While it may not be within the power of Congress by a special
system of license taxes to obtain, from a territory of the United
States, revenue for the benefit of the nation, as distinguished
from that necessary for the support of the territorial government,
Congress has plenary power, save as controlled by the provisions of
the Constitution, to establish a government of the territories
which need not necessarily be the same in all territories, and it
may establish a revenue system applicable solely to the territory
for which it is established.
The fact that the taxes are paid directly into the Treasury of
the United States, and are not specifically appropriated for the
expenses of the territory, when the sum total of all the revenue
from the territory including all the taxes does not equal the cost
and expense of maintaining the government of the territory does not
make the taxes unconstitutional if it satisfactorily appear that
the purpose of the taxes is to raise revenue in that territory for
the territory itself.
The license taxes provided for in § 460, Title II, of the Alaska
Penal Code are not in conflict with the uniformity provisions of §
8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.
The general rule that debates of Congress are not appropriate
sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the
language of statutes passed by that body does not apply to the
examination of the reports of committees of either branch of
Congress with a view of determining the scope of statutes passed on
the strength of such reports.
Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U. S. 457,
143 U. S.
464.
Page 194 U. S. 487
Section 460 of Title II. of the Alaska Penal Code, Act of March
3, 1899, 30 Stat. 1253, 1336, as amended by the Act of June 6,
1900, entitled "An Act Making Further Provision for a Civil
government for Alaska, and for Other Purposes," 31 Stat. 321, 330,
reads
"that any person or persons, corporation or company prosecuting
or attempting to prosecute any of the following lines of business
within the district of Alaska shall first apply for and obtain
license so to do from a district court or a subdivision thereof in
said district, and pay for said license for the respective lines of
business and trade, as follows, to-wit: . . . Transfer companies,
fifty dollars per annum."
Section 461 provides:
"That any person, corporation, or company doing or attempting to
do business in violation of the provisions of the foregoing
section, or without having first paid the license therein required,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,"
etc.
Section 463:
"That the licenses provided for in this act shall be issued by
the clerk of the district court or any subdivision thereof . . .
duly made and entered: . . . Provided, That . . . all moneys
received for licenses by him . . . under this act shall, except as
otherwise provided by law, be covered into the Treasury of the
United States, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of
the Treasury may prescribe."
Under this statute, plaintiff in error was prosecuted and
convicted in the District Court for the District of Alaska, Second
Division. This conviction has been brought to this Court on writ of
error, and the question presented is whether the statute is in
conflict with Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the
United States, which reads:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States, but all duties,
imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.
"
Page 194 U. S. 490
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The contention of plaintiff in error is that the license tax is
an excise, that it is laid and collected "to pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States," because, by section 463, it is provided that "all moneys
received for licenses . . . under this act shall . . . be covered
into the Treasury of the United States;" that it is imposed only in
Alaska, and is not "uniform throughout the United States."
It is unnecessary to consider the decisions in the
Insular cases, for, as said by MR. JUSTICE WHITE in his
concurring opinion in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.
S. 244,
182 U. S.
335:
"Without referring in detail to the acquisition from Russia of
Alaska, it suffices to say that that treaty also contained
provisions for incorporation, and was acted upon,"
and by Mr. Justice Gray in his concurring opinion (p.
182 U. S.
345):
"The cases now before the Court do not touch the authority of
the United States over the territories, in the strict and technical
sense, being those which lie within the United States, as bounded
by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Dominion of Canada, and the
Republic of Mexico, and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii; but
they relate to territory, in the broader sense, acquired by the
United States by war with a foreign state."
It had been theretofore held by this Court in
The Coquitlam
v. United States, 163 U. S. 346,
163 U. S. 352,
that
"Alaska is
Page 194 U. S. 491
one of the territories of the United States. It was so
designated in the order [the order assigning the territory to the
Ninth Judicial Circuit], and has always been so regarded. And the
court established by the act of 1884 is the court of last resort
within the limits of that territory."
Nor can it be doubted that it is an organized territory, for the
Act of May 17, 1884, 23 Stat. 24, entitled "An Act Providing a
Civil Government for Alaska," provided:
"That the territory ceded to the United States by Russia by the
Treaty of March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and
known as Alaska, shall constitute a civil and judicial district,
the government of which shall be organized and administered as
hereinafter provided."
See also 31 Stat. 321, sec. 1.
We shall assume that the purpose of the license fees required by
section 460 is the collection of revenue, and that the license fees
are excises within the constitutional sense of the term.
Nevertheless, we are of opinion that they are to be regarded as
local taxes, imposed for the purpose of raising funds to support
the administration of local government in Alaska.
It must be remembered that Congress, in the government of the
territories as well as of the District of Columbia, has plenary
power, save as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution;
that the form of government it shall establish is not prescribed,
and may not necessarily be the same in all the territories. We are
accustomed to that generally adopted for the territories, of a
quasi-state government, with executive, legislative, and
judicial officers, and a legislature endowed with the power of
local taxation and local expenditures; but Congress is not limited
to this form. In the District of Columbia, it has adopted a
different mode of government, and in Alaska still another. It may
legislate directly in respect to the local affairs of a territory,
or transfer the power of such legislation to a legislature elected
by the citizens of the territory. It has provided in the District
of Columbia for a board of three commissioners, who are the
controlling officers of the District. It may entrust to them a
large volume of legislative
Page 194 U. S. 492
power, or it may, by direct legislation, create the whole body
of statutory law applicable thereto. For Alaska, Congress has
established a government of a different form. It has provided no
legislative body, but only executive and judicial officers. It has
enacted a penal and civil code. Having created no legislative body
and provided for no local legislation in respect to the matter of
revenue, it has established a revenue system of its own, applicable
alone to that territory. Instead of raising revenue by direct
taxation upon property, it has, as it may rightfully do, provided
for that revenue by means of license taxes.
In reference to the power of Congress, reference may be had to
Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.
S. 404, in which it was held that
"it is within the constitutional power of Congress, acting as
the local legislature of the District of Columbia, to tax different
classes of property within the District at different rates,"
and further, after referring to the case of
Loughborough v.
Blake, 5 Wheat. 317, it was said (pp.
18 U. S.
407-408):
"The power of Congress, legislating as a local legislature for
the District, to levy taxes for District purposes only, in like
manner as the legislature of a state may tax the people of a state
for state purposes, was expressly admitted, and has never since
been doubted. 5 Wheat.
18 U. S. 318;
Welch v.
Cook, 97 U. S. 541;
Mattingly v.
District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687. In the exercise of
this power, Congress, like any state legislature unrestricted by
constitutional provisions, may at its discretion, wholly exempt
certain classes of property from taxation, or may tax them at a
lower rate than other property."
In view of this decision, it would not be open to doubt that, if
the act had provided for a local treasurer to whom these local
taxes should be paid, and directed that the proceeds be used solely
in payment of the necessary expenses of the government of Alaska,
its constitutionality would be clear; but the contention is that
the statute requires that the proceeds of these licenses shall be
paid into the Treasury of the United States, from which, of course,
they can only be taken under
Page 194 U. S. 493
an act of Congress making specific appropriation. In fact, all
the expenses of the territory are, in pursuance of statute, paid
directly out of the United States Treasury. Act of June 6, 1900,
Title I., sections 2 and 10, 31 Stat. 322, 325; Act of March 3,
1901, 31 Stat. 960, 987; April 28, 1902, 32 Stat. 120, 147, and
February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 882. True, there are some special
provisions for revenues and their application. Thus, the fees for
issuing certificates of admission to the bar, and for commissions
to notaries public, are to be retained by the secretary of the
district, and "kept in a fund to be known as the District
Historical Library Fund," and designed for "establishing and
maintaining the district historical library and museum," Act of
June 6, 1900, Title I, sec. 32, 31 Stat. 333, and municipal
corporations are authorized to impose certain taxes for local
purposes. Title III, section 201, 31 Stat. 521. By section 203,
fifty percent of all the license moneys collected within the limits
of such corporations are to be paid to their treasurers, to be used
for school purposes. By subsequent legislation, 31 Stat. 1438, it
is provided that, if the amount thus paid is not all required for
school purposes, the district court may authorize the expenditure
of the surplus for any municipal purpose. And by the same statute
it is also provided that fifty percent of all license moneys
collected outside municipal corporations, and covered into the
Treasury of the United States, shall be set aside, to be expended
for school purposes outside the municipalities. By still later
legislation (although that was enacted after the commencement of
this prosecution,32 Stat. 946), the entire proceeds of license
taxes within the limits of municipal corporations are to be paid to
the treasurer of the corporation, for school and municipal
purposes.
But, outside of these special matters, there are no provisions
for collecting revenue within the territory for the expenses of the
territorial government other than these license taxes and charges
of a similar nature. According to the information furnished by the
officers of the Treasury Department,
Page 194 U. S. 494
as shown in the brief of counsel for the government, all the
revenues of every kind and nature which can be considered as coming
from Alaska are not equal to the cost and expense of administrating
its territorial government. How far we are at liberty to rely upon
this information, which was not presented upon the trial of this
case, or how far we can take judicial notice of the facts as shown
by the records of the Treasury Department, need not be determined,
for if an excess of revenue above the cost and expense of
administering the territorial government must be shown to establish
the unconstitutionality of the license taxes, the fact should have
been shown by the plaintiff in error. The presumptions are that the
act imposing those taxes is constitutional, and anything essential
to establish its invalidity which does not appear of record or from
matters of which we can take judicial notice must be shown by the
party asserting the unconstitutionality.
The question may, then, be stated in this form: Congress has
undoubtedly the power, by direct legislation, to impose these
license taxes upon the residents of Alaska, providing that, when
collected, they are paid to a treasurer of the territory, and
disbursed by him solely for the needs of the territory. Does the
fact that they are ordered to be paid into the Treasury of the
United States, and not specifically appropriated to the expenses of
the territory, when the sum total of these and all other revenues
from the territory does not equal the cost and expense of
maintaining its government, make them unconstitutional? In other
words, if, under any circumstances, Congress has the power to levy
and collect these taxes for the expenses of the territorial
government, is it essential to their validity that the proceeds
therefrom be kept constantly separate from all other moneys, and
specifically and solely appropriated to the interests of the
territory? We do not think that the constitutional power of
Congress in this respect depends entirely on the mode of its
exercise. If it satisfactorily appears that the purpose of these
license taxes is to raise revenue for use in Alaska, and that the
total revenues
Page 194 U. S. 495
derived from Alaska are inadequate to the expenses of the
territory, so that Congress has to draw upon the general funds of
the nation, the taxes must be held valid. That the purpose of these
taxes was to raise revenue in Alaska for Alaska is obvious. They
were authorized in statutes dealing solely with Alaska. There is no
provision for a direct property tax to be collected in Alaska for
the general expenses of the territory. The entire moneys collected
from these license taxes and otherwise from Alaska are inadequate
for the expenses of that territory. So far as we may properly refer
to the proceedings in Congress, they affirm that these license
taxes are charges upon the citizens of Alaska for the support of
its government. While it is generally true that debates in Congress
are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover
the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,
166 U. S. 290,
166 U. S. 318,
yet it is also true that we have examined the reports of the
committees of either body with a view of determining the scope of
statutes passed on the strength of such reports.
Church of Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457,
143 U. S. 464.
When sections 461 and 462 were under consideration in the Senate,
the chairman of the Committee on Territories, in response to
inquiries from Senators, made these replies:
"The Committee on Territories have thoroughly investigated the
condition of affairs in Alaska, and have prepared certain licenses
which, in their judgment, will create a revenue sufficient to
defray all the expenses of the government of the Territory of
Alaska. . . . They are licenses peculiar to the condition of
affairs in the Territory of Alaska on certain lines of goods,
articles of commerce, etc., which, in the judgment of the
committee, should bear a license, inasmuch as there is no taxation
whatever in Alaska. Not one dollar of taxes is raised on any kind
of property there. It is therefore necessary to raise revenue of
some kind, and in the judgment of the Committee on Territories,
after consultation with prominent citizens of the Territory of
Alaska, including the governor
Page 194 U. S. 496
and several other officers, this code or list of licenses was
prepared by the committee. It was prepared largely upon their
suggestions, and upon the information of the committee, derived
from conversing with them."
Vol. 32, Congressional Record, Part III, p. 2235.
While, of course, it would have simplified the matter and
removed all doubt if the statute had provided that those taxes be
paid directly to some local treasurer, and by him disbursed in
payment of territorial expenses, yet it seems to us it would be
sacrificing substance to form to hold that the method pursued, when
the intent of Congress is obvious, is sufficient to invalidate the
taxes.
In order to avoid any misapprehension we may add that this
opinion must not be extended to any case, if one should arise, in
which it is apparent that Congress is, by some special system of
license taxes, seeking to obtain from a territory of the United
States revenue for the benefit of the nation, as distinguished from
that necessary for the support of the territorial government.
We see no error in the record, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN took no part in the decision of this
case.