Yates v. Jones National Bank, ante, p.
206 U. S. 158,
followed, and
held further:
That a judgment was rendered upon demurrer does not affect its
cogency if it is otherwise efficacious to bring into play the
presumption of the thing adjudged.
A judgment of dismissal based on the ground that plaintiff in an
action against the directors of a national bank had not set up any
individual wrong suffered by him but solely an injury sustained in
common with all other creditors of the bank, is not
res
adjudicata of a right of action
Page 206 U. S. 182
between the same parties to recover for individual loss
suffered, as distinct from the right of the bank.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are the actions referred to in the opinion just announced
in No. 230,
Yates v. Jones National Bank, as companion
actions with that case and as having been tried with it. The issues
raised below and the questions of law which here arise for decision
are therefore the same as in No. 230, and the reasons given in the
opinion in that case require a reversal of the judgments in
these.
In the
Bailey case (No. 232), however, there is a
question not presented in the others, which, if determined in favor
of the plaintiffs in error in that case, will finally settle that
particular controversy. Referring, therefore, to the opinion in the
Jones National Bank case for the general grounds of
reversal in the three cases, we come to consider the particular
ground which is additionally relied upon in the
Bailey
case as establishing that the decree of reversal in that case
should be made conclusive of the entire controversy.
By a "second defense," the defendants pleaded as
res
judicata a judgment asserted to have been rendered in their
favor in an action brought by the same plaintiff in Lancaster
County, Nebraska, which was removed into the circuit court
Page 206 U. S. 183
of the United States, where, upon the sustaining of a demurrer
to the petition, a judgment of dismissal was entered which was by
the circuit court of appeals affirmed. 63 F. 488.
Despite the introduction in evidence of the judgment roll in the
case just referred to, which, for convenience, we term the
Lancaster County action, the jury in this case, over the objection
and exception of the defendants, were in effect instructed that the
judgment in the former action did not operate as a bar to a
recovery in the present case. Each defendant, in a motion for a new
trial, alleged the commission of error by the court in "failing to
give full faith and credit" to the judgment of the circuit court of
appeals in the Lancaster County action. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska considered the subject, and as its conclusion was that the
judgment of the circuit court of appeals was not
res
judicata of the issues in this cause, it therefore decided
that, in refusing to give effect of
res judicata to such
judgment, the trial court had not wrongfully denied the validity of
an authority exercised under the United States. The correctness of
this conclusion is the particular question to be considered which,
as we have said, distinguishes this case from the others.
Whilst the court below found that the Lancaster County action
was between the same parties, and, in its opinion, was based
substantially upon the same facts, as in the present action, it
based its ruling denying the effect of
res judicata to the
prior judgment upon the conclusion that, taking into view both the
pleadings and the opinion in the previous action, it must be
considered as certain that the case involved a different cause of
action from the one presented here. In so concluding, we think the
court was right.
The judgment relied upon was rendered upon a demurrer. This
fact, however, does not affect the cogency of the judgment if
otherwise efficacious to bring into play the presumption of the
thing adjudged.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Slaght,
205 U. S. 122,
205 U. S. 133,
and authorities there cited. To determine whether the judgment in
the former case was conclusive in
Page 206 U. S. 184
this, in view of its uncertainty, we must address ourselves to
the pleadings in that case and consider the opinion of the court
for the purpose of ascertaining precisely what was concluded by the
judgment upon the demurrer.
National Foundry & Pipe Works
v. Oconto Water Supply Co., 183 U. S. 216,
183 U. S. 234,
and cases cited. Coming to do so, we find that the demurrer was
sustained on the ground that no cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff was stated in the petition, because the circuit court of
appeals was of the opinion that the petition only stated a right to
recover for violations of the National Bank Act, causing damage to
the bank as such, the right to recover for which was an asset of
the bank, enforceable only by its receiver. In so deciding the
court expressly held that the averments in the petition relative to
the fraud and deceit claimed to have been practiced upon the
plaintiff through reports to the Comptroller of the Currency were
mere matter of inducement or surplusage, and did not constitute
averments of a substantive cause of action. In other words, the
previous case was decided exclusively upon the ground that, as the
plaintiff had not set up any individual wrong suffered by him, but
solely an injury sustained in common with all other creditors of
the bank, the resulting damage was only recoverable by the
receiver. As, adopting the construction given in the
Jones
National Bank case to a petition like unto the one in this
case, we hold that the petition in this case sets up a right to
recover for the individual loss suffered, as distinct from the
right of the bank, it follows, if we accept the construction given
by the circuit court of appeals to the pleadings in the case
wherein the judgment relied upon was rendered, that case and this
involve different causes of action. But it is insisted that, if a
correct analysis be made of the facts set out in the previous case,
the result will be to demonstrate that that case and this are
identical, and therefore the judgment in the previous case is
controlling here. This, however, is but to assert that the previous
judgment was wrong, and therefore, in determining its effect as
res judicata, we must treat it as embracing matters which
it did not include. To
Page 206 U. S. 185
give full force and effect to the judgment, we must necessarily
exclude those things which the judgment excluded. To hold to the
contrary would be to decide that the former judgment must be
accepted as correct, and yet it must be extended to controversies
which are beyond its reach, because the judgment was wrongfully
rendered.
The same judgment must therefore be ordered in each of these
cases as was directed to be entered in the
Jones National Bank
case, viz., as to Mosher and Outcalt, two of the persons named
as plaintiffs in the writ of error and citation, the writ of error
in each action is dismissed for want of prosecution; as to the
other plaintiffs in error, the judgment below in each action is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.