This Court is bound by the decision of the highest court of a
state that a state statute does not violate any provision of the
state constitution, and is valid so far as that instrument is
concerned.
The first ten amendments to the federal Constitution operate on
the National government only, and were not intended to, and did
not, limit the powers of the states in respect to their own
people.
A state cannot, by statute, grant immunity to a witness from
prosecution by the United States for violation of a federal
statute, or prevent the testimony given by him under compulsion of
the statute from being used against him in a prosecution by the
United States, and the absence of such immunity from prosecution by
the United States, does not necessarily invalidate the statute
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The provisions in the Kansas antitrust law, as construed by the
highest court of that state, compelling witnesses to testify as to
violations of the act, and granting immunity from prosecution for
violations testified to, or the use of the testimony against the
witness, are not void under the Fourteenth Amendment because
immunity from federal prosecution is not granted, and one
committed, in accord with the provisions of the statute, for
contempt for refusing to testify to acts within his knowledge is
not deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
The plaintiff in error seeks to review the judgment of the
Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirming a judgment against
him of imprisonment for contempt, entered by direction of the
district court of Shawnee County in that state. The plaintiff in
error had been duly subpoenaed as a witness to appear before the
above mentioned district court, and was examined before that court
under and by virtue of the provisions of section 10 of chapter 265
of the Laws of Kansas of 1897. Gen.Stat. 1901, § 7873. The statute
is known as the Kansas Anti-Trust Act. Section 10 is reproduced in
the margin.
*
Page 199 U. S. 373
The proceeding was commenced in September, 1903, by the Attorney
General and County Attorney of Shawnee County, and those officers
presented to the court their verified application, informing it of
the existence of combinations of persons engaged in the operation
of coal mines in Osage County to fix the price of coal at the
mines, and the price to be charged to purchasers; that the members
of the combination met at a place in Shawnee County monthly to fix
the minimum price to be charged for coal, and that they would not
sell coal for less than the minimum price so fixed, and that the
agreements thus entered into were by them carried out and executed.
The plaintiff in error was engaged in operating a coal mine in
Osage County, and was named in the application as one who had a
knowledge concerning the existence of the combination, and a
subpoena was thereupon asked for to be served upon him. The
district judge granted the application. The subpoena was duly
served, and the plaintiff in error appeared pursuant thereto before
the district judge and answered some questions that were propounded
him by the attorney general or county attorney. Other questions
were put to him in relation to his knowledge of the meetings, and
as to the existence of any agreement between
Page 199 U. S. 374
the operators of the coal mines of Osage County, and with regard
to the fixing of the price of coal to be sold to residents and
citizens of Kansas. The plaintiff in error refused to answer these
questions, and assigned reasons for such refusal at some length;
but the chief ground now relied on in this Court as forming a
federal question is that the statute violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution; that the statute
did not furnish a broad enough indemnity, and the judgment of
imprisonment deprived him of his liberty without due process of
law.
The court held that the excuses given for declining to answer
were insufficient, and thereupon instructed and directed the
witness to answer the questions propounded to him, but he still
refused to do so. Whereupon the court found him guilty of a direct
contempt of court in refusing to answer the questions, and ordered
that he be committed to the jail of Shawnee County until he should
answer them, but not beyond a period of thirty days.
The plaintiff in error then appealed from the judgment rendered
against him to the supreme court, where it was affirmed in May,
1904. To review that judgment of affirmance, the plaintiff in error
has brought the case here by writ of error.
Page 199 U. S. 379
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has held in this case that the
statute under which the plaintiff in error was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a contempt of court was a valid statute, and did not
violate either the constitution of the state or of the federal
government.
One portion of the statute in question has already been passed
upon by this Court and decided to be a valid provision as construed
by the state court.
Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.
S. 447. The decision in that case has no application to
the section involved herein.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff in error that the
court below denied to him the protection of section 10 of the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution of Kansas, and also denied to him the
benefit of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, that no person should be compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself, and also that he
has been deprived of the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas that the
statute in question violated no provision of the constitution of
that state, and that it was a valid statute so far as that
instrument was concerned. This doctrine is familiar, and a few of
the many cases upon the subject are cited in
Smiley v.
Kansas, 196 U. S. 447.
It has been so frequently held as not to warrant the citation of
many authorities that the first ten amendments to the
Page 199 U. S. 380
federal Constitution operate on the national government only,
and were not intended to, and did not, limit the powers of the
states in respect to their own people.
Spies v. Illinois,
123 U. S. 131;
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172,
175 U. S. 174.
That portion of the Fifth Amendment, therefore, already cited has
no application in a proceeding like this in a state court, under a
state statute.
The plaintiff in error, however, contends that the denial of his
claim of right to refuse to answer the questions was in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and deprived him of his liberty without due process of law.
This, in reality, is the sole question in the case. He contends
that the immunity granted by the state statute, while enforcing the
giving of testimony which may incriminate the party interrogated as
a violator of that statute is not (and could not be) broad enough
to provide immunity from prosecution under the federal antitrust
statute, and that compelling him to answer questions under such
circumstances, which might incriminate him as a violator of the
federal antitrust statute, and upon his refusal condemning him to
imprisonment, deprived him of his liberty without due process of
law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the statute
is therefore void. The state statute could not, of course, prevent
a prosecution of the same party under the United States statute,
and it could not prevent the testimony given by the party in the
state proceeding from being used against the same person in a
federal court for a violation of the federal statute, if it could
be imagined that such prosecution would be instituted under such
circumstances. Is this fact fatal to the proceeding? We think not.
Assuming for this purpose that, if the statute failed to give
sufficient immunity from prosecution or punishment, it would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and that an imprisonment by
virtue of the statute would be depriving the witness of his liberty
without due process of law, we come to an examination of the extent
of the immunity in this case.
Page 199 U. S. 381
The question has been before this Court in cases somewhat
similar to this, although they arose under federal statutes. In
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, the
immunity provided for by section 860 of the Revised Statutes was
held not to be broad enough to enable the prosecution to insist
upon an answer from the witness. In the subsequent case of
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, the
statute there involved was held to afford complete immunity to the
witness, and he was therefore obliged to answer the questions that
were put to him although they might tend to incriminate him. In
that case, it was contended on the part of the witness that the
statute did not grant him immunity against prosecutions in the
state courts, although it granted him full immunity from
prosecution by the federal government. This contention was held to
be without merit. While it was asserted that the law of Congress
was supreme, and that judges and courts in every state were bound
thereby, and that therefore the statute granting immunity would
probably operate in the state as well as in the federal courts, yet
still, and aside from that view, it was said that, while there
might be a bare possibility that a witness might be subjected to
the criminal laws of some other sovereignty, it was not a real and
probable danger, but was so improbable that it needed not to be
taken into account.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has held in this case that, in the
proceeding under the section in question, the witness can only be
asked material questions relating to information regarding any
alleged violation of the statute relating to transactions within
the state, and that it would not be material, and consequently not
permissible, to ask a witness in relation to matters of interstate
commerce, which might constitute a violation of the federal
antitrust act. Therefore, the opinion continued, if, in the course
of an examination properly made in regard to transactions within
the state, information should incidentally be given which might
possibly be used in a prosecution under the federal act, such
possible prosecution did not operate as a reason for permitting the
witness to refuse to
Page 199 U. S. 382
answer; that it could not be presumed that under such
circumstances any federal prosecution would ever take place, and
that it was, within the reasoning of
Brown v. Walker,
161 U. S. 591, a
danger so unsubstantial and remote that it was not necessary (as it
was impossible) for the statute to provide against it. We regard
this as a sound view. We do not believe that in such case there is
any real danger of a federal prosecution, or that such evidence
would be availed of by the government for such purpose. We think
the legal immunity is in regard to a prosecution in the same
jurisdiction, and when that is fully given, it is enough. The
principles underlying the provision itself have been thoroughly
treated in the above-cited cases, and it would be out of place to
here renew their discussion.
We are of opinion that no federal right of the plaintiff in
error has been violated, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Kansas must therefore be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE McKENNA dissented.
* Section 10, being section 7873, General Statutes 1901,
reads:
"The several district courts of this state and the judges
thereof shall have jurisdiction, and it shall be their duty, upon
good cause shown, and upon written application of the county
attorney or the attorney general, to cause to be issued by the
clerk of said court subpoenas for such witnesses as may be named in
the application of a county attorney or the attorney general, and
to cause the same to be served by the sheriff of the county where
such subpoena is issued, and such witnesses shall be compelled to
appear before such court or judge at the time and place set forth
in the subpoena, and shall be compelled to testify as to any
knowledge they may have of the violations of any of the provisions
of this act, and any witness who fails or refuses to attend and
testify shall be punished as for contempt, as provided by law. Any
person subpoenaed and examined shall not be liable to criminal
prosecution for any violation of this act about which he may
testify. Neither shall the evidence of any such witness be used
against him in any criminal proceeding. The evidence of all
witnesses so subpoenaed shall be taken down by the reporter of said
court, and shall be transcribed and placed in the hands of the
county attorney or the general attorney, and he shall, in the
proper courts at once prosecute such violator or violators of this
act as the testimony so taken shall disclose. Witnesses subpoenaed
as provided for in this section shall be compelled to attend from
any county in the state."
