On writ of error to review a judgment of conviction of the state
court this Court has no jurisdiction to notice errors other than
those which involve alleged violations of federal rights. The
states have the right to administer their own laws for the
prosecution of crime so long as fundamental rights secured by
federal law are not denied.
Whether provisions as to qualifications of jurors and electors
in subsequently adopted constitution and subsequently enacted laws
of one of the states enumerated in the Act of Congress of June 25,
1868, c. 70, 15 Stat. 73, providing that the constitution of such
states should never be amended so as to deprive citizens of the
United States of their rights as electors, violate such act will
not be determined at the instance of a person convicted of crime
unless it appears that persons qualified under the federal act were
disqualified, and thereby prevented from serving on the jury by the
constitution and laws the validity whereof is attacked.
Quaere whether the Act of June 25, 1868, c. 70, 15
Stat. 73, does restrict the states enumerated therein in fixing the
qualifications for suffrage within such states respectively.
Where the real objection is that a grand jury is so made up as
to exclude persons of the race of accused, the facts establishing
the contention must be averred and proved.
Martin v.
Texas, 200 U. S. 316.
Where the state court has held that, under the state jury law,
the commissioners are only required to select men of good moral
character and that competent negroes are equally eligible with
others, this Court cannot hold that a negro is denied equal
protection of the law by reason of the statute because the
commissioners have not selected any negroes for the grand jury
which indicted him, and so
held as to the jury law of 1902
of South Carolina.
The granting and denial of continuances are matters within the
discretion of the trial court, and are not ordinarily reviewable;
in this case, the refusal to grant a continuance did not amount to
a denial of due process of law to the accused.
Quaere, and not decided in this case, to what extent
one can resist arrest under process issued under a void or
unconstitutional law.
Page 218 U. S. 162
Where one about to be arrested by an officer of the law under
process issued under a law which is unconstitutional shoots the
officer upon his entering the room, the question of right of
resistance to arrest is for the jury, and the accused is not
entitled to a peremptory instruction of dismissal, nor is he denied
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the refusal of
the court to give such instruction because the process was issued
under a statute violative of the Thirteenth Amendment, to-wit, §
357 of the Criminal Code of South Carolina in regard to
agricultural contracts.
80 S.C. 332 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error, Pink Franklin, a citizen of the negro
race, was convicted, in the court of general sessions for the
County of Orangeburg, South Carolina, of the crime of murder by the
shooting of one H. E. Valentine; thereupon he was sentenced to
suffer the death penalty, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, the judgment of the Court of General Cessions was
affirmed. 80 S.C. 332. The case is here upon a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
The record discloses that the homicide occurred upon the attempt
of H. E. Valentine, a constable, to arrest Franklin upon a charge
of "having violated and broken
Page 218 U. S. 163
an agricultural contract," against the form of a statute made
and provided in such cases in the State of South Carolina. The
statute referred to is § 357 of the Criminal Code of South
Carolina, which provides:
"Any laborer working on shares of crop or for wages in money or
other valuable consideration, under a verbal or written contract to
labor on farm lands, who shall receive advances either in money or
supplies, and thereafter willfully, and without just cause, fail to
perform the reasonable service required of him by the terms of said
contract, shall be liable to prosecution for a misdemeanor, and on
conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
twenty days, nor more than thirty days, or to be fined in the sum
of not less than $25 nor more than $100, in the discretion of the
court:
Provided, the verbal contract herein referred to
shall be witnessed by at least two disinterested witnesses."
Upon the filing of the complaint before a magistrate, what is
termed an arrest warrant was issued, directed to Henry E.
Valentine, as special constable, commanding him to apprehend the
plaintiff in error because of the alleged violation of the
agricultural contract, and to bring him before the magistrate, to
be dealt with according to law.
As it becomes necessary, in considering the federal questions
raised in the record, to know the facts concerning the homicide, we
take occasion to briefly summarize such as are pertinent. The
testimony offered for the state and that offered for the plaintiff
in error differed widely as to what occurred at the time the
constable was shot. The record discloses that, about the time of
the attempted arrest, Valentine, the constable, summoning one
Carter to assist him, about three o'clock on the morning of the
homicide, proceeded to the farm of one Spires, who lived near to
Franklin's house, and requested him to induce Franklin to go to his
house, that he might be there arrested.
Page 218 U. S. 164
Accordingly, Spires went to Franklin's, and, having aroused him,
asked him to do some plowing for him. Franklin replied that he
would do the plowing that afternoon, but could not work for Spires
that morning. Thereupon Valentine and Carter went to Franklin's
house to make the arrest. For the state, the testimony tended to
show that the door of Franklin's house and the inner door of his
bedroom were open; that Valentine rapped with a knife on the steps
of the house, and called to Franklin, and received no response;
that Valentine thereupon directed Carter to go around that house,
which he did, and Valentine, entering the door, was instantly shot
by Franklin, and Valentine's pistol was seized and wrung from his
hand; that, after he was shot, a colored woman came in with an axe
and said that she had a good will to finish up the job; that
Carter, upon hearing the pistol shots, which were fired in rapid
succession, ran around the house, and was caught by the leg by
Franklin's son, a small boy; that, upon entering the house he, too,
was shot, receiving a slight wound.
On other hand, the accused testified that he had no acquaintance
with Valentine; that he did not know that he was an officer of the
law and armed with a warrant for his arrest; that he heard nothing
until the door was hurled open, and Valentine said to him "Hands
up," that he (Franklin) did not move; that Valentine shot him,
inflicting a wound in his shoulder; that he fell down by his
pallet, got his gun, and fired, intending to get out of the way,
and did get out as fast as he could.
In a proceeding of this kind, this Court has no jurisdiction to
notice other errors than those which involve alleged violations of
federal rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or
federal statutes. The states have the right to administer their own
laws for the prosecution of crime, and the jurisdiction of this
Court extends only to the reversal of such state proceedings
Page 218 U. S. 165
where fundamental rights secured by the federal law have been
denied by the proceedings in the state courts.
Rogers v.
Peck, 199 U. S. 425,
199 U. S. 434,
and cases there cited.
We will proceed, then, to examine the errors assigned which may
be fairly said to raise federal questions reviewable here. A motion
was made to quash the indictment because of the disqualification of
the grand jury which returned it. The argument being that the
federal Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73, c. 70, provides that the
constitutions of certain states, including South Carolina, should
never be amended or changed so as to deprive any citizen or class
of citizens of the United States, of the right to vote in said
state, given to them by the Constitution thereof, named in the act,
except for the punishment for crimes such as are now felonies at
common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under laws
equally applicable to all the states. The necessary qualifications
of voters in South Carolina at that time were defined in § 2, art.
8, of the Constitution of South Carolina of 1868, and were:
"Every male citizen of the United States of the age of
twenty-one years and upwards, not laboring under the disabilities
named in this Constitution, without distinction of race, color, or
former condition, who shall be a resident of this state at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution, or who shall thereafter
reside in this state one year and in the county in which he offers
to vote sixty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled
to vote for all officers that are now or hereafter may be elected
by the people, and upon all questions submitted to the electors at
any elections:
Provided, that no person shall be allowed
to vote or hold office who is now or hereafter may be disqualified
therefor by the Constitution of the United States until such
disqualification shall be removed by the Congress of the United
States:
Provided further, that no person, while kept in
any almshouse or asylum, or of unsound mind, or confined in any
public
Page 218 U. S. 166
prison, shall be allowed to vote or hold office."
These qualifications for voters were changed by the Constitution
of 1895, and now are:
"Art. 2, § 4. The qualifications for suffrage shall be as
follows: (a) residence in the state for two years, in the county
one year, in the polling precinct in which the elector offers to
vote, four months, and the payment, six months before any election,
of any poll tax then due and payable; . . . (d) Any person who
shall apply for registration after January first, 1898, if
otherwise qualified, shall be registered:
Provided, that
he can both read and write any section of this Constitution
submitted to him by the registration officer, or can show that he
owns and has paid all taxes collectible during the previous year on
property in this state assessed at three hundred dollars ($300) or
more."
This change in the qualification for voters, it is said, worked
a deprivation of the rights of the accused, because the
qualification of grand jurors under the constitution of 1895, they
being required to be electors of the state, made eligible different
persons than those who were qualified to be electors under the
Constitution of 1868. As to this contention, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the Constitution of 1895 laid no
restriction on color or previous condition to entitle one to be an
elector; that the act of Congress of 1868 had no reference to the
selection of jurors, and that it was inapplicable to the
constitution of the state in regard to juries.
If it could be held that the act of Congress restricted the
State of South Carolina in fixing the qualifications for suffrage,
it is unnecessary to decide the point in this case, as there is
nothing in the record to show that the grand jury, as actually
impaneled, contained any person who was not qualified as an elector
under the Constitution of 1868, nor is there anything to show that
the grand jury was so made up as to prevent citizens of the race of
the
Page 218 U. S. 167
plaintiff in error from sitting thereon. There was no allegation
in the motion to quash upon this ground, or offer of proof in the
case to show that persons of the African race were excluded because
of their race or color from serving as grand jurors in the criminal
prosecution of a person of that race; therefore the case does not
come within the rule laid down in
Carter v. Texas,
177 U. S. 422;
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226, and
kindred cases. Moreover, if the restriction upon the right to fix
qualifications for suffrage in the federal act could have the
effect contended for as to subsequent state action, there was
nothing in the act to prevent the selection of grand jurors having
the qualifications prescribed for electors in the Constitution of
1895 in the absence of a showing that such legislation operated to
exclude citizens from such juries on account of race.
In re
Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 297,
140 U. S. 298. In
this class of cases, when the real objection is that a grand jury
is so made up as to exclude persons of the race of the accused from
serving in that capacity, it is essential to aver and prove such
facts as establish the contention.
Martin v. Texas,
200 U. S. 316.
It is next contended, concerning the jury law of South Carolina,
that it confers arbitrary power upon the jury commissioners in
selecting jurors. Section 2 of the Act of 1902 provides (p.
1066):
"They [the jury commissioners] shall . . . prepare a list of
such qualified electors under the provisions of the Constitution,
between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-five years, and of good
moral character, of their respective counties, as they may deem
otherwise well qualified to serve as jurors, being persons of sound
judgment and free from all legal exceptions, which list shall
include not less than one from every three of such qualified
electors,"
etc.
We do not think there is anything in this provision of the
statute having the effect to deny rights secured by the federal
Constitution. It gives to the jury commissioners
Page 218 U. S. 168
the right to select electors of good moral character, such as
they may deem qualified to serve as jurors, being persons of sound
judgment and free from all legal exceptions. There is nothing in
this statute which discriminates against individuals on account of
race or color or previous condition, or which subjects such persons
to any other or different treatment than other electors who may be
qualified to serve as jurors. The statute simply provides for an
exercise of judgment in attempting to secure competent jurors of
proper qualifications.
Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.
S. 101,
163 U. S. 108;
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565,
162 U. S.
589.
Under this statute, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that the jury commissioners were only required to select men of
good moral character, and that competent colored men were equally
eligible with others for such service. We find no denial of federal
rights in this provision of the statute.
It is next contended that the plaintiff in error was denied due
process of law in the refusal of the court of continue his case
when the same was called for trial. It is elementary that the
matter of continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its action in that respect is not ordinarily reviewable.
It would take an extreme case to make the action of the trial court
in such a case a denial of due process of law. A continuance was
asked for because, it was alleged, the counsel for the accused had
not had sufficient time or opportunity to examine the notes of the
testimony taken before the coroner who investigated the case. The
record discloses that, in support of the motion to continue,
counsel for the plaintiff in error made affidavit that, two weeks
before the beginning of the term, he had called upon the clerk of
the court, and asked to see the testimony taken before the coroner,
and that the clerk had informed him that the coroner kept his book
in a room upstairs, but that the
Page 218 U. S. 169
room was locked at the time; that the plaintiff in error's
counsel thereupon made a search for the coroner, and that, failing
to find his, he called upon the solicitor for the state, and asked
him if he had the original testimony, and the same was handed him,
which testimony was partly in shorthand, and the stenographer who
took the same being out of town at the time, counsel for the
accused could therefore not get a proper and intelligent reading of
the testimony. Counsel for the accused further deposed that he
called upon the deputy sheriff and asked him to go into the room
used by the grand jury at the time, to get the coroner's book. This
was on Tuesday or Wednesday of the week of the trial. He found,
upon examination, that the testimony had not been copied into the
coroner's book, and that therefore the counsel were not enabled to
read and become familiar with the testimony "absolutely needed for
contradiction on the trial of such causes." Counsel for the state
stated in this connection that, when the attorney for the accused
came to his office and asked for the coroner's inquisition, he
handed to him the papers in the case, telling him at the time that
he did not know whether he could read them or not, because they
were written in a kind of short or running hand; that he had
suppressed no record in the case, and had given the counsel all the
records which he had; that the record was written in a kind of
running long hand; that the young man who took the testimony was
out of town at the time, and that he had so stated. Upon this
showing, the court declined to continue the case. Certainly there
was no deprivation of due process of law in this action.
It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to direct
a verdict upon motion of the defendant's counsel at the close of
the testimony because the warrant on which the deceased attempted
to arrest the plaintiff in error was null and void, because the act
under which it
Page 218 U. S. 170
was issued was unconstitutional, and this, so far as federal
questions are concerned, because it was in violation of Art. IV,
and repugnant to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
federal Constitution. Responding to this motion to direct an
acquittal, the court said:
"It is not necessary to argue that point further, even if you
were to establish the fact that the warrant were null and void, or
even if the man had no warrant at all, it would not be competent
for the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant Pinkney
Franklin, and the motion is refused. I will also leave it to the
jury as to the guilt or innocence of the other defendant. I don't
care to discuss the matter, but I do not apprehend that it is a
case in which the court ought to direct a verdict in case of either
of the defendants, and the motion is therefore refused."
The only federal question raised in this connection is found in
this denial of the motion to direct a verdict in favor of the
accused, because the statute under which he was sought to be
arrested was void under the federal Constitution, and the warrant
issued for his arrest under such unconstitutional law therefore
void and of no effect. That the statute under which the proceedings
were had and the warrant issued is unconstitutional was held by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in
Ex Parte Hollman, 79
S.C. 1. In that case, the court reached the conclusion that the
statute in question not only violated the Constitution of the
state, but was in contravention of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and § 1990 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, known as the peonage
statute.
See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.
S. 207.
But an inspection of this record does not disclose that, by any
request to charge or otherwise, any advantage was sought to be
taken of the unconstitutionality of the act other than is found in
the request for the peremptory
Page 218 U. S. 171
instruction to acquit the accused. Even if one attempted to be
arrested under process issued under a void and unconstitutional law
has the right to resist arrest, even to the taking of human life (a
point we do not find it necessary to decide), the case could not
have been taken from the jury upon the testimony disclosed in this
record. The right to make such resistance to the officer, under the
circumstances here shown, must have been left to the determination
of the jury, under proper instructions. In this case, if the
state's testimony is to be believed, the accused, without any
warning, or resorting to any other means of resistance, and after
the constable had knocked for admission, shot the officer upon his
entering the open door, armed with a supposed warrant of arrest.
Upon this showing, the case could certainly not be taken from the
jury because of any supposed right to resist with all necessary
force an unlawful arrest because of the invalidity of the statute,
or the warrant issued in pursuance thereof.
It was insisted in the oral argument of this case, and an
elaborate brief was filed by eminent counsel, making the
contentions that the proceedings for the arrest of the accused were
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and
of § 1990 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, abolishing
and prohibiting peonage and declaring null and void the
resolutions, regulations, and usages of any state or territory in
that respect, and that they were in violation of § 5526 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, punishing any person who
holds, arrests, or returns, or causes to be held, arrested, or
returned, or in any way aids in the arrest or return of, any person
to a condition of peonage, and were in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. This being so, and the statute and the warrant being
illegal and void, the accused, it is contended, had the right to
use all reasonable force to protect his person, his liberty, and
his habitation
Page 218 U. S. 172
from such unlawful arrest, and that, therefore, the firing of
the fatal shot was only a reasonable use of force for the defense
of the accused under the circumstances shown.
But, as we have said, the only attempt to raise questions of a
federal character concerning the validity of the statute and the
warrant under which it was issued, and the right to resist arrest
under such warrant, was in the request for a peremptory instruction
for an acquittal. Even upon the theory of his rights now advanced,
he was not entitled to a peremptory instruction taking the case
from the jury.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina considered and overruled
certain grounds of appeal, which embrace objections to the charge.
But we do not find in these rulings any determination of federal
questions adverse to the plaintiff in error which would warrant a
reversal of the judgment by this Court. These rulings were upon
questions of general law, concerning which no federal right was
asserted and denied, as is essential to enable this Court to review
the judgment of a state court.
After giving this case the examination its importance deserves
in view of its gravity, we are unable to find in the record
anything which worked a deprivation of federal rights, warranting
this Court in disturbing the judgment of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.