Although its functions are public, a railroad company holds the
legal title to the property employed in the discharge of its
duties, and while it must under all circumstances do everything
reasonably necessary for the accommodation of passengers and
shippers, it may use its property to the best advantage of the
public and itself, and for that end may make reasonable rules and
regulations for the use of its property consistent with the
purposes for which it is created and not inconsistent with legally
established regulations. When not unnecessary, unreasonable, or
arbitrary, a railroad may make arrangements with, including the
granting of special privileges to, a single concern to supply
passengers arriving at its terminals with hacks and cabs, and it is
not bound, at least in the absence of valid state legislation
requiring it to do so, to accord similar privileges to other
persons, even though they be licensed hackmen. Such an exclusive
arrangement is not a monopoly in the odious sense of the word, nor
does it involve an improper use by a railroad company of its
property .
Public sidewalks and streets are for use by all on equal terms
for proper purposes subject to valid regulations prescribed by the
constituted authorities.
Where there is a continuing trespass by a number of parties, and
a suit of law could only determine a particular controversy at a
particular time, a court of equity may meet such an unusual
emergency and by a comprehensive decree determine finally the
controversy between the parties,
Page 199 U. S. 280
avoid a multiplicity of suits and conserve the public interest;
and so
held that the Pennsylvania Company could maintain a
suit against hackmen combined together in disregard of its
regulation enjoining them from congregating upon the sidewalk
adjacent to its terminal at Chicago so as to interfere with the
ingress and egress of passengers.
The rights of a railroad company as abutting owner of the
sidewalks adjacent to the property on which its station stands and
those of its passengers are not paramount to the rights of the
general public to legitimately use the sidewalk, and licensed
hackmen, unless forbidden by local regulations, may, within
reasonable limits, use a public sidewalk in properly prosecuting
their calling so long as such use does not obstruct others in
legitimately using it upon equal terms.
This suit involves some questions as to the relative rights of
the parties in the use of a railroad passenger station and depot
grounds, and in the use of the public sidewalk and street adjacent
to such station and grounds.
The facts out of which the controversy has arisen are clearly
established, and may thus be summarized:
By a lease executed in 1871, the Pennsylvania Company, a
corporation of Pennsylvania, engaged in transporting passengers and
freight by railroad, acquired the possession and control of the
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway and all its rolling
stock and property, the latter railway extending from Pittsburgh to
a passenger station at or near the corner of Canal and Adams
Streets in Chicago.
In 1880, the lessee company erected on the leased premises a new
passenger house, now known as the Union Passenger Station, which
ever since has been and is now occupied and used by it and its
tenants, the Chicago & Alton Railway Company, the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, the Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul Railway Company, and the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. The companies just named
occupy and use that station under a perpetual lease by which the
Pennsylvania Company, as between it an its tenants, has charge of
the station, with authority to control and manage all trains
therein as well as all watchmen and employees in the business there
transacted.
Page 199 U. S. 281
This passenger station is the only terminus in Chicago of each
of those lines of railway, and through that station alone can the
several companies using it conduct an exchange of passengers and
baggage and the transportation and handling of the United States
mail and express parcels.
The extent of the business done at that station is indicated by
the statement that the Chicago & Alton Railway Company controls
and operates in the transaction of what is commonly called
interstate business over 1,000 miles of railway; the Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railway Company, over 7,000 miles; the
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, over 6,000
miles; the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway
Company, over 1,400 miles, and the Pennsylvania Company, over 1,000
miles.
At this station, the average number of passengers arriving and
departing is over 30,000 each day; the average number of parcels of
baggage daily received and delivered is over 2,200, and the average
number of tons of United States mail daily received and delivered
is over 250. Passenger trains to the number of 250 arrive and
depart each day. This statement does not include the large number
of express parcels daily handled at the station.
All tickets of interstate passengers arriving and departing from
this station, known as through tickets, have attached to each a
check or coupon for conveyance through Chicago to the station of
the connecting line of railroad designated on such tickets, and not
running into or out of the passenger depot of the Pennsylvania
Company. The latter company and the other companies named have
contracts for the use of a line of omnibuses or conveyances for the
performance of the services called for by such coupons or checks,
and those omnibuses or conveyances form the only regular connecting
lines of transportation between the Pennsylvania Company's station
and the stations of other railways in Chicago.
Page 199 U. S. 282
Besides the Pennsylvania Company's station, there are five other
railway stations in Chicago.
The main entrance to and exits from the Pennsylvania Company's
station for passengers, for employees, and for the public using the
station, is on Canal Street, about 100 feet north of Adams Street.
Substantially all passengers, whether arriving or departing, pass
through that entrance, which is at the head of a flight of stairs
leading down to and up from the station platform upon which trains
arrive and depart.
The present suit was instituted by the Pennsylvania Company
against the defendant Donovan and others, citizens of Illinois, for
the purpose of protecting that company in the enjoyment of certain
alleged rights and privileges in respect of its passenger station
and depot grounds in Chicago. The plaintiff alleged that those
rights had been violated by the defendants, and, unless enjoined
from so doing, they would continue to violate them, to its great
damage.
After referring to its efforts for many years to protect
incoming and outgoing passengers from extortion and annoyance
practiced by local hackmen, expressmen, and hotel runners
congregating about its station, and noisily soliciting the
patronage of passengers, the plaintiff, besides stating the above
facts, alleged that it was compelled, in 1894, to institute a
partial hack service of its own; and, for the purpose of protecting
the rights of passengers, it made, on the thirty-first day of
December, 1894, an arrangement, or contract, with one Eighme for
the purpose of furnishing sufficient carriage and cab service to
passengers arriving at its station, and gave to him for a carriage
stand a small piece of ground, about thirty-two feet wide and about
ten feet long, in the northwest corner of its passenger station at
the corner of Madison Street, near its power house, requiring him
to keep at all times clean vehicles, carriages, and cabs with
uniformed, honest, and competent drivers, who would be satisfactory
to the company; to make charges for the use of such carriages and
cabs only in accordance with the ordinances of the City of Chicago;
that Eighme
Page 199 U. S. 283
had been allowed to place an agent inside the company's station
to notify passengers that suitable cabs and carriages could be
obtained from such agent; that, by means of such arrangement, the
company made full provision for the wants of incoming passengers
desiring cabs or carriages for transportation from its station to
any part of Chicago. The arrangement or agreement with Eighme was
terminated by the company on the thirty-first day of January, A.D.
1902, and a similar arrangement was made with the Parmelee Transfer
Company, which thereafter succeeded Eighme in the same business,
and now carried it on in the same manner.
The plaintiff charged a conspiracy and confederation among the
defendants -- hack drivers and members of the Chicago Hack, Coupe
& Cab Drivers' Union -- to injure its business and property
rights, alleging that they daily gathered in numbers from eight to
twenty men at a time, in rows and groups, upon the sidewalk in
front of its main entrance, entered the company's station at its
main entrance by twos and threes at a time, without plaintiff's
consent and against its express objections, and loud and boisterous
voices and manner solicited incoming passengers and baggage for
their vehicles; that defendants, by their numbers and noisy calls,
harassed and annoyed passengers, sometimes forcibly laying hold of
them when leaving the station in order to secure their patronage,
to the annoyance and confusion of passengers, and to the injury and
damage of the plaintiffs; that the number of the defendants, upon
the arrival of each train at the entrance and within the station,
soliciting businesses, had become so great that, by their
boisterous actions and obstruction of the sidewalk and the interior
of plaintiff's station, without its consent, they had in large part
deprived plaintiff of its lawful property rights in the street
frontage, and of the free and full use of its station and property,
and thereby created and continued a private nuisance damaging to
the plaintiff's property, depriving it of the full, lawful,
beneficial use of its station and street frontage, and of the main
entrance thereto, and had prevented
Page 199 U. S. 284
and now daily prevented it from securing to passengers a free
and uninterrupted passage from and to its station and to arriving
and departing trains, and that, by such acts of the defendants,
great and substantial damages were inflicted upon plaintiff's
property, different in kind and degree from that suffered by the
general public, incapable of computation, and which could not be
compensated at law.
It was further averred in the bill that the defendants asserted
the right -- and acted upon that claim and assertion -- to enter
the station of the plaintiff at all times, in such numbers as
suited their purposes, to remain there and occupy such portions of
the station as they saw fit in soliciting the custom of incoming
passengers, regardless of the consent or the regulations of the
plaintiff, or the use to which its property is lawfully devoted,
and to the prejudice of its duties and business as a common
carrier, and by their actions largely deprived the plaintiff of the
control of its property, to its irreparable loss and damage.
Alleging that its rights could not be effectively protected
except by the decree of a court of equity, the plaintiff prayed
that the defendants be perpetually enjoined from "entering the
station" of the plaintiff
"for the purpose of soliciting the custom of incoming passengers
for cabs, carriages, express wagons, or hotels, respectively, and
that the occupation of the sidewalk and street abutting the main
entrance of your orator's said station by said defendants for the
purpose of soliciting custom of passengers for their said cabs,
carriages, express wagons, and hotels be decreed to be a nuisance
to your orator, and damaging to its property, and that said
defendants and each of them, and all persons acting in concert with
them, whose names are unknown to your orator, may be perpetually
enjoined from congregating singly or in larger numbers upon the
said sidewalk at the main or any other entrance of your orator's
said station for the purpose of plying their respective vocations
as hackmen, cabmen, expressmen, or hotel runners, and from
interfering with or soliciting the custom of any of the
passengers
Page 199 U. S. 285
upon the sidewalk adjoining said station at any main or other
entrance to said station, and that your orator may have such other
and further relief in the premises as the nature of its case may
require, and to your honors shall seem meet."
The defendants filed an answer putting in issue the material
allegations of the bill and insisting upon their legal right to
have their vehicles in the public street in front of the company's
station, and to go upon the plaintiff's depot grounds or into its
station, as well as to stand upon the sidewalk in front of the main
entrance to the station, for the purpose of soliciting the business
of incoming or outgoing passengers.
A motion for an injunction against the defendants was heard upon
the pleadings and upon affidavits filed by the respective parties.
The circuit court granted a preliminary injunction to the effect
that the defendants and all persons claiming to act under their
authority, direction, or control, or to whom notice of the court's
order or injunction should come, refrain
"from entering the passenger station of complainant at the
corner of Adams and Canal Streets, in the City of Chicago, to
solicit custom of the incoming passengers for cabs, carriages,
express wagons, or hotels, and do absolutely desist and refrain
from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or
about such entrances to said passenger station, and from soliciting
the custom of passengers for cabs, carriages, express wagons, or
hotels until the further order of the court in the premises."
The defendants appealed from that order, and it was affirmed in
the circuit court of appeals, except the last clause thereof, which
was modified by restraining the defendants
"from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to,
or about the entrances of appellee's [company's] passenger station
. . . and from there soliciting the custom of passengers,
so as
to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers and
employees."
120 F. 215. Subsequently, a final decree was passed in the
circuit court in conformity with the above order of the circuit
court of appeals.
Page 199 U. S. 286
That decree, upon appeal by the defendants, was affirmed in the
latter court, and the case is now before this Court upon writ of
certiorari, sued out by the defendants.
Page 199 U. S. 292
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
As this case is before us on writ of certiorari, we can dispose
of all questions arising on the record.
Upon the pleadings, two principal inquiries arise: first,
whether the Pennsylvania Company, having made an arrangement with
the Parmelee Transfer Company to furnish at its passenger station,
from time to time, all vehicles necessary for the accommodation of
passengers arriving there on its trains or on the trains of other
railroad companies, may legally exclude from its depot grounds or
passenger station all hackmen or expressmen coming to either
for the purpose only of soliciting for themselves the
custom or patronage of passengers. Second, whether, in virtue of
its ownership of the passenger station and depot grounds in
question, the railroad company is entitled, in prosecuting its
business, to any greater privileges in respect of the use of the
sidewalk and street in front of the main entrance to such station
than belonged to the defendants in the prosecution of their
business.
Much has been said in argument as to the functions and duties of
railroad companies. Under the decisions of this Court, there can be
no doubt as to the nature of those functions or duties. In
New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344,
47 U. S. 382,
this Court held that a corporation engaged, under legislative
authority, in the transportation of passengers and freight over
navigable waters, was "in the exercise of a sort of public office,
and has public duties to perform." In
Olcott v.
Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678,
83 U. S.
694-695, it was adjudged that a railroad, whether
constructed by a private corporation or by individuals under the
authority of a
Page 199 U. S. 293
legislative grant, or by the state itself, was a public highway,
and that the function performed by the corporation was that of the
state, and the uses to which its property was devoted were of a
public nature. In
Queensbury v.
Culver, 19 Wall. 83,
86 U. S. 91, it
was said that the construction or maintenance of a public highway
was "for the promotion of a public use." So, in
Township
of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666,
86 U. S. 676,
which involved the validity of taxation, under legislative
authority, to aid in the construction of a railroad by a
corporation: "Though the corporation was private, its work was
public, as much so as if it were to be constructed by the state."
Again, in
Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway Co.,
135 U. S. 641,
135 U. S.
657:
"The question is no longer an open one as to whether a railroad
is a public highway, established primarily for the convenience of
the people, and to subserve public ends, and therefore subject to
governmental control and regulation. It is because it is a public
highway, and subject to such control, that the corporation by which
it is constructed, and by which it is to be maintained, may be
permitted, under legislative sanction, to appropriate private
property for the purposes of a right of way, upon making just
compensation to the owner in the mode prescribed by law."
To the same effect are
United States v. Freight
Association, 166 U. S. 290,
166 U. S. 332;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466,
169 U. S. 544;
Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285,
173 U. S. 301.
Necessarily, the same principles apply in reference to the use of
the company's stationhouse and depot grounds, for they are held in
the same right as are its road, its locomotives, and other property
or appliances employed in the transportation of passengers and
freight, and must be devoted primarily to public use to the extent
necessary for the public objects intended to be accomplished by the
construction and maintenance of the railroad as a highway.
It by no means follows, however, that the company may not
establish such reasonable rules, in respect of the use of its
property, as the public convenience and its interests may suggest,
provided only that such rules are consistent with the
Page 199 U. S. 294
ends for which the corporation was created, and not inconsistent
with public regulations legally established for the conduct of its
business. Although its functions are public in their nature, the
company holds the legal title to the property which it has
undertaken to employ in the discharge of those functions. And, as
incident to ownership, it may use the property for the purposes of
making profit for itself, such use, however, being always subject
to the condition that the property must be devoted primarily to
public objects, without discrimination among passengers and
shippers, and not be so managed as to defeat these objects. It is
required under all circumstances to do what may be reasonably
necessary and suitable for the accommodation of passengers and
shippers. But it is under no obligation to refrain from using its
property to the best advantage of the public and of itself. It is
not bound to so use its property that others, having no business
with it, may make profit to themselves. Its property is to be
deemed, in every legal sense, private property as between it and
those of the general public who have no occasion to use it for
purposes of transportation. In
Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 195 U. S. 540, the
Court considered the nature of the interest which a railroad
company had in its right of way. It was there said:
"A railroad's right of way has therefore the substantiality of
the fee, and it is private property even to the public in all else
but an interest and benefit in its uses. It cannot be invaded
without guilt of trespass. It cannot be appropriated in whole or
part except upon the payment of compensation. In other words, it is
entitled to the protection of the Constitution, and in the precise
manner in which protection is given."
In that case, the Court referred with approval to the
observation of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. v. Hummell, 44 Pa.
375, to the effect
"that a railroad company is a purchaser, in consideration of
public accommodation and convenience, of the exclusive possession
of the ground paid for to the proprietors of it."
So, in
Pittsburgh,
Page 199 U. S. 295
Fort Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Bingham, 29 Ohio
St. 370, 371, the Supreme Court of Ohio said that,
"for all purposes not connected with the operation of its road,
the right of the company to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the
corporate property is as perfect and absolute as is that of an
owner of real property not burdened with public or private
easements or servitudes."
Applying these principles to the case before us, it would seem
to be clear that the Pennsylvania Company had the right -- if it
was not its legal duty -- to erect and maintain a passenger station
and depot buildings in Chicago for the accommodation of passengers
and shippers as well as for its own benefit, and that it was its
duty to manage that station so as to subserve, primarily, the
convenience, comfort, and safety of passengers and the wants of
shippers. It was therefore its duty to see to it that passengers
were not annoyed, disturbed, or obstructed in the use either of its
stationhouse or of the grounds over which such passengers, whether
arriving or departing, would pass. It was to that end -- primarily,
as we may assume from the record -- that the Pennsylvania Company
made an arrangement with a single company to supply all vehicles
necessary for passengers. We cannot say that that arrangement was
either unnecessary, unreasonable, or arbitrary; on the contrary, it
is easy to see how, in a great city and in a constantly crowded
railway station, such an arrangement might promote the comfort and
convenience of passengers arriving and departing, as well as the
efficient conduct of the company's business. The record does not
show that the arrangement referred to was inadequate for the
accommodation of passengers. But if inadequate, or if the transfer
company was allowed to charge exorbitant prices, it was for
passengers to complain of neglect of duty by the railroad company,
and for the constituted authorities to take steps to compel the
company to perform its public functions with due regard to the
rights of passengers. The question of any failure of the company to
properly care for the convenience of passengers
Page 199 U. S. 296
was not one that in any legal aspect concerned the defendants as
licensed hackmen and cabmen. It was not for them to vindicate the
rights of passengers. They only sought to use the property of the
railroad company to make profit in the prosecution of their
particular business. A hackman in nowise connected with the
railroad company cannot, of right and against the objections of the
company, go upon its grounds or into its station or cars for the
purpose simply of soliciting the custom of passengers; but, of
course, a passenger, upon arriving at the station, in whatever
vehicle, is entitled to have such facilities for his entering the
company's depot as may be necessary.
Here, the defendants press the suggestion that they are entitled
to the same rights as were accorded by special arrangement to the
Parmelee Transfer Company. They insist in effect that, as carriers
of passengers, they are entitled to transact their business at any
place which, under the authority of law, is devoted primarily to
public uses -- certainly at any place open to another carrier
engaged in the same kind of business. But this contention, when
applied to the present case, cannot be sustained. The railroad
company was not bound to accord this particular privilege to the
defendants simply because it had accorded a like privilege to the
Parmelee Transfer Company, for it had no contractual relations with
the defendants, and owed them, as hackmen, no duty to aid them in
their special calling. The defendants did not have, or profess to
have, any business of their own with the company. In meeting their
obligations to the public, whatever the nature of those
obligations, the defendants could use any property owned by them,
but they could not, of right, use the property of others against
their consent. In maintaining a highway, under the authority of the
state, the first and paramount obligation of the railroad company
was, as we have already said, to consult the comfort and
convenience of the public who used that highway. To that end, it
could use all suitable means that were not forbidden by law. In its
discretion, it
Page 199 U. S. 297
could accept the aid or stipulate for the services of others.
But, after providing fully for the wants of passengers and
shippers, it did not undertake, expressly or by implication, to so
use its property as to benefit those who had no business or
connection with it. It is true that, by its arrangement with the
railroad company, the Parmelee Company was given an opportunity to
control, to a great extent, the business of carrying passengers
from the Union Passengers' Depot to other railway stations and to
hotels or private houses in Chicago. But in a real, substantial,
legal sense, that arrangement cannot be regarded as a monopoly in
the odious sense of that word, nor does it involve an improper use
by the railroad company of its property. That arrangement is to be
deemed, not unreasonably, a means devised for the convenience of
passengers and of the railroad company, and as involving such use
by the company of its property as is consistent with the proper
performance of its public duties and its ownership of the property
in question. If the company, by such use of its property, also
derived pecuniary profit for itself, that was a matter of no
concern to the defendants, and gave them no ground of
complaint.
This question is not controlled by any statute of Illinois.
Reference has been made to the Illinois act as amended in 1883, by
which it is provided that every railroad in that state shall,
"at all junctions with other railroads at all depots where said
railroad companies stop their trains regularly to receive and
discharge passengers in cities and villages, for at least one-half
hour before the arrival of, and one-half hour after the arrival of,
any passenger train, cause their respective depots to be open for
the reception of passengers, said depots to be kept well lighted
and warmed for the space of time aforesaid;"
also, to the act of 1877, as amended in 1895, by which it is
provided,
"that all railroads in this state carrying passengers or freight
shall, and they are hereby required to, build and maintain depots
for the comfort of passengers and for the protection of shippers of
freight, where such railroad
Page 199 U. S. 298
companies are in the practice of receiving and delivering
passengers and freight at all towns and villages having a
population of two hundred or more, on the line of their roads and
roads leased and operated by them."
Hurd's Ill.Stat., 1901, pp. 1378, 1385. Clearly these statutes
have nothing to do with the matter before us. They relate only to
the comfort and convenience of passengers and shippers of freight,
and do not confer or assume to confer any rights on hackmen or
cabmen who seek to enter the depot grounds and station of the
railroad company merely to solicit business for themselves. It does
not appear that the state has undertaken by any statute to compel
the railroad company to share the use of its depot grounds and
station with hackmen and cabmen seeking to use them only to solicit
custom for themselves. Whether such a statute would be valid we
need not now consider or determine.
In the
Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1,
117 U. S. 24,
which involved a general inquiry as to the respective rights of
railroad and express companies in respect of the use of railroads
for the transportation of express parcels, this Court said:
"So long as the public are served to their reasonable
satisfaction, it is a matter of no importance who serves them. The
railroad company performs its whole duty to the public at large and
to each individual when it affords the public all reasonable
express accommodations. If this is done, the railroad company owes
no duty to the public as to the particular agencies it shall select
for that purpose. The public require the carriage, but the company
may choose its own appropriate means of carriage, always provided
they are such as to insure reasonable promptness and security."
In
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Pullman Car Co.,
139 U. S. 79,
139 U. S. 87,
one of the questions was as to the validity of a contract between a
railroad company and the Pullman company whereby the latter was
given the exclusive right for fifteen years to furnish drawing room
and sleeping cars to be used by the former, and whereby also the
railroad company stipulated
Page 199 U. S. 299
that, during that term, it would not contract to give a like
privilege to other sleeping car companies. That contract was
assailed as one in restraint of trade and as being against public
policy. This Court said:
"The authorities cited in support of this contention have no
application to such a contract as the one before us. The defendant
was under a duty arising from the public nature of its employment
to furnish for the use of passengers on its lines such
accommodations as were reasonably required by the existing
conditions of passenger traffic. Its duty as a carrier of
passengers was to make suitable provisions for their comfort and
safety. Instead of furnishing its own drawing room and sleeping
cars, as it might have done, it employed the plaintiff, whose
special business was to provide cars of that character, to supply
as many as were necessary to meet the requirements of travel. It
thus used the instrumentality of another corporation in order that
it might properly discharge its duty to the public. So long as the
defendant's lines were supplied with the requisite number of
drawing room and sleeping cars, it was a matter of indifference to
the public who owned them.
Express Cases, 117 U. S.
1."
The views we have expressed find more or less support in
numerous adjudged cases, some of which are cited in the margin.
* There are cases
to the contrary, but, in our opinion, the better view -- the one
sustained by the clear weight of
Page 199 U. S. 300
authority and by sound reason and public policy -- is that which
we have expressed.
The defendants cite, as supporting their contention,
Pennsylvania Company v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 289. But that
case did not involve any question as to the right of licensed
cabmen to enter the stationhouse of a railroad company, against its
objection, solely for the purpose of soliciting the custom of
passengers. What appears in the opinion of the majority, and in the
particular cases cited by the learned state court on that point
was, we feel constrained to say, outside of the issues presented,
and cannot be deemed authoritative upon the question now being
considered. The sole issue in that case was as to the validity of
certain ordinances of the City of Chicago relating to the use by
hackmen of the public street and sidewalk in front of the company's
station -- a question wholly different from the one relating to the
special arrangement between the railroad company and the Parmelee
Transfer Company. If the question had been before the state court,
and it had adjudged that a railroad corporation could not grant to
one person or company the exclusive right within its station to
solicit the custom of passengers (the subject not being covered by
any valid statute), then it would have been necessary to consider
whether the subject was not one of general law, in respect of which
the courts of the United States were entitled to exercise their
independent judgment, in light of the settled principles that must
always control the determination of the legal rights of parties. No
such question is now presented.
The next question to be examined is that which involves the
respective rights of the parties in the use of the public street
and sidewalk in front of the company's passenger station.
We have seen that the original temporary restraining order of
the circuit court was, in general terms, to the effect that the
defendants desist from congregating upon the sidewalk in front of,
adjacent to, or about the entrance to the company's passenger
station, and from soliciting the custom of passengers
Page 199 U. S. 301
for cabs, etc., until the further order of the court, and that
this order was so modified in the circuit court of appeals as to
restrain only
such congregating by defendants upon the
sidewalk
as would interfere with the ingress and egress of
passengers and employees. We take it that the final decree
recognized the right of the defendants in prosecuting their
business to congregate, in reasonable numbers, upon the sidewalks
in front of, adjacent to, or about the entrance of the company's
station, and from there soliciting the custom of passengers,
providing such use of the sidewalks did not obstruct the ingress
and egress of passengers and employees.
As the railroad company did not appeal from the final decree of
the circuit court, it cannot, upon this appeal, complain of any of
its provisions. The defendants did appeal, and they object to the
decree relating to the use of the sidewalk and street in front of
the main entrance to the passenger depot.
That the railroad company, by its agents and employees, are
entitled, in prosecuting its business, to use in all appropriate
ways the sidewalk and street in front of its station and depot
grounds cannot be doubted, that right being appurtenant to the
lands upon which its stationhouse and depot grounds stand.
Passengers may therefore in their own right, as well as in right of
the company, use the sidewalk in order to gain access to the depot
grounds and station, or to reach the public street when leaving the
station.
Referring to the rights of abutting owners, the Supreme Court of
Illinois, in
Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556, 571,
said:
"The dedication of the street by the plat, the sale of lots with
reference to it, conveyance of abutting lots, and the payment of
the money for the conveyances, were elements sufficient to create
the right. The right may be regarded in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament. It becomes appurtenant to the lots. As to
the rights secured, they are plain: to have the street kept open,
so that free access may be had to and from lots abutting on the
street."
In the later case of
Pennsylvania Company v. Chicago,
181 Ill. 289, above
Page 199 U. S. 302
cited, that court adjudged that the title to the streets in
Chicago was vested in the city, and
"it has the conservation, control, management, and supervision
of such trust property, and it is its duty to defend and protect
the title to such trust estate. The city has no power or authority
to grant the exclusive use of it streets to any private person or
for any private purposes, but must hold and control the possession
exclusively for public use, for purposes of travel and the
like."
The general doctrine is correctly stated in Dillon on Municipal
Corporations:
"For example, an abutting owner's right of access to and from
the street, subject only to legitimate public regulation, is as
much his property as his right to the soil within his boundary
lines. . . . When he is deprived of such right of access, or of any
other easement connected with the use and enjoyment of his
property, other than by the exercise of legitimate public
regulation, he is deprived of his property."
Again:
"But it was further seen that he had rights not shared by the
public at large, special and peculiar to himself, and which arose
out of the very relation of his lot to the street in front of it,
and that these rights, whether the bare fee of the streets was in
the lot owner or in the city, were rights of property, and as such
ought to be and were as sacred from legislative invasion as his
right to the lot itself."
2 Dill.Mun.Corp., 4th ed., §§ 587b. 656a. So, in Lewis on
Eminent Domain, where the adjudged cases are referred to and
examined:
"When the owner of a tract of land lays the same out into lots
and streets, and sells the lots, the purchasers of such lots
acquire, as appurtenant thereto, a private right of way and access
over the streets. This private right arises without any express
grant, and in the absence of any statute. The law presumes that the
parties had in mind the advantages to be derived from the use of
the proposed streets, and implies a right to such use as a part of
the grant. . . . Therefore, in the case of such a grant, there
arises by operation of law a private right to use the streets in
connection with the lots of each proprietor, which is as inviolable
as any other right of property. . . . The existence of these
private rights
Page 199 U. S. 303
and easements is therefore entirely independent of the mode in
which the highway is established, or of the estate or interest
which the public acquires in the soil of the street, whether a fee
or less."
Lewis on Eminent Domain, 2d ed., § 91
f, and authorities
cited in notes.
See also Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104.
But the right of the railroad company, as abutting owner, and
the rights of passengers are not, in their nature, paramount to the
rights of others of the general public to use the sidewalk in
question in legitimate ways and for legitimate purposes. Licensed
hackmen and cabmen, unless forbidden by valid local regulations,
may, within reasonable limits, use a public sidewalk in prosecuting
their calling, provided such use is not materially obstructive in
its nature -- that is, of such exclusive character as in a
substantial sense to prevent others from also using it upon equal
terms for legitimate purposes. Generally speaking, public sidewalks
and streets are for use by all upon equal terms for any purpose
consistent with the object for which such sidewalks and streets are
established, subject, of course, to such valid regulations as may
be prescribed by the constituted authorities for the public
convenience -- this to the end that, as far as possible, the rights
of all may be conserved without undue discrimination.
By the Illinois statutes, it is provided that the city council
in cities may regulate the use of streets and sidewalks, and
license, tax, and regulate hackmen, omnibus drivers, carters,
cabmen, porters, expressmen, and all others pursuing like
occupations, and to prescribe their compensation. Hurd's Ill.Stat.
1901, pp. 285, 287. And by ordinance of the city council of Chicago
it is provided that
"any licensed hackney, coach, cab, or other vehicles for the
conveyance of passengers, may stand, while waiting for employment
at the following places, and for the period of time hereinafter
provided: . . . Stand No. 4. The east side of Canal Street,
occupying one hundred and ten feet between Adams and Madison
Streets, as the superintendent of police shall direct . . . Stand
No. 6.
Page 199 U. S. 304
At all railroad depots ten minutes previous to the arrival of
all passenger trains."
Rev.Code of Chicago, § 498. The validity of this ordinance has
been sustained by the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Pennsylvania
Co. v. Chicago, 181 Ill. 299. Perceiving nothing in the above
provisions inconsistent with any right secured by the Constitution
of the United States, we accept the decision of the state court as
authoritative upon this point. When, therefore, licensed hackmen
and cabmen, at appropriate times, placed their vehicles in the
public street next to the sidewalk in front of the company's
passenger house, they did not violate the regulations established
by the city council. Nor, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, did
they violate such regulations, when, leaving their vehicles in the
public street at the appointed places, they stood nearby them for a
reasonable time upon the sidewalk awaiting the coming of passengers
from the stationhouse. What they could not legally do -- what the
final decree properly forbade them to do -- was to congregate upon
the sidewalk in front of, adjacent to, or about the passenger house
so as to interfere with the ingress and egress of passengers. Of
course, any use of the sidewalk in whatever was that would
unnecessarily or unduly obstruct and interfere with passengers in
their going or coming would be inconsistent with the rights of such
passengers, as well as an infringement of the right of the company,
as abutting property owner, to have, by its agents and employees,
for the purposes of its business, reasonable access to and from the
sidewalk and the public street.
It only remains to inquire as to the competency of a court of
equity to give the railroad company the relief it sought. The
defendants insist that equity cannot properly interfere. But the
inadequacy of a legal remedy in such a case as this one is quite
apparent. According to the record, the attempt of the defendants,
despite the objections of the company, to use its stationhouse and
depot grounds for the purpose of meeting passengers and soliciting
their patronage was of constant, daily, almost hourly occurrence.
The case was one of a continuing
Page 199 U. S. 305
trespass, involving injury of a permanent nature. A suit at law
could only have determined the particular wrong occurring on a
particular occasion, and would not reach other wrongs of like
character that would occur almost every hour of each day as
passengers arrived at the station of the company. The same state of
things existed in reference to such use of the sidewalk in front of
the passenger station as unduly interfered with the rights of
passengers arriving and departing. Only a court of equity was
competent to meet such an unusual emergency, and by a comprehensive
decree determine finally and once for all the entire controversy
between the parties, thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits and
conserving the public interests. No remedy at law would be so
complete or efficacious as a suit in equity in such a case as this
one.
Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.
S. 550;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.
S. 466,
169 U. S. 517.
The Supreme Court of Illinois well said in
Chicago General Ry.
Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 181 Ill. 605, 611:
"When irreparable injury is spoken of, it is not meant that the
injury is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond the
possibility of compensation in damages, but it must be of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress
can be had therefor in a court of law."
See also Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104, 115-116;
Carpenter v. Capital Electric Co., 178 Ill. 29, 36;
Lowery v. Pekin, 186 Ill. 387, 389.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is
Affirmed.
*
Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221;
Barney v. The
Martin, 11 Blatchf. 233;
Commonwealth v. Power, 7
Met. 596;
Barney v. Oyster Bay Steamboat Co., 67 N.Y. 301;
Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35;
Commonwealth
v. Carey, 147 Mass. 40, note;
State v. Depot Co., 71
Ohio St. 379;
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Old Dominion
Baggage Co., 99 Va. 111;
Fluker v. Georgia Railroad
Co., 81 Ga. 461;
Griswold v. Webb, 16 R.I. 649;
Summitt v. State, 76 Tenn. 413;
New York &c. R.
Co. v. Scovill, 71 Conn. 136;
Kates v. Cab. Co., 107
Ga. 636;
Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot, 79 Minn. 188;
Boston & Albany R. Co. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65;
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230;
New York &c. R. Co. v. Bork, 23 R.I. 218;
St.
Louis Drayage Co. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 65 F. 39;
Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N.H. 377.
