pursuance of Rule XIII.
Page 218 U. S. 451
Nor do we find anything in the objections made to the manner in
which the record of the sessions was kept, which it is unnecessary
to examine in further detail, it being sufficient to say that we
think the court that sat in November, 1906, was legally in session,
with authority to proceed against the accused.
It is next objected that the order for the impaneling of the
grand jury was made by a judge of the Circuit Court for the Fifth
Circuit, who, although within his circuit, was not within the
district where the court was located when the trial was had. If
there were otherwise merit in this objection, it certainly could
not be made on habeas corpus. Such objections must be made by
proper pleas filed in the court of original jurisdiction.
Kaizo
v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146,
211 U. S. 149.
It is contended that competent testimony was adduced to show
that the indictments were not properly presented by the grand jury
in that the one under which the accused was tried was not regularly
found by the grand jury nor voted upon by them. Testimony was
introduced to the effect that, after the presentation of the
original indictment, the grand jury were informed by the district
attorney that the indictment needed amendment in some particular,
this amendment was read over in the presence of the grand jury, was
incorporated into an indictment, the indictment was regularly
returned into court, where it was produced with the consent of all
the grand jurors. No objection was taken at the trial to the
indictment for this reason, and upon proper pleas a trial and
conviction were had; certainly an objection of that kind, if ever
available, cannot be made for the first time in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
It was objected in the court below that the original sentence
exceeded the authority of the court, in that it required service at
hard labor. Upon motion of the government's counsel, that much of
the sentence was stricken
Page 218 U. S. 452
out. There is no contention that hard labor has been, or will
be, imposed upon the appellants, and, at most, only that part of
the sentence in excess of the law will be void.
United States
v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48.
We find no error in the judgments of the Circuit Court in
refusing to release the petitioners upon the writs of habeas
corpus, and the same will be affirmed.
Affirmed.