Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Patterson, 154 U.S. 130 (1894)
U.S. Supreme CourtNorthern Pacific R. Co. v. Patterson, 154 U.S. 130 (1894)
Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Patterson
Argued and submitted April 12, 1894
Decided May 26, 1894
154 U.S. 130
When the laws of a state create a tribunal for the correction and equalization of assessments, and provide that persons feeling aggrieved by a valuation may apply to such board for its correction, and confer upon the board power so to do, it is for the supreme court of the state to determine whether the statute remedy is exclusive or whether it is only cumulative, and its action in that respect raises no federal question.
This was an action commenced by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company against J. L. Patterson, County Treasurer of Gallatin County, Montana, for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling certain lands, blocks, and lots for taxes which have been levied thereon in the year 1889, or collecting the same, and also for a decree adjudging said taxes to be void. The complaint set out three separate and distinct causes of action, but it is not claimed that any federal question was presented by the allegations in respect of the second and third causes, and no error as to the ruling of the state court thereon was assigned in this Court. The complaint asserted an interest in the lands in question under the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1864, entitled "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget sound on the Pacific coast on the northern route," but insisted that the lands were not so segregated from the public domain and identified as a part of the lands granted by said act as to extinguish all interest of the United States therein, and render them taxable, and the grounds set up are thus stated in the brief of counsel:
"That a grant was made to the plaintiff by said Act of July 2, 1864. That plaintiff definitely fixed the line of its road, and filed a plat thereof in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. That the road
was duly constructed, and was accepted by the President. That the lands involved are on and within forty miles of the line of the road as definitely fixed, and that plaintiff has performed all the things and conditions upon its part to be done and performed to entitle it to the lands inuring to it under the grant, except that it has not repaid to the United States the cost of surveying these lands. That it is now, and has been at all times, ready and willing to pay such costs, and has so advised the United States, but is unable to repay such costs until the United States shall determine what lands are granted to it. That the lands have not been certified or patented to plaintiff, and that the United States have failed and refused to certify said lands or to certify any lands in Gallatin County to plaintiff, for the reason that it is claimed that said lands are mineral, and are excepted from the grant, and that the question whether the title to said lands passed to plaintiff under said grant, and plaintiff's compliance therewith, is now in controversy, and pending before the Commissioner of the General Land Office and Secretary of the Interior. That this failure to certify or patent these lands is solely because of their nonidentification as granted lands. That the lands granted by said act of Congress to plaintiff in said county have never been segregated from the public lands or identified, and the boundaries of the specific lands granted have never been ascertained or determined."
"That plaintiff has no other right, title, claim, interest, property, or possession of, in, or to said lands described in the complaint than such right, title, claim, interest, property, or possession as it obtained under said Act of July 2, 1864."
"That in 1889, the county officers of Gallatin County assessed these lands to plaintiff, and proceeded to levy taxes thereon, and defendant, the county treasurer, having advertised the same for sale in satisfaction of these taxes, is about to sell them."
The complaint alleged that a sale would greatly impair the rights of the plaintiff in and to the lands, and cloud its title thereto, and cause a multiplicity of suits with reference to such title, etc. The defendant demurred on the ground that
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer was sustained, and, plaintiff electing to stand on the complaint, judgment was entered in favor of defendant. From this judgment plaintiff appealed to the supreme court of the state, by which it was affirmed. 10 Mont. 90. Thereupon plaintiff sued out this writ of error.