A Porto Rican contracted, in 1894, to pay a certain amount of
pesos in money current in the commerce, whatever may be the coinage
in circulation at the rate of one hundred centavos of the money in
circulation for each peso. Section 11 of the Foraker Act, passed
April 12, 1900, provided for the retiring of Porto Rican coin and
the substitution thereof of United States coin and for the payment
of debts at the rate of sixty cents per peso, and thereafter the
debtor offered to pay the obligation at that rate but the Supreme
Court of Porto Rico held that he was entitled under the contract to
one hundred cents for each peso. The creditor also claimed the
matter was
res judicata under a judgment which had been
obtained for an installment of interest. In reversing this
judgment,
held that:
Appellant having claimed, and been denied, the right to pay the
indebtedness at the rate fixed by § 11 of the Act of April 12,
1900, this Court has jurisdiction under § 35 of that act to review
the judgment on appeal.
Under Article 1477 of the Porto Rico Code of Civil Procedure,
judgments rendered in executory actions are not
res
judicata.
The contract only contemplated such change in coin as might
occur while Porto Rico was under the same political power, and a
strict and literal construction of the contract will not be
entertained where it does not convey the real meaning of the
parties.
The indebtedness should be paid at the rate of sixty cents per
peso as fixed by the statute, and neither the provisions of the
statute making United States coin the circulating medium nor the
terms of the contract should be construed as making a centavo (the
one-hundredth part of a peso) the equivalent of a cent in United
States money.
The appellee, plaintiff below, commenced this action, called a
"declaratory action of greater import" (Law of Civil Procedure,
porto Rico, Arts. 480, 481-482), to obtain payment of certain sums
due on an indebtedness of the defendants (appellants), secured by
mortgage, as stated in that instrument. She obtained judgment in
her favor in the proper district court of Porto Rico, which was
affirmed by the supreme court of the island, and the defendants
have appealed from that judgment
Page 200 U. S. 104
to this Court. The sole question is whether the debt may be
solved in American money at the rate of sixty cents thereof for
each peso of indebtedness, or must one dollar in American money be
paid for each peso.
The following are the facts: one Nicholas Cartagena y Mangual
desired to sell the fractional part, owned by him, of a sugar
plantation, known as "Ursula," situated in the Municipal District
of Juana Diaz, in the Province of Porto Rico, such fractional part
being eighteen percent of the value of the whole plantation, valued
at 80,000 pesos. The purchaser, Juan Serralles, agreed to pay for
such share 18,000 pesos. Accordingly, a deed of purchase and
mortgage was made between the parties on the first day of
September, 1894. That instrument contained the statement that the
sale was effected "in consideration of the sum of 18,000 pesos,
commercial money," which shall be paid by the purchaser in
installments,
viz.,
"2,000 pesos on the 15th day of July, of the year 1898; two
thousand pesos on the same day and month of the year 1899; an equal
sum of two thousand pesos on the fifteenth day of July, 1900, and
three thousand pesos on the fifteenth day of July, of the years of
1901 to the year 1904, both inclusive, all of which to be paid in
the money current in the commerce, whatever may be the coinage of
the money that as such is in circulation or is accepted in this
province at the rate of one hundred centavos (cents) of the money
in circulation for each peso, excluding all kinds of paper money in
circulation or to be issued, even if its circulation should be
compulsory."
The installments were to bear interest at the rate of ten
percent per annum from the date of the deed, which interest was due
and payable quarterly. The parties also declared "that the price
for which said sale is made is the just and true value at present
of the share and interest hereby sold and conveyed," they being
"fully aware that that is the value that shall serve as a basis
in the public sale that shall be held if the obligation is not
paid, and its payment should be demanded judicially."
A few days after the execution and delivery of this
instrument,
Page 200 U. S. 105
it was discovered that Cartagena was not the owner of all of the
one-eighteenth part of the plantation, because that interest was
acquired during his marriage with his first wife, and was what is
termed "conjugal partnership property," acquired for a valuable
consideration during her life. When she died, her interest went to
her children, and so the seller, Cartagena, owned the
above-mentioned fractional part of the plantation, with those
children. It therefore became necessary to make another deed and
mortgage, conveying the interest of all the owners of the
fractional part of the plantation including such children. This was
accordingly done, and on the sixth of October, 1894, another
instrument, in the nature of a deed and mortgage, was executed by
the proper parties in ratification and extension of the first
instrument, and which contains substantially the same provisions as
the first instrument, and the payments were to be made to the
parties conveying the premises in the proportion in which they were
interested in that property. These 18,000 pesos were to be paid by
the purchaser at the same times mentioned in the former
instrument
"in current commercial money, whatever the coinage may be of
money which, with such character, be in circulation or accepted in
this province at the rate of one hundred cents of the circulating
medium for each peso, and to the exclusion of all paper money
created or to be created, even though its circulation be
compulsory."
On the fifteenth of September, 1900, a quarterly payment of
interest became due under the terms of the mortgage, and the
appellant proposed to pay it in American money then current at an
amount equivalent in value to the former provincial money, which
was not then in circulation. This offer was refused. The appellee
then commenced an action in a municipal court, to recover the
interest due September 15, 1900, in American money at the rate of
one dollar for each peso that was due. She obtained what is termed
an "executory judgment" for such payment, and that judgment (of the
municipal court) was affirmed by the district court, and the
appellant then paid the
Page 200 U. S. 106
same. Upon quarterly installments of interest due December 15,
1900, and March 15, 1901, the appellants made the same offer to pay
in American money of equivalent value of the provincial money or
peso, which was not then in circulation, and the offer was again
refused, and this declaratory action of greater import was then
commenced, to recover one American dollar for each peso of
indebtedness due up to the date of the commencement of suit, and to
obtain a declaration that the future payments should be made in the
same manner. Before the commencement of this action, in 1901, the
province had been ceded to the United States, which (prior to the
cession) had occupied it by its troops in 1898. On the twelfth day
of April, 1900, Congress passed an act (31 Stat. 77, 80), § 11 of
which (reproduced in the margin
*) provided for
retiring the Porto Rican coins and substituting American money
therefor.
In the pleading on the part of the plaintiff below, the
foregoing
Page 200 U. S. 107
facts were averred, but no averment or contention was made that
the so-called "executory judgment" which plaintiff had theretofore
obtained constituted
res judicata as to the question now
in issue.
The defendants (appellants herein) put in an answer setting up
various facts unnecessary to be here adverted to.
They also averred that, under § 11 of the act of Congress above
mentioned, they had the right to pay the installments due on the
mortgage, in American money at the established rate of sixty cents
in the coin of the United States for one peso of Porto Rican
coin.
The trial court, in its judgment, after reciting the existence
of the executory judgment in the action above-described and also
all the proceedings in the case before it, decreed the payment of
the interest or installments which might then be due, or the
thereafter to grow due, to the plaintiff, in United States coin at
the rate of one dollar thereof for each peso of indebtedness.
Basing its decree wholly upon the literal language of the contract,
the court said:
"It appears that Don Juan Serralles y Colon bound himself to
make the payments to said Cartagena, by virtue of the said contract
of sale, in money current in commerce, of whatever coinage it may
be at the rate of one hundred cents of the current money for each
peso; it is plain and evident that the heirs of said Serralles are
bound to pay in dollars all the installments arising from the same
contract, or the interest on the same, for dollars are the money
current at present in this island."
An appeal was taken by the defendants to the supreme court on
the ground, among others, that the judgment of the district court
violated articles 1281 and 1283 of the Civil Code. The articles are
as follows:
"ART. 1281. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt as to the intentions of the contracting parties, the literal
sense of the stipulations shall be observed."
"If the words should appear contrary to the evident intention of
the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. "
Page 200 U. S. 108
"ART. 1283. However general the terms of a contract may be,
there should not be understood as included therein things and cases
different from those with regard to which the persons interested
intended to contract."
Further ground of appeal was the alleged violation of the
eleventh section of the act of Congress above mentioned, under
which appellants claimed the right to pay in United States coin at
the equivalent value of sixty cents for each peso.
The supreme court, in due time, after argument, affirmed the
judgment of the court below on the law, holding that the contract
was clear, and its literal terms must be complied with. It did not,
nor did the district court, hold the prior judgment to be
res
judicata.
The court also denied the right claimed by the defendants under
the above-mentioned act of Congress, to pay their indebtedness at
the rate of sixty cents of American money for each peso of such
indebtedness, on the ground that the act did not apply to such
cases as the one before the court.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question arises herein whether this Court has jurisdiction
to hear the case, upon appeal or otherwise. The action is one to
recover the interest due on an indebtedness from the appellants to
the appellee on account of the purchase by the former of a certain
interest in a plantation in Porto Rico, owned by the testator of
appellee, which indebtedness was secured by a mortgage. This action
is in its nature something like one to foreclose a mortgage. The
question arising in the case is in regard to the kind of money in
which the indebtedness of appellants (both that due at the time of
the commencement of the
Page 200 U. S. 109
action and that accruing thereafter) should be paid, the
appellee asserting her right to be paid in American money at the
rate of one dollar for each peso of indebtedness, while the
appellants, on the contrary, assert their right under section
eleven of the act of Congress of April 12, 1900, already mentioned,
to pay the indebtedness in money or coins of the United States at
the rate of sixty cents in such coins for each peso of their
indebtedness. This right was denied by the court below on the
ground that there was a clear contract to pay as demanded by the
appellee, and that the act of Congress had no application to the
case. Judgment was accordingly given in favor of the appellee, that
the appellants should pay to the appellee the indebtedness due or
thereafter to grow due to her at the rate of one dollar in American
money for each peso of their indebtedness. Appellants thus claimed
a right under a statute of the United States, which was denied, and
under section thirty-five of the Foraker Act (April 12, 1900), this
Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment.
Crowley v.
United States, 194 U. S. 461;
Rodriguez v. United States, 198 U.
S. 156.
The record also shows that a prior action had been commenced by
appellee in a municipal court of Porto Rico, between the same
parties, to recover an installment of interest due September 15,
1900, and that the same defense was there made in regard to the
character of the money in which the debt should be paid. The
municipal court in that case decided in favor of the appellee
herein, and judgment to that effect having been duly entered, an
appeal therefrom was taken to the district court, which affirmed
the judgment, and the same was thereupon paid by the appellants
herein. That judgment is not set up by the appellee as
res
judicata, and while it is recited in the judgments in this
case both in the district and supreme courts as having been
recovered, it is not held to be such by either of the courts, but
in such judgments it is referred to as an "executory judgment," and
by article 1477 of the Porto Rico "Law of Civil Procedure" (page
299), it is provided that
"judgments rendered in executory actions shall not give rise
Page 200 U. S. 110
to the exception of
res judicata, the parties reserving
their rights to institute the ordinary action on the same
question."
As the courts below have treated and denominated the prior
judgment in the municipal court as an "executory judgment,"
obtained in an executory action, the reason for not holding the
judgment to be
res judicata becomes apparent when the
above article of the Code is considered.
We come, then, to a consideration of the proper construction of
the provisions in the two deeds, regarding the kind of money in
which the debt is to be paid. They are set forth in the foregoing
statement, and are substantially alike, excepting that the first
deed, that of September, 1894, in speaking of the coinage, says
that the payment is to be made in money that is in circulation or
is accepted in the province at the rate of one hundred centavos
(cents) of the money in circulation for each peso, and in the
amended deed of October 6, 1894, the translator of the original
Spanish leaves out the word "centavos," and gives what he regards
as its proper translation -- the word "cents" -- so that the
provision reads that the money is to be paid at the rate of one
hundred "cents" of the circulating medium for each peso. These two
deeds represented the same transaction, and were drawn, of course,
in the Spanish language. In the first deed, the interest of the
children of Cartagena was not referred to because of the mistaken
assumption that Cartagena had the whole title, and, upon
discovering the mistake, the second deed was made, conveying his
interest and the interest of his children, amounting to
one-eighteenth of the whole value of the plantation, as conveyed by
that deed to the same purchaser. The later deed was regarded by all
parties as a mere rectification and ratification of the first deed,
and it is quite clear that the word "centavos," contained in the
first deed, was used in both, and that the word "cents" is but a
translation of the original Spanish word "centavos," which was used
in this contract drawn in the Spanish language.
This is in truth assumed to be correct by counsel in the court
below, in his communication to that court in behalf of the
present
Page 200 U. S. 111
appellee (which forms part of the record herein), as he there
uses the word "cents," and then follows it by the use of the word
"centavos."
It may be therefore stated as a fact that the original contract
in the deeds provided for the payment in money current in the
province at the rate of one hundred centavos for each peso. There
is no finding in so many words, as to the value of the peso
mentioned in the contract. The Spanish word "centavo" is said to
be, in Spanish and in South American countries, a small copper or
nickel coin, in value six-tenths of a cent (actual), and one cent
(nominal); the one-hundredth of a peso.
See Standard
dictionary of the English language. The centavo being worth really
six-tenths of a cent, and being the one-hundredth part of a peso,
would, of course, make the peso worth sixty cents in American
money.
The eleventh section of the act of Congress already mentioned
provides for the redemption of all silver coins of Porto Rico known
as the peso, and all other copper and Porto Rican coins in
circulation in Porto Rico
"at the present established rate of sixty cents in the coins of
the United States for one peso of Porto Rican coin, and for all
minor and subsidiary coins the same rate of exchange shall be
applied."
The Congress thus fixed the rate of exchange in the redemption
of these coins, and it must be assumed to have been fixed at the
value of the peso in American coin.
From these facts, it appears to us that there is no rational
doubt that, at the time when this contract was executed, the peso
in circulation in Porto Rico was worth not to exceed sixty cents,
American money. At the time when the money was due under the
contract, in September, 1900, it is admitted that all the pesos and
centavos theretofore in circulation had been at that time redeemed
by the United States pursuant to the provisions of the act of
Congress, and the money in circulation in Porto Rico was then and
thereafter the money of the United States. This was the money
current in commerce in Porto Rico, and was in circulation and
accepted therein as such money. It
Page 200 U. S. 112
is now claimed by the appellee that, as the American money was
the money of commerce, and was alone in circulation, she was
entitled in September, 1900, under the provisions of the contract,
to be paid one hundred cents, or, in other words, one dollar of
that money for every peso of indebtedness owed by the appellants,
either then due or thereafter to grow due. By calling the centavo a
cent in American money, while worth but six-tenths of a cent, the
claim is made that the contract really provided for the payment of
one hundred cents of American money for every peso of indebtedness.
In other words, a centavo is made a cent, and it is said that the
appellants promised to pay one hundred cents per peso. This
construction of the contract has been upheld by the courts below
because, as it is said, the strict and plain letter of the contract
calls for it, and the result is that the appellants are adjudged to
pay over sixty percent more than the value of the interest they
purchased, and that much more than the value of the peso, and also
that much more than the real amount of their debt. While it is true
that the silver coinage of Porto Rico, known as the peso, and all
other silver and copper coins which were in circulation on April
12, 1900, had been retired before September, 1900, and that the
money then current in commerce in Porto Rico was American money, we
do not, on that account, think that the appellee had the right to
claim payment of one dollar in American money for each peso of
indebtedness. The centavo is not a cent. It is equal to but
six-tenths of a cent, and the parties contracted, the one to pay
and the other to receive, one hundred centavos to the peso, not one
hundred cents to the peso. Although the translator seems to have
assumed that the word "cents" was the correct and accurate
translation of the word "centavos," it must be remembered that the
contract was in fact to pay centavos, and that the centavos were in
fact, as we think is plainly shown in this record, worth only about
six-tenths of a cent, and that, while one hundred centavos were
worth one peso, one hundred American cents were worth one dollar,
or above sixty percent more then the same number of centavos. It
is
Page 200 U. S. 113
entirely incredible that either party ever meant any such result
as is now contended for by the appellee. Even if it were conceded
that the liberal and strict construction of the contract is as
decided by the courts below, yet we are clear that such literal and
strict construction does not express the real intention of the
parties when the contract was made.
Articles 1281 and 1283 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico, set
forth in the foregoing statement, show the law to be in Porto Rico
substantially the same as it is here -- that is, that where it is
plain that a strict and literal construction of the contract does
not convey the real meaning of the parties, such construction is
not to be entertained.
See cases cited in
United
States v. Utah &c. Stage Co., 199 U.
S. 414. In that case, the strict and literal
construction of the contract was contended, by the officers of the
government, to be its proper construction, and hence, it was
argued, when the contractor might, under the provisions of his
contract, be required to perform new or additional mail, messenger,
or transfer service, under the authority of the Postmaster General,
without additional compensation, that then such official could
require such additional service as arose by reason of the
establishment of what amounted to a new station, which additional
service required, above the normal increase of service, an
additional distance to be traveled in wagons of over 300,000 miles.
This Court held that the parties never meant any such thing, and
the judgment of the Court of Claims for the recovery of
compensation for the extra distance traveled was affirmed.
On looking at this contract, we are of opinion that it evidently
contemplates only such change in coins as might occur while Porto
Rico was under the same political power. It speaks of the payment
of the debt in the money current in commerce, whatever may be the
coinage of the money that, as such, is in circulation "in this
province." The words "in this province" evidently did not
contemplate any change of government, but only a possible change of
coinage under the same government. It may be assumed that, in 1894,
no one could have contracted
Page 200 U. S. 114
with reference to a war between Spain and the United States,
which did not break out until four years thereafter, nor would
anyone have contemplated the cession of Porto Rico to the United
States, and the entire substitution of American money for that
which had theretofore circulated in Porto Rico, and the retirement
of all the other money.
The value of the interest sold in the plantation was agreed by
both parties at the time of the execution of the instrument of deed
and mortgage, to be 18,000 pesos, and so it was plainly stated in
that instrument. The transaction was a
bona fide one,
providing for actual conveyance of the interest in the plantation,
and there was plainly no gambling in the possible changes in the
value of the coin which might take place under a foreign government
when the various payments were to be made. The parties evidently
had no thought of the war, or of being transferred to a foreign
government as a result thereof. Under the circumstances, it is
impossible to conceive of sane persons' agreeing in this case upon
the value of the interest purchased and sold, and then that the
purchaser should further agree to pay over sixty percent more than
the value of the thing purchased if it should so happen in the
future that different coinage might be in circulation under a
different sovereignty, which would effect that result.
The question may be asked, what did the parties by this use of
language, if they did not mean precisely what the courts below have
said they did, and where is the justification for changing the
interpretation as gathered from their language? It may not,
perhaps, always be clear to see and determine what parties did mean
by the language they used in a contract, and at the same time it
may be perfectly clear they did not mean to contract with reference
to what the courts below have called the literal and specific
import of the language actually used. In this case, we have no such
difficulty. We have just stated what, in our opinion, the meaning
really was, and that it was aimed at the possible change in coinage
or of the value of the new coin under the decree of the government
of Spain itself.
Page 200 U. S. 115
Why that contingency should have presented itself is not stated
clearly as a fact in either of the judgments of the courts below.
(It may be here remarked that the judgments of those courts also
partake of the nature of findings of fact and opinions of the court
thereon.) There is a recital in the judgment or decree of the
Supreme Court of what was stated by counsel for appellants in his
written communication to the court, and which is part of the
record, and that statement was, in substance, that the change was
contemplated by the Spanish government at that time (1894), by
which the peso then in circulation was to be retired, and another
coin was to be issued which would be worth sixty instead of
fifty-seven cents to the peso, and it was with that contingency in
mind that the parties provided as they did in the contract in
question. It is true the supreme court does not find the fact of
the existence of this intention on the part of the Spanish
government, but, in giving a statement of what it regarded as the
distinction between the case at bar and one theretofore decided by
the same court, in a manner seemingly inconsistent with this
decision here, the supreme court said:
"This case being different from what occurred in the case of
Dona Josefa Cayol y Julia, and the agricultural corporation
'Balseiro and Gergetti,' which case was recently decided by this
supreme court, and in which neither of the parties had expressed
their will in so clear and explicit a manner as in the present
case, nor could the case offer any difficulty, since the plaintiff
herself had recognized in her complaint -- and it was also proven
in the course of the suit -- that the clause of the deed, the
application of which was being considered, and on which she based
her claim that the purchasers Balseiro and Georgetti should pay her
the interest on that part of the price, the payment of which had
been postponed, in American currency without the discount fixed by
the government of the United States for the money of this country,
had been established by the parties in consideration of the
exchange of the Mexican money, which had already been announced by
the Spanish government
Page 200 U. S. 116
on that date when the contract was made, for which reason this
supreme court had to dismiss the appeal in cassation interposed by
the plaintiff Dona Josefa Cayol, from the judgment rendered by the
District Court of Arecibo, denying the claim made by the said Dona
Josefa Cayol, the court basing its decision precisely on this same
article 1283 of the Civil Code, the application of which is the
question at issue in the present appeal."
True, it appears to have been proved in that case, what the
record does not show to have been specifically proved here, that
there was at the time this contract was entered into a contemplated
exchange of money to be circulated, and the contemplated change had
been announced by the Spanish government at the time when the
contract was made. But this fact is not a necessity in order to
maintain our view of the proper construction of the contract, for
it simply furnishes what may be termed a presumption that the use
of the language as to the payments was made with reference to this
particular and contemplated exchange. The wholly incredible nature
of the contract, if construed in the way the lower courts have
done, is nonetheless apparent, and we cannot agree with a
construction which binds the appellants to pay more than sixty
percent than the parties agreed the interest in the plantation was
worth, and just that amount more than both parties supposed was to
be paid.
In truth, a careful reading of the whole decree of the supreme
court (while also considering that the recitals in that decree of
matters contained in the appellants' brief were not negatived by
the court as to matters of fact, the case being decided wholly upon
the asserted strict construction of the contract) rather leads one
to the conclusion that the court assumed the truth of those
recitals as to the contemplated change of coinage, but regarded the
fact as immaterial in view of what it thought to be the plain
language of the contract. Of course, we do not intimate that the
court below was bound to deny the truth of the recitals or else it
was to be taken as admitting it. We only
Page 200 U. S. 117
refer to it in passing in connection with the language of the
whole decree, and the reasons given for the judgment, as some
ground for the belief that the court in fact assumed the truth of
the recitals, but thought them wholly immaterial. The court also
pays no heed to the evidence which was received upon the trial of
the case showing the manner in which settlements of existing debts
had been made upon instruments like the one in question, with or
without the particular clause as to payments, the evidence being
that the debts were paid at the rate of exchange provided for in
the act of Congress. This, of course, must have been upon the
ground that the words of the contract, as construed by the court,
governed.
In
City of San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co., 195 U.
S. 510, the contention was that the money due the gas
company for lighting the street lamps was payable in Porto Rican
money, but this Court said that the contract was for payment in
current foreign money, exclusive of Spanish gold, and it was
conceded that, if the foreign current money was required by the
contract, money of the United States, current at the time the
contract was made, was within the contemplation of the parties.
Such money was also current in the island when performance was due.
The case does not cover the one at bar.
Nor is the debt payable at the rate of one hundred cents for
each peso, on the theory that the money in circulation at the time
and place for the performance of the contract was the money in
contemplation of the parties thereto in the absence of a contract
for the payment in some other money.
See 195 U. S. 195 U.S.
510, cases cited, page
195 U. S.
520.
There was, as we have seen, no contract to pay in American money
at the rate contended for by appellee. In providing for the
withdrawal of all coins in circulation in Porto Rico, Congress
provided at the same time for fixing the equivalent between those
coins and American coins for the payment of all existing debts.
This was simply fixing the value of those coins relatively to their
value in American coin and with reference to the payment of debts
then existing. All money then unpaid
Page 200 U. S. 118
on this mortgage obligation was an existing debt within the act,
and hence might be paid in American money at the rate of exchange
therein specified. The withdrawal of the coins of Porto Rico in
circulation at the time of the passage of the act of Congress, and
provided for therein, did not take legal effect, so far as
concerned debts then existing, except upon the condition that those
debts might be solved in the coins of the United States at the rate
of exchange stated in the act. This did not impair or change the
obligation of any contract, and was but an exercise of power to fix
the value of the coins which were to be withdrawn, and to state the
rate of exchange at which existing debts might be paid in American
money, and as there was no contract to pay at any other rate, the
act was valid, and applied to this case.
We are of opinion that the appellants are entitled to pay the
balance remaining unpaid of the debt secured by the mortgage in
American money at the rate of exchange prescribed by Congress.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion.
Reversed.
*
"SEC. 11. That, for the purpose of retiring the Porto Rican
coins now in circulation in Porto Rico and substituting therefor
the coins of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury is
hereby authorized to redeem, on presentation in Porto Rico, all the
silver coins of Porto Rico known as the peso, and all other silver
and copper Porto Rican coins now in circulation in Porto Rice, not
including any such coins that may be imported into Porto Rico after
the first day of February, nineteen hundred at the present
established rate of sixty cents in the coins of the United States
for one peso of Porto Rican coin, and for all minor and subsidiary
coins the same rate of exchange shall be applied. The Porto Rican
coins so purchased or redeemed shall be recoined at the expense of
the United States, under the direction of the Secretary of the
Treasury, into such coins of the United States now authorized by
law as he may direct, and from and after three months after the
date when this act shall take effect, no coins shall be a legal
tender, in payment of debts thereafter contracted, for any amount
in Porto Rico except those of the United States, and whatever sum
may be required to carry out the provisions hereof, and to pay all
expenses that may be incurred in connection therewith, is hereby
appropriated, and the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby
authorized to establish such regulations and employ such agencies
as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes hereof: Provided,
however, That all debts owing on the date when this act shall take
effect shall be payable in the coins of Porto Rico now in
circulation, or in the coins of the United States at the rate of
exchange above named."
