MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the early part of November, A.D. 1883, Marcella Doyle, a
widow with a family of six children, agreed with the Union Pacific
Railway Company to occupy the company's sectionhouse situated on
the line of the railroad at or near Woodstock, in the County of
Chaffee and State of Colorado, and to board at said sectionhouse
such sectionhands and other employees of the company as it should
desire at the rate of four and one-half dollars per week, to be
paid by the persons so to be boarded, and the company agreed to aid
her in collecting her pay for such board by retaining the same for
her out of the wages of the employees so to be boarded.
Mrs. Doyle moved with her children into the sectionhouse, and
continued in the discharge of her duties as boarding housekeeper
until the 10th day of March, A.D. 1884, when a snowslide
overwhelmed the sectionhouse, injured Mrs. Doyle, and crushed to
death the six children residing with her.
Subsequently, Marcella Doyle brought, in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of Colorado, two actions against
the Union Pacific Railway Company -- one for her personal injuries,
the other for damages suffered by her in the loss of her children,
and which latter action was based on a statute of the State of
Colorado.
The actions resulted in verdicts and judgments in favor of the
defendant company, and the cases have been brought to this Court by
writs of error. As the cases turn upon the same facts and
principles of law, they can be disposed of together.
The record discloses that the facts of the case, as claimed by
the respective parties, and certain admission by the defendant
company, were stated in a bill of exceptions, and upon which
instructions by the court were given which are made the subject of
the assignments of error.
The bill of exceptions was as follows:
"Be it remembered that on the trial of this cause at the
Page 147 U.S. 415
November term, A.D. 1886, of the said circuit court, the
defendant admitted, and such admissions were received in evidence
before the jury:"
"That the plaintiff was at the several times named in the
complaint a widow and the mother of the said Martin Doyle, Andrew
Doyle, Christopher Doyle, Catharine Doyle, Marcella Doyle, and
Maggie Doyle, mentioned and named in the complaint as the children
of the plaintiff, and as having each and all been killed by a
snowslide at Woodstock in the month of March, A.D. 1884."
"That her husband and the father of said children had died
previously to their death. That each of said children was of the
age and sex stated in the complaint, was each unmarried and had no
child nor children, and had each lived with their said mother,
making their home with her, up to the time of their death, and were
each then living with the plaintiff, aiding and assisting her in
and about making a living, and in and about her duties and labors
in the keeping of the sectionhouse of the defendant at Woodstock,
in the County of Chaffee and State of Colorado, where said children
were killed. That said children were all killed while in said
sectionhouse, on the 10th day of March, A.D. 1884, by a snowslide,
which then and there occurred from the mountainside above said
sectionhouse. That said sectionhouse was built and used by the
defendant as and for a sectionhouse and a place at which the
section hands of the defendant who should work on said section
could board and lodge."
"That on or about the 5th day of November, A.D. 1883 at the
instance and request of the defendant, and for the mutual benefit
of herself and the defendant, the plaintiff undertook and agreed
with the defendant to keep for it, during its will and pleasure,
its sectionhouse situated at or near Woodstock, on the line of its
railroad, in the County of Chaffee and State of Colorado. That by
the said agreement between her and the defendant, the plaintiff was
to provide and furnish board at said sectionhouse for such
sectionhands and other employees of the defendant as it should
desire at the rate of four and one-half dollars per week, to be
paid by the persons so furnished
Page 147 U.S. 416
with such board, but the defendant was to aid and assist the
plaintiff in collecting her pay for such board by stopping and
retaining the same for her out of the wages of those so furnished
with such board. That plaintiff thereupon, to-wit, on the said 5th
day of November, A.D. 1883, moved into said sectionhouse with her
family, and entered upon the discharge of her duties as the keeper
thereof, and remained there in the discharge of such duties until
the occurrence of the snowslide, on the 10th of March, A.D. 1884.
That the defendant did not at any time notify or apprise the
plaintiff or either of her said children, or cause her or either of
them to be notified or apprised, of the danger of a snowslide or
snowslides or of the liability of a snowslide or snowslides at such
place where said sectionhouse then was, or in that locality. And
the plaintiff, further to maintain the issues on her part,
introduced evidence tending to show that said sectionhouse was a
one-story frame building, and was constructed in 1882, about the
time that said railroad was first operated in that section of the
country; was situated in the mountains, near the base of a high and
steep mountain, and in a place subject to snowslides, and dangerous
on that account. That the sides of the mountain at the base of
which was the house in question were marked by the tracks of former
snowslides, but only those familiar with snowslides and their
effects would know what they meant. That the defendant was aware of
said danger at and before the time it engaged the plaintiff to keep
its said sectionhouse. That the plaintiff and her said children had
never before resided in a region of country subject to snowslides,
and had no knowledge of snowslides or of their indications, or of
the dangers incident thereto, and was not aware of the particular
danger in question. That there was a prominence or hip on this
mountainside, about ten or twelve hundred feet above the
sectionhouse, which cut off a view of the mountainside above said
hip from the sectionhouse or its immediate vicinity. That above
said hip there was a large depression or draw on the mountainside
extending from said hip to the summit, into which great quantities
of snow fell and drifted during the winter season of each year,
thus tending
Page 147 U.S. 417
to create snowslides of danger to persons in said sectionhouse
or its vicinity. That this danger was not apparent even to a person
having knowledge of snowslides and their causes without a view or
examination of this mountainside above said hip. That the altitude
of said sectionhouse was about 10,200 feet, and of the summit of
said mount in nearly 12,000 feet. That the snowfall there was great
in the winter season of each year, and that depressions on the
mountainside were filled with snow by drifting. That the snowslide
of March 10, 1884, which killed the said children, proceeded from
this depression above said hip. That a snowslide of less
dimensions, and of less scope and extent, occurred there in
February, 1883, in the same place and from the same source, which
reached to within about two hundred feet of said sectionhouse, and
of which the defendant had knowledge at the time thereof."
"That the attention of the superintendent of the construction of
said railroad and of said sectionhouse was called to the fact of
such danger at or about the time said sectionhouse was built, by
one of the civil engineers of said defendant who assisted in
locating the line of said railroad."
"That her said son Andrew Doyle was an employee of the defendant
-- a sectionhand on the same section where said sectionhouse was
located -- at the time he was so killed by said snowslide. That the
plaintiff and her said children were in said sectionhouse at the
time the said children were killed, and that neither of said
children was aware of said danger before the said snowslide of
March 10, 1884, occurred."
"That through this prominence or hip on the mountainside there
was a chasm or draw from twenty to thirty feet wide, which
continued on down to the sectionhouse, but became wider after
leaving the hip. That with this draw another draw united about
midway between the sectionhouse and the said hip, and formed one
draw from their point of union to the sectionhouse."
"That this mountain is a part of the range of mountains known as
the 'Continental Divide,' which divides the waters of the Atlantic
from those of the Pacific. At this point above Woodstock station,
the course of the mountain is nearly east
Page 147 U.S. 418
and west. This railroad passes this mountain by means of a
tunnel called 'Alpine Tunnel,' which is to the westward of a line
north of Woodstock, and descends this mountain at a heavy grade,
along the side thereof, about midway between the sectionhouse and
the said hip on the mountain (which hip is termed a 'projection of
rocks' by some of the witnesses), and passes on to the eastward of
Woodstock a considerable distance, where it turns, and, forming a
kind of horseshoe shape, runs back again past Woodstock, but
between the sectionhouse and said hip, the sectionhouse being below
and distant from this lower track about two hundred and thirty
feet, and the two tracks forming this horseshoe are both between
the sectionhouse and said hip, and on a direct line from the
sectionhouse up to the hip. The two tracks are about five hundred
feet apart, the upper track being about seventy feet higher in
point of altitude where they cross this line from the sectionhouse
to the hip on the mountainside above. That there was a water tank
on the upper side of the lower track fifty or sixty feet to the
westward of the sectionhouse, which water tank was injured by the
snowslide of February, 1883."
"That the snowslide of March 10, 1884, spread out as it
descended the mountain, so that where it passed over the lower
railroad track, its space in width was six or seven hundred feet,
and the sectionhouse was not far from the center of said snowslide
track."
"That the contour of this mountain, beginning at the
sectionhouse and ascending the mountain, is about as follows,
to-wit: above the sectionhouse, it slopes slowly to the first
railroad track; then there is a rockslide; then there is a bench
above that, and on the same level of the upper railroad track, and
above that a steep gorge, and on each side of said gorge there is a
thin belt of timber, and between these belts of timber and along
the gorge there is a space from three to four hundred feet in width
of nothing but rock, with a very steep slope, and above this slope
some very steep rocks (the hip on the mountainside), and above this
hip is a large basin or depression extending on up the mountainside
three or four thousand feet long to the summit of the mountain,
which has an elevation or
Page 147 U.S. 419
altitude of about 11,500 feet, the mountainside above the hip
being very steep, having a slope of more than thirty-three degrees,
and from the hip down there is quite a precipitous piece of rock,
not perpendicular, but quite steep, and after or below that the
slope is at an angle of about twenty-five degrees. In the basin
above the hip there is no timber, and in and about the sectionhouse
there is a space of eight or nine hundred feet square on which
there is no timber except three or four trees."
"That the timber on the mountainside was sparse and scattered.
That only a few trees were carried down by the snowslide. That
snowslides do not always follow beaten tracks made by former
snowslides on the same mountainside, but frequently depart
therefrom. That the snowslide of March 10, 1884, separated into
broken fragments or divisions before reaching the base of the
mountain, one of which struck the sectionhouse, resulting in the
injuries complained of."
"That the winter of 1883-84 was severer, and the snow fell some
deeper, than the winter previous thereto, and that it snowed
heavily and continuously from about the 1st of March to the 10th of
March, 1884, and the trains had ceased to run on account of the
snow. That ordinarily in the winter season the snow was from five
to seven feet deep in said locality in places where it did not
drift, and after it had settled compactly. That it drifted greatly,
filling up basins and depressions on the mountainsides. That there
were rockslides and existing evidences of former snowslides on this
mountainside above said sectionhouse."
"That the snowslide of February, 1883, deposited snow and debris
on the upper track of the railroad above said sectionhouse from
twenty to twenty-five feet deep, and for a considerable space of
time from then, during the remainder of that winter and the
following spring, the said railroad was not operated on account of
the snow."
"And the defendant, to maintain the issues on its part,
introduced evidence tending to prove that said sectionhouse was
built below the said tracks and behind, and protected by a
Page 147 U.S. 420
thick growth of timber above and between said sectionhouse and
the mountain; that there were no marks or tracks of former
snowslides directly above or in the vicinity of said sectionhouse;
that the defendant was not aware of any danger from snowslides at
the place where the sectionhouse was built, but, on the contrary,
that the officers of the company had carefully examined the
locality where the same was built, and the contour of the mountains
above the same to the summit of the range, and that said
sectionhouse was built at that place because the officers of the
company thought that it was [a?] safe place, and could not be
endangered by snowslides, which were apt to occur in that part of
the country; that the prominence or hip spoken of was a protection
against snowslides which might occur on the mountainsides above
said sectionhouse; that an examination of the ground, timber, and
rocks in the vicinity of where the house was built, and above on
the mountainside, showed that there had not been a snowslide there
for at least two hundred years; that the snowslide of March 10,
1884, was caused by a storm of unprecedented severity and duration,
and that the same came down through the timber above said house,
breaking down and carrying with it standing trees, from bushes up
to trees two feet in diameter; that the snowslide mentioned as
occurring in February, 1883, came down a considerable distance to
the north of where the one came down in 1884, and that the
snowslide in 1883 did no damage except to cover up a short distance
of the railroad track and break in some boards of the house under
the water tank; that the attention of the superintendent of
construction of said railroad was not called by anyone to the fact
of there being any danger from snowslides at the place where said
sectionhouse was built, but that the conversation or notice
referred to was in regard to a place a mile or more further up
Quartz Creek; that the said Andrew Doyle had been an employee of
the defendant as a sectionhand, but had quit work some days before
on account of the road's being blockaded by snow and all attempts
to open it having been abandoned, and for ten days or more before
the snowslide no work whatever was being done by defendant on said
road for
Page 147 U.S. 421
a distance of several miles each way from said Woodstock; that
said prominence or hip on the mountainside mentioned by the
witnesses tended to protect said sectionhouse and its immediate
locality from snowslides; that there was no chasm or draw
immediately above said sectionhouse, and that whatever formation of
that kind there was on said mountain was a distance of two hundred
feet or more north of said sectionhouse; that said sectionhouse was
broken down by said snowslide of March 10, 1884, by a spreading out
of the snow as it came down the mountain, and that said
sectionhouse was on the southerly side of said snowslide; that the
gorge referred to is simply an opening a few feet wide in the ridge
of rock referred to as the 'hip' or 'prominence;' that a short
distance above said prominence, the general timberline of the
country is reached, above which no timber occurs; that there was a
considerable amount of timber between said sectionhouse and the
first railroad track, and a thick growth of large timber
immediately above the first railroad track, extending up some
distance to wards the second track of the loop, and some scattering
timber above the upper track; that there are no rockslides or
existing evidences of former snowslides on the mountainsides
immediately above said sectionhouse."
"And the foregoing was all the evidence in the case."
To the answers of the court to the prayers for instructions, and
to the charge, the plaintiff has filed thirteen assignments of
error.
The twelfth assignment alleges that "the circuit court erred in
charging the jury substantially to the effect that they must find
for the defendant," and in the brief of the plaintiff in error it
is asserted that the answers of the court to the several requests
for instructions were in effect directions to the jury to find for
the defendant.
Although in point of fact the court did not give the jury
peremptory instructions to find for the defendant, but left the
cases to them on instructions under which they might have found
verdicts for the plaintiff, yet the validity of the plaintiff's
exceptions to the court's treatment of the cases may be
conveniently tested by assuming for the present that the
Page 147 U.S. 422
charge and instructions legally amounted to a direction to find
for the defendant. If an examination of the facts and of the
principles of law involved warrants us in concluding that the court
would have been justified in so doing, it will not be necessary to
consider each and every assignment of error nor to minutely scan
isolated expressions used by the court.
The first question to be determined is what was the relation
between the plaintiff and the railway company? Was Mrs. Doyle a
servant or employee of the company, aiding in the transaction of
its business and subject to its directions, or was she a tenant at
will holding the premises by an occupation during the will of the
company? The facts averred by the plaintiff show that the company
was not interested, in a legal sense, in the management of the
boarding house; did not receive the board money, pay the expenses,
take the profits, or suffer the losses. The company could not call
upon her for any account, nor could she demand payment from the
company for any services rendered by her in carrying on the
boarding house. The fact that the company agreed to aid her in
collecting what might be due to her from time to time by the
boarders, by withholding moneys out of the wages payable to them by
the railroad company, did not convert Mrs. Doyle into a servant of
the company or change her relation to the company as a tenant at
will of the company's house. Such an arrangement might equally have
been made if Mrs. Doyle had been the owner of the house. The court
below was not in error in holding that the relation of the parties
was that of landlord and tenant.
If, then, such was the relation of the parties, upon what
principle can a liability for the damages occasioned by the
snowslide be put upon the company? There was neither allegation nor
proof of fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit on the part of the
defendant company as to the condition of the premises. Indeed, it
was not even pretended that the catastrophe was in any way
occasioned by the condition of the house.
It was, indeed, alleged that the sectionhouse was built near the
base of a high and steep mountain, and in a place subject
Page 147 U.S. 423
to snowslides and dangerous on that account; that the company
was aware of said danger; that the plaintiff and her children had
never before resided in a region of country subject to snowslides,
and had no knowledge of snowslides or of their indications, or of
the dangers incident thereto, and that the company did not at any
time notify or apprise the plaintiff or her children of the danger
of snowslides or of the liability of snowslides at such place where
said section then was, or in that locality, and upon this alleged
state of facts it was contended that the jury had a right to find
that the railway company was guilty of carelessness or disregard of
duty toward the plaintiff such as to make it liable in these
actions.
It is, however, well settled that the law does not imply any
warranty on the part of the landlord that the house is reasonably
fit for occupation; much less does it imply a warranty that no
accident should befall the tenant from external forces, such as
storms, tornadoes, earthquakes, or snowslides. The law is thus
stated in a well known work on Landlord and Tenant:
"There is no implied warranty, on the letting of a house, that
it is safe, well built, or reasonably fit for habitation; or of
land that it is suitable for cultivation or for any other purpose
for which it was let, and where a person hired a house and garden
for a term of years to be used for a dwelling house, but
subsequently abandoned it as unfit for habitation in consequence of
its being infested with vermin and other nuisances which he was not
aware of when he took the lease, the principle was laid down, after
an elaborate review of all the cases where a contrary doctrine
seemed to have prevailed, that there is no implied contract on a
demise of real estate that it shall be fit for the purposes for
which it was let. Consequently an abandonment of the premises under
these circumstances forms no defense to an action for rent, and in
all cases where a tenant has been allowed, upon suggestions of this
kind, to withdraw from the tenancy and refuse the payment of rent,
there will be found to have been a fraudulent misrepresentation or
concealment as to the state of the premises which were the subject
of the letting or else the premises proved to be uninhabitable by
some wrongful act or default of the landlord himself. The lessor is
not, however, always bound to disclose the state of the
premises
Page 147 U.S. 424
to the intended lessee unless he knows that the house is really
unfit for habitation and that the lessee does not know it and is
influenced by his belief of the soundness of the house in agreeing
to take it, for the conduct of the lessor may in this respect
amount to a deceit practiced upon the lessee."
Taylor, Landlord and Tenant § 382.
The principles applicable to the present case have been well
stated in the recent case of
Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass.
380. The syllabus states the case and decision as follows:
"A tenant cannot maintain an action against his landlord for an
injury caused by falling upon a stair in the tenement the tread of
which has been sawed out and left unsupported by a previous tenant,
there having been full opportunity to examine the stair at the time
of hiring, and no warranty of the fitness of the tenement having
been given by the landlord, the only evidence of knowledge on the
part of the landlord being that he knew the stair had been sawed
out, that he tried it, and it bore his weight, and he thought it
would bear anybody's weight."
The judge directed a verdict for defendants, and the supreme
court sustained this ruling. Field, J., giving the opinion of the
court, said (page 383):
"There is no implied warranty in the letting of an unfurnished
house or tenement that it is reasonably fit for use [citing cases].
The tenant takes an estate in the premises hired, and persons who
occupy by his permission, or as members of his family, cannot be
considered as occupying by the invitation of the landlord so as to
create a greater liability on the part of the landlord to them than
to the tenant. The tenant is in possession, and he determines who
shall occupy or enter his premises [citing cases]."
"In the case at bar, there was no express or implied warranty,
and no actual fraud or misrepresentation. If the action can be
maintained, it must be on the ground that it was the duty of the
defendants to inform the tenant of the defect in the
Page 147 U.S. 425
staircase. This duty, if it exists, does not arise from the
contract between the parties, but from the relation between them,
and is imposed by law. If such a duty is imposed by law, it would
seem that there is no distinction as a ground of liability between
an intentional and an unintentional neglect to perform it, but in
such a case as this is, there can be no such duty without knowledge
of the defect. There is no evidence of any such knowledge except on
the part of C. D. Hunking, and the other defendants cannot, in any
event, be held liable unless his knowledge can be imputed to them
as the knowledge of their agent in letting the premises. The
evidence is insufficient to warrant the jury in finding that C. D.
Hunking intentionally concealed the defect from the tenant, and the
action, if it can be maintained, must proceed upon the ground of
neglect to perform a duty which the law imposed upon the
defendants."
"A tenant is a purchaser of an estate in the land or building
hired, and
Keates v. Earl of Cadogan, 10 C.B. 591, states
the general rule that no action lies by a tenant against a landlord
on account of the condition of the premises hired in the absence of
an express warranty or of active deceit.
See also Robbins v.
Jones, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 240. This is a general rule of
caveat emptor. In the absence of any warranty, express or
implied, the buyer takes the risk of quality upon himself.
Hight v. Bacon, 126 Mass. 10;
Ward v. Hobbs, 3
Q.B.D. 150;
Howard v. Emerson, 110 Mass. 320. This rule
does not apply to cases of fraud."
This rule of
caveat emptor has been applied also in
many other cases, some of which we now refer to.
Keates v. Cadogan, above cited, was an action on the
case. The declaration stated in substance that the defendant knew
that the house was in such a ruinous and dangerous state as to be
dangerous to enter, occupy, or dwell in, and was likely to fall,
and thereby do damage to persons and property therein; that the
plaintiff was without any knowledge, notice, or information
whatever that the said house was in said state or condition; that
the defendant let the house to plaintiff without giving plaintiff
any notice of the condition of the house; and
Page 147 U.S. 426
that plaintiff entered, and his wife and goods and business were
injured. Defendant demurred to the declaration, and the court
unanimously sustained the demurrer. Jervis, C.J., giving the
opinion, said:
"It is not contended that there was any warranty that the house
was fit for immediate occupation, but it is said that because the
defendant knows it is in a ruinous state, and does nothing to
inform the plaintiff of that fact, therefore the action is
maintainable. It is consistent with the state of things disclosed
in the declaration that, the defendant knowing the state of things,
the plaintiff may have come to him and said, 'Will you lease that
house to me?' and the defendant may have answered, 'Yes, I will.'
It is not contended by the plaintiff that any misrepresentation was
made, nor is it alleged that the plaintiff was acting on the
impression produced by the conduct of the defendant as to the State
of the house, or that he was not to make investigations before he
began to reside in it. I think, therefore, that the defendant is
entitled to our judgment, there being no obligation on the
defendant to say anything about the State of the house, and no
allegation of deceit. It is an ordinary case of letting."
The rule of
caveat emptor was also applied in the
recent case of
Woods v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 134
Mass. 357. Defendant was owner of a tenement house fitted for four
families, and plaintiff was tenant at will or wife of tenant at
will. There were three stone steps leading down from the yard to
the street on which ice and snow had accumulated, and on which
plaintiff slipped and received the injury complained of. There was
evidence tending to prove that at the time plaintiff was injured,
she was in the exercise of due care. The jury viewed the premises.
Plaintiff contended that the steps were of such material, and
constructed in such manner, that they occasioned the accumulation
of snow and ice thereon improperly, and that the defendant's
omission to place a rail on either side or to take other reasonable
measures to prevent one from falling was such negligence as would
render the defendant liable; but the trial court held there was no
evidence to go to the jury, and directed a verdict for defendant,
and the supreme court sustained this ruling. Field, J., giving the
opinion, says (p. 359):
"There may be cases in which the landlord is liable to the
tenant for injuries received from secret defects which are
Page 147 U.S. 427
known to the landlord and are concealed from the tenant, but
this case discloses no such defects in the steps. . . . [Page 361.]
The ice and snow were the proximate cause of the injury."
"The exceptions state that no railing had ever been placed on
either side of the steps, that the jury viewed the premises, and
that it was contended 'that the steps were of such material, and
constructed in such manner, that they occasioned the accumulation
of ice and snow thereon improperly.' The steps were of rough-split,
unhewn granite, and the 'structure of the steps remained unchanged
from the time of the plaintiff's first occupancy of the tenement to
the time she received her injury.' The defendant was under no
obligation to change the original construction of the steps for the
benefit of the tenant."
Hazlett v. Powell, 30 Penn.St. 293, was an action of
replevin in which an apportionment of rent was claimed by the
tenant of an hotel on the ground that he had been partially evicted
by the act of an adjoining owner in building so that the tenant's
light and air from one side of his hotel were shut off or
obstructed and, as a result, that the hotel was rendered
pro
tanto unfit for the purpose for which it was intended to be
used. There was an offer to prove certain facts (p. 294), which the
court states as follows (p. 297):
"But the rejected proposition also contained an offer to prove
that the lessor knew at the time of executing the lease that the
adjoining owner intended building on his lot -- at what time is not
offered to be shown -- and did not communicate this information to
the lessees. We think he was not bound to do so and that, if the
evidence had been received, it would have furnished no evidence of
fraud on the part of the lessor or become the foundation in equity
for relief of the lessees. The substance of the complaint regarded
something that the lessor was no more presumed to know than the
lessees. It was nothing which concerned the title of the lessor, or
the title he was about to pass to the lessees. It was a collateral
fact, something only within the knowledge and determination of a
stranger to both parties, and if material to either, I can see no
obligation resting on either side of furnish
Page 147 U.S. 428
to the other the information. It was not alleged that the lessor
made any representations on the subject or that there was any
concealment of the information, or that any relation of trust and
confidence existed between the parties, or that the lessees were
misled by his silence and entered into the contract under the
belief that the vacant lot would not be occupied, or that they were
in a position in which they could not by diligence have ascertained
the fact for themselves, and that they were not legally bound to
take notice of the probability that the ground would be occupied by
buildings, and inquire for themselves. These were elements to be
shown to constitute fraud, and make the testimony available."
"'The general rule both in law and equity,' says Story on
Contracts § 516,"
"in respect to concealment is that mere silence in regard to a
material fact which there is no legal obligation to disclose will
not avoid a contract, although it operates as an injury to the
party from whom it is concealed."
"But the relation, generally, which raises the legal obligation
to disclose facts known by one party to the other, is where there
is some especial trust and confidence reposed, such as where the
contracting party is at a distance from the object of negotiation,
when he necessarily relies on full disclosure, or where, being
present, the buyer put the seller on good faith by agreeing to deal
only on his representations. In all these and kindred cases, there
must be no false representations nor purposed concealments; all
must be truly stated and fully disclosed. 'The vendor and vendee,'
says Atkinson on Marketable Titles, 134,"
"in the absence of special circumstances, are to be considered
as acting at arm's length. When the means of information as to the
facts and circumstances affecting the value of the subject of sale
are equally accessible to both parties, and neither of them does
anything to impose on the other, the disclosure of any superior
knowledge which one party may have over the other is not requisite
to the validity of the contract."
"
Id. Illustrative of this is the celebrated case of
Laidlaw
v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178. The parties had been
negotiating for the purchase of a quantity of tobacco. The buyer
got private information of the conclusion of peace with Great
Britain, and called very early
Page 147 U.S. 429
in the morning following the receipt of it on the holders of the
tobacco, and, ascertaining that they had received no intelligence
of peace, purchased it at a great profit. The contract was
contested for fraud and concealment. Chief Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court to the effect that the buyer was
not bound to communicate intelligence of extrinsic circumstances
which might influence the price, though it were exclusively in his
possession. And Chief Justice Gibson, in
Kintzing v.
McElrath, 5 Penn.St. 467, in commenting on this decision,
says:"
"It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine
within proper limits where the means of intelligence are equally
accessible to both parties."
"
See also Hershey v. Keembortz, 6 Penn.St. 129. When
the information is derived from strangers to the parties
negotiating, and not affecting the quality or title of the thing
negotiated for, it is not such as the opposite party can call for.
We see no error in the rejection of the evidence on account of this
part of the proposition, as there was no moral or legal obligation
for the lessor to disclose any information he had on the subject of
the intended improvement of the adjoining lot. It was not in the
line of his title. It was derived from a stranger; it might be true
or false, and the lessees could have got it by inquiry, as well as
the lessor."
"It is well settled that there is no implied warranty that the
premises are fit for the purposes for which they are rented [citing
authorities], nor that they shall continue so, if there be no
default on the part of the landlord."
In the recent case of
Viterbo v. Friedlander,
120 U. S. 712,
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, who delivered the opinion of the Court, said, in
contrasting the doctrines of the common and civil law:
"By that law [the common law, unlike the civil law], the lessor
is under no implied covenant to repair, or even that the premises
shall be fit for the purpose for which they are leased."
The plaintiff's evidence failed wholly to show that there was
any special and secret danger from snowslides which was known only
to the railway company, and which could not have been ascertained
by the plaintiff. It was indeed alleged
Page 147 U.S. 430
that "the sectionhouse was in a place of danger from
snowslides," but this was plainly the danger that impended over any
house placed, as this one necessarily was, on a mountainside in a
country subject to heavy falls of snow. The danger referred to was
that incident to the region and the climate, and, in the eye of the
law, as well known to the plaintiff as to the defendant.
On a careful reading of the plaintiff's evidence, we are unable
to see that the jury could have been permitted to find any positive
act of negligence on the part of the railroad company or any
omission by it to disclose to the plaintiff any fact which it was
the company's duty to disclose.
If, then, the plaintiff's case, as it appeared in her evidence,
would not have justified a verdict on the ground of negligence or a
fraudulent suppression of facts, and as the determination of the
nature of the relation between the parties as that of landlord and
tenant was clearly the function of the court, there would, in our
opinion, have been no error if the court had really given a
peremptory instruction to the jury to find for the defendant.
However, the record discloses that the court permitted the cases
to go to the jury. It is true that the remarks made by the judge
must have indicated to the jury that his own view was against the
plaintiff's right to recover, but it has often been held by this
Court that it is not a reversible error in the judge to express his
own opinion of the facts if the rules of law are correctly laid
down and if the jury are given to understand that they are not
bound by such opinion.
Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Fifth
Baptist Church, 137 U. S. 568;
Simmons v. United States, 142 U.
S. 148.
It is not necessary for us to review in detail the criticisms
made in the several instructions, for, as we have seen, even if
such instructions had amounted in a legal effect to a direction to
find for the defendant, no error would have been committed.
It is obvious that these views of the case of Marcella Doyle,
claiming for her personal injuries, are equally applicable to her
suit under the statute, for the loss of her children. The
Page 147 U.S. 431
latter must be regarded as having entered under their mother's
title, and not by reason of any invitation, express or implied,
from the railway company, and hence they assumed a like risk, and
are entitled to no other legal measure of redress.
No error being disclosed by these records, the judgment of the
court below is in each case
Affirmed.