An agreement in a court of common law, chancery, or prize made
under a clear mistake will be set aside.
If an agreement be made to confess a judgment or a judgment be
actually confessed, a court of law will set it aside, and if the
judgment be no longer in the power of a court of law, relief may be
obtained in chancery.
So also an agreement entered into in a suit originally depending
in a court of chancery will be relaxed or set aside if it be proved
to the court to have been entered into under a mistake.
This was a vessel laden with flour and bound from Baltimore to
Lisbon, captured, and finally condemned by this Court at February
term, 1814, for sailing under a license from the enemy. The present
case was that of the claimants of a greater part of the cargo. The
ship was owned
Page 14 U. S. 441
and the license procured, by Samuel G. Griffith, a citizen of
the United States. Separate bills of lading were at first signed by
the master, one for each shipper, and separate letters of
instruction were given to Patterson Hartshorne, the supercargo. But
in the expectation, as was alleged, that in case of detention, the
delay and expense would be less considerable if the cargo appeared
to be the property of one individual than if there should be
several small claims, one general bill of lading was signed to the
owner of the ship and one general letter of instruction was given
in his name to the supercargo, so as to make the whole cargo appear
to be owned by Mr. Griffith, the owner of the ship and of a small
part of the cargo. At the May term, 1814, of the circuit court, the
property of the claimants was condemned by that court upon the
ground that their counsel had, at the preceding term, entered into
an agreement with the captors that the decision of the Supreme
Court as to Griffith's claim should conclude the rest. Of this
agreement the circuit judge had made a memorandum in his minute
book, but it was not entered on the records of the court until the
May term, at which condemnation was pronounced, when it was
admitted by the claimants' counsel to have been made, and was
recorded. From this last sentence of condemnation an appeal was
taken to this Court.
Page 14 U. S. 444
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
When the claimants in this case applied to the circuit court to
be let in to further proof for the purpose of showing their
ignorance of the fact that the
Hiram sailed under the
protection of a British license, the judge of that court considered
the agreement of the parties that these causes should depend on the
fate of Griffith's claim, under which agreement the sentence that
would otherwise have been pronounced against them was suspended
until the decision of the Supreme Court on that claim should be
made, as having the same validity as if that agreement had been
entered, at the time, on the records of the court. In that opinion,
there having been no doubt respecting the fact, this Court concurs.
But this Court is also of opinion that if the agreement was made
under a clear mistake, the claimants ought to be relieved from it,
where it could be done without injury to the opposite party. If a
judgment be confessed
Page 14 U. S. 445
under a clear mistake, a court of law will set that judgment
aside if application be made and the mistake shown while the
judgment is in its power. An agreement, made a rule of court, to
confess a judgment cannot be stronger than a confession itself, and
of course a party will not be compelled to execute such an
agreement, but will be allowed to show cause against the rule in a
case where it was plainly entered into under a mistake. If the
judgment be no longer in the power of a court of law, relief may be
obtained in chancery. Still more certainly will an agreement,
entered into in a suit originally depending in a court of chancery,
be relaxed or set aside if it be proved to the court to have been
entered into under a mistake. The case cited from Peere Williams is
directly in point.
These principles are of universal justice and of universal
obligation. They cannot apply with less force to causes depending
in prize courts than to causes depending in other courts. The
propriety, then, of rejecting further proof in this case and of
condemning the property claimed by the appellants will pend on the
clearness with which they show the mistake under which the
agreement was made and on their ability to support their case if
that agreement be set aside. If a real and substantial difference
exists between the case of the present claimants and that formerly
decided by this Court, there will not be much difficulty in
yielding to the suggestion, supported as it is by the proof now
offered, that this agreement was made without knowledge of that
difference, and consequently by mistake.
Page 14 U. S. 446
But the question then occurs whether restitution ought to be
decreed to them if the obligation of the agreement be removed.
The claimants allege that in point of fact they did not know
that the
Hiram sailed under a British license, and the
proof they offer goes far in supporting this allegation. It is
admitted that ignorance of this fact will save from the forfeiture
incurred by it unless the claimants have such constructive notice
as will preclude them from showing the want of actual notice. It
has been argued that the transaction rendered Griffith the agent of
the other shippers, so as to infect their claims with his
knowledge; that by consenting that their property should be shipped
in his name, it becomes liable to all the risks to which it would
have been exposed had it been actually his. It has been also argued
that the supercargo is clearly the agent of the shippers, and that
his knowledge of the license being on board is, constructively,
their knowledge. The counsel for the claimants endeavors to rescue
his clients from the effect of this constructive notice by
contending that the principle of
respondeat superior can
never apply to a case of a criminal nature, that a license works a
forfeiture, because it is a breach of allegiance -- an offense
which cannot be imputed to a person having no knowledge of the
criminal act which constitutes the breach of allegiance, and that
this principle has, in prize courts, been applied to cases
punishable under the law of nations, not to offenses against the
government of the captor and captured.
Page 14 U. S. 447
The Court considers the sailing under an enemy's license as
closely connected in principle with the offense of trading with the
enemy, in which case it is believed to be incontrovertible that the
knowledge of the agent would affect the principal, although he
might in reality be ignorant of the fact.
* Upon this ground,
the sentence of the circuit court is affirmed with costs.
Sentence affirmed.
* Thus, where a shipment was made to the enemy by the partners
of a house of trade resident in a neutral country, without the
knowledge or consent of a co-partner resident in the belligerent
state, his share was held liable to confiscation. 6 Rob. 129,
The Franklin. And it appears from that case that even an
inactive or sleeping partner (as it is termed) has been held, by
the Lords of Appeal incapable of receiving restitution in a
transaction in which he could not lawfully be engaged as a sole
trader.
Id., 131.
