A ruling by the highest court of the state sustaining the method
of proving the existence of a law of that state presents no federal
question.
Where the language of the appellate court is ambiguous, if it
may be taken as a declination to pass upon a question not necessary
to the decision, this Court will not, in order to aid a technical
and nonmeritorious defense, spell out a federal question, but it
will resolve the ambiguity against the plaintiff in error who is
bound, in order to give this Court jurisdiction, to clearly show
that a federal right has been impaired.
Writ of error to review 185 N.Y. 107 dismissed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to a Surrogates' Court of the State of
New York. The judgment brought under review was entered in
obedience to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of that state. The
judgment imposed a transfer tax upon certain real property devised
by the will of Joseph Stickney, deceased. The tax was properly
assessed if an act purporting to be passed on March 16, 1903 (1
Sessions Laws of 1903, p. 165), was a duly enacted law of the
state. It appears that, by the constitution of the state, laws of
the nature of this one require for their due enactment a majority
vote in each legislative chamber when three-fifths of the members
are present. The presiding officers of both branches of the
legislature, in certifying that this bill was duly passed by a
majority vote, failed to certify that three-fifths of the members
were then present.
Page 209 U. S. 420
The defendant in error was permitted, over the objection of the
plaintiffs in error, to prove that the journals of the two houses
showed that the requisite number of members were, in point of fact,
present. This the Court of Appeals held to be sufficient to show
that the statute was validly enacted. The first five assignments of
error in this Court simply allege in various forms that the Court
of Appeals erred in its decision of the cause. These assignments
may be summarily overruled upon the plain ground that they present
no federal question. It must not, however, be understood that we
intimate that any form of assignment would have given this Court
the authority to review the determination of the highest court of a
State of the proper method of proving the existence of its own
laws.
Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S.
260;
Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S.
359;
Post v. Supervisors, 105 U.
S. 667;
In re Duncan, 139 U.
S. 449;
Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.
S. 506.
There is, however, a sixth assignment of error. For its
understanding, it is necessary to make a further statement of
facts. When certified copies of the journals of the two houses were
offered in evidence for the purpose of showing that at the time of
the passage of the bill, three-fifths of the members were in fact
present, notwithstanding the omission of the presiding officers to
certify to their presence, counsel for plaintiffs in error made the
following objection:
"I object on the ground that the paper offered is incompetent,
irrelevant, and immaterial; that the original journal, if produced,
is not a record, either at common law or by the statute, and cannot
be introduced in evidence, and cannot be resorted to by the court
for the purpose of either validating or impeaching any law, and
that the legislative law makes the certificates of the presiding
officers conclusive evidence as to whether the majority were
present or three-fifths, and the conclusive evidence is that there
was only a majority present, and not three-fifths."
The objection was overruled, the evidence was admitted, and an
exception was taken. It will be observed that no objection
Page 209 U. S. 421
was taken that the original journals were not produced, but only
that, if produced, they were not admissible to add to or vary the
certificates of the presiding officers, which were conclusive as to
the numbers present. The judgment of the surrogate, which was in
writing, and of the appellate division of the supreme court,
proceeded upon this view of the objection, and treated the question
exactly as if the original journals had been offered. But the
judgment of the Court of Appeals indicates that there it was
objected, for the first time, as far as the record discloses, that
the original journals were not produced, and that the certified
copies were not competent evidence of their contents. The inference
that such a question was raised can only be drawn from the
concluding part of the opinion. After deciding that the presence of
the requisite number of members could be proved by recourse to the
journals, and that the journals showed the fact, the court
said:
"It is contended, however, that the authenticity of the journals
of the legislature, certified copies of which were put in evidence,
was not established, and that, with the failure of any original
record, certified extracts therefrom were not competent. Without
expressing any opinion on this objection, it is sufficient to say
that the question has now been set at rest by the enactment, since
the argument of the appeal, of Chapter 240 of the Laws of 1906,
which, in express terms, declares the printed copies to be the
original journals of the two houses, and makes them, or copies
thereof, competent evidence when certified by the respective clerks
of the senate and assembly."
A motion for rehearing was made and denied. Based upon this part
of the opinion, a supposed federal question is alleged in the sixth
assignment of error in this Court, which is as follows:
"VI. That the said Court of Appeals of the State of New York
erred in holding and deciding that the motion for reargument and
for a hearing on the validity and effect of Chapter 240 of the Laws
of 1906 should be denied, by reason of which denial the said Court
of Appeals has, in effect, held: "
Page 209 U. S. 422
"(a) that Chapter 240 of the Laws of 1906 should be construed to
have a retroactive effect, and"
"(b) that such construction would not be in violation of the
Fourteenth Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, and"
"(c) would not impose and exact a tax without due notice and
without due process of law, and"
"(d) that the state would not, by such act and such construction
thereof, deprive the plaintiffs in error of property without due
notice and without due process of law, each of these grounds having
been stated in the notice of said motion by the plaintiffs in
error, who then and there insisted upon their constitutional rights
in such respects as soon as the occasion arose."
We do not intend to intimate that, if the words of the opinion
were capable of the meaning which is attributed to them in this
assignment of error, there would have been shown any violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
League v. Texas, 184 U.
S. 156. But we think, in view of the fact that, when the
copies of the journals were offered in evidence, no objection had
been made that the originals were not produced, the language of the
court may quite as naturally be interpreted as a declination to
pass on a question, not necessary to the decision, which had been
set at rest for the future by legislation. The best that can be
said for the plaintiffs in error is that the action of the court
was ambiguous. We resolve the ambiguity against the parties
complaining, who are bound to show clearly that a federal right was
impaired, rather than misuse our ingenuity to spell out a federal
question to aid a defense which is merely technical and destitute
of substantial merit.
It does not, therefore, appear that the judgment under review
was based upon the decision of any federal question.
Bachtel v.
Wilson, 204 U. S. 36.
The writ of error is
Dismissed.