The Governor of Vermont has ample power to grant reprieves to
persons sentenced to death for murder.
It is only where fundamental rights specially secured by the
federal Constitution are invaded that the federal courts will
interfere with a state in the administration of its law for the
prosecution of crime, and it will not be presumed that, if the
freedom of a person properly convicted of murder and sentenced to
death is improperly restricted, that the state authorities will not
afford the necessary relief.
Federal courts will not, by writs of habeas corpus, reverse the
proceedings of state courts while acting within their jurisdiction
under statutes which
Page 199 U. S. 426
do not conflict with the federal Constitution, and the decision
of the state court that it is not necessary for the court to refix
the day for execution of a person already sentenced by the court
and reprieved by the Governor, where the reprieve definitely sets
the day, is one wholly within state practice, and is not controlled
by federal Constitution or laws.
Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not require the state to adopt a particular form of procedure, so
long as the accused has had sufficient notice and adequate
opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution, and the state may
determine, free from federal interference or control, in what
courts crime may be prosecuted and by what courts the prosecutions
may be reviewed.
Statutes should be given a reasonable construction with a view
to make effectual the legislative intent, and the granting by the
Governor of a reprieve to a person sentenced to death in order that
an appeal may be heard in this Court from an order of the district
court dismissing a petition in habeas corpus proceedings is not
such an interference by state authorities in a proceeding in the
federal courts in violation of § 766, Rev.Stat., as will make the
subsequent confinement and execution of the prisoner a deprivation
of liberty or life without due process of law.
The appellant, Mary Mabel Rogers, having been convicted and
sentenced in the County Court of Bennington, in the State of
Vermont, of the crime of murder in the first degree, filed her
petition on June 19, 1905, for a writ of habeas corpus against the
sheriff and superintendent of the state prison in the District
Court of the United States for the District of Vermont. The
petition, having been heard, was denied on June 22, 1905. From that
order, an appeal was taken to this Court.
The conviction of appellant was had at the December term, 1903,
of the Bennington County Court, and she was sentenced to be
confined at hard labor in the State Prison at Windsor until the
third day of November, 1904, and on and after that day to be kept
in solitary confinement until February 3, 1905, on which day she
should suffer the penalty of death by hanging. On the first day of
February, 1905, the Governor of the State of Vermont reprieved the
execution of sentence until June 2, 1905. On April 29, 1905, the
appellant presented a petition for a new trial to two judges of the
Supreme Court of Vermont. On May 5, 1905, the judges made an order
allowing the petition for new trial to be filed, and fixed May 10
for the hearing
Page 199 U. S. 427
thereof. After hearing before the supreme court, sitting at
Montpelier, Washington County, on May 30, an order was made
dismissing the petition, and refusing the new trial.
Rogers v.
State, 77 Vt. 454. On June 1, 1905, the execution of sentence
was further reprieved by the Governor until June 23, 1905.
Thereupon appellant filed her petition in the federal court for the
writ of habeas corpus, which was dismissed, as heretofore stated.
On the date of the dismissal of her petition (June 22, 1905), the
Governor further reprieved the execution of the sentence until
December 8, 1905. The appeal to this Court was allowed on June 22,
1905. The petitioner (appellant) averred that, by the various
proceedings in the state courts and her incarceration in the prison
in solitary confinement, she has been restrained of her liberty and
is about to be executed without due process of law, guaranteed for
her protection by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.
Page 199 U. S. 431
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the reversal of the judgment and order of the district court
of the United States discharging the writ and remanding her to the
custody of the Vermont authorities, appellant relies upon the
following specifications of error:
"First. Because the petitioner was and is deprived of her
liberty by the state, and subjected to the punishment of solitary
confinement without any statute authorizing such punishment, and
without any sentence of any court directing such punishment, and
therefore without due process of law. "
Page 199 U. S. 432
"Second. Because the Supreme Court of Vermont, having taken
jurisdiction of the petition for a new trial and having failed to
comply with the requirements of law in respect of ordering a stay
of execution and fixing the time for the execution of the
petitioner, has failed to fix a day for the execution, and the
Governor of Vermont has no right or authority to fix such a day,
and the petitioner is being held to be executed in accordance with
a precept not authorized by law, and which is not in and of itself
due process of law."
"Third. Because the State of Vermont, having failed to maintain
an appellate court in the County of Bennington, as required by its
Constitution, has deprived the relator of the opportunity to be
heard by a court of competent jurisdiction, and thus deprived her
of due process of law."
"Fourth. Because the Governor of Vermont, having issued his
order requiring execution of the petitioner on December 8, while
proceedings were pending in the courts of the United States for her
relief on habeas corpus, said order of the Governor is to be deemed
null and void, and the petitioner should be released from custody
thereunder."
We shall notice these several assignments in the order
named.
As to solitary confinement of the prisoner, it is not contended
that she was not properly sentenced in this respect by the court of
original jurisdiction. The statute of the State of Vermont
(Vt.Stat. § 2007) provides:
"When execution is not to take place until after six months from
date of sentence, the court at the same time shall sentence the
respondent to hard labor in the state prison or house of correction
until three months before the time fixed in the sentence of death
for execution thereof, and shall also sentence him to solitary
confinement in the state prison or house of correction from the
expiration of the sentence to hard labor until the time of
execution."
The court, in sentencing the appellant to be hanged on the first
Friday of February, 1905, in pursuance of this statute, imposed a
sentence of three months at hard labor until within
Page 199 U. S. 433
three months of the time fixed for the execution, and three
months of solitary confinement next before the day of
execution.
The complaint in this behalf is not of a sentence alleged to
have been imposed in violation of law, but because of the manner in
which the appellant has been kept in confinement in prison after
the original day fixed for the execution of the sentence. She
alleges that she is suffering solitary confinement without due
process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If
she is held in such confinement by the state authorities, which the
record does not disclose, the confinement shown being close, rather
than solitary, we are of the opinion that no case within the
federal protection is made.
In re Medley, 134 U.
S. 160, is cited and relied upon by counsel. That case
presented an entirely different question. It was there held that a
sentence under a state law passed after the commission of felonious
homicide, affixing the punishment of solitary confinement for a
period of six months in addition to the death penalty, was an
ex post facto law within the meaning of Section 10,
Article I, of the federal Constitution, and therefore void. In
Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U. S. 319, it
was held that a statute which substituted close confinement in the
penitentiary for a period before execution longer than had
theretofore been authorized for confinement in jail was not an
ex post facto law. In the present case, no sentence or law
is being violated, and, assuming the appellant to be held in
solitary confinement, there is nothing to prevent her having relief
at the hands of the state authorities, and nothing to show that the
appellant is being deprived of her liberty in violation of any
right secured to her by the federal Constitution.
The extent of the right of the federal courts to interfere by
the writ of habeas corpus with the proceedings of courts and other
authorities of a state is carefully defined by statute. When a
prisoner is in jail, he may be released upon habeas corpus when
held in violation of his constitutional rights. Rev.Stat. § 753. In
the case before us, assuming for this purpose
Page 199 U. S. 434
that the appellant has been properly convicted and sentenced of
one of the gravest offenses known to the law, she is properly
restrained of her liberty while in custody, for the purpose of
making the sentence effectual. If her custodian is improperly
restricting her freedom more than is necessary or legal under state
law, there is no reason to suppose that the state authorities will
not afford the necessary relief. And certainly there is nothing in
this branch of the case to justify federal interference with the
local authority entrusted with the keeping of the prisoner.
The reluctance with which this Court will sanction federal
interference with a state in the administration of its domestic law
for the prosecution of crime has been frequently stated in the
deliverances of the court upon the subject. It is only where
fundamental rights, specially secured by the federal Constitution,
are invaded that such interference is warranted.
Ex Parte
Reggel, 114 U. S. 642;
In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624;
Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138;
Hodgson v. Vermont, 168 U. S. 262;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172;
In re Frederich, 149 U. S. 70.
As to the second assignment of error, arising from the failure
of the Supreme Court of Vermont to grant a stay and fix time for
execution of the sentence when it entertained and denied the
petition for a new trial, at the time of the ruling in this behalf,
the prisoner had been reprieved until June 2. The decision was made
before that day had arrived (May 30th). It is difficult to perceive
any good reason for requiring the court to fix a time for sentence
which was already definitely set by the reprieve of the Governor.
It was the opinion of the Supreme Court of Vermont that it was not
required to do so, and this decision cannot be reversed by federal
authority. It has been so frequently ruled by this Court that it is
scarcely necessary to cite cases that the federal courts will not,
by writs of habeas corpus, undertake to reverse the proceedings of
the state courts while acting within their jurisdiction under
statutes which do not conflict with the federal Constitution.
In Re
Page 199 U. S. 435
Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291;
In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278;
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272.
Whether, when the Governor had issued a reprieve which carried
the date of execution beyond the time of decision in the supreme
court, such action rendered unnecessary the fixing of a new day for
execution was purely a question of state practice, not controlled
by the federal Constitution or laws, and upon which the state court
had final jurisdiction.
Lambert v. Barrett, 159 U.
S. 660.
As to the third assignment, that the State of Vermont had failed
to maintain an appellate court in the County of Bennington, as
required by its Constitution, and thereby deprived the appellant of
an opportunity to be heard in review by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the state has the right to determine for itself the
courts in which crime may be prosecuted, and the appellate
tribunals, if any, to which such causes may be carried for review.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684,
153 U. S. 687.
Due process of law, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not require the state to adopt a particular form of procedure so
long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of
the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the
prosecution.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v.
Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230;
Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.
S. 586.
The appellant had the right, by the laws of the state, to have a
jury trial before a competent court. Upon exceptions, duly and
seasonably taken for errors of law alleged to have occurred upon
the trial, the appellant had a right to review in the supreme court
(Vt.Stat. § 1961); whether this court should be held in each
county, or at the state capital for all the counties, is entirely a
question of state procedure, presenting no federal question for
review here.
The fourth assignment of error calls for the consideration of §
766, Rev.Stat. of the United States, as amended. 27 Stat. 751. This
section provides in substance that any proceeding against a person
imprisoned or confined or restrained
Page 199 U. S. 436
of his liberty in any state court or by authority of any state
pending the proceedings or appeal in habeas corpus cases in the
federal courts, and until final judgment therein, and after final
judgment of discharge, shall be null and void. The contention for
the appellant in this behalf is that the order further staying
execution of the sentence by the Governor of Vermont, made on June
22, 1905, granting a reprieve until December 8 of the same year,
was made pending the habeas corpus proceedings in the federal
courts, and is therefore void. The order of reprieve was made on
June 22, the day upon which the writ was dismissed and appeal
allowed to this Court, just after the petitioner was remanded to
the custody of the state authorities and very shortly before the
appeal here was allowed. The power of the Governor of Vermont to
grant reprieves in cases of murder is ample. Constitution of
Vermont, chap. 2, § 11, Amendment, Art. 8. And such power is
neither granted nor withheld by the federal Constitution.
Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138.
It is perfectly apparent that it was exercised in the present
instance for the very purpose of permitting the prisoner to appeal
to this Court, and not to render ineffectual or in anywise
interfere with the jurisdiction and orders of the federal courts.
Statutes should be given a reasonable construction, with a view to
make effectual the legislative intent in their enactment. The
object of this statute is apparent. It requires the state courts
and authorities to make no order, and entertain no proceeding,
which shall interfere with the full examination and final judgment
in a habeas corpus proceeding in the federal courts,
In re
Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291, and
in no wise to interfere with the judgment if it shall result in a
restoration of the petitioner's freedom when wrongfully imprisoned
or restrained. The proceedings annulled are "against the person so
imprisoned," etc. The statute aims to entirely prevent action which
shall interfere with the perfect freedom of the federal courts to
inquire into the case and make such orders and render such judgment
as they shall see fit.
Page 199 U. S. 437
The reprieve granted has had the effect doubtless intended by
the chief executive of the state -- to allow the cause to be heard
upon appeal in this Court. To denominate such an order a proceeding
against the prisoner would do violence to the terms of the statute,
and defeat, not carry out, its purpose.
We are unable to find that the appellant has sustained any
violation of rights secured by the federal Constitution by the
proceedings of the executive or judicial departments of the State
of Vermont. The final order is affirmed, mandate to issue at
once.
