Bills were filed in Tennessee by the American National Bank and
others against the Carnegie Land Company, a Virginia corporation,
doing business in Tennessee under the provisions of the act which
was under review in
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.
S. 239;
176 U. S. 176
U.S. 69, and also against various creditors of that company. The
prayer of the bill was that it might be taken as a general
creditors' bill, and it was alleged that the company was insolvent,
having a large amount of property in the state which it had
assigned for the benefit of its creditors, without preferences,
which was in disregard of the statute of the state, that a receiver
should be appointed, the assets marshaled and the creditors paid
according to law. The company answered denying that it was
insolvent, and claimed that the assignment should be held valid,
and the trust administered by the assignees. During the pendency of
the suit, Sully and Carhart, New York creditors, filed a bill
setting up that nearly all the assets, if not all of them, in the
hands of the assignee of the company and sought to be impounded by
the bill filed by the bank were covered and conveyed to Sully, as
trustee, and that Carhart was entitled to priority over all other
creditors of the defendant in the appropriation of the assets
covered by the deed of trust to Sully. They asked for leave to file
that bill as a general bill against the land company, or, if that
could not be done, that they might file it in the case of the bank
against the land company, as a petition in the nature of a
cross-bill against that company. Other proceedings took place which
are set forth in detail in the statement of the case. They ended in
the consolidation of the various proceedings into one action and a
reference to a master to take proof of all the facts. The master
made his report, upon which a final decree was entered. It was
decreed that the land company, by its
Page 178 U. S. 290
deed of general assignment of June 3, 1893, in making
disposition therein for the payment of its creditors, without any
preferences, attempted to defeat the preferences given by law to
creditors, residents of Tennessee, over nonresident creditors and
mortgagees, whose mortgages were made subsequent to the creation of
the debts due resident creditors, and that such deed was fraudulent
in law, and void; that the making of the deed was an act of
insolvency by the land company, and that the bill filed by the bank
was properly filed, and should be sustained as a general creditors'
bill, and that the assets of the company under the jurisdiction of
the court were subject to distribution under the law relating to
foreign corporations doing business in Tennessee, and as such
should be decreed in the action then pending. The decree further
adjudged that Carhart was a
bona fide holder of the bonds
mentioned in his bill, and that he was entitled to recover thereon
as provided for in the decree, but subject to the payment of debts
due residents of Tennessee prior to the registration of such
mortgage. It was also decreed that the Travelers' Insurance
Company, by its mortgage, acquired a valid lien upon the property
covered by it, subordinate, however, to debts due residents of
Tennessee contracted prior to the registration thereof, and also
subject to some other liabilities of the land company. The case was
taken to the Court of Chancery Appeals, which modified in some
particulars the decree of the chancellor, and after such
modification, it was affirmed. Upon writ of error from the Supreme
Court, the case was there heard, and that court held that the
statute in question, providing for the distribution of assets of
foreign corporations doing business in that state, was
constitutional, and was not in contravention of any provision of
the Constitution of the United States. The decree of the court of
appeals was, after modifying it in some respects, affirmed. The
case was then brought here on writ of error.
Held:
(1) That on an appeal from a state court, the plaintiff in error
in this Court must show that he himself raised the question in the
state court which he argues here, and it will not aid him to show
that someone else has raised it in the state court, while he failed
to do so; but if he raised it in the supreme court of the state, it
is sufficient.
(2) That the allegation in Carhart's case that he was a resident
of New York is a sufficient allegation of citizenship, no question
having been made on that point in the courts below.
(3) That a Tennessee general creditor has the same right of
preference as against a resident mortgagee that he has against a
nonresident, and the same burden that is placed upon nonresident
mortgagees and judgment creditors is by the statute placed upon
resident mortgagees and judgment creditors.
(4) That there is no foundation for the claim made on behalf of
Carhart that section 5 of the Tennessee act of 1877 violates
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in that it deprives the nonresident mortgagee of his
property
Page 178 U. S. 291
without due process of law, but, on the contrary, the question
has been decided the other way in
Blake v. McClung.
(5) That there has been no denial by the Tennessee of the equal
protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.
The contest in this case arises out of the insolvency of the
Carnegie Land Company, a Virginia corporation doing business at the
time of its insolvency in the State of Tennessee under the
provisions of the act of the legislature of that state passed in
1877, and which was under review in this Court in
Blake v.
McClung, 172 U. S. 239;
176 U. S. 176 U.S.
59.
The contest is between creditors of the company above named, who
are nonresidents of the State of Tennessee, both those who are
unsecured, as well as those who are secured, by mortgages upon the
property of the company in that state, and creditors of such
company who are residents of the state.
The questions to be decided arise out of the provisions of the
fifth section of the above-mentioned act, the material portion of
which reads as follows:
"SEC. 5. That the corporations, and the property of all
corporations coming under the provisions of this act, shall be
liable for all the debts, liabilities, and engagements of the said
corporations, to be enforced in the manner provided by law, for the
application of the property of natural persons to the payment of
their debts, engagements, and contracts. Nevertheless, creditors
who may be residents of this state shall have a priority in the
distribution of assets, or subjection of the same, or any part
thereof, to the payment of debts over all simple contract
creditors, being residents of any other country or countries, and
also over mortgage or judgment creditors, for all debts,
engagements, and contracts which were made or owing by the said
corporations previous to the filing and registration of such valid
mortgages or the rendition of such valid judgments. But all such
mortgages and judgments shall be valid, and shall constitute a
prior lien on the property on which they are or may be charged, as
against all debts which may be incurred subsequent to the date of
their registration or rendition."
Acts of Tennessee, 1877, p. 44.
On November 27, 1893, the American National Bank and
Page 178 U. S. 292
others filed their bill against the Carnegie Land Company and
various named creditors of that company, and prayed that the bill
might be taken as a general creditors' bill against the company on
behalf of the complainants and of all the other creditors of the
company, and that those named as creditor defendants might
represent the class, their number being too great to make them all
parties to the bill. The complainants alleged that they were
creditors of the land company; that the company was insolvent; that
it had a large amount of property in the state; that it had
assigned the same for the benefit of its creditors without giving
preferences, which was in disregard of the statute of the state
(above referred to), and asked that the creditors of the company
should prove their claims in that suit; that a receiver should be
appointed, the assets marshaled, and the creditors paid according
to law.
To this bill the land company made answer, denying its
insolvency, or that it had ceased to do business, or had abandoned
its franchises, and claimed that its assignment was good and valid,
and that the trust should not be taken out of the hands of its
assignee.
During the pendency of this suit, Wilberforce Sully and A. B.
Carhart, residents of the State of New York, filed a bill against
the land company and certain corporations in the State of
Connecticut, called the Travelers' Insurance Company and the
Connecticut Trust & Safety Deposit Company. The complainants
alleged that the Carnegie Land Company had duly determined to issue
$300,000 worth of bonds, secured by mortgage upon its property in
the State of Tennessee, and of that amount of bonds but $85,000 had
actually been issued; that Sully was the mortgagee in trust in the
mortgage executed by the company for securing the payment of the
bonds, and that Carhart was the
bona fide holder of all of
the $85,000 of such bonds; that the mortgage was executed on
January 2, 1893, and was duly registered in the office of the
Register of Washington County,
Tennessee, on February 10, 1893; that the interest had not been
paid as it became due, and that, by virtue of a provision of the
mortgage, the whole principal sum had become due
Page 178 U. S. 293
and payable, and that the land company was in default in the
payment of the principal and interest due on such bonds. The bill
alleged the commencement of the suit already spoken of, brought by
the American National Bank and others against the land company, and
it alleged that nearly all of the assets, if not all of them, in
the hands of the assignee of the company, and sought to be
impounded by the bill filed by the American National Bank, were
covered and conveyed to the complainant Sully, as trustee, and that
the complainant Carhart, the holder of the outstanding bonds, was
entitled to priority over all other creditors of the defendant in
the appropriation of the assets covered by the deed of trust
executed to Sully, as above stated. Complainants prayed that they
might be allowed to file this bill as a general bill against the
land company, or, if for any reason this could not be done, that
they should be allowed to file the same in the above cause of the
bank against the land company and others as a petition in the
nature of a cross-bill against the said company.
To this bill the complainants in the first bill, the American
National Bank and others, made answer and denied that the land
company had ever executed any mortgage, or that any bonds were ever
issued under any mortgage, and denied that the land company ever in
any way or manner, either in law or in fact authorized the issuing
of any bonds under such mortgage, or to be secured thereby, and
they denied that any such bonds constituted any binding obligation
as against the land company.
The bank also alleged that if the bonds to the extent of $85,000
had in fact been issued, yet still the debts sued on by the bank
and its co-plaintiffs in the first bill above mentioned were
contracted by the land company, and were incurred long before the
execution and registration of the mortgage securing such bonds, and
therefore they claimed that the debts owing to citizens and
residents of Tennessee prior to the execution and registration of
the mortgage above mentioned should have priority under the law
over any debts secured or pretended to be secured by the
mortgage.
The Travelers' Insurance Company and the Connecticut Trust
Page 178 U. S. 294
& Safety Deposit Company also filed an answer to the bill of
Sully and Carhart in which the Travelers' company alleged that the
land company was indebted to it in the sum of $30,000 and three
years' interest, and in other sums amounting to several thousand
dollars, which amount was secured by a mortgage or deed of trust to
the Connecticut Trust & Safety Deposit Company, on what is
known as the Carnegie hotel property, which is a portion of the
property of the land company, and is situated in the State of
Tennessee. It also denied the existence of the bonded indebtedness
claimed on the part of complainants, and alleged that, in any
event, the debt of the Travelers' company against the land company
was older than, and the mortgage to the Trust company was prior to,
that of the complainants Sully and Carhart, and it denied that
these last-named parties had any debt as claimed by them, or a lien
of any kind on the property of the land company.
The insurance company also filed a petition in the suit brought
by the bank, in which it set up the existence of its mortgage, and
also prayed to be allowed to become a party to that cause, and to
have its note, which was secured by the mortgage, declared a
preferred claim, and decreed to be paid in full out of the proceeds
of the sale of the property specifically mortgaged to it.
An amended petition was filed by it in which it alleged that it
was the owner of another claim against the land company in favor of
P. Fleming & Company, for a little less than $2,000, under the
circumstances mentioned in the petition.
October 11, 1895, Mary P. Myton and A. B. Carhart filed a
petition in each of the above suits, in which they described
themselves as Mary P. Myton, a resident of the State of New York,
and A. B. Carhart, a resident of the City of Brooklyn. In that
petition, Mary P. Myton alleged a claim against the land company,
as existing on November 27, 1894, in the sum of $4,094.54, with
interest from November 27, 1892, while A. B. Carhart alleged a
claim as of the date of November 27, 1894, of $2,248.66, and they
asked to become parties to the above-named causes
Page 178 U. S. 295
for the purpose of setting up these demands and for a decree
against the company for their amounts, with interest.
(It is stated that the two debts represented by these notes were
actually in existence prior to the execution of the mortgage to
secure the bonds owned by Carhart, the notes being, in truth,
renewals of other ones executed prior to that time.)
These various proceedings were consolidated into one action, and
the case was referred to a master to take proof of all the facts.
The master made his report, upon which a final decree by the
chancellor was entered. It was decreed that the land company, by
its deed of general assignment of June 3, 1893, in making
disposition therein for the payment of its creditors, without any
preferences, attempted to defeat the preferences given by law to
creditors, residents of Tennessee, over nonresident creditors and
mortgagees whose mortgages were made subsequent to the creation of
the debts due resident creditors, and that such deed was fraudulent
in law, and void, that the making of the deed was an act of
insolvency by the land company, and that the bill filed by the bank
was properly filed, and should be sustained as a general creditors'
bill, and that the assets of the company under the jurisdiction of
the court were subject to distribution under the law relating to
foreign corporations doing business in Tennessee, and as such
should be decreed in the action then pending.
The decree further adjudged that Carhart was a
bona
fide holder of the bonds mentioned in his bill, and that he
was entitled to recover thereon as provided for in the decree, but
subject to the payment of debts due residents of Tennessee prior to
the registration of such mortgage. It was also decreed that the
Travelers' Insurance Company, by its mortgage, acquired a valid
lien upon the property covered by it, subordinate, however, to
debts due residents of Tennessee contracted prior to the
registration thereof, and also subject to some other liabilities of
the land company.
The case was taken to the court of chancery appeals, which
modified in some particulars the decree of the chancellor, and
after such modification, it was affirmed. Upon writ of error from
the supreme court, the case was there heard, and that
Page 178 U. S. 296
court held that the statute in question, providing for the
distribution of assets of foreign corporations doing business in
that state, was constitutional, and was not in contravention of any
provision of the Constitution of the United States. The decree of
the court of chancery appeals was modified in some respects, and
after modification it was affirmed, and the cause remanded to the
chancery court for execution.
The case has been brought here on writ of error in behalf of
certain unsecured creditors, nonresidents of Tennessee, and also in
behalf of the Travelers' Insurance Company and of the holder of the
bonds issued by the land company.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
There are two classes of creditors before the Court, both of
whom insist upon the erroneous character of the decree of the
supreme court of the state. They are (a) general unsecured and
nonresident creditors, and (b) nonresident creditors who are also
mortgagees. The creditors suing out this writ of error are all
nonresidents of the State of Tennessee, and they claim to have been
illegally discriminated against in the courts below by reason of
the statute of Tennessee providing for preferences to Tennessee
creditors.
In regard to the unsecured nonresident creditors, objection is
first made that there is only one of them, A. B. Carhart, who can
be heard upon the question of the validity of the act of 1877,
because he is the only person who has raised the point in any of
the state courts. It is also claimed that the question was raised
too late, even by Carhart himself, inasmuch as it is alleged to
have been raised by him for the first time in the supreme court of
the state.
Page 178 U. S. 297
In reply to the first objection, it is urged on the part of
creditors other than Carhart that they are general creditors in
like class with him, and that, if he can raise the question, they
are entitled to participate with him in the benefits of a decision
thereof in his favor to the same extent as if they had each
personally raised the same question in the state court.
Cases are cited by counsel for these creditors from the courts
of Tennessee, in which they say it has been held that
"a broad appeal by any one party from an entire chancery decree
where the matter is purely of equitable cognizance, carries up the
whole case, so as to allow relief to be granted to those who do not
appeal,"
and it is said that Carhart made a broad appeal.
In reply, counsel for defendants in error say that the rule in
Tennessee is that an appeal by an antagonistic party, even though a
broad one, will not avail his opponent. It is also argued that the
other creditors cannot be heard under Carhart's appeal, because the
interests of such other creditors are not joint or common with him,
but they are simply interested in the same question, which has
never been held sufficient.
However it may be in regard to the rights of parties on appeal
in the state court, we think that, in order to be heard in this
Court, the question must have been raised in the state court by the
individual who seeks to have it reviewed here. A plaintiff in error
in this Court must show that he has himself raised the question in
the state court which he argues here, and it will not aid him to
show that someone else has raised it in the state court, while he
failed himself to do so.
The two plaintiffs in error here, Sully, as the assignee of
Manning, and Mrs. Myton, failed to appeal from the decree of the
chancellor, as well as from the decree of the court of chancery
appeals; nor did they except to the report of the master, nor to
the decree affirming it, and their first mention of the point in
their own behalf is after the decision of the state supreme
court.
This is not a case where, by the reversal of a decree at the
instance of those who particularly raised the question in the
courts below, the whole decree is opened and nullified so as to
necessarily let in all parties standing in the same position to
Page 178 U. S. 298
share in the benefits of the decision. The fund is to be
distributed in this case according to the decision of the court,
and, of the parties to this suit, those only can avail themselves
of the benefits of the decree who have properly raised the question
and in whose favor the decree is rendered.
We must hold, therefore, that neither Sully, as assignee of
Manning, nor Mrs. Myton, is in a position to raise the question of
the invalidity of the state statute.
In regard to the objection that even Carhart has raised the
question too late, we think it is without foundation. He raised it
in the supreme court, and that court decided it against him not on
the ground that he had not raised it in the lower court, but on its
merits, and for the reason that, in the judgment of the supreme
court, the statute was a valid and constitutional exercise of the
legislative powers of the state.
The further objection made to Carhart is that it does not appear
that he is a citizen of another state than Tennessee, and hence
cannot avail himself of the fact of such citizenship in order to
claim that his rights as such citizen have been infringed within
the meaning of Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution,
declaring that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. We
think the objection untenable.
In his original bill to foreclose the mortgage securing the
$85,000 of bonds held by him, he described himself as a resident of
the State of New York, and in the petition of Mrs. Myton and Mr.
Carhart, filed October 11, 1895, in the two cases of the bank
against the land company, and Sully, trustee, against the land
company, Mrs. Myton is described as a resident of the State of New
York, and A. B. Carhart is described as a resident of the City of
Brooklyn. No question seems to have been made throughout the
litigation as to the citizenship of those parties. The question
does not seem to have arisen in any stage of the case up to the
argument in this Court. Although there may be some slight
difference in the facts between this case and those which are
stated in
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. at
172 U. S. 246,
we yet think that Carhart brings himself within the principle
decided in that case, and that his
Page 178 U. S. 299
citizenship in the State of New York should be regarded as
sufficiently proved.
Being entitled to raise the question, we must hold, in
conformity to our decision in the
Blake case, that
Carhart, as an unsecured creditor and a citizen of New York, is
entitled to share in the distribution of the assets of the Carnegie
Land Company upon the same level as like creditors of the company
residents of the State of Tennessee, and as the decree denies him
that right, it must be reversed for that reason.
The next question arises out of the mortgage given as security
for the payment of the bonds of the land company, of which Carhart
held all that had been issued -- $85,000.
Part of the fifth section of the act of 1877 provides --
"Nevertheless, creditors who may be residents of this state
shall have a priority in the distribution of assets, or subjection
of the same, or any part thereof, to the payment of debts over all
simple contract creditors, being residents of any other country or
countries, and also over mortgage or judgment creditors, for all
debts, engagements, and contracts which were made or owing by said
corporation previous to the filing and registration of such valid
mortgages or the rendition of such valid judgments."
Under this provision of the section, creditors of the land
company residing in Tennessee whose debts accrued prior to the
filing and registration of the Sully, trustee, mortgage were by the
decree of the court below preferred in payment over the mortgagee.
By reason of such preference, Carhart did not receive what he would
have received but for the preference so given. He claims that this
preference in favor of resident creditors whose debts existed when
his mortgage was registered is an illegal discrimination against
him as a nonresident mortgagee because the statute, as he says,
while directing such a discrimination against a nonresident
mortgagee, does not permit it as against a resident mortgagee. Such
a discrimination, if it existed, is invalid within the decision of
Blake v. McClung, supra.
It is objected, however, on the part of the defendants in error
that this is a merely abstract or moot question, because
Page 178 U. S. 300
there are no resident mortgagees, and their rights have not
therefore been determined. The objection is not well taken.
Although there are no resident mortgagees in this case, yet the
decree of the court below, following the statute, has postponed the
payment of the mortgage in favor of resident creditors whose debts
accrued prior to the registration of that mortgage. If the statute
does not permit such postponement against a resident mortgagee,
then the postponement in the case of a nonresident mortgagee would
be invalid. The postponement has in fact been made as against the
nonresident mortgagee, and whether that postponement was legal and
valid is no mere abstraction because by reason thereof this
nonresident mortgagee has actually suffered a loss in the payment
of his mortgage. It is therefore entirely immaterial whether in
this particular case there are or are not resident mortgagees. We
are in this case necessarily brought to a decision of the question
whether the postponement was valid, and that depends upon the
question whether the act permits a similar postponement in the case
of a resident mortgagee. If it does, it is conceded that the act is
valid so far as this particular question is concerned.
For us to hold that such postponement is not permitted in the
case of a resident mortgagee is to condemn the statute on that
point as a violation of the Constitution of the United States. Such
a construction should not be adopted if the statute is reasonably
susceptible of another which renders it valid. That rule applies
even though on some other point the statute has been already held
to be a violation of the federal Constitution.
We think the true construction of the statute requires us to
hold that the resident owner of a mortgage would be postponed in
its payment in favor of those debts made or owing by the
corporation prior to the filing and registration of his mortgage.
In other words, that the Tennessee general creditor has the same
right of preference as against a resident mortgagee that he has
against a nonresident, and the same burden that is placed upon
nonresident mortgagees and judgment creditors is by the statute
placed upon resident mortgagees and judgment
Page 178 U. S. 301
creditors. We do not think that this construction leads to any
absurd result.
It is urged that if it were to be so construed, a Tennessee
creditor who had no mortgage or judgment would share with all other
unsecured Tennessee creditors in the assets of the insolvent
company, but that if he, being such creditor, took a judgment or
mortgage as a security for the payment of his debt, he would
thereby lose his right to share with the other resident nonsecured
creditors, and the latter would have a preferred right of payment
over him for all debts of the company existing at the time of the
registration of the mortgage. The creditor, it is said, would thus
lose his right as a general creditor, and he would obtain no lien
by his mortgage or judgment as against those creditors of whom he
was one before he took his mortgage.
We agree that a construction which leads to such a result would
be absurd, but such a result does not follow from our construction
of the statute. When the Tennessee creditor takes his mortgage or
recovers his judgment to secure an existing indebtedness, a new
debt is not thereby created, but he has simply received or obtained
a security for its payment, and a preference as against all other
creditors whose debts may accrue subsequently to the filing and
registration of his mortgage or the recovery of his judgment. He
gains no priority over existing creditors of his class by taking a
mortgage or judgment. The debts existing at that time, including
his own, are to be paid, and it is only against debts subsequently
incurred that the mortgage or the judgment has a preferential lien.
If the debt for which he took the mortgage existed prior to the
execution thereof, the mortgagee did not, by taking his mortgage,
lose his right to share with the other unsecured creditors; but he
did not acquire the right to assert the lien of his mortgage in
preference to and against those creditors whose debts existed at
the time of its registration. His rights as a general creditor of
the land company, existing prior to the registration of the
mortgage, were not in any manner lost or affected by the mortgage.
He cannot assert the lien of his mortgage against prior creditors,
but he does not lose his own right as a prior creditor
Page 178 U. S. 302
by taking the mortgage. Although the act was evidently passed
for the purpose of awarding certain preferences to Tennessee over
foreign creditors, yet we see nothing in its general purpose which
requires us to consider the act as making a distinction in favor of
a Tennessee mortgagee as against a nonresident mortgagee.
While the effect of this construction deprives both classes of
mortgagees, in case of insolvency of the mortgagor, of any benefit
from their mortgages as against resident nonsecured creditors
existing when the mortgages were registered, yet at the same time
it permits such mortgagees to share in the distribution of assets
with such unsecured creditors, provided their own debts existed
prior to the taking of the mortgage, and did not spring into
existence simultaneously with the mortgage.
The rights of Carhart as a secured creditor must be adjusted
with reference to these views. If his secured debt, or any portion
thereof, did in fact exist prior to his mortgage, he is entitled to
share with other unsecured creditors who are residents of the State
of Tennessee.
Plaintiff in error Carhart also insists that section 5 of the
act of 1877 violates section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States in that it deprives the
nonresident mortgagee of his property without due process of
law.
We are unable to perceive any foundation for the claim, and we
think the question has been already so decided in
Blake v.
McClung, which we have so frequently referred to. It was
stated in that case at page
172 U. S.
260:
"It does not follow that, within the meaning of that amendment
[XIV], the judgment below deprived the Virginia corporation of
property without due process of law simply because its claim was
subordinated to the claims of the Tennessee creditors. That
corporation was not in any legal sense deprived of its claim, nor
was its right to reach the assets of the British corporation in
other states or countries disputed. It was only denied the right to
participate upon terms of equality with Tennessee creditors in the
distribution of particular assets of another corporation doing
business in that state. It had notice of the proceedings in the
state court, became a party to those
Page 178 U. S. 303
proceedings, and the rights asserted by it were adjudicated. If
the Virginia corporation cannot invoke the protection of the second
section of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States
relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states, as its co-plaintiffs in error have done, it is
because it is not a citizen within the meaning of that section, and
if the state court erred in its decree in reference to that
corporation, the latter cannot be said to have been thereby
deprived of its property without due process of law within the
meaning of the Constitution."
That language fits this case. The principle is not altered by
the fact that, in this case, the creditor had a mortgage which was
postponed, while in the case cited, his debt was unsecured, but it
was also postponed to the Tennessee creditor.
Nor can we see that there has been any denial by the State of
Tennessee to any person within its jurisdiction of the equal
protection of the laws. Upon this point also we refer to the same
case of
Blake v. McClung, where, at page
172 U. S. 260,
the question is decided.
These two last points would apply also to the mortgage of the
Travelers' Insurance Company. That company, being a corporation of
the State of Connecticut, could not raise the question of a denial
of any privilege or immunity as such citizen, under the provision
of Section 2, Article IV, of the Constitution.
Blake v.
McClung, supra. But the questions as to the deprivation of
property without due process of law and of being denied the equal
protection of the laws are raised by that corporation, and must be
decided in a way similar to the case of Carhart.
With the exception of Carhart as a nonresident unsecured
creditor, we do not see that the plaintiffs in error herein have
any right to complain of the decree of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, but as such nonresident unsecured creditor, he has the
right to share in the distribution of the assets of the Carnegie
Land Company upon the same level as like creditors of the company
who are residents of the State of Tennessee, and as the decree
below denies him that right, it must be reversed as to him for that
reason, and the case remanded to the supreme
Page 178 U. S. 304
court of the state for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE WHITE did not hear the
argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.
