Lovell v. Cragin, 136 U.S. 130 (1890)
U.S. Supreme CourtLovell v. Cragin, 136 U.S. 130 (1890)
Lovell v. Cragin
Argued March 12-13, 1890
Decided May 19, 1890
136 U.S. 130
When the matter set up in a cross-bill is directly responsive to the averments in the bill and is directly connected with the transactions which are set up in the bill as the gravamen of the plaintiff's case, the amount claimed in the cross-bill may be taken into consideration in determining the jurisdiction of this Court on appeal from a decree on the bill.
In Louisiana, the holder of one or more of a series of notes secured by a concurrent mortgage of real estate is entitled to a pro rata share in the net proceeds arising from a sale of the mortgaged property at the suit of a holder of any of the other notes, and an hypothecary action lies to enforce such claim, based upon the obligation which the law casts upon the purchaser to pay the pro rata share of the debt represented by the notes that were not the subject of the foreclosure suit.
Such obligation, cast by law upon the purchaser, partakes of the nature of a judicial mortgage, and, in order to be effective as to third persons -- i.e., persons who are not parties to the act or the judgment on which the mortgage is founded -- it must be inscribed with the recorder of mortgages, and no lien arises until it is so registered.
Under the laws of Louisiana, a claim for damages arising from alleged wrongful acts of a party with respect to removing personal property from a plantation while he had possession of it, and for waste committed by him about the same time, are quasi-offenses, and are prescribed in one year.
It appearing that the subject of the controversy in this case is identical with that which was before the court in an action at law at October term, 1883, in Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U. S. 19I, and that the parties are the same, and that the Court then held that "the petition shows no privity between the plaintiff and Cragin," and "alleges no promise or contract by Cragin to or with the plaintiff," held that while the plea of res judicata is not strictly applicable, the court should make the same disposition of the controversy which was made then.
In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.