Gedney Channel, being the main entrance to the harbor of New
York, is as much a part of the inland waters of the United States
within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1885, c. 354, 23 Stat.
438, as the harbor within the entrance.
The real point aimed at by Congress in that act was to allow the
original code (Rev. Stat. § 4233) to remain in force so far as it
applies to pilotage waters, or waters within which it is necessary,
for safe navigation, to have a local pilot.
The Delaware, returning to New York in ballast only,
entered Gedney Channel upon a true course of W. by S. About the
same time, the
Talisman, a tug towing a pilot boat,
entered it from the northwest, upon a course about S.SE., and not
far from a right angle to the course of the
Delaware.
Under these circumstances, as they were approaching each other on
crossing courses, the
Delaware was bound to keep out of
the way, and the
Talisman to keep her course. The
Delaware made no effort to avoid the
Talisman,
but kept on its course until about a minute before collision, when
its engines were stopped too late. The
Talisman was struck
and sunk, and became a total loss.
Held that the
Delaware was grossly in fault.
The Supervising Inspector's rules, so far as they require
whistles to be used, ought to be construed in harmony with the
International Code, and, as applied to vessels upon crossing
courses, they mean that when a single blast is given by the
preferred steamer, she intends to comply with her legal obligation
to keep her course, and throw upon the other steamer the duty of
avoiding her.
It is the primary duty of a steamer having the right of way when
approaching another steamer to keep her course; all authorities
agree that this rule applies so long as there is nothing to
indicate that the approaching steamer will not discharge her own
obligation to keep out of the way, and it is settled law in the
United States that the preferred steamer will not be held in fault
for maintaining her course and speed so long as it is possible for
the other to avoid her by porting, at least in the absence of some
distinct indication that she is about to fail in her duty. The
facts stated and referred to in the opinion leave too much doubt
about the fault of the
Talisman to justify the court in
apportioning the damages.
The
Delaware is not exempted from liability by the
provisions of the Act
Page 161 U. S. 460
of February 13, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445, entitled "An act
relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading, and to certain
obligations, duties and rights in connection with the carriage of
property."
This was a suit in admiralty, instituted by Charles H. Winnett,
the owner and master, and the crew of the tug
Talisman
against the steamship
Delaware, to recover damages for a
collision between these vessels, which occurred on September 16,
1893, about ten o'clock in the morning, in Gedney's Channel, off
Sandy Hook at the outer entrance of New York harbor, and within
three miles from land.
In the district court, the
Delaware was held solely in
fault, 61 F. 525, and a decree was entered against her for
$21,318.70. Her owner thereupon appealed to the circuit court of
appeals, which affirmed the decree of the district court as to the
fault of the steamship, and certified to this Court certain
questions as to whether she was absolved from liability by the
provisions of the Act of February 13, 1893, c. 105, 27 Stat. 445,
entitled "An act relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading
and to certain obligations, duties and rights in connection with
the carriage of property." This certificate was docketed as a
separate cause. The owner of the
Delaware thereupon
applied for and was granted a writ of certiorari to bring up the
whole record upon the ground that the circuit court of appeals
erred in failing to find contributory negligence on the part of the
Talisman.
The first three sections, containing the material provisions of
the act in question, commonly known as the "Harter Act," are
printed in the margin.
*
Page 161 U. S. 461
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
There are two questions involved in this case: first, whether
the tug
Talisman was guilty of a fault contributing to the
collision, and second, whether the
Delaware is exonerated
from liability under the act of February 13, 1893, known as the
"Harter Act," by the fact that her owners had used due diligence to
make her seaworthy and provide her with competent officers and
crew.
1. Gedney's Channel, in which the collision took place, is a
dredged passage, about 1, 100 feet in width, running from the open
ocean in a direction about W.N.W. 1/4 W., and constituting the main
entrance to New York harbor. It is defined by
Page 161 U. S. 462
red buoys, bearing even numbers, along its northerly side at
intervals of 2,000 feet, and corresponding black buoys, bearing odd
numbers, on the southerly side at the same distance apart. Two iron
can buoys, sometimes called "fairway buoys," the northerly one red
and the southerly one black, mark the outer entrance to the
channel. About a mile out to sea beyond the channel entrance, an
automatic whistling buoy marks the prolongation of the central axis
of the channel. Directly outside the entrance is located the
station pilot boat, which anchors near black buoy No. 1 and sends
out small boats to take off pilots who have been taking vessels to
sea through the channel. Within the bar at the other end of the
channel, the water widens, and the Swash Channel diverges from the
main ship channel as shown in the following diagram:
image:a
Page 161 U. S. 463
Counsel upon one, if not upon both, sides have assumed, upon the
authority of
The Aurania and
The Republic, 29 F.
98, and
Singlehurst v. La Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 53 F. 293, that Gedney's Channel is within
the "coast waters of the United States," and therefore that the
vessels involved were subject to the revised international
regulations of March 3, 1885, c. 354, 23 Stat. 438. We think that
they are mistaken in this assumption.
The international code for preventing collisions was first
adopted by Act of April 29, 1864, now incorporated into the Revised
Statutes as section 4233, and was made applicable generally to the
"vessels of the navy and of the mercantile marine of the United
States." This code remained substantially unaffected by
congressional legislation until March 3, 1885, when the revised
international regulations for preventing collisions at sea were
adopted by act of Congress, and made applicable to "the navigation
of all public and private vessels of the United States upon the
high seas and in all coast waters of the United States." By section
2, all laws inconsistent with these rules were repealed
except as to the navigation of such vessels within the
harbors, lakes, and
inland waters of the United
States. As to such waters, the original code of 1864 still remains
in force, explained and supplemented by the rules of the
supervising inspectors.
The act of 1885 did not attempt to draw the line between the
high seas and the coast waters of the United States, on the one
hand, and the harbors and inland waters on the other. Nor was it
possible by any general legislation to do so. We are of opinion,
however, that the dredged entrance to a harbor is as much a part of
the inland waters of the United States, within the meaning of this
act, as the harbor within the entrance, and that the real point
aimed at by Congress was to allow the original code to remain in
force so far as it applied to pilotage waters, or waters within
which it is necessary, for safe navigation, to have a local pilot.
It is important that a pilot, while conducting a vessel in or out
of a harbor, should not traverse waters governed by two
inconsistent codes of signals; and if there are to be two codes,
the
Page 161 U. S. 464
line should be drawn between the high seas and the inland
waters, wherein the services of a local pilot are requisite for
safe navigation. If, as has been suggested, ocean steamers were
authorized or compelled to observe the new revised rules until
their arrival at their docks, while vessels engaged in local
traffic were observing the original rules, great confusion would
result and the probabilities of collision be materially increased.
It is evident that all vessels running upon the same waters should
be bound by the same rules and regulations in respect to their
navigation.
Recent legislation has not only established the proper practice
for the future, but has explained what must have been the intention
of Congress in passing the original act. By Act of February 19,
1895. c. 102, 28 Stat. 672, "to adopt special rules for the
navigation of harbors, rivers and inland waters of the United
States," these waters are declared to be still subject to the
provisions of Rev.Stat. section 4233 (the original code), and to
the regulations of the supervising inspectors. §§ 4412, 4413. By
section 2, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized and
directed from time to time
"to designate and define by suitable bearings or ranges with
lighthouses, light vessels, buoys or coast objects, the line
dividing the high seas from rivers, harbors and inland waters."
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of the Treasury, on
May 10, 1895, by department circular 95, designated and defined the
dividing line between the high seas and the rivers, harbors, and
inland waters of New York as follows:
"From Navesink (southerly) lighthouse N.E. 5/8 E., easterly, to
Scotland light vessel, thence N. NE. 1/2 E. through Gedney Channel
whistling buoy (proposed position) to Rockaway Point life-saving
station."
The whole of Gedney's Channel is within this line.
This, of course, must be accepted as the dividing line as to all
future cases, but as the Secretary of the Treasury was merely
directed to carry out the existing law upon the subject, we think
it should be treated as cogent evidence of what the law had been
before, and we are therefore of the opinion that Gedney's Channel
should be treated, for the purposes of this case, as belonging to
the inland waters of the United
Page 161 U. S. 465
States. We are the less reluctant to take this course in view of
the fact that the pilots of both steamers appear to have acted in
contemplation of the supervising inspectors' rules, rather than the
revised international rules and regulations.
The
Delaware was an English tank steamship of 2,495
tons registered, 345 feet in length, and was engaged in the
business of transferring petroleum in bulk from New York to London
and Liverpool. She was returning to New York in ballast only, and
had taken a duly licensed Sandy Hook pilot, who was in charge of
her navigation at the time of the collision. The
Talisman
was an ocean tug, 100 feet in length, and at the time of the
collision was engaged in towing the station pilot boat
Edmund
Driggs, with a hawser 15 fathoms in length, from a point some
distance to the northward of the northerly line of Gedney's Channel
diagonally across the channel towards the pilot station outside of
the black fairway buoy, on the southerly side of the channel.
During the morning of the collision, the weather was cloudy and
overcast until the
Delaware got within three or four miles
of the outer end of the channel, when a heavy rain squall came on
which lasted for about ten minutes, during which time the vessels
were lost to view of each other. About four or five minutes before
the collision, and when the vessels were probably a mile or more
apart, the squall passed over, and each vessel sighted the other,
and kept her in sight from that time until the collision. As the
squall passed over, the pilot of the steamship made the outer red
buoy about half a point on his port bow, and thereupon starboarded
one point, to bring the buoy upon his starboard bow, and was
brought into the channel upon a true course of W. by S. At the same
time, the
Talisman was entering the channel from the
northwest, upon a course about S.S.E. and not far from a right
angle to the course of the
Delaware.
Without inquiring minutely into the respective maneuvers and
courses of the two steamers, it is sufficient to say that they were
approaching each other upon crossing courses and that, under the
nineteenth rule, the steamship, having the
Talisman on her
starboard side, was bound to keep out of her way. By
Page 161 U. S. 466
Rule 23, there was a corresponding obligation on the part of the
Talisman to keep her course. The
Delaware made no
effort to avoid the tug. Instead of porting as she entered the
channel, and passing up the starboard side and astern of the
Talisman, the pilot kept her on her course until about a
minute before the collision, when the master, who had been below,
ran hurriedly on the bridge, and, seeing the
Talisman
about three points on his starboard bow, and close at hand, ordered
the helm hard a-starboard, and the engine stopped, though both
orders were given too late to be of any service. The
Delaware struck the
Talisman upon the port
quarter, about 15 feet from the stern, listing her heavily to
starboard and continued to push her sidewise through the water for
about 300 feet, when she sank near the southerly side of the
channel. A fireman, who was trying to cast off the tow line, was
drowned; Capt. Winnett's arm was severely fractured, and the tug
became a total loss. It is evident from the bare statement that the
Delaware was grossly at fault, and no claim is made to the
contrary.
2. It is insisted, however, that the
Talisman was also
in fault in several particulars. It seems that when the
Delaware was about a mile off, the
Talisman blew
a single blast of her whistle, which does not appear to have been
answered. When the
Delaware was from a quarter to an
eighth of a mile off, and the
Talisman was a little above,
or near the northerly edge of the channel, she sounded another
single blast, which was not answered, although three of the
libelant's witnesses from the
Talisman seemed to have
understood that it was answered. When the
Delaware was
about a length off, the
Talisman sounded an alarm signal
of three blasts, but did not change her helm or reduce her speed
before the collision.
In this connection, the
Talisman was charged with a
violation of the supervising inspectors' rules in not porting her
helm and directing her course to starboard after sounding her first
signal. These rules, however, so far as they require the whistle to
be used, are applicable rather to vessels meeting end on or nearly
end on, and the signals therein provided for are designed to
apprise the approaching vessel of the intention
Page 161 U. S. 467
of the steamer giving the signal to port or starboard, as the
case may be. As applied to vessels upon crossing courses, however,
it means, when a single blast is given by the preferred steamer,
nothing more than that she intends to comply with her legal
obligation to keep her course, and throw upon the other steamer the
duty of avoiding her. Such was evidently the view taken by both
parties in this case, as there is not the slightest evidence that
the pilot of the
Delaware was misled by these signals, nor
is a failure to port charged in the answer or suggested in the
testimony as a fault on the part of the
Talisman. These
rules, so far as they require whistles to be used, ought to be
construed in harmony with the international code. If they were so
construed as to require the preferred vessel to port after having
blown a blast of her whistle, it would involve a violation of
Article 23, which requires her to keep her course. On the other
hand, if they be construed as applying chiefly to steamers meeting
end on, or nearly end on, under Rule 18, they would frequently aid
in solving any doubt with regard to the proposed course of the
vessel giving the signal, and thus enable the meeting vessel to
govern her own course accordingly. Certainly the rules should not
be construed to require the steamer giving the signal to violate a
plain statutory rule of navigation.
As bearing upon the proper interpretation of these rules, it is
pertinent to observe that to Rule 23 of the act "to regulate
navigation upon the Great Lakes and their connecting and
contributory waters," approved February 8, 1895, c. 64, 28 Stat.
645 -- a rule which corresponds in this particular feature with the
supervising inspectors' regulations -- and with Article 19 of the
revised international regulations, there is added the following
qualification: "But the giving or answering a signal by a vessel
required to keep her course shall not vary the duties or
obligations of the respective vessels."
The main fault charged upon the
Talisman, however, is
that of not stopping and reversing when the failure of the
Delaware to take measures to avoid her became apparent. In
The Britannia, 153 U. S. 130,
which was also a case of a starboard-hand collision, the preferred
steamer, the
Beaconsfield, was
Page 161 U. S. 468
held to have been in fault for stopping and reversing under
similar circumstances; -- in other words, for doing what it is
claimed the
Talisman should have done in this case. Two
members of the Court dissented upon the ground that the
Beaconsfield, having been brought into a position of peril
by the negligence of the
Britannia, was not in fault for
stopping and reversing, the substance of their opinion being that,
under such circumstances, the master might exercise his judgment as
to the best method of avoiding a collision, and that an error in
judgment should not be imputed to him as a fault. In neither
opinion, however, was it intimated that if the
Beaconsfield had kept her speed, she would have been in
fault for so doing.
The duty of a steamer having the right of way when approaching
another steamer charged with the obligation of avoiding her has
been the subject of much discussion both in the English and
American courts. That her primary duty is to keep her course is
beyond all controversy. It is expressly required by the 19th Rule
of the original International Code (Rev.Stat. § 4233), and of the
16th rule of the Revised Code of 1885, and doubtless applies so
long as there is nothing to indicate that the approaching steamer
will not discharge her own obligation to keep out of the way. The
divergence between the authorities begins at the point where the
master of the preferred steamer suspects that the obligated steamer
is about to fail in her duty to avoid her. The weight of English,
and perhaps of American, authorities is to the effect that, if the
master of the preferred steamer has any reason to believe that the
other will not take measures to keep out of her way, he may treat
this as a "special circumstance" under Rule 24, "rendering a
departure" from the rules "necessary to avoid immediate danger."
Some even go so far as to hold it the duty of the preferred vessel
to stop and reverse when a continuance upon her course involves an
apparent danger of collision. Upon the other hand, other
authorities hold that the master of the preferred steamer ought not
to be embarrassed by doubts as to his duty, and, unless the two
vessels be
in extremis, he is bound to hold to his course
and speed.
Page 161 U. S. 469
The cases of
The Britannia, 153 U.
S. 130, and
The Northfield, 154 U.
S. 639, must be regarded, however, as settling the law
that the preferred steamer will not be held in fault for
maintaining her course and speed so long as it is possible for the
other to avoid her by porting, at least in the absence of some
distinct indication that she is about to fail in her duty. If the
master of the preferred steamer were at liberty to speculate upon
the possibility, or even the probability, of the approaching
steamer's failing to do her duty and keep out of his way, the
certainty that the former will hold his course, upon which the
latter has a right to rely and which it is the very object of the
rule to insure, would give place to doubts on the part of the
master of the obligated steamer as to whether he would do so or
not, and produce a timidity and feebleness of action on the part of
both which would bring about more collisions than it would prevent.
Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674;
The Highgate, 62 L.T.R. 841,
s.c., 6 Asp.Mar.Law
Cases 512.
In the case under consideration, there was really nothing to
apprise the tug that the
Delaware would not port and go
under her stern until the collision became inevitable. The vessels
were in plain sight of each other. The
Delaware was
entering a channel whose course was marked by buoys, and she could
not possibly have continued her then course without soon crossing
the line of black buoys which marked the southerly edge of the
channel. There was every reason to suppose that, as soon as she
passed the line of red buoys at the northerly edge, she would port
and take her proper course up the channel, and if for any reason
she was unable to do this, it was her plain duty to apprise the tug
of the fact either by blowing the starboard signal of two whistles
or an alarm whistle to indicate that the circumstances were such as
to render it impossible for her to fulfill her obligation to keep
out of the way of the tug. If she had done so, a different question
would have been presented. Until the last moment, the tug had a
right to assume that she would comply with the rule. Had the tug
stopped and reversed, she might not only have brought about a
collision with the
Delaware, but would
Page 161 U. S. 470
have incurred the danger of a collision with her own tow. It is
true, the
Delaware did not answer the signals of the
Talisman as she should have done, but Capt. Winnett, who
was in charge, testifies that he was under the impression that she
answered the first whistle, and made an allegation to that effect
in his libel. He appears to have been mistaken in this, but, as the
morning was somewhat thick, he might have thought so, and was not
in fault for acting upon that hypothesis. The second whistle was
given so late that the vessels were evidently
in extremis
before a reasonable time had elapsed in which to answer it. In any
event, there is too much doubt about the fault of the
Talisman to justify us in apportioning the damages.
3. Is the
Delaware exempted from liability by the Act
of February 13, 1893, entitled "An act relating to navigation of
vessels, bills of lading and to certain obligations, duties and
rights in connection with the carriage of property?" This is the
first case in which this act, which has an important bearing upon
the rights of shippers, has been called to our attention.
The
first section declares it to be unlawful for the
manager, etc., of any vessel engaged in foreign trade, to insert in
any bill of lading any covenant or agreement whereby the vessel or
her owner
"shall be relieved from liability for loss or damage arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in proper loading, stowage,
custody, care or proper delivery of any and all lawful merchandise
or property committed to its or their charge,"
and that any such clause shall be null and void. The
second section declares it to be unlawful for any such
vessel to insert in any bill of lading any covenant whereby the
obligation of the owner to exercise due diligence to properly
equip, man, provision, and outfit said vessel, and to make her
seaworthy, and to carefully handle and stow her cargo, and to care
for and properly deliver the same, shall in anywise be lessened,
weakened, or avoided. The
third section provides that if
the owner shall exercise due diligence to make her seaworthy,
"neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers
shall become or be held responsible
Page 161 U. S. 471
for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation
or in the management of said vessel,"
nor shall they be
"liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea, or other
navigable waters, acts of God or public enemies, or the inherent
defect, quality or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency
of package, or seizure under legal process, or for loss resulting
from any act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his
agent or representative, or saving or from attempting to save life
or property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such
service."
The
fourth section makes it obligatory to issue to
shippers a bill of lading, stating certain particulars, which
document shall be
prima facie evidence of the receipt of
the merchandise therein described. The
fifth section is
penal in its character. The
sixth reserves the application
of the limited liability act, and the
seventh excepts
vessels engaged in the transportation of live animals.
Respondent relies in this connection upon the first clause of
section 3:
"That if the owner of any vessel, transporting merchandise or
property to or from any port in the United States of America, shall
exercise due diligence to make the said vessel, in all respects,
seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the
vessel, her owner or owners, agent or charterers, shall become or
be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or
errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel."
It is entirely clear, however, that the whole object of the act
is to modify the relations previously existing between the vessel
and her cargo. This is apparent not only from the title of the act,
but from its general tenor and provisions, which are evidently
designed to fix the relations between the cargo and the vessel, and
to prohibit contracts restricting the liability of the vessel and
owners in certain particulars connected with the construction,
repair, and outfit of the vessel, and the care and delivery of the
cargo. The act was an outgrowth of attempts, made in recent years,
to limit, as far as possible, the liability of the vessel and her
owners, by inserting in bills of lading stipulations against losses
arising from unseaworthiness,
Page 161 U. S. 472
bad stowage and negligence in navigation, and other forms of
liability which had been held by the courts of England, if not of
this country, to be valid as contracts and to be respected even
when they exempted the ship from the consequences of her own
negligence. As decisions were made by the courts from time to time,
holding the vessel for nonexcepted liabilities, new clauses were
inserted in the bills of lading to meet these decisions until the
common law responsibility of carriers by sea had been frittered
away to such an extent that several of the leading commercial
associations, both in this country and in England, had taken the
subject in hand, and suggested amendments to the maritime law in
line with those embodied in the Harter act. The exigencies which
led to the passage of the act are graphically set forth in a
petition addressed by the Glasgow Corn Trade Association to the
Marquis of Salisbury, and embodied in a report of the committee on
interstate and foreign commerce of the House of Representatives. As
a part of the history of the times, this is a proper subject of
consideration.
American Net & Twine Co. v.
Worthington, 141 U. S. 468,
141 U. S.
474.
"That, taking advantage of this practical monopoly, the owners
of the steamship lines combined to adopt clauses in their bills of
lading very seriously and unduly limiting their obligations as
carriers of the goods, and refused to accept consignments for
carriage on any other terms than those dictated by themselves."
"That this policy has been gradually extended by the steamship
owners until at the present time their bills of lading are so
unreasonable and unjust in their terms as to exempt them from
almost every conceivable risk and responsibility as carriers of
goods."
"For example, many of these bills of lading provide, in addition
to the usual and reasonable exceptions, that the carriers shall not
be liable for loss or damage occasioned by negligence of the
master, pilot, stevedores, crew, or others in their employment; nor
for bad stowage, nor for defect or insufficiency of the hull,
machinery, or fittings of a vessel, whether occurring before or
after receiving the goods on board; nor
Page 161 U. S. 473
for the admission of water into the vessel by any cause, and
whether for the purpose of extinguishing fire or for any other
purpose, and whether occurring previously or subsequently to the
vessel's sailing; nor for the differences between the quality,
marks, or brands of flour or other goods shipped and those of the
goods actually found to be on board of the steamer (the marks,
numbers or description in the bill of lading notwithstanding); nor
for loss of weight; nor for detention, delay, or deviation."
"Such bills of lading also frequently exempt the carrier from
any claim not intimated before delivery of the goods, and at the
same time provide that the master porterage of the goods on arrival
of the steamer shall be done by the steamship owners or their
agents at the expense and risk of the receivers, so that the
receivers have no opportunity before the delivery of their goods of
ascertaining whether they are damaged or not, or how or in what
part of the hold they may have been stowed."
"That bills of lading have thus become so lengthened, complex,
and involved that in the ordinary course of business it is almost
impossible for shippers of goods to read or check their various
conditions, even if objections would be listened to, and the
hardship is aggravated by the fact that new and more stringent
conditions are constantly being added by the shipowners to provide
for new questions or claims that have arisen."
"That a striking illustration of this is the fact that recently
a clause has been added to certain steamship forms of bill of
lading actually giving the shipowners a right of lien over and the
right to sell the goods entrusted to them for carriage, not only
for the freight upon the goods themselves, but for all debts due,
either by the shippers or the consignees of such goods, to the
carriers or their agents, though these debts may have arisen on
contracts unconnected with the carriage of such goods. The effect
of this clause is to render the bill of lading, which has been of
such essential service on account of its negotiable character in
promoting the commercial prosperity of Great Britain, a document
unfit for negotiation. "
Page 161 U. S. 474
No complaint was made in this connection of the liability of
vessels under the ordinary forms of bills of lading, or their
liability to other vessels for the consequences of their
negligence, the evil to be remedied being one produced by the
oppressive clauses forced upon the shippers of goods by the vessel
owners. It is true that the general words of the third section,
above quoted, if detached from the context, and broadly construed
as a separate provision, would be susceptible of the meaning
claimed; but when read in connection with the other sections, and
with the remainder of section 3, they show conclusively that the
liability of a vessel to other vessels with which it may come in
contact was not intended to be affected.
The first, second, fourth, and seventh sections deal exclusively
with bills of lading and their covenants, and the third section,
after using the general language relied upon by the respondent
here, with regard to nonliability for faults or errors in
navigation or in the management of the vessel, contains a further
exemption of
"loss arising from dangers of the sea, or other navigable
waters, acts of God or public enemies, or the inherent defect,
quality or vice of the thing carried, or from insufficiency of
package, or seizure under legal process, or for loss resulting from
any act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent
or representative, or from saving or attempting to save life or
property at sea, or from any deviation in rendering such
service."
These provisions have no possible application to the relations
of one vessel to another, and are mainly a reenactment of certain
well known provisions of the common law applicable to the duties
and liabilities of vessels to their cargoes. The fact, too, that,
by section 6, the various sections of the Revised Statutes which
embody the limited liability act are preserved unimpaired would
seem to indicate that the later act was not intended to receive the
broad construction claimed.
The decree of the court below is therefore
Affirmed.
*
"An act relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading and
to certain obligations, duties and rights in connection with the
carriage of property."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled: That it
shall not be lawful for the manager, agent, master or owner of any
vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports
of the United States and foreign ports to insert in any bill of
lading or shipping document any clause, covenant or agreement
whereby it, he, or they shall be relieved from liability for loss
or damage arising from negligence, fault, or failure in proper
loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery of any and all
lawful merchandise or property committed to its or their charge.
Any and all words or clauses of such import inserted in bills of
lading or shipping receipts shall be null and void and of no
effect."
"SEC. 2. That it shall not be lawful for any vessel transporting
merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States
of America and foreign ports, her owner, master, agent or manager,
to insert in any bill of lading or shipping document any covenant
or agreement whereby the obligations of the owner or owners of said
vessel to exercise due diligence, properly equip, man, provision,
and outfit said vessel, and to make said vessel seaworthy and
capable of performing her intended voyage, or whereby the
obligations of the master, officers, agents or servants to
carefully handle and stow her cargo and to care for and properly
deliver same, shall in any wise be lessened, weakened or
avoided."
"SEC. 3. That if the owner of any vessel transporting
merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States of
America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all
respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied,
neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent or charterers, shall
become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from
faults or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel,
nor shall the vessel, her owner or owners, charterers, agent or
master, be held liable for losses arising from the dangers of the
sea or other navigable waters, acts of God, or public enemies, or
the inherent defect, quality or vice of the thing carried, or from
insufficiency of package, or seizure under legal process, or for
loss resulting from any act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods, his agent or representative, or from saving or
attempting to save life or property at sea, or from any deviation
in rendering such service."