The personal property of a citizen of and resident in one state
invested in bonds and mortgages in another state is subject to
taxation in the latter state, and the amount of the tax is a claim
against the property of the person taxed which is a debt that may,
in case of death of the person taxed, be proved against his estate
in the state where the mortgages and loans are contracted subject
to the statutes of limitations of the state.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for the
District of Minnesota, allowing a claim in favor of Washington
County, Minnesota, against the estate of Sophia M. Bristol,
deceased.
Sophia M. Bristol died testate, naming James Bristol as her
executor, and her will was duly admitted to probate in Wyoming
County, State of New York, where said James and Sophia M. resided.
Thereafter Mr. Bristol applied to the Probate Court of the County
of Ramsay, Minnesota, for the admission of the will to probate
there and the issue of letters testamentary to him. This was done,
and subsequently the County of Washington exhibited its claim
against said estate, whereupon Bristol filed his petition in the
Probate Court for the removal of the action instituted by the
filing of the claim into the circuit court of the United States,
and it was removed accordingly. A repleader was awarded by
stipulation, and a formal complaint and answer filed. The matter
was heard by the circuit court, a jury being waived according to
law, and the court made the following findings:
"I. That Cyrus Jefferson was the father of said Sophia M.
Bristol, deceased, and died in November, 1883. For fourteen years
just prior to his death, he was a citizen and resident of the New
York, and during said time loaned and invested
Page 177 U. S. 134
large sums of money to various persons residing in Minnesota,
upon their notes, payable to his order at said Stillwater, secured
by mortgages on real estate in said Washington and adjoining
counties in the State of Minnesota; all said loans and investments
were made and the notes and mortgages taken by and through William
M. McCluer, the agent of said Cyrus Jefferson, who resided at the
City of Stillwater, in said Washington County, during all the time
hereinafter mentioned, and who, with full authority from said Cyrus
Jefferson, made all such loans and took and retained all notes and
securities and collected and reloaned both the principal and
interest of said loans at said City of Stillwater, in Washington
County, Minnesota, and kept the same permanently invested in that
way, as nearly as practicable, save as to such moneys as said
Jefferson drew from time to time to pay his debts and living
expenses."
"II. Prior to May 1, 1883, said William M. McCluer at said
Stillwater, by the direction of said Jefferson, but otherwise with
the same power and under the same authority and in the same manner,
loaned of said moneys of said Cyrus Jefferson to persons in
Washington County sums aggregating eighteen thousand dollars
($18,000), taking notes and mortgages therefor in the name of and
payable to said Sophia M. Bristol at said Stillwater, and retained
the same as her agent, and handled and collected and reinvested the
same in the same manner as he had those of Cyrus Jefferson."
"III. After the death of said Cyrus Jefferson and on December
18, 1883, all the other notes and mortgages held by said McCluer as
agent for said Cyrus Jefferson were transferred, assigned, and
passed to said Sophia M. Bristol as her share of the estate of her
said father. She thereupon employed said William M. McCluer and
Charles M. McCluer, both of whom then at all times herein mentioned
resided at said Stillwater, as her agents at said City of
Stillwater in and about said loaning business. She gave to them all
the authority before that time exercised by said William M. McCluer
for her father, Cyrus Jefferson, as aforesaid, and also gave to
them a written power of attorney empowering them or either of
them
Page 177 U. S. 135
to satisfy and discharge or to sell and assign any and all
mortgages then or thereafter in her name in the States of Minnesota
or Wisconsin; all of said notes and mortgages of said Sophia M.
Bristol, including those received by her as her share of her
father's estate, as well as those taken in her name by said William
M. McCluer prior to the death of her father, as aforesaid, were
still left by her in the hands of her agents in Stillwater,
Minnesota, and said agents continued as before to make collections
of both principal and interest due on said notes and mortgages, to
satisfy and discharge mortgages, and to make new loans and
investments upon like securities with the moneys so collected by
them for said Sophia M. Bristol, and kept all of her moneys
received or collected by them prior to transmittal or reinvestment
of the same, and while in their hands, deposited in bank in said
Stillwater as their money, and having all notes and mortgages
received by them for such loans made payable at their own office in
said City of Stillwater, said mortgages being upon lands in
Washington and adjoining counties in Minnesota."
"IV. In March, 1885, all of such notes then in the bands of said
agents were delivered to said Sophia M. Bristol, and thereafter all
new notes as taken by said agents in.said business were sent to
Sophia M. Bristol and kept by her at her home in New York, but were
payable as before at the office of said agents in Stillwater,
Minnesota; all mortgages securing such notes were retained by said
agents, and said notes were returned to said agents at Stillwater
by said Sophia M. Bristol from time to time whenever required by
them for the purpose of renewal, payment, collection, or
foreclosure of securities; that the said William M. McCluer and
Charles M. McCluer continued as agents for said Sophia M. Bristol,
collecting money becoming due upon said notes and making loans in
her name, sometimes under the direction of James Bristol, her
husband, but generally upon their own judgment; that they remitted
money to Sophia M. Bristol when she called for the same, and what
was not received by her was invested in new loans, as
aforesaid."
"That said Sophia M. Bristol did receive from the proceeds
Page 177 U. S. 136
of said collections at various times large sums of money through
said agents, and all moneys collected were always subject to be
sent to her or paid out in any way she should order."
"V. In the month of August, 1890, said William M. McCluer died,
and thereafter said Charles M. McCluer continued to act as sole
agent for said Sophia M. Bristol at said City of Stillwater,
Minnesota, with the same power as before exercised by him and said
William M. McCluer, except that in November, 1890, Sophia M.
Bristol revoked said power of attorney which authorized said agent
to satisfy mortgages of record, and thereafter executed
satisfactions of mortgages herself."
"VI. Said loaning business was so carried on by said Sophia M.
Bristol by and through her said agents at the City of Stillwater,
Minnesota, in the manner aforesaid until her death, in the month of
August, 1894."
"VII. Said Sophia M. Bristol had no taxable property in said
Washington County during any of the years hereinbefore or
hereinafter mentioned other than the loans and indebtedness
mentioned, which were secured by mortgages upon lands in Minnesota,
and which were under the charge and management of her said agents,
who, during all said years and during all the time within which the
taxes hereinafter mentioned were assessed and levied, resided and
had their office and transacted said loaning business at the said
City of Stillwater, in said county and state."
"VIII. That the moneys originally sent by said Jefferson to said
William M. McCluer and invested and reinvested by said McCluer, and
afterwards by said Sophia M. Bristol kept and retained in the hands
of said William M. McCluer and Charles M. McCluer as her agents,
were so sent, retained and kept in the hands of said agents in the
City of Stillwater, Washington County, Minnesota, in and during
each of the years when the taxes hereinafter mentioned were
assessed and levied against said Sophia M. Bristol, as hereinafter
specifically set forth, as and for a permanent investment and
business under the full control of said agents, and said property
and said loans acquired and had a situs in said City of Stillwater,
Washington County, Minnesota, for the purpose of taxation. "
Page 177 U. S. 137
"IX. That the claimant herein, Washington County, is and for
more than thirty years last past has been a municipal corporation,
to-wit, an organized county created and existing under and pursuant
to the laws of the Minnesota."
"X. That in and during each of the years from 1883 to 1894,
inclusive, certain personal property taxes were duly assessed and
levied against said Sophia M. Bristol by the proper taxing officers
of said City of Stillwater and said Washington County on the
personal property of said Sophia M. Bristol, deceased, consisting
of the 'credits other than that of bank, banker, broker or stock
jobber,' and that said assessments were each in fact based upon
credits due said Sophia M. Bristol on promissory notes of various
persons residing in Washington County and other counties in
Minnesota, payable to her order, secured by mortgages on real
estate situate in Washington County and other counties in the
Minnesota."
"Said notes were all made payable at the office of William M.
McCluer or Charles M. McCluer at the City of Stillwater. The
assessed valuation of said personal property upon which said taxes
were so assessed and levied for each of said years, the rate of the
tax assessed upon property in the said City of Stillwater, in said
county, that being the district where said property was assessed,
in the number of mills levied on each dollar of property at the
assessed valuation for each of said years, and the amount of said
taxes so assessed and levied against said Sophia M. Bristol,
deceased, for each of said years, are as set forth in the following
schedule thereof, to-wit: [Here followed schedule as described. The
valuations ran from $17,900 in 1883 to $184,900 in 1884; $196,672
in 1888; $181,292 in 1889, and $179,900 in 1890, 1, 2, 3 and
4]."
"That the said Sophia M. Bristol failed and neglected to pay
said taxes on the first day of March in each of the years following
that in which said taxes were respectively levied, as hereinbefore
set forth, or at any time thereafter, and that, by reason of such
failure said Sophia M. Bristol became and was and is liable to pay
a penalty amounting to five percent on the amount of said taxes for
the years 1883 to 1894, and ten percent on the amount of said taxes
for each year thereafter, and that the
Page 177 U. S. 138
amount of said penalty for each of said years is as follows that
is to say: [Here, the penalties claimed for each year were set
forth.]"
"XI. Said Sophia M. Bristol never resided in Washington County
nor in the Minnesota at any time, nor was she within the Minnesota
from March 1, 1883, until her death, in August, 1894, except
temporarily, and that the whole period of time she spent in the
Minnesota from March 1, 1883, until her death did not exceed one
year."
"XII. On or about the nineteenth day of October, 1894, the will
of said Sophia M. Bristol was duly admitted to probate in and by
the Probate Court of Ramsay County, in the Minnesota, and such
proceedings were had in the matter of said estate that James
Bristol, the executor named in said will, was duly appointed by
said court as the executor of said last will and testament and of
said estate, and the said James Bristol thereupon duly qualified as
such executor and entered upon the discharge of his duties as such,
and thereafter and on the eighteenth day of April, 1895, and within
the time required by the order duly made by said probate court for
filing claims against the estate of said Sophia M. Bristol,
deceased, said claimant, Washington County, duly made and filed its
verified claim in due form for all of the said taxes and the said
penalties, together with interest upon the amount of said taxes and
penalties for each year from and after the first day of March, in
the year after the year in which said taxes were levied, as
aforesaid."
"XIII. That the said Sophia M. Bristol was and for more than
fifteen years next prior to her death bas been a resident and
citizen of the New York, and said James Bristol, the executor above
named, is now and for more than fifteen years last past always has
been a resident and citizen of the New York."
"XIV. The court further finds that all of the taxes hereinbefore
mentioned were fairly and equally assessed on a fair valuation of
the personal property of said Sophia M. Bristol, deceased, for each
of the years hereinbefore mentioned, and that no part of said taxes
has ever been paid."
As conclusions of law, the court found that Washington
County
Page 177 U. S. 139
was entitled to judgment for the amount of the taxes and
penalties, together with costs and disbursements, and that "said
claim of said amount is a just and valid claim against the estate
of Sophia M. Bristol, deceased," and entered judgment as
follows:
"It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged -- That the
County of Washington, the claimant in this case, do have and
recover of and from the estate of Sophia M. Bristol, deceased, the
sum of sixty-four thousand six hundred eighty-four dollars and
seventy-eight cents ($64,684.78), so found to be due by the court,
and that said sum of sixty-four thousand six hundred eighty-four
dollars and seventy-eight cents ($64,684.78) is a just and valid
claim against the estate of Sophia M. Bristol, deceased, in favor
of said Washington County, besides the costs and disbursements
herein to be taxed."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The judgment amounted in effect to the allowance of the claim
payable in due course of administration out of assets of the estate
within the jurisdiction of the probate court. This was so
notwithstanding the domicil of the testatrix and of her executor
was in the New York; that that was the place of principal
administration, and that the person charged therewith was the same.
Aspden v.
Nixon, 4 How. 467;
Johnson v. Powers,
139 U. S. 156,
139 U. S.
159.
Our jurisdiction by direct appeal is invoked on the ground that
the application of the Constitution of the United States was
involved, and that a law of the state was "claimed to be in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States."
The objections of the executor to the allowance of the claim
Page 177 U. S. 140
and his answer put forward the deprivation of property without
due process of, law; the abridgment of privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States, and the denial of the equal
protection of the laws, as the violations of constitutional
safeguards relied on. Of these the first only is pressed upon our
attention and needs to be considered, and that raises the question
whether the laws of the Minnesota, as expounded by the Supreme
Court of that state, in authorizing this judgment, amounted to the
taking of property without due process of law.
In the course of the administration of the estate of Cyrus
Jefferson, deceased, in the probate court of the County of
Washington, Minnesota, a claim was presented in March, 1884,
against the estate for unpaid taxes for the years 1882 and 1883, on
credits secured by mortgages, amounting to about $122,000, and the
claim was allowed. The executors appealed to the district court
where the order of the probate court was affirmed. The case was
then carried by the executors to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
which, on May 26, 1886, affirmed the judgment.
In re
Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215. It was objected "that taxes are not
debts which can be proved against the estate of deceased persons,"
but the court overruled the objection, saying:
"It is not material whether a personal tax is a debt in the
sense that an action against the person may be maintained to
recover it. It is at least a claim against the property which
survives the death of the person against whom it is levied, and
remains a claim against his estate. The statute regards it as a
debt to be paid out of the estate. In prescribing the order of
preference in which debts shall be paid, where the estate is not
sufficient to pay all, it provides (Gen.St., 1878, c. 53, § 38)
that, after paying the necessary expenses of the funeral, last
sickness and administration, the executor or administrator shall
'pay the debts against the estate in the following order. . . .
Second, public rates and taxes.' This, we think, is
conclusive that, for the purpose of.proof and payment out of the
estate, a personal tax is a debt."
The court further held that a tax list or tax duplicate, duly
certified by the county auditor, as required by statute, was
prima facie evidence of the
Page 177 U. S. 141
due levy of the taxes in it. The main question in the case was
whether credits due to a resident of another state, from residents
within Minnesota, for moneys loaned and invested by, and which
credits were managed and controlled by, an agent of the creditor,
resident within Minnesota, could be taxed in Minnesota under
existing statutes, and the court held that they could. The court,
after referring to the provisions of the statute that all personal
property in the state was subject to taxation, and that all moneys
and credits should be listed by the owner or his agent, where one
or the other resided, said:
"It is to be taken therefore as the intent of the statute, that
credits, to whomsoever owing, are taxable here if they can be
regarded as personal property in. this state -- that is, situated
in this state. To justify the imposition of tax by any state, it
must have jurisdiction over the person taxed, or over the property
taxed. As Jefferson was not a resident of this state, there was no
jurisdiction over him. But if the property on account of which
these taxes were unpaid was within this state, the state had
jurisdiction to impose them as it might impose a tax upon tangible
personal property permanently situated here, and to enforce the
taxes against the property. The authorities which we cite in
support of the proposition that the credits taxed had a sinus here,
fully sustain this."
"For many purposes, the domicil of the owner is deemed the situs
of his personal property. This, however, is only a fiction, from
motives of convenience, and is not of universal application, but
yields to the actual situs of the property when justice requires
that it should. It is not allowed to be controlling in matters of
taxation. Thus, corporeal personal property is conceded to be
taxable at the place where it is actually situated. A credit, which
cannot be regarded as situated in a place merely because the debtor
resides there, must usually be considered as having its situs where
it is owned -- at the domicil of the creditor. The creditor,
however, may give it a business situs elsewhere, as where he places
it in the bands of an agent for collection or renewal, with a view
to reloaning the money and keeping it invested as a permanent
business."
After citing
Catlin v. Hall, 21 Vermont, 152;
People v. Smith, 68 N.Y. 576;
Wilcox v.
Page 177 U. S. 42
Ellis, 14 Kans. 588;
Board of Supervisors v.
Davenport, 40 Ill. 197, and many other cases, the opinion
continued thus:
"The obligation to pay taxes on property for the support of the
government arises from the fact that it is under the protection of
the government. Now here was property within this state not for a
mere temporary purpose, but as permanently as though the owner
resided here. It was employed here as a business by one who
exercised over it the same control and management as over his own
property, except that he did it in the name of an absent principal.
It was exclusively under the protection of the laws of this state.
It had to rely on those laws for the force and validity of the
contracts on the loans, and the preservation and enforcement of the
securities. The laws of New York never operated on it. If credits
can ever have an actual situs other than the domicil of the owner,
can ever be regarded as property within any other state, and as
under obligation to contribute to its support in consideration of
being under its protection, it must be so in this case."
It was thus ruled that the tax list of personal property was
prima facie evidence of the due levy of the taxes, that
such taxes could be proven against decedents' estates, and that
credits secured by mortgages, the result of the business of
investing and reinvesting moneys in the state, were subject to
taxation as having their situs there.
Admonished as to the law of the state in these particulars, Mrs.
Bristol, Mr. Jefferson's daughter, continued the business of
investing and reinvesting in the same way and through the same
agency until her own death in August, 1894. The state statute
required every person being a resident of the state to list his
personal property, including moneys, credits, etc., for taxation
and
"moneys and other personal property invested, loaned or
otherwise controlled by him as the agent or attorney or on account
of any other person or persons,"
and in cases of failure to obtain a statement of personal
property from any cause, it was made the duty of the assessor to
ascertain its amount and value and assess the same at such amount
as he believed to be the true value thereof. Stat. 1894, c. 11, §§
1515, 1546; Stat. 1878, c. 11, §§ 7, 38. No question arises here in
respect of the
Page 177 U. S. 143
regular listing of these investments for taxation from 1883
until and including 1894, nor in respect of the valuation
thereof.
Mrs. Bristol had invested some $18,000 of her own money,
belonging to her prior to her father's death, in the same way and
by the same agency, and invested and reinvested in the same manner
that money and moneys derived from notes and mortgagee held by the
agent for Mr. Jefferson, which passed to her on his death. And
these investments were taxable, and were taxed year by year during
all this period according to the statutes of the state and the
decision of the Supreme Court from which we have quoted.
It is insisted, however, that this is not so, because in 1885,
which was after the presentation of the claim against the father's
estate in the probate court, though before the decision by the
supreme court, the notes then in the hands of the agents were
delivered to Mrs. Bristol, and thereafter all new notes taken in
the business were sent to her and kept by her in her home in New
York. But these notes were payable as before at the office of the
agents in Minnesota; the mortgages securing the notes were retained
by the agents, and the notes were returned to the agents from time
to time, whenever required by them, for the purpose of renewal,
collection or foreclosure of securities; the agents continued to
collect the money due on the notes and to make loans in the name of
Mrs. Bristol, sometimes under her husband's direction, but
generally on their own judgment, and they remitted money to Mrs.
Bristol whenever she called for the same, while what was not
received by her was invested in new loans. It also appeared that
Mrs. Bristol had given the agents a power of attorney empowering
them to satisfy or discharge, or to sell and assign, any and all
mortgages in her name in the states of Minnesota and Wisconsin, but
that she revoked this instrument after the death of one of the
agents, and about November, 1890, thereafter executing
satisfactions of mortgages herself.
Nevertheless, the business of loaning money through the agency
in Minnesota was continued during all these years just as it had
been carried on before, and we agree with the circuit court that
the fact that the notes were sent to Mrs. Bristol in New
Page 177 U. S. 144
York, and the fact of the revocation of the power of attorney,
did not exempt these investments from taxation under the statutes
as expounded in the decision to which we have referred. And we are
unable to perceive that any rights secured by the federal
Constitution were infringed by the statutes as thus interpreted so
far as the situs of these loans and mortgages was concerned.
In
New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.
S. 309, certain taxes were levied on money on deposit,
and also on money loaned on interest, credits and bills receivable,
and it was held by this Court that the statutes of Louisiana, as
interpreted by the courts of that state, in authorizing such
assessment, did not violate the Constitution of the United States.
There, the money, notes, and evidences of credits were in fact in
Louisiana, though their owners resided elsewhere. Still, under the
circumstances of the case before us, we think, as we have said,
that the mere sending of the notes to New York and the revocation
of the power of attorney did not take these investments out of the
rule.
Persons are not permitted to avail themselves for their own
benefit of the laws of a state in the conduct of business within
its limits, and then to escape their due contribution to the public
needs through action of this sort, whether taken for convenience or
by design.
In
New Orleans v. Stempel, it was remarked:
"With reference to the decisions of this Court, it may be said
that there has never been any denial of the power of a state to tax
securities situated as these are, while there have been frequent
recognitions of its power to separate for purposes of taxation the
sites of personal property from the domicil of the owner. . . . In
Tappan
v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall. 490, the
ruling was that although shares of stock in national banks were in
a certain sense intangible and incorporeal personal property, the
law might separate them from the persons of their owners for
purposes of taxation, and give them a sites of their own.
See
also Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S.
18,
141 U. S. 22, where the
question of the separation of personal property from the person of
the owner for purposes of taxation was discussed at length. As also
the case of
Savings Society v.
Multnomah
Page 177 U. S. 145
County, 169 U. S. 421,
169 U. S.
427, in which a statute of Oregon taxing the interest of
a mortgagee in real estate was adjudged valid although the owner of
the mortgage was a nonresident."
In the latter case, the subject was much considered, and MR.
JUSTICE GRAY, delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"The authority of every state to tax all property, real and
personal, within its jurisdiction, is unquestionable.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316,
17 U. S. 429. Personal
property, as this Court has declared again and again, may be taxed
either at the domicil of its owner or at the place where the
property is situated, even if the owner is neither a citizen nor a
resident of the state which imposes the tax.
Tappan v. Merchants'
Bank, 19 Wall. 490,
86 U. S.
499;
State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575,
92 U. S. 607;
Coe v.
Errol, 116 U. S. 517,
116 U. S.
524;
Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,
141 U. S.
18,
141 U. S. 22,
141 U. S.
27."
Accepting the views of the state court in relation to the state
statutes and proceedings thereunder, and concluding that the
Constitution of the United States did not operate to prohibit the
exercise of the power to tax these investments, it follows that the
circuit court did not err in sustaining the validity of the
taxation. But it is further contended that, as Mrs. Bristol was a
nonresident, the power to tax could be exercised only as against
the very property taxed, that these assessments did not constitute
judgments
in personam, and that judgment against her
estate could not therefore be rendered upon them. The state statute
provided that claims for taxes should be preferred to ordinary
debts (Stat. 1894, c. 45, § 4529), and, as has been seen, the
supreme court has decided that, "for the purpose of proof and
payment out of the estate, a personal tax is a debt." The court,
for that purpose, so treated taxes, but not as being debts in the
usual acceptation of the term. The obligation to contribute to the
support of government in return for the protection and advantages
afforded by government is not dependent on contract, but on the
exercise of the public will as demanded by the public welfare.
By the laws of Minnesota, moneys, credits and other personal
property were required to be listed, either by the owner or his
agent; provisions were made for notice, for action by the
assessor
Page 177 U. S. 146
in case of failure to list, for a board of review, meeting at a
specified time, for the delivery of lists (in tax books) to the
county treasurers, who were duly authorized to receive and collect
the taxes named therein, that personal property taxes unpaid on the
1st of March next after they became due should be deemed
delinquent, for the filing of delinquent lists in the appropriate
office, for issue of warrant, for the distraint of goods and
chattels, for personal judgment on service of citation, and for
proceeding against nonresidents by attachment and publication of
notice. Gen.Stat. 1894, c.11; Gen.Stat. 1878, c. 11.
By § 1623, Gen.Stat. 1894, Gen.Stat. 1878, c. 11, § 105, it was
provided that:
"The taxes assessed upon personal property shall be a lien upon
the personal property of the person assessed from and after the
time the tax books are received by the county treasurer."
Thus it appears that, on the return of the delinquent tax list,
the amount of the tax could be collected by distraint of goods and
chattels or by proceedings by attachment and publication, judgment
in which would operate on the property taken in attachment, by
garnishment or otherwise. There was no want of due process in all
this, for while the nonresident came under the obligation to pay,
appropriate notice and opportunity to contest were afforded. And if
a personal action were brought and service obtained, the defendant
would not be cut off from any competent defense, as the delinquent
list would not necessarily be held conclusive. In this case, no
defense on the merits appears to have been relied on except the
want of situs.
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193,
cited by plaintiff in error, is not to the contrary. What was ruled
there was that a citizen of one state cannot be cast in a personal
judgment in another state on an assessment levied there on real
estate for a local improvement without service on him, or voluntary
appearance, or some action on his part amounting to consent to the
jurisdiction.
This brings us to consider the plea of the statute of
limitations interposed as to the taxes for the years 1883 to 1888,
inclusive.
Mrs. Bristol died in August, 1894; the will was admitted to
Page 177 U. S. 147
probate by the Probate Court of Ramsay County, October 19, 1894;
Washington County filed its claim for taxes in that court April 18,
1895; the statute of limitations provided that actions "upon a
liability created by statute" should be barred by the lapse of six
years. Stat. 1894, c. 66, § 5136. This statute applied to actions
brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state. § 5142. The
right to proceed to enforce these taxes commenced the first of
April of the year following that for which they were levied. If
this had been a personal action brought against Mrs. Bristol in her
lifetime, the plea of the statute was open to be defeated by the
fact of her nonresidence (§ 5145), but treating the filing of the
delinquent lists as proceedings
in rem, it is contended
that the statute applied.
In
County of Redwood v. Winona & St. Peter Land
Co., 40 Minn. 512, the statute of limitations of six years was
held to apply to proceedings to enforce the collection of taxes
against real estate, and to the same effect are
Mower County v.
Crane, 51 Minn. 201;
Pine County v. Lambert, 57 Minn.
203;
State v. Norton, 59 Minn. 424. In the first cited
case, it appeared that certain lands having been taxed were in 1883
assessed and a tax levied for each year for fifteen years prior to
that time. On an application for judgment against the land, it was
objected that the statute of limitations had run as to all taxes
where the application for judgment could have been made six years
or more prior to the time it was made, if the land bad been taxed
at the time it should have been taxed under the statute, and the
court sustained the objection. It was held that, by statute in
Minnesota, the statute of limitations ran against the state the
same as against an individual; that a tax was a liability created
by statute; that, although statutes of limitation may in terms be
applicable only to actions, they are to be construed liberally and
applied to all proceedings that are analogous in their nature to
actions
"so as to make the right sought to be enforced, and not a form
of procedure, the test as to whether or not the statute applies.
Upon this principle, they are held to apply to all claims which may
be the subject of actions, however presented; also that they
furnish a rule for cases analogous in their subject matter, but for
which a remedy unknown to the
Page 177 U. S. 148
common law has been provided. They have also been applied by
analogy to proceedings in admiralty, to claims in bankruptcy, or in
probate court, although not within the strict letter of the
statute. . . . A tax being a liability created by statute, and the
filing of the delinquent list being, as the statute declares, and
as we have held, the institution of an action against the land for
the recovery of the tax appearing against it in the list; and,
inasmuch as the nature of the right sought to be enforced, and not
the mode of procedure, is the test -- we are unable to see why it
should make any difference whether the action is
in rem or
in personam -- against the property instead of against its
owner. We have therefore come to the conclusion that these
proceedings are, within the meaning of the statute, 'an action upon
a liability created by statute,' and are barred as to all taxes for
the enforcement of which such proceedings might have been
instituted more than six years before the commencement of the
present proceedings, had such taxes been assessed in the proper
year."
The estate of Mrs. Bristol is liable to respond to this claim
because these taxes were lawfully levied in respect of her property
situated in Minnesota when the levies were made, and the statute
gave a lien for them against all her personal property within the
jurisdiction. Collection could have been enforced by distraint, or
by attachment, and in either case could only have been made out of
the property sequestered. In the pending proceeding, then, which
seeks to subject assets of the estate within the jurisdiction to
payment of the claim it seems to us the ruling of the supreme court
is applicable. In other words, the filing of the delinquent lists
had reference to property, and a personal judgment could not have
been taken thereon without service of citation.
Hence, in a subsequent proceeding to enforce collection from
property of the decedent, the rule which was applied to proceedings
to obtain judgment against real estate would appear to be
applicable in principle. If the County of Redwood had lost its
right to enforce the assessments (supposing they bad been made when
they should have been) by lapse of time, the County
Page 177 U. S. 149
of Washington may well be held subject to a similar deprivation
in respect of the allowance of a portion of its claim.
Reversed, and the cause remanded with direction to exclude
the taxes for the years 1883 to 1888, inclusive, and to render
judgment for the taxes and penalties after the latter year, with
interest on the aggregate sum thereof from June 29, 1895, the date
of the judgment below.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE concurred on the ground of
stare
decisis.
