When the circuit court dismisses a case under the provisions of
§ 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, as amended by § 1 of
the Act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 434, because not substantially
involving the requisite amount in controversy to confer
jurisdiction, the order of the court, in this case without a jury,
is subject to review in this Court in respect to the rulings of law
and findings of fact upon the evidence.
Whatever plaintiff's motive in bringing his suit in the federal
court, rather than in the state court may be, he has the right to
act upon it.
Page 204 U. S. 633
Where a plaintiff in good faith asserts a claim against several
defendants that, acting together, they have taken land from him of
over $2,000 in value and inflicted upon him damages of over $2,000,
and requisite diverse citizenship exists, the Circuit Court has
jurisdiction and the case does not fall within the dismissal
provision of § 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875, because it appears to
the trial judge that each of the defendants claims that the part of
plaintiffs' land which he has taken and the damages recoverable
against him would amount in value to less than $2,000. A
determination by the judge that the defendants did not act jointly
is not a determination of a jurisdictional fact but, of an
essential element of the merits.
The plaintiff in error, a citizen of New York, brought in the
Circuit Court for the Northern District of Texas a petition to try
the title to 1,280 acres of land, against ten defendants, citizens
either of Texas, Kentucky, or Illinois. Six of the defendants were
warrantors of the plaintiff's title, and questions arising as to
them are not material here. The petition alleged that, upon January
15, 1902,
"the defendants Reagan, Smith, Greer, and Deven unlawfully
entered upon said premises and dispossessed plaintiff thereof, and
have since that date unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff the
possession thereof, to his damage $2,000.00;"
that the plaintiff's title was derived by mesne conveyances from
two patents of adjoining lots of land, known respectively as survey
27 and survey 91; that, prior to plaintiff's acquisition of title,
the two surveys were circumscribed by a fence two miles long and
one mile wide, making a single tract of land of those dimensions;
that the value of the land was $5,000, and that the defendants have
destroyed fences and other improvements and thereby damaged the
plaintiff in the sum of $2,000, and prayed possession of the land,
and damages.
The answer of Reagan alleged that he was the owner of part of
the land described in the petition by a title separate and
independent from the other defendants; that his land is enclosed by
a fence and in his possession; that he disclaims title to the
remainder of the land claimed; that the allegation in the petition
that he entered
Page 204 U. S. 634
upon any other than his own land was untrue, "and made with the
intent to confer upon this Court jurisdiction over him;" that the
value of the land which he entered, is in possession of, and claims
is less than $800, and asked that the suit abate as to him.
Treating the foregoing answer as a plea in abatement, Reagan,
without waiving it, further answered, disclaiming as to part of the
land claimed in the petition and pleading the general issue as to
the remainder.
The answer of Greer was substantially the same, except that the
value of the land upon which he entered and was possessed of was
alleged to be less than $600. Greer further answered, alleging the
pendency in the courts of the state of an action
"to try title to recover of S. A. Greer, a defendant in the case
at bar, one T. Smith and others, the title and possession of the
land described in the petition in the case at bar,"
and praying that the cause await the determination of the cause
in the state court. The answer of Smith contained the same
allegation with regard to the pendency of the action in the state
court as that of Greer, disclaimed as to part of the land described
in the petition, and pleaded the general issue as to the remainder.
Deven filed no answer.
More than a year after the last of the foregoing pleadings were
filed, the plaintiff filed what was entitled "First amended
original petition." In it, Lee, also a resident of Texas, was named
as an additional defendant. The amendment seems to be substantially
like the original petition, except that it alleged that "the
defendants Reagan, Smith, Greer, Lee, and Deven together unlawfully
entered upon said premises and dispossessed plaintiff thereof," and
that "all of said defendants have jointly taken possession of
plaintiff's said land;" that the plaintiff has acquired title to
land by the statute of limitations, and that the action is one to
fix and determine the boundaries, which are uncertain, and that
"the entire land is the subject matter of this controversy as
between the plaintiff and each and all of said defendants."
Subsequently Lee answered, alleging that he was the owner of
part of the land described in plaintiff's petition by a title
Page 204 U. S. 635
separate and independent from that of the other defendants, and
with respect to that he pleads the general issue, and disclaims as
to the remainder. The answer also alleged that the matter in
controversy did not exceed the sum of $2,000, and that
"the claim of plaintiff as set forth in his petition as to the
value of said land, improvements, rents, and damages, exceeding
$2,000, has been fraudulently alleged with the intent and purpose
to confer jurisdiction upon this honorable court, when in truth and
in fact no such jurisdiction existed, because the matter in
controversy is of less than $2,000 in value."
Subsequently Smith amended his answer and alleged that he was
the owner and in possession of 443 acres of the land described in
plaintiff's petition, which was of the value of $1,500, and
disclaimed as to the remainder. He also alleged that the valuation
placed by the plaintiff on the land, and the plaintiff's allegation
that "he and S. A. Greer jointly took possession of said lands,"
was
"fraudulently claimed and alleged for the intent and purpose of
conferring jurisdiction upon this honorable court, when in truth
and in fact no such jurisdiction existed, because the whole matter
in controversy is and was of less value than $2,000."
He further alleged that the controversy had been adjudicated in
the state court. The pleas to the jurisdiction were, on motion of
the defendants, tried by the judge, jury being waived, who found
that
"the pleas of each of the said defendants Reagan, Lee, Smith,
and Greer is fully proved and sustained, and that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in dispute,"
and dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. A writ of
error was allowed "solely upon the question of jurisdiction," the
judge, certifying that no other question was tried, transmitted the
record containing a bill of exceptions to this Court.
The bill of exceptions shows that it was agreed that the
plaintiff owned the two surveys, 91 and 27, containing 1,280 acres,
of a value much exceeding $2,000; that Lee owned section 32, Reagan
section 31, Smith section 28, and Greer
Page 204 U. S. 636
section 90, all of which were adjoining sections and surrounded
three sides of the plaintiff's land. The dispute concerned the
situation of the boundaries. As the defendants claimed the
boundaries, they owned 1,014 acres of what the plaintiff claimed to
be his land, which, when he acquired it, was enclosed by a fence in
one parcel of 1,280 acres. Of the 1,014 acres taken from the land
claimed by plaintiff, Lee claimed 96, Reagan 288, Smith 443, and
Greer 187. The evidence, which is reported in full in the bill of
exceptions, shows the following facts: in 1892, before any of the
defendants appeared claiming title, the 1,280 acres claimed by the
plaintiff was enclosed as one parcel by a substantial fence, and
was known as the Pendleton pasture. Subsequently the plaintiff
acquired title to the enclosed land. Smith pulled down part and
Reagan another part of the Pendleton pasture fence, and Smith and
Greer each pastured their cattle throughout the Pendleton
pasture.
Page 204 U. S. 639
MR. JUSTICE MOODY, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error brought an action in the circuit court
for the recovery of certain land and damages for the detention
thereof, basing jurisdiction upon a diversity of citizenship, which
was undisputed. In such case, it is essential to the jurisdiction
of the circuit court that "the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive
of interest and costs, the sum or value of
Page 204 U. S. 640
$2,000." Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, section 1, 18 Stat. 470;
amended Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, section 1, 25 Stat. 434.
The action was dismissed by the authority given by section 5 of the
Act of March 3, 1875, in which it is provided that,
"if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court, . . . it shall
appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court at any time after
such suit has been brought, . . . that such suit does not really
and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to such
suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants for the purpose of creating a case
cognizable . . . under this act,"
the court shall dismiss the suit. The propriety of the dismissal
is brought here for review by virtue of section 5 of the Act of
March 3 1891, and is the only question for decision.
The plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of a quadrangular lot
of land two miles long and one mile wide, containing 1,280 acres,
enclosed by a fence, and known as the Pendleton pasture. Its value
largely exceeded $2,000. He sought to recover possession of this
land and damages from the defendants Reagan, Smith, Greer, Deven,
and Lee, who, as he claimed, had disseised him of the land and were
unlawfully holding possession. In ascertaining the precise nature
of the plaintiff's claim, we take into account not only the
original petition, but that pleading entitled "First amended
original petition," although it is urged that it does not appear
that the amendment was allowed by the court. It is not clear that
the amendment adds anything material to the question presented here
to the original petition, but, however that may be, as it is
certified to be a part of the record and was answered by one of the
defendants, we assume that it was properly allowed, and was not a
mere casual intruder among the papers in the case. The plaintiff
alleged in substance in the original, and more specifically in the
amended, petition that the defendants had jointly entered upon,
taken, and held possession of, his land, which was of the value of
$5,000, and
Page 204 U. S. 641
inflicted damages of $2,000 upon him by the unlawful entry and
possession, and sought to recover of all the defendants the whole
parcel of land and all the damages claimed. Thus, the plaintiff set
forth a case within the jurisdiction of the court. Giving to the
defendants' answers the broadest possible effect, they each, for
the purpose of disputing the jurisdiction of the court, denied that
they had jointly entered upon plaintiff's land, and, each
disclaiming as to the remainder, alleged that, under a title
separate and independent from the other defendants, he had entered
upon and held possession of only a certain part of the plaintiff's
land, which, together with the damages inflicted by the entry and
possession, was of much less value than $2,000. The answers further
alleged that the allegations of the value of the land, the extent
of the damages, and the joint action of the defendants in entering,
taking, and holding possession, were fraudulently made by the
plaintiff with the intent and purpose of conferring jurisdiction
upon the court, when in truth no such jurisdiction existed, because
the matter in controversy was in reality less than the value of
$2,000. Upon the motion of the defendants, the judge, without a
jury, passed upon the question of jurisdiction, and, after hearing
evidence, found that the pleas of the defendants as to the
jurisdiction were "fully proved and sustained," and that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in dispute, and
dismissed the suit.
The order of the court is subject to review in this Court in
respect of the rulings of law and findings of fact upon the
evidence.
Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.
S. 115.
The absence of any opinion in the court below, and of any
finding of fact except by reference to the several answers of the
defendants, which are said to be "fully proved and sustained," and
of any more specific recital in the judgment than that the suit was
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, renders it somewhat difficult
to understand the facts and reasons which led to the dismissal.
But, upon an examination of the whole record, it seems clear that
the court found:
Page 204 U. S. 642
(1) That the defendants did not jointly take and hold the
plaintiff's land;
(2) That each defendant, acting independently of the others,
took and held only a part of plaintiff's land, and that each part
thus taken and held by each defendant was of less value than
$2,000; and
(3) That the plaintiff, in his petition, had fraudulently stated
the value of his land, the extent of his damages, and the joint
character of defendants' action in entering and taking possession
of his land, and had done this for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction upon the court.
If the last finding of fact was warranted by the evidence, there
is no need of going further, because such a state of facts would
demand a dismissal of the action. Ordinarily the plaintiff's claim
with respect to the value of the property taken from him or the
amount of damages incurred by him through the defendants' wrongful
act measures, for jurisdictional purposes, the value of the matter
in controversy,
Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.
S. 669;
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.
S. 550;
Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S.
58;
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S.
58, unless, upon inspection of the plaintiff's
declaration, it appears that, as a matter of law, it is not
possible for the plaintiff to recover the jurisdictional amount.
Lee v. Watson,
1 Wall. 337;
Schacker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
93 U. S. 241;
Vance v. Vandercook Company, 170 U.
S. 468;
North American Company v. Morrison,
178 U. S. 262. The
rule that the plaintiff's allegations of value govern in
determining the jurisdiction, except where, upon the face of his
own pleadings, it is not legally possible for him to recover the
jurisdictional amount, controls even where the declaration shows
that a perfect defense might be interposed to a sufficient amount
of the claim to reduce it below the jurisdictional amount.
Schunk v. Moline Co., 147 U. S. 500. In
the last case, the plaintiff's petition prayed judgment on several
promissory notes, of which some, amounting to $530, were due, and
others, amounting to $1,664, were not due, the jurisdictional
amount then,
Page 204 U. S. 643
as now, being $2,000. In holding that the court had jurisdiction
of the claim, this Court, by MR. JUSTICE BREWER, said:
"Although there might be a perfect defense to the suit for at
least the amount not yet due, yet the fact of a defense, and a good
defense, too, would not affect the question as to what was the
amount in dispute. Suppose an action were brought on a
nonnegotiable note for $2,500, the consideration for which was
fully stated in the petition, and which was a sale of lottery
tickets, or any other matter distinctly prohibited by statute --
can there be a doubt that the circuit court would have
jurisdiction? There would be presented a claim to recover the
$2,500, and whether that claim was sustainable or not, that would
be the real sum in dispute. In short, the fact of a valid defense
to a cause of action, although apparent on the face of the
petition, does not diminish the amount that is claimed nor
determine what is the matter in dispute, for who can say in advance
that that defense will be presented by the defendant, or, if
presented, sustained by the court?"
Nevertheless, however stringent and far-reaching the rule may be
that it is the plaintiff's statement of his case which governs in
determining the jurisdiction, it does not exclude the power of the
court to protect itself against fraud. This was pointed out in
Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 669,
where it was said that, if the court found as a fact that the
damages were laid in the declaration colorably and beyond a
reasonable expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating
jurisdiction, there would be authority for dismissing the case;
and, following this statement of the law, it was held that, where
the judge of the circuit court, upon sufficient evidence, found
that the damages had been claimed and magnified fraudulently beyond
the jurisdictional amount, the action should be dismissed.
Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.
S. 540. It follows, therefore, as has been said, that if
the third finding of the judge in the court below was warranted,
his action in dismissing the case should be affirmed. But, after an
examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion
Page 204 U. S. 644
that nothing in it warranted any such finding. It appeared
clearly that the Pendleton pasture, which the plaintiff sought to
recover against all the defendants, was of a value much in excess
of the jurisdictional amount. There was not a word of evidence
reflecting upon the plaintiff's good faith in bringing the action,
in joining the defendants, or in framing his petition. He doubtless
preferred to try his controversy in the federal courts, and,
whatever the motive of his preference may have been, he had the
right to act upon it.
Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.
S. 400;
Chicago v. Mills (decided February 4,
this term),
204 U. S. 321.
Therefore, the validity of the order of dismissal must be
considered, after an elimination of the finding that the
plaintiff's claim was fraudulently made.
The plaintiff's claim, which we now assume to have been made in
good faith, was that the defendants, acting together, took and held
from him land of the value of $5,000, and at the same time
inflicted damages upon him of $2,000. Upon any possible theory of
law, this claim states the plaintiff's side of a controversy which
is unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
When it is duly put in issue by the defendants' pleadings the
record upon its face discloses a controversy between citizens of
different states, in which "the matter in dispute exceeds $2,000 in
value," and therefore one which is within the exact words of the
act conferring jurisdiction upon that court. It is legally possible
for the plaintiff to recover the full amount of all the land and
the full amount of the damages claimed. We know of no case that
holds that, in such a situation, the judge of the circuit court is
authorized to interpose and try a sufficient part of the
controversy between the parties to satisfy himself that the
plaintiff ought to recover less than the jurisdictional amount, and
to conclude therefore that the real controversy between the parties
is concerning a subject of less than the jurisdictional value, and
we think that, by sound principle, he is forbidden to do so. In
exercising the authority to dismiss the action conferred by the act
of 1875,
Page 204 U. S. 645
the judge may proceed upon motion of the parties or upon his own
motion, and, if he chooses, without trial by jury.
Williams v.
Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209;
Wetmore v. Rymer, ubi supra. Such an authority obviously
is not unlimited, and its limits ought to be ascertained and
observed lest, under the guise of determining jurisdiction, the
merits of the controversy between the parties be summarily decided
without the ordinary incidents of a trial, including the right to a
jury. For it must not be forgotten that where, in good faith, one
has brought into court a cause of action which, as stated by him,
is clearly within its jurisdiction, he has the right to try its
merits in the manner provided by the Constitution and law, and
cannot be compelled to submit to a trial of another kind. This was
clearly stated by Mr. Justice Matthews in
Barry v.
Edmunds, 116 U.S. at
116 U. S. 565,
who said:
"In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself
for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part of the latter
with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and
measure of that justice which the jury itself is the appointed
constitutional tribunal to award."
In applying these general principles for the purpose of
ascertaining the limits of the authority to dismiss summarily for
lack of jurisdiction, the circumstance that, in this case, a jury
was waived by the parties is without significance, because, if the
judge had authority to adopt this summary method, he could dispense
with the jury whether the parties agreed to it or not.
The error into which the judge in the court below has fallen is
shown by an analysis of his findings. He did not find that the land
which the plaintiff claimed to recover was not of a value in excess
of $2,000, but that parts of that land which each defendant claimed
that the plaintiff ought only to recover against him were each of
less than the value of $2,000. As the plaintiff alleged, and the
defendants denied, that the defendants jointly took and held his
whole lot of land, the judge, on the conceded value of the
plaintiff's land, in order to have arrived at the conclusion that
the case should be dismissed,
Page 204 U. S. 646
must have found that the defendants had not jointly taken and
held the whole of the plaintiff's land. In doing this, we think he
exceeded his authority under the statute, and, in determining the
jurisdiction, in effect decided the controversy between the parties
upon the merits. In deciding that the defendants had not acted
jointly, as the plaintiff alleged and the defendants denied, he
determined not a jurisdictional fact, but an essential element of
the merits of the dispute upon which the parties were at issue.
An assumption which underlay the action of the court below in
dismissing the case evidently was that, if the defendants, as they
asserted in their pleadings, had each, acting by virtue of a
separate and independent title, taken and held a part only of the
plaintiff's land, each part being less than the jurisdictional
amount, although the whole was of more than the jurisdictional
amount, there was no controversy within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. The correctness of this assumption of law has been
argued before us by the parties. We do not deem it necessary to
decide that question. There is certainly respectable authority
which tends to show that, in such a case, the plaintiff, being the
owner of a single lot of land, may maintain one action against all
the defendants, and that the measure of jurisdiction is the value
of the plaintiff's land, and not the value of the part held by each
defendant. The appropriate rule, however, to be applied to the
facts of this case can be better determined in a trial on the
merits, where instructions on their varied aspects may be given to
the jury, subject to the review provided by law.
Because the circuit court erred in dismissing the case for want
of jurisdiction, its action must be reversed.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and
the cause remanded to that court with directions to take such
further proceedings therein as the law requires and in conformity
with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissents.
