The " after-acquired property " clause in a railroad mortgage
covers not only legal acquisitions, but also all equitable rights
and interests subsequently acquired either by or for the railroad
company, the mortgagor.
Where negotiable paper has been put in circulation, and there is
no infirmity or defense between the antecedent parties thereto, a
purchaser of such securities is entitled to recover thereon, as
against the maker, the whole amount, irrespective of what he may
have paid therefor.
A railroad company contracted with a construction company to
build and complete its railroad on a line designated on a map of
the same, and to furnish and equip it, agreeing to pay for the same
in stock and mortgage bonds, to be issued from time to time as
sections should be completed. A mortgage was made of the road and
property then existing and after wards to be acquired. The
construction company began work and completed a small section, for
which it received the stipulated pay in stock and bonds. It parted
with the latter for a good consideration, and they eventually came
by purchase into the possession of W. No further section was
completed, but work was done at various points on the line, and the
construction company acquired for the railroad company rights of
way through nearly or quite the entire route. Subsequently another
railroad company acquired these properties through the construction
company, and completed the road.
Held that W., being a
bona fide holder of the bonds secured by the first
mortgage, who had purchased the bonds in good faith, had through
the mortgage a prior lien on the whole line
Page 149 U. S. 328
for the full amount of the face of his bonds, which was not
affected by the fact that the new company acquired its rights and
property not directly from the first company, but through
intervening conveyances.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellants, Belle N. B. Wade and Warner M. Hopkins,
testamentary trustees of the estate of Robert B. Wade, as holders
of fifty first mortgage bonds of the Chicago, Springfield & St.
Louis Railroad Company, on January 27, 1887, filed their bill in
the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of
Illinois for the purpose of enforcing a mortgage lien upon the
property and railway of said company, extending from Springfield,
Illinois, to East St. Louis, Illinois. The material facts of the
case, as set out in the bill, and as disclosed by the record, are
as follows:
The Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company was
incorporated January 17, 1883, under the general laws of Illinois,
to build and operate a proposed line of railroad from Springfield
to East St. Louis in that state. After surveying the route, and
designating the same on a map filed in the office of the company,
and after securing certain rights of way on the line of the road,
on March 3, 1883, it entered into a contract with the Empire
Construction Company, of which one Wing was President and sole
stockholder, to build, finish, and equip the proposed railway of
the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company within a
stipulated time. The contract provided as follows:
"These articles of agreement, made and entered into this
Page 149 U. S. 329
third day of March, A.D. 1883, by and between the Empire
Construction Company, a corporation of the State of Illinois, party
of the first part, and the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company, a railroad corporation of the same state, party
of the second part, witnesseth:"
"That for and in consideration of the covenants and payments
hereinafter recited, to be made by said party of the second part,
said party of the first part hereby, for itself, its successors and
assigns, covenants and agrees to furnish all the material and labor
necessary to construct, iron, bridge, and complete the railroad of
said party of the second part, as now surveyed and designated on a
map filed in the office of the party of the second part, which
railroad commences at a point on the Gilman and Clinton branch of
the Illinois Central Railroad at the City of Springfield, and
extends, by way of Litchfield and Mount Olive to the bridge
junction at East St. Louis, Illinois, a distance of about
ninety-eight (98) miles, passing through the Towns of Pawnee,
Litchfield, Mount Olive, Alhambra, Marine, Troy, and Collinsville,
with four and one-half (4 1/2) miles of side track (necessary to
the places marked on said map for the business of the line at the
time of the opening) and to furnish the said railroad with depots,
water tanks, and turntables, and to equip the same with engines and
cars as hereinafter provided."
"The road and side tracks hereby agreed to be constructed are
those on said map marked and specified only, and said map is hereby
referred to for further particulars in this behalf, and the said
road and side tracks are to be built in manner and according to the
specifications and conditions following, and the bridges, depots,
water tanks, turntables, engines, and cars are to be those only
also hereinafter mentioned in the specifications."
Certain specifications were made a part of the contract, but
they need not be recited.
In consideration of the premises and of the undertakings of the
construction company thus set forth, the railroad company agreed to
pay therefor, in its negotiable bonds to be issued thereafter, the
amount of $2,500,000, and $990,000 of its
Page 149 U. S. 330
capital stock, fully paid and nonassessable. The bonds were to
be secured by a trust deed or mortgage in proper form, and duly
executed by the company, upon all its property, real or personal,
owned by it or afterwards acquired, including its franchises of
every kind. The construction company, its successors or assigns,
were to receive from the trustee twenty-five bonds, to the amount
of $25,000, and eighty shares of capital stock, of the value of
$8,000, as each mile of the road was constructed and completed, and
on the chief engineer's certificate obtained therefor.
The contract further provided that the construction company, its
successors or assigns, for the purpose of construction, should have
the right to the full and free possession, use, and control of said
railway, equipment, and property of the railroad company, as
constructed, made, or furnished under the agreement, or otherwise
obtained, together with the right to use and operate said railway
in the name of the railroad company, under its franchises necessary
thereto, for the transportation of persons and property, until the
final and ultimate completion and acceptance of said railroad,
without charge therefor by the railroad company, and, also at its
own cost, keep said railroad in good repair and condition, ordinary
wear and tear excepted.
The contract further provided that if at any time a change of
the route of the said road was necessary to be made, it was agreed
that the same might be done on certificate of the chief engineer,
and approval of the president of the construction company, and
thereupon all of the terms and conditions of the contract as to
said modified route were to be the same as agreed in respect to the
route then specified on the map.
In pursuance of this contract, and under proper authority of
law, by vote of the stockholders of the railroad company, its board
of directors was authorized to issue bonds of the company in the
sum of $2,500,000 to pay for the building of the road, and to
execute to the Central Trust Company of New York a mortgage upon
all the properties and franchises, which were particularly
described in the mortgage as follows:
"All and singular, the several pieces or parcels of land
Page 149 U. S. 331
forming the track or roadway of said railroad company from a
point on the Gilman and Clinton branch of the Illinois Central
railway at the City of Springfield, and extending by way of
Litchfield and Mt. Olive to the bridge junction at East St. Louis,
Illinois, a distance of about ninety-eight miles, passing through
the Towns of Crow's Mills, Pawnee, White Oak, Litchfield, Mt.
Olive, Alhambra, Nervine, Troy, and Collinsville, and being in or
through the Counties of Sangamon, Montgomery, Macoupin, Madison,
and St. Clair, whether the same is now acquired and owned by said
railroad company or may be hereafter acquired and owned by said
company; also, the railroad of said party of the first part, and
any and all its branches thereof, and any and all switches, and
turnouts thereof, together with all the rails, bridges, depots,
stations, stationhouses, section houses, fences, and other
structures and appurtenances thereto belonging now owned by said
railroad company or that may hereafter be constructed, completed,
finished, acquired, or owned by said company; also, all the tolls,
income, issues, and profits and alienable franchises of said party
of the first part, connected with its railroad, or relating
thereto, including its rights and franchises as a corporation, and
also all and singular, the property of every kind hereinafter
mentioned, whether now owned, or that may hereafter be acquired and
owned by said railroad company -- that is to say, all the rolling
stock of every description, all the machine shops, car shops, and
blacksmith shops, all the machinery, stationary engines, and all
articles used in the construction, replacing, and repairing
thereof, together with all the tools and materials, and any and all
other property now owned, or hereafter to be acquired by said party
of the first part."
This mortgage was duly executed and properly recorded near that
date in the several counties through which the railroad was located
and was to be constructed. The bonds secured thereby were 2,500 in
number, of the denomination of $1,000 each, redeemable in gold May
1, 1913, with interest-bearing coupons attached, payable
semiannually at the American Exchange National Bank, New York.
These bonds
Page 149 U. S. 332
were delivered to the trustee, to be by it delivered to the
construction company in amounts of $25,000, on the certificate of
the engineer of the railroad company as each mile of the road was
completed, under and in accordance with the terms of the contract
of the construction company with the railroad company; and, in
addition to the bonds to be thus delivered, eight shares of
nonassessable stock of the railroad company at the par value of
$8,000, were to be delivered to the construction company upon the
same conditions.
The construction company, under and in pursuance of this
contract, commenced the construction of the railroad, and in July
or early in August, 1883, had completed two miles of the road, and
thereafter, on October, 1883, received from the Central Trust
Company, upon certificate of the chief engineer of that fact, fifty
of the mortgage bonds.
These bonds, so received by the construction company, were
deposited on November 5, 1883, by Wing, the representative of said
company, with a trustee as collateral security to secure the
payment of the sum of $35,000, evidenced by the note of said Wing,
and endorsed by Robert B. Wade for the accommodation of Wing and
the said construction company. By the terms of the pledge of these
bonds, the trustee was authorized, upon the failure of Wing or the
construction company to pay said note at maturity, to sell said
bonds, which sale it was agreed might be made without notice to
Wing or to the construction company, and by express terms, Wade was
to have the same power or privilege of purchasing at said sale as
any other person. Demand was made upon Wing, at the maturity of the
note, to pay the same, which he failed to do, and thereupon the
trustee holding the collateral, on due notice of time, place, and
terms of sale, sold the bonds. They were purchased by the
testamentary trustees of Wade, he having died in the meantime, for
the sum of $20,000, which amount was credited upon a judgment on
the note previously confessed by Wing, and the balance of the
indebtedness was subsequently collected by process of law. Under
this purchase, the appellants became the holders of the bonds.
These bonds, amounting to $50,000, were all that were ever
Page 149 U. S. 333
actually issued under the above-described mortgage of the
Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, for, while
the construction company graded considerable portions of the road,
and acquired for the railroad company rights of way throughout a
large part, if not the entire route, it failed to complete any
other mile or miles of the road so as to become entitled to
additional bonds.
In April, 1885, the railroad company becoming satisfied that the
construction company was unable to execute its contract or would
fail to perform the same, the stockholders authorized its board of
directors to
"make such arrangements with said company or other parties as
will secure the construction of this road and preserve the rights
of all parties interested, and that they be authorized to modify or
change said contract, or make a new contract with the Empire
Construction Company, if they think necessary to secure the
building of this road, maintaining legal rights of all parties
concerned, and, upon the surrender of all outstanding bonds, said
directors may satisfy the present mortgage, and issue new bonds,
and secure same by mortgage on the property and franchises of this
road."
Acting under this authority, the railroad company, on April 29,
1885, entered into a new contract with the construction company,
which need not, however, be specially noticed, as it was vacated
and cancelled on May 23, 1885, in compliance with the request of
said construction company.
Wing, who was the chief promoter of the Chicago, Springfield,
and St. Louis Railroad Company and the sole stockholder and owner
of the Empire Construction Company, after suspending operations
under the contract of the latter with the railroad company,
organized and caused to be incorporated on May 19, 1885, the St.
Louis and Chicago Railway Company. This company was incorporated to
construct a railroad from Litchfield to Springfield in Illinois, on
the line of the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company, and on May 26, 1885, a few days after the organization of
the new company, and after the construction company had been
released from its contract with the Chicago, Springfield, and St.
Louis Railroad
Page 149 U. S. 334
Company, the said construction company, by Wing, as its
president, conveyed and transferred to H. H. Cooley & Company,
a firm composed of a brother and a brother-in-law of Wing, for the
consideration of $142,015.11, the following-described property: all
right of way acquired by the Empire Construction Company for the
Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company between
Litchfield, Illinois, and Springfield, Illinois, estimated, as per
voucher, to be of the value of $4,785.40; all cross-ties between
Litchfield and Springfield, Illinois, on the side (site) of survey
made for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company,
estimated, per voucher, to be of the value of $2,546; all
embankments, excavations, trestlework, tiling, and all other work
done in the building and construction of a railroad on the line of
survey between Litchfield and Springfield, Illinois, done and
constructed by the Empire Construction Company, estimated, per
voucher, to be of the value of $72,134.22; all contracts for right
of way guarantied the Empire Construction Company for the
Chicago-Springfield Railroad Company, estimated, per voucher at the
sum of $19,000; all right of way contracted for the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company by the Empire
Construction Company, estimated, per voucher at the sum of $12,000;
all right of way in Litchfield acquired by the Empire Construction
Company for the right of way for the Chicago, Springfield, and St.
Louis Railroad Company, estimated to be of the value of $10,000;
all engineering services and engineering in tile construction,
location, surveys, estimates, and superintendence of construction
in the work done between Litchfield and Springfield, Illinois,
estimated, as per voucher at $4,672.93; all estimates, rights, and
advantages accrued to the Empire Construction Company by reason of
any contract heretofore existing, and all rights in the Empire
Construction Company resulting from work done, material furnished,
money expended, and included in the term "miscellaneous," as per
vouchers, $16,876.56, and surveys, contracts, profiles, books, and
all property belonging to the Empire Construction Company, except
that of like nature as above enumerated, on the line of the
Chicago, Springfield, and St.
Page 149 U. S. 335
Louis Railroad Company south of the line of the Indianapolis and
St. Louis Railroad Company.
This conveyance was duly recorded in Montgomery County,
Illinois, May 27, 1885. On the same day, the above conveyance was
executed, H. H. Cooley & Company, by deed duly recorded in
Montgomery County, Illinois, transferred the same property to the
St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company in consideration of one
dollar, and of a contract entered into that day by H. H. Cooley
& Company with the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company to
build a line of railroad north from Litchfield to Springfield, a
distance of about forty-five miles. This road was completed in 1886
on the same line, substantially, as that surveyed for the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, and described in the
conveyance of the Empire Construction Company to H. H. Cooley &
Company The St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company, on July 1, 1885,
executed a mortgage to the Mercantile Trust Company of New York to
secure an issue of its bonds to the amount of $500,000, which bonds
were put in circulation and are outstanding. The mortgage securing
the bonds was duly recorded in each of the counties through which
the said railroad extended.
It further appears from the record, and the findings of fact in
the decree of the court below, that on June 12, 1886, the Empire
Construction Company conveyed to the said firm of H. H. Cooley
& Company, for the express consideration of $5,000, all the
real estate and personal property, rights, and easements acquired
by said construction company for the Chicago, Springfield, and St.
Louis Railroad Company south of the Indianapolis and St. Louis
Railway, and between Litchfield and Alhambra, Illinois, over the
line surveyed, and on the rights of way acquired, for the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, together with all
embankments, excavations, trestlework, and all other work done in
the building and construction of a railroad on the line of said
Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company south of
Litchfield, and on the same date, June 12, 1886, the firm of Cooley
and Co., for the expressed consideration of $75,000, conveyed
Page 149 U. S. 336
the same property and rights to the Litchfield and St. Louis
Railway Company, which the said Wing and associates also organized
and incorporated, under the laws of Illinois, for the purpose of
completing the road of the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company between Litchfield and East St. Louis. This line
was constructed between Litchfield and Mt. Olive, a distance of
about ten miles, but the new corporation appropriated the rights
acquired for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company between Litchfield and Alhambra. The Litchfield and St.
Louis Railway Company executed a mortgage to the Central Trust
Company of New York for the purpose of securing $200,000 of bonds.
It is claimed by the complainants that this mortgage was cancelled
and discharged, but that does not distinctly appear from the
record, and is not deemed material, in the view we take of the
case.
The Central Trust Company, as trustee of the mortgage of the
Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, executed in
1883, and also as trustee of the mortgage of the Litchfield and St.
Louis Railway Company, executed in 1886, when applied to by the
complainants, declined to institute foreclosure proceedings upon
the first mortgage, and thereupon the complainants filed their bill
making the three above-described railroad companies, and the
trustees of the mortgages executed by them, respectively, defendant
to the bill. The complainants claim that under the foregoing facts,
the fifty bonds held by them are a lien upon the entire line
originally surveyed, and partially constructed, for the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, by which said bonds
were issued, and that said company had made default in the payment
of the same, and the interest coupons thereto attached, which
matured May 1, 1884, and all interest coupons maturing since that
date.
The bill was answered by the three railroad companies,
viz., the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company, the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company, and the
Litchfield and St. Louis Railway Company. Each of the companies
admitted in its separate answer the execution of the various
Page 149 U. S. 337
mortgages; that complainants were the holders of the fifty
mortgage bonds issued by the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company; that said company had made default in the payment
of the bonds and coupons as stated in the bill, and that said
railroad company was insolvent; but they each denied that any of
the insolvent company's property was in the possession of the other
defendants.
The Central Trust Company, in its answer, admitted that the
complainants had applied to it to file a bill to foreclose the
mortgage made by the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company, and that it had refused to do so, and declared its purpose
of resigning its trusteeship under both of the mortgages aforesaid;
that before the actual commencement of this suit, it resigned its
trusteeship under each of these mortgages, and that the reasons for
so doing were that it was advised by counsel that, owing to its
trust relation to holders of bonds secured by each mortgage, it
ought not to take part, on behalf of one or the other, in any
controversy between such bondholders, and that the rights of the
complainants could be fully protected in any suit or suits brought
by said complainants in their own names.
The answer of the Mercantile Trust Company admitted the
execution of the mortgage to it of the St. Louis and Chicago
Railway Company, but denied that it accepted the trust therein with
notice and subject to the prior rights of the complainants as
holders of the fifty bonds of the Chicago, Springfield, and St.
Louis Railroad Company, and, as to other allegations of the bill,
it answered that it had no knowledge or information.
Proofs were taken upon the issues thus made, and the court
below, on August 5, 1889, rendered its decision in the premises,
dismissing the bill as to the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company
and its trustee, the Mercantile Trust Company, and ordered and
adjudged that the defendant the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company, or some one in its behalf, pay to the
complainants, within ninety days, the sum of $22,976.59, being the
said sum of $20,000, for which said bonds were bid off by
complainants, and six percent interest thereon
Page 149 U. S. 338
until paid, with costs of the suit to be taxed, and that in
default of said payment, all the right, title, interest, and equity
of redemption of said Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company, and of the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway Company, and
the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company, in and to that portion
of the property described in said mortgage, and lying south of the
Indianapolis and St. Louis Railroad, originally surveyed and laid
out for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company,
which is specially described, be sold by a special master, without
any equity of redemption, and that out of the proceeds of said
sales, after the payment of costs and expenses attending the
execution of the decree, the complainants be paid the amount
decreed, with interest thereon at the rate of six percent from the
date of the decree.
After this decree was passed, the American Loan and Trust
Company made application to intervene in the case as a trustee
under a mortgage made April 1, 1887, by the St. Louis and Chicago
Railway Company to secure bonds to the amount of $1,100,000, which
the intervener claimed was a lien on that portion of the railroad
line and property south of Litchfield, on which the decision of the
court below had awarded a lien to the complainants. This
application of the American Loan and Trust Company was allowed, and
by order of the court it was
"made a defendant to this cause, with all rights of exceptions,
appeal, and the prosecution of writs of error; the said American
Loan and Trust Company hereby entering its appearance, and adopting
and accepting the answer of the defendant the Chicago, Springfield,
and St. Louis Railroad Company as its answer herein, and agreeing
that the replication to said answer heretofore filed shall stand as
the replication to said answer as adopted by said American Loan and
Trust Company, and it being further provided that this order shall
not make it necessary to retake any of the evidence in this cause,
or to set aside any interlocutory proceedings or orders heretofore
had or entered therein."
It appears from the proof that, pending complainants' suit,
Page 149 U. S. 339
the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company had in some way
acquired or been consolidated with the Litchfield and St. Louis
Railway Company, and that the mortgage to the American Loan and
Trust Company covered the whole line, both north and south of
Litchfield.
The complainants appeal from so much of the decree of the
circuit court as denied them a recovery upon the entire issue of
bonds held by them, $50,000 and interest, and in denying them a
prior lien upon the entire line of railroad, described in the bill
as extending from Springfield to East St. Louis, and the American
Loan and Trust Company appeal from so much of the decree as awarded
complainants a lien for $22,976.59 on the Litchfield and St. Louis
branch of the road, lying south of Litchfield. These constitute, in
substance, the errors assigned by the respective appellants. The
corporate existence of the American Loan and Trust Company having
terminated during the pendency of these appeals, Dallas B. Pratt
was substituted as trustee, and by order of this Court has become a
party to the record, in place of his predecessor in the trust.
The testimony clearly establishes that the completed road south
of Litchfield to Mt. Olive was the same road surveyed, located, and
mapped for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad
Company, which was located over the right of way acquired partly by
the railroad company, and partly by the construction company, under
contract, for the railroad company. The court below found, as the
proof clearly establishes, that
"the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway Company took possession of
the said uncompleted line of railroad, and mingled other work and
material therewith, and upon a survey made, and in accordance with
plats and profiles thereto made, for the Chicago, Springfield, and
St. Louis Railroad Company, did complete a line of railroad from
Litchfield to Mt. Olive, Illinois, and did also appropriate the
rights acquired by and for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company between Mt. Olive and Alhambra, Illinois"
It is further established by the proof that the defendant the
St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company built and constructed
Page 149 U. S. 340
its road a distance of about eighteen miles on that portion of
the line of the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad north
of Litchfield, on the surveyed route and located line, and upon
rights of way which had been theretofore acquired by and for the
latter road. The rest of the line of the St. Louis and Chicago
Railway to Springfield, while slightly divergent from the line of
the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad, was substantially
the same, so that there is no practical difference between those
portions of the line, either north or south of Litchfield.
It is further clearly established by the recitals in the
conveyances made by the Empire Construction Company to H. H. Cooley
& Company, and from said firm to the St. Louis and Chicago
Railway Company, and to the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway
Company -- all of which conveyances were duly recorded -- that the
newly organized railway companies and their mortgagees were
affected with full notice of the rights, properties, and interests
which the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company had
in, to, and over the lines of road which the newly organized roads
completed under their contracts with Cooley and Co., as the
successors or assignees of the Empire Construction Company.
It is clear, therefore, that the St. Louis and Chicago Railway
Company and the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway Company must be
held to occupy, in respect to the complainants, the same position
which H. H. Cooley & Company and the Empire Construction
Company would have occupied if the roads in question had been
completed by either of them without the organization or
incorporation of the two railroad companies which now claim and
assert title to said lines of railway. Being charged with full
notice and knowledge of the fact that the lines which they were
completing belonged to the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company, and with the further notice that that company had
issued and put in circulation, for value, $50,000 in bonds, secured
by its mortgage of 1883, they must be held to have acquired and to
hold their rights in said lines in subordination to the rights of
complainants. It may be true that all the rights of way,
easements,
Page 149 U. S. 341
embankments, and appurtenances which the Empire Construction
Company acquired for the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company under the contract between those parties did not
invest that railroad company with a perfect legal title thereto;
but it cannot be questioned that all the rights thus acquired
conferred upon or gave to the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company an equitable title and interest therein which
would be covered by the "after-acquired clause" of its mortgage,
and that the construction company had no right to transfer such
interests over to third parties, especially as against the bonds in
question, which the railroad company had issued for value and the
construction company had put in circulation.
The "after-acquired clause" in the mortgage of the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, under the decisions of
this Court, covers all acquisitions made to that property by either
construction company, or others acquiring rights under it.
Dunham v. Cincinnati, Peru
&c. Railway Co., 1 Wall. 254;
Galveston
Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459;
Porter v.
Bessemer Steel Co., 122 U. S. 267;
Toledo &c. Railroad v. Hamilton, 134 U.
S. 296;
Central Trust Co. v. Kneeland,
138 U. S. 414. In
this latter case, it was held that the "after-acquired property
clause" of a mortgage will cover not only legal acquisitions, but
all equitable rights and interests subsequently acquired by or for
the mortgagor.
If the two newly organized corporations, which have appropriated
the line of road, rights of way, and easements of the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, had taken their
transfers directly from the latter, it would admit of no question
that the lien of complainants' bonds would extend over the whole
line, and the result is not, and cannot be, changed by the fact
that they have acquired their rights through the intervention and
conveyances of the Empire Construction Company to Cooley &
Company, and by that firm to the newly organized companies, as
those conveyances, together with the mortgage of the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, put them in full
notice of the rights of the latter company, and also of the rights
of its mortgagee.
Joy v. St. Louis, 138 U. S.
1.
Page 149 U. S. 342
It cannot be assumed, therefore, that the St. Louis and Chicago
and the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway Companies, or their
mortgagees, are such
bona fide transferees or purchasers
for value of the partially constructed Chicago, Springfield, and
St. Louis Railroad as to cut off the rights of bondholders secured
by the prior mortgage of the latter company. Their acquisitions of
the rights and interests of the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis
Railroad Company have in no way displaced the lien of complainants'
mortgage, which had previously attached not only to all of said
partially constructed road, but to all accessions which might be
made thereto, either by the mortgagor or others succeeding to its
rights.
Under the facts in this case, the newly organized railway
companies are, in legal effect, the successors of the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company,
cum onere,
and the mortgage lien held by the complainants upon the franchises
and all property acquired in completing their mortgagor's railroad
between the original termini, whether by itself or its successors,
remains in full force. It follows, therefore, that the decree of
the court below was erroneous in limiting the complainants to a
lien on that portion of the road lying south of Litchfield,
completed in the name of the Litchfield and St. Louis Railway
Company. The same principles and consideration which entitle the
complainants to a lien on that portion of the road lying south of
Litchfield apply with equal force to the line lying north of
Litchfield, and under the facts of the case, as already stated,
they should have had their lien declared upon that portion of the
railroad north, as well as south, of Litchfield. The complainants'
lien has a clear and undoubted priority over the lien of the
mortgage executed by the St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company to
the American Loan and Trust Company on April 1, 1887, as that
mortgage was executed
pendente lite after the filing of
complainants' bill herein.
The remaining question to be considered is whether complainants
are entitled to a decree for the full amount of their bonds and
interest, instead of the price they paid therefor
Page 149 U. S. 343
when the bonds were sold under pledge made by Wing, president of
the construction company. The pleadings do not raise the question
as to whether complainants were entitled to the full amount of
their bonds. There was no issue presented on that question, and it
was not proper, therefore, on the proof, even if the proof had
warranted it, to have reduced the complainants' claim to the amount
which they paid for the bonds when sold under the pledge thereof.
The bonds were valid securities in the hands of the trustee for the
protection of Wade as accommodation endorser for Wing, or the
construction company, by whom they were pledged, and the pledgee or
purchaser thereunder succeeded to the rights of the pledgor, and
upon no principle could such purchaser, as against the maker, be
restricted to what he might pay for the bonds. Negotiable
securities, once put in circulation for value, may be transferred
for less than their face but the maker, and those claiming under
him cannot limit the right of a subsequent holder to a recovery of
what he may have paid therefor.
In the case of
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S.
51,
96 U. S. 59-60,
in which it was held that the holder of such negotiable securities,
regularly issued, is not limited to the amount which he may have
paid therefor, it is said by the Court, speaking by MR. JUSTICE
FIELD:
"We are of opinion that a purchaser of a negotiable security
before maturity, in cases where he is not personally chargeable
with fraud, is entitled to recover its full amount against its
maker, though he may have paid less than its par value, whatever
may have been its original infirmity. We are aware of numerous
decisions in conflict with this view of the law, but we think the
sounder rule, and one in consonance with the common understanding
and usage of commerce, is that the purchaser, at whatever price,
takes the benefit of the entire obligation of the maker. Public
securities, and those of private corporations, are constantly
fluctuating in price in the market, one day being above par, and
the next below it, and often passing, within short periods, from
one-half of their nominal to their full value. Indeed, all sales of
such securities are made with reference to prices current in the
market, and not with preference to their
Page 149 U. S. 344
par value. It would introduce, therefore, inconceivable
confusion if
bona fide purchasers in the market were
restricted in their claims upon such securities to the sums they
had paid for them."
The same general principle is held in
Fowler v.
Strickland, 107 Mass. 552;
Moore v. Baird, 30
Penn.St. 138;
Bange v. Flint, 25 Wis. 544;
Bank of
Michigan v. Green, 33 Ia. 140;
Baily v. Smith, 14
Ohio St. 396. By the decisive weight of authority in this country,
where negotiable paper has been put in circulation, and there is no
infirmity or defense between the antecedent parties thereto, a
purchaser of such securities is entitled to recover thereon, as
against the maker, the whole amount, irrespective of what he may
have paid therefor.
This was the position occupied by the complainants in respect to
the bonds in question, which were regularly issued for value and
constituted
bona fide debts against the mortgagor in the
hands of Wade or of the construction company before they were
pledged. The testimony in respect to that pledge, and the price at
which the complainants purchased the bonds, was objected to as
incompetent, and it should have been excluded on two grounds: first
because there was nothing in the pleadings to warrant its
introduction, and secondly because nothing disclosed thereby
authorized the scaling of the bonds, as was done by the decree. We
are therefore of opinion that the decree was wrong in limiting
complainants' right of recovery to the amount, and interest
thereon, for which they purchased the bonds.
It is urged on behalf of Pratt that the principal of the bonds
was not due; but in becoming a party to the cause, the American
Loan and Trust Company, to whose rights Pratt has succeeded, was
required to adopt, and did adopt, the answer of the Chicago,
Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company, which admitted by its
answer that it was in default in the payment of the bonds, and a
similar admission was made by the St. Louis and Chicago Railway
Company, under whose mortgage said trustee claims his rights were
acquired. But aside from this, it is by no means certain under the
terms
Page 149 U. S. 345
of the Chicago, Springfield, and St. Louis Railroad Company's
mortgage that the complainants did not have the right to foreclose
both for principal and for interest on their bonds.
This mortgage contained the provision
"that upon default made in the payment of either interest or
principal upon any one hundred of said bonds for the period of
sixty days, then each and all of said bonds shall become absolutely
due at the option of the majority in interest of the holders of
said one hundred bonds in default, and, upon decree rendered as
aforesaid, judgment shall be made for the whole of said
indebtedness thus due upon default of the part of said
indebtedness, as if all were absolutely due according to the terms
of said bond."
It was further provided that in the event of a sale the proceeds
thereof, after defraying expenses incident thereto, should be
applied in paying the several holders of the then outstanding bonds
and coupons, secured by the mortgage, the amount of principal and
interest which might be due and unpaid, and, in case of a
deficiency in the fund to pay the same in full, then to distribute
the fund
pro rata among such holders. But, the defendants
having admitted that the bonds were in default, we do not feel
disposed, in view of the fact that $50,000 constituted the entire
issue, to reverse or modify the decree on the doubtful point as to
whether the principal of the bonds, under the terms of the
mortgage, could properly be treated as due.
Our conclusion is that there is no error in the decree of the
circuit court of which the American Loan and Trust Company, or its
successor, Pratt, can complain, and further that the decree of the
circuit court was erroneous in not allowing the complainants the
full amount of their bonds, and in not declaring said bonds a lien
upon the entire line of completed road from Springfield to Mt.
Olive.
The decree is accordingly reversed, in this respect, and the
cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a
decree in conformity with this opinion, and it is accordingly so
ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD did not sit in this case, and took no part in
its decision.