Where a decision of the Land Department rests on the priority of
equitable rights of a contestant it is conclusive upon the courts
so far as it involves questions of fact, and on a mixed question of
law and fact it is conclusive unless the court can so separate the
question that the mistake of law is clearly apparent.
Where the controversy in the Land Department involves the
question of whether the first occupant occupied the land for
homestead or townsite entry, and there is evidence to support the
Secretary's finding, that finding is conclusive on the courts even
though the evidence be conflicting.
13 Idaho 90 affirmed.
This was an action brought by John E. White and Roberta B.
White, his wife, in the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai,
to recover the possession of the
"Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter and Lots five (5),
six (6), and seven (7), of Section two (2), Township fifty-five
(55) North of Range two (2) East, Boise Meridian."
The defendants' answer was in the nature of a cross-bill in
equity, admitting that the legal title to the premises was in the
plaintiffs, and seeking to charge them as holders of that title in
trust for the use and benefit of the defendants. A trial before the
court without a jury resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs for
the recovery of possession and damages
Page 214 U. S. 16
for the detention. On appeal to the supreme court of the state,
the award of damages was set aside, but the judgment for the
recovery of possession was affirmed. Thereupon the case was brought
here on error.
The plaintiffs' title was a patent from the United States to
plaintiff John E. White, based upon a homestead entry. The
defendants claimed to have been occupants of the premises as a
townsite, and that therefore the land was not subject to entry as a
homestead. The application for the homestead entry was formally
made at the land office a few hours before that of the probate
judge of the county, acting under the statutes as trustee for the
occupants of the townsite. A contest was had in the local land
office, which resulted in a finding in favor of the plaintiff John
E. White. This decision was sustained by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office and affirmed by the Secretary of the
Interior.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decision of the Land Department was not rested solely upon
the fact that White's formal application was filed a few hours
before that of the trustee for the occupants of the townsite, but
rather chiefly upon the priority of the former's equitable rights.
So far as such decision involves questions of fact, it is
conclusive upon the courts.
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72,
80 U. S. 86;
Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330,
91 U. S. 340;
Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473,
101 U. S. 476;
Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420,
104 U. S.
425-426;
Burfenning v. C., St. P.M. & O.
Ry., 163 U. S. 321,
163 U. S. 323;
De Cambra v. Rogers, 186 U. S. 119,
186 U. S.
120.
And this rule is applied in cases where there is a mixed
Page 214 U. S. 17
question of law and fact unless the court is able to so separate
the question as to see clearly what and where the mistake of law
is. As said by Mr. Justice Miller in
Marquez v. Frisbie,
supra, p.
101 U. S.
476:
"This means, and it is a sound principle, that, where there is a
mixed question of law and of fact, and the court cannot so separate
it as to see clearly where the mistake of law is, the decision of
the tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is
conclusive."
Quinby v. Conlan, supra, 104 U. S.
426.
Further, the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth findings of the
trial court, which were not disturbed by the supreme court in its
opinion, were:
"38. That the officers of the Interior Department did not
exclude any testimony, and there was in said Land Office and said
Department a full, fair, and complete hearing."
"39. That the officers of said Interior Department, of said Land
Office, or any or either of them, were not guilty of any fraud or
any unlawful conduct."
Clearly the findings of the Land Department cannot be
disregarded, especially since they are reinforced by the judgment
of the state courts. This Court ought not to reverse such judgment
except upon the clearest and most convincing evidence of mistake or
injustice.
These are among the matters shown by the testimony and upon
which the decisions of the Land Department and the state court were
based: while the entire quarter section was public land, and before
settlement by any individual, the Northern Pacific constructed its
road, crossing Clark's Fork of the Columbia River near the tract.
At that time, the public surveys had not been extended over this
region; indeed, were not so extended until 1893, and the approved
plat of the township was not filed in the local land office until
November 27, 1895, the day the formal applications of these parties
were made. Between 1884 and 1890, some four or five persons settled
on the tract, who, with others at the time of the application for
the townsite entry, in 1895, claimed to be then occupying
Page 214 U. S. 18
it for the purposes of trade and business, and to have
established a town, which they called Clark's Fork. The right of
way of the Northern Pacific was 400 feet in width (13 Stat. 365),
and, at first, the houses were upon this right of way, the settlers
believing that it was only 200 feet in width. The original
occupants were not seeking to establish a town, but to enter the
land as a homestead. The first attempt to obtain title to the tract
in controversy under the townsite laws was made on October 29,
1895, when a petition signed by ten persons was filed with the
probate judge of the county, asking him to secure the tract as a
townsite. 28 L.D. 412, 415. In 1890, the plaintiff White was the
station agent of the Northern Pacific at that place, and in 1891
settled upon the land, making his home outside the right of way and
intending to enter it as a homestead. There was talk between him
and some of the other occupants in reference to an apportionment of
the quarter section between them, but no agreement was reached. In
other words, the occupation at first was with no thought of a town,
but by parties contemplating securing homes under the homestead
law. After it had been ascertained that the railroad right of way
was 400 feet in width, and in 1893, the settlers were notified by
the railroad company of its title. Thereupon some leased from the
company, while others moved their houses off the company's ground.
Under those circumstances, questions of fact arose as to the first
occupant, and for what purpose he occupied it. In deciding the
contest, the Secretary of the Interior held (28 L.D. 412, 421):
"In the case at bar, at the time of the survey in the field,
White was the only settler on this subdivision except Whitcomb, the
other parties at that time being located on the right of way, and
as to them, White's right, as a prior settler, attached to the
entire tract from such time. Any right Whitcomb may have had as a
homestead settler by reason of his settlement before survey in the
field is lost by his failure to assert the same under the homestead
law."
"The evidence shows that, after the survey in the field,
Page 214 U. S. 19
White made claim to the entire tract and exercised rights of
ownership over the same. It was necessary for him to adjust his
settlement claim to the lines of the public survey, and, in so
doing, to include the legal subdivision on which his improvements
were placed."
Notwithstanding some conflict in the testimony, there was
abundant to support the findings of the Secretary of the Interior,
and, as heretofore stated, such findings of facts are to be
regarded as conclusive in any controversy in the courts.
There was no error in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Idaho, and its judgment is
Affirmed.
