When, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court and
without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders
it impossible for the appellate court, if it should decide the case
in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief, the
court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the
appeal.
When, pending an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill in
equity to secure a right to vote at the election of delegates to a
constitutional convention, the election is held and the convention
assembles on the days appointed by the statute calling the
convention, the appeal must be dismissed, without considering the
merits of the bill.
This Court, on appeal from the circuit court of the United
States, takes judicial notice of the days of public general
elections of members of the legislature, or of the constitutional
convention of a state, as well as of the times of the commencement
of its sitting and of the dates when its acts take effect.
Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a bill in equity, filed April 19, 1895, in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina by
Lawrence P. Mills, alleging himself to be a citizen of the State of
South Carolina and of the United States and a resident of a certain
precinct in the County of Richland, and qualified to vote at all
federal and state elections in the precinct, and suing in behalf of
himself and all other citizens
Page 159 U. S. 652
of the county in like circumstances for an injunction against W.
Briggs Green, the supervisor of registration of the county.
The bill alleged that, by a statute of South Carolina of
December 24, 1894, a convention was called to revise the
constitution of the state, the delegates to be elected on the third
Tuesday of August, 1895, and the convention to assemble on the
second Tuesday of September, 1895; that the same and other statutes
of South Carolina contained regulations as to the registration of
voters and as to certificates of registration which were in
violation of the Constitution of South Carolina and of the
Constitution of the United States in various particulars pointed
out as abridging, impeding, and destroying the suffrage of citizens
of the state and of the United States; that the defendant was
exercising the duties prescribed by those statutes, and intended to
continue to do so, and specifically intended to furnish and deliver
to the boards of managers appointed to hold the election of
delegates to the constitutional convention the registration books
of the several precincts, to be used by the managers at that
election; that the plaintiff had failed to register as a voter
because, notwithstanding repeated efforts to become registered, he
found himself unable to comply with the unreasonable and burdensome
regulations prescribed by the unconstitutional registration laws;
that he was desirous of voting for delegates to the constitutional
convention at the election prescribed by the statute of 1894 for
that purpose; that the registration books in the defendant's hands
did not and would not contain the plaintiff's name; that he and
others under like circumstances would not be permitted by the
managers to vote at that election unless their names were found
upon the books and unless they could produce registration
certificates, and that if the defendant were permitted to continue
the illegal, partial, and void registration, and were allowed to
turn over the books to the managers, the plaintiff would be
deprived of his right to vote at that election and grievous and
irreparable wrong would be done to him, and to other citizens under
like circumstances.
The prayer of the bill was for
"a writ of injunction restraining
Page 159 U. S. 653
and enjoining the said defendant, individually and as supervisor
of registration, from the performance of any of the acts
hereinbefore complained of,"
and for further relief.
On the filing of the bill, the circuit court granted a temporary
injunction, as prayed for, and ordered notice to the defendant to
show cause on May 2, 1895, why it should not be continued in force,
and on that day, after a hearing, ordered it to be continued until
the final determination of the case or until the further order of
the court. 67 F. 818.
The defendant appealed to the circuit court of appeals, which,
on June 11, 1895, reversed the orders of the circuit court,
dissolved the injunction, and remanded the case to that court with
directions to dismiss the bill. 69 F. 852. The plaintiff, on
September 4, 1895, appealed to this Court, and the appeal was
entered in this Court on September 19, 1895.
The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, assigning as one
ground of his motion
"that there is now no actual controversy involving real and
substantial rights between the parties to the record, and no
subject matter upon which the judgment of this Court can
operate."
We are of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed upon this
ground, without considering any other question appearing on the
record or discussed by counsel.
The duty of this Court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is
to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried
into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. It
necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the judgment
of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event
occurs which renders it impossible for this Court, if it should
decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any
effectual relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal
judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. And such a fact, when not
appearing on the record, may be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Lord v.
Veazie, 8 How. 251;
California v. San Pablo
& Tulare Railroad, 149 U. S. 308.
Page 159 U. S. 654
If a defendant, indeed, after notice of the filing of a bill in
equity for an injunction to restrain the building of a house, or of
a railroad, or of any other structure, persists in completing the
building, the court nevertheless is not deprived of the authority
whenever, in its opinion, justice requires it, to deal with the
rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the suit
and to compel the defendant to undo what he has wrongfully done
since that time, or to answer in damages.
Tucker v.
Howard, 128 Mass. 361, 363, and cases cited;
Attorney
General v. Great Northern Railway, 4 De G. & Sm. 75, 94;
Terhune v. Midland Railroad, 36 N.J.Eq. 318, 38 N.J.Eq.
423;
Platteville v. Galena & Southern Wisconsin
Railway, 43 Wis. 493.
But if the intervening event is owing either to the plaintiff's
own act or to a power beyond the control of either party, the court
will stay its hand.
For example, appeals have been dismissed by this Court when the
plaintiff had executed a release of his right to appeal,
Elwell
v. Fosdick, 134 U. S. 500, or
when the rights of both parties had come under the control of the
same persons,
Lord v.
Veazie, 8 How. 251;
Chamberlain v.
Cleveland, 1 Black 419;
Wood Paper
Co. v. Heft, 8 Wall. 333;
East Tennessee
Railroad v. Southern Telegraph Co., 125 U.
S. 695;
South Spring Co. v. Amador Co.,
145 U. S. 300, or
when the matter had been compromised and settled between the
parties,
Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.
S. 222, or when, pending a suit concerning the validity
of the assessment of a tax, the tax was paid,
San Mateo County
v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 116 U.
S. 138;
Little v. Bowers, 134 U.
S. 547;
Singer Co. v. Wright, 141 U.
S. 696, or the amount of the tax was tendered, and
deposited in a bank, which, by statute, had the same effect as
actual payment and receipt of the money,
California v. San
Pablo & Tulare Railroad, 149 U. S. 308.
Where appeals were taken from a decree of foreclosure and sale,
and also from decrees made in execution of that decree, and the
principal decree was reversed, it was held that the later appeals
having been annulled by operation of law, their subject matter was
withdrawn, and they must be dismissed
Page 159 U. S. 655
for lack of anything on which they could operate.
Chicago
& Vincennes Railroad v. Fosdick, 106 U. S.
47,
106 U. S.
84.
Where, pending an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill to
restrain a sale of property of the plaintiff under assessments for
street improvements, and to cancel tax lien certificates, the
assessments and certificates were quashed and annulled by a
judgment in another suit, the appeal was dismissed without costs to
either party.
Washington Market Co. v. District of
Columbia, 137 U. S. 62.
Where, pending a writ of error in an action which did not
survive by law, the plaintiff died, the writ of error was abated.
Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U.
S. 673.
In the great case of
The State of Pennsylvania v. The
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company, which was a bill in
equity filed in this Court under its original jurisdiction for an
injunction against the construction and maintenance of a bridge
across the Ohio River to the obstruction of the free navigation of
the river, this Court entertained jurisdiction, and on May 27,
1852, decreed that the bridge was an obstruction and a nuisance,
and should be either abated or elevated so as not to interfere with
the free navigation of the river, and awarded costs against the
defendant, but suspended the enforcement of the decree for a
limited time to allow the defendant to carry out a scheme by which
the obstruction to navigation might be removed.
54 U. S. 13 How.
518,
54 U. S.
626-627. By the Act of Congress of August 31, 1852, c.
111, § 7, the defendant was authorized to have and maintain the
bridge at its then site and elevation, and the officers and crews
of all vessels and boats navigating the river were required to
regulate the use of their vessels and boats, and of any pipes or
chimneys belonging thereto, so as not to interfere with the
elevation and construction of the bridge. 10 Stat. 112. The bridge
having been blown down by a violent storm in the summer of 1854,
and the defendant preparing to rebuild it according to the original
plan, the plaintiff, on June 26, 1854, obtained from Mr. Justice
Grier, in vacation, an injunction which was served upon the
defendant, notwithstanding which it proceeded with the erection of
the bridge and completed it in November,
Page 159 U. S. 656
1854. At December term, 1854, of this Court, the defendant moved
to dissolve that injunction, and the plaintiff filed motions for a
sequestration against the defendant, and for an attachment for
contempt against its officers for disobeying the former decree of
this Court and the injunction of Mr. Justice Grier, and for an
execution for the costs awarded by the former decree of this Court.
This Court held that the act of 1852 was a constitutional exercise
of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and that
since that act, that portion of its former decree which directed
the alteration or abatement of the bridge could not be carried into
execution, and therefore denied the plaintiff's motions for
sequestration and attachment, dissolved the injunction, and only
granted to the plaintiff execution for the costs decreed by this
Court before the passage of the act of Congress.
59 U. S. 18 How.
421,
59 U. S.
435-436,
59 U. S.
459-460.
In a suit by a county to restrain a railroad corporation from
building a railroad along a public highway, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held that an order refusing an injunction, though erroneous
when made, should not be reversed when the legislature, pending the
appeal, had authorized the act complained of.
Linn County v.
Hewitt, 55 Ia. 505.
Still more analogous to the present case is one brought before
the Court of Appeals of Now York, and stated in its opinion as
follows:
"This action was commenced to restrain certain persons from
proceeding to incorporate the Village of North Tarrytown under the
general act of the legislature authorizing the incorporation of
villages. The persons made defendants are those who signed the
notice required and the officers of the town who would be
inspectors of the election. A temporary injunction was obtained
which was dissolved, and the election was held, and a majority of
votes determined in favor of the incorporation, and the proceedings
for such incorporation have been perfected, village officers
chosen, and the corporation is in operation. By a supplemental
complaint these facts were set up, and judgment demanded that all
these acts be declared null and void. The grounds of the action are
that the statute was not complied with, and that
Page 159 U. S. 657
the statute itself is unconstitutional. We do not deem it
necessary to determine whether the action is maintainable as
originally commenced. As it appeared upon the trial and is
presented to us upon appeal, no effectual judgment can be rendered
in it. The acts sought to be restrained have been consummated, and
from a project to incorporate a village the village has become
incorporated. The defendants are not necessary or proper parties to
the action upon the facts disclosed at the trial. The village
itself, or the trustees who are now exercising the franchise, are
the necessary parties to the action, and an injunction restraining
the defendants would have no practical effect upon the corporation.
We do not deem it proper, therefore, to express an opinion upon the
points presented involving the validity of the statute or the
regularity of the proceedings under it, for the reason that a
decision could not be made effectual by a judgment."
People v. Clark, 70 N.Y. 518.
In the case at bar, the whole object of the bill was to secure a
right to vote at the election, to be held, as the bill alleged, on
the third Tuesday of August, 1895, of delegates to the
Constitutional Convention of South Carolina. Before this appeal was
taken by the plaintiff from the decree of the circuit court of
appeals dismissing his bill, that date had passed, and before the
entry of the appeal in this Court, the convention had assembled,
pursuant to the statute of South Carolina of 1894 by which the
convention had been called. 21 Statutes of South Carolina pp. 802,
803. The election of the delegates and the assembling of the
convention are public matters, to be taken notice of by the court
without formal plea or proof. The lower courts of the United
States, and this Court on appeal from their decisions, take
judicial notice of the constitution and public laws of each state
of the Union.
Owings v.
Hull, 9 Pet. 607,
34 U. S. 625;
Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452,
112 U. S. 474,
and
114 U. S. 114 U.S.
218,
114 U. S. 223;
Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1,
116 U. S. 6;
Fourth National Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U.
S. 747,
120 U. S. 751;
Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623;
Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U.
S. 673,
151 U. S. 678.
Taking judicial notice of the Constitution and laws of the state,
this Court must take judicial
Page 159 U. S. 658
notice of the days of public general elections of members of the
legislature, or of a convention to revise the fundamental law of
the state, as well as of the times of the commencement of the
sitting of those bodies and of the dates when their acts take
effect. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 6;
Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S.
37,
91 U. S. 42;
Gardner v.
Collector, 6 Wall. 499;
Hoyt v. Russell,
117 U. S. 401;
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202,
137 U. S.
216.
It is obvious, therefore, that even if the bill could properly
be held to present a case within the jurisdiction of the circuit
court, no relief within the scope of the bill could now be
granted.
Appeal dismissed without costs to either party.