Pieces of ivory for the keys of pianos and organs, matched to
certain octaves, sold to manufacturers, who scrape them to make
them adhere to wood, and then glue them to wood, were charged with
duty as manufactures of ivory, under Schedule M of section 2504 of
the Revised Statutes of 1874, 2d ed. p. 474, and under Schedule N
of section 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by the Act of
March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 511. The importer claimed that they were
liable to a less duty as musical instruments under Schedule M of
section 2004 of the Revised Statutes of 1874,2d ed. p. 478, and
under Schedule N of section 2502 of the Revised Statutes as enacted
by said Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 513. In a suit by him
against the collector to recover the alleged excess of duty paid,
the court charged the jury that if the articles were made on
purpose to be used in pianos and organs and were used exclusively
in them, they were dutiable as musical instruments and not as
manufactures of ivory.
Held that this was error, and that
the articles, as imported, were manufactures of ivory.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 132 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought in the Superior Court of the City of
New York and removed by certiorari by the defendant into the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New
York by Otto Gerdan against William H. Robertson, collector of
customs of the port to New York, to recover duties paid under
protest on certain ivory pieces for the keys of pianos or organs,
imported into the port of New York and entered there, some of them
in September and October, 1882, and the rest of them in January,
October, and November, 1884. Upon those imported in 1882 the
collector assessed a duty of 35 percent
ad valorem, under
the provision of Schedule M of section 2504 of the Revised
Statutes, 2d ed., p. 474, enacted June 22, 1874, which imposes that
rate of duty on "manufactures of bones, horn, ivory, or vegetable
ivory." On the articles imported in 1884 the collector or assessed
a duty of 30 percent
ad valorem under that provision of
Schedule N of section 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by
the Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 511, which imposes that rate of
duty on "bone, horn, ivory, or vegetable ivory, all manufactures
of, not especially enumerated or provided for in this act."
The importer claimed in his protest that the goods imported in
1882 were subject to a duty of 30 percent
ad valorem under
that provision of Schedule M of section 2504 of the Revised
Statutes of 1878, 2d ed., p. 478, which imposes that rate of duty
on "musical instruments of all kinds," and that the goods imported
in 1884 were liable to a duty of 25 percent
ad valorem
under that provision of Schedule N of section 2502 of the Revised
Statutes, as enacted by the said Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat.
513, which imposes that rate of duty on "musical instruments of all
kinds."
On appeal, the decision of the collector was affirmed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, and suit was brought in due time.
The plaintiff had a verdict at the trial, and judgment was
entered for him for $345.50, to review which the defendant has
brought a writ of error. The bill of exceptions states as
follows:
"Plaintiff called
Page 132 U. S. 456
as his only witness George W. Clark, who, being duly sworn,
testified that he was in the employ of plaintiff; that he
identified the samples produced as similar to the articles which
were imported; that they are pieces for the keys of pianos or
organs; that they come in packages and are matched to certain
octaves for certain instruments, to-wit, organs and pianos, five
octaves for organs and seven octaves for pianos, and are glued on
the keys; that they are sawed and cut in a particular shape for
that purpose, and are tapered in thickness so that the end meets
and the shaft comes in between."
"Q. They are used for no other purpose than for pianos and organ
keys?"
"A. That is it, sir."
On cross-examination, this witness testified that he had never
put them on pianos or organs; that there are different grades, and
two sizes, of the articles in question.
"Q. Do you know how they are put on the piano?"
"A. We don't do that. We sell to the piano makers and keyboard
makers. I have seen it done. They scrape them to make them hold to
the wood; then they are put on the key-board, and then sawed out
and stuck on in that way, on a large board, and then sawed out, and
this, the ivory piece, is then glued on top of it, and then it is
polished."
"Q. Are the corners rounded off?"
"A. We don't do that. We sell to the makers."
"Q. As a matter of fact, don't you know that the outside corners
are rounded off?"
"A. I have seen it so, yes, sir, on the pianos. We are not piano
makers. We sell to the piano and keyboard makers."
No other evidence was offered on either side.
The defendant asked the court to direct a verdict in his favor
because (1) the imported article was not a musical instrument; and,
(2) it was not a completed indispensable part of a musical
instrument. This motion was denied, and the defendant excepted. The
defendant then asked the court to charge the jury that, in order to
find for the plaintiff, they must find that the imported articles
were completed indispensable parts of a musical instrument. But the
court charged that if the articles were used exclusively for pianos
and organs, the jury should return a verdict for the plaintiff, if
not, for the defendant, to which instruction the defendant
excepted. The court also charged that if the articles were made on
purpose
Page 132 U. S. 457
for pianos and organs as musical instruments and no other
purpose, the jury might return a verdict for the plaintiff. To this
instruction the defendant excepted.
We think there was error in the charge of the court. The
substance of the charge was that if the articles were made on
purpose to be used in pianos and organs and were used exclusively
in pianos and organs, they were dutiable as musical instruments,
and not as manufactures of ivory. That the articles were in
themselves musical instruments cannot be gravely contended. They
were ivory pieces for the keys of pianos or organs. As imported,
they were simply pieces of ivory which had undergone a process of
manufacture, were of a shape and size to be used for certain
octaves of pianos and organs, and were sold to piano makers and
keyboard makers. Those persons scraped the lower surface of the
ivory to make it adhere to a piece of wood to which it was
afterwards glued. In the shape in which the articles were imported,
they were clearly manufactures of ivory.
Neither of the statutes in question imposes on parts of musical
instruments the same rate of duty which it imposes on musical
instruments. By Schedule E of section 11 of the Act of July 30,
1846, 9 Stat. 47, a duty of 20 percent
ad valorem was
imposed on "musical instruments of all kinds, and strings for
musical instruments of whip-gut or cat-gut, and all other strings
of the same material," and by the same act (p. 45), a duty of 30
percent
ad valorem was imposed on "manufactures of bone,
shell, horn, pearl, ivory, or vegetable ivory." By section 20 of
the Act of March 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 190, a duty of 20 percent
ad
valorem was imposed on "musical instruments of all kinds, and
strings for musical instruments of whip-gut, or cat-gut, and all
other strings of the same material," and by section 22 of the same
act (p. 192), a duty of 30 percent
ad valorem was imposed
on "manufactures of bone, shell, horn, ivory, or vegetable ivory."
By section 6 of the Act of July 14, 1862, 12 Stat. 550, a duty of
10 percent
ad valorem, in addition to then existing
duties, was imposed on "musical instruments of all kinds, and
Page 132 U. S. 458
strings for musical instruments of whip-gut or cat-gut, and all
other strings of the same material," and by section 13 of the same
act (p. 557), a duty of 5 percent
ad valorem, in addition
to then existing duties, was imposed on "manufactures of bone,
shell, horn, ivory, or vegetable ivory."
By Schedule M of section 2504 of the Revised Statutes of 1878,
2d ed., p. 481, a duty of 30 percent
ad valorem was
imposed on "strings; all strings of whip-gut or cat-gut, other than
strings for musical instruments," and by section 2505 of said
Revised Statutes, 2d ed., p. 484, "cat-gut strings, or gut-cord,
for musical instruments" were made free of duty.
By section 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by the Act
of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 514, a duty of 25 percent
ad
valorem was imposed on "strings; all strings of cat-gut, or
any other like material, other than strings for musical
instruments," and by section 2503 of the same enactment, 22 Stat.
518, "cat-gut strings, or gut-cord, for musical instruments" were
made free of duty.
It is thus seen that by the act of 1846, by the act of 1861, and
by the act of 1862, provision was made for imposing a duty on parts
of stringed musical instruments by laying a duty on "strings for
musical instruments of whip-gut or cat-gut," leaving other parts of
musical instruments, imported in parts, to be dutiable under other
provisions of law. So in the Revised Statutes of 1878, and as
enacted in 1883, while there is no specific duty on parts of
musical instruments as such parts, "cat-gut strings or gut-cord,
for musical instruments" are made free of duty, leaving other parts
of musical instruments to be dutiable under other provisions than
that applicable to "musical instruments of all kinds."
This view of the legislation of Congress is fortified by the
fact that in the Revised Statutes of 1878 and in the same as
enacted in 1883, a duty is imposed on carriages and parts of
carriages; on chronometers and parts of chronometers; on clocks and
parts of clocks, and on watches and parts of watches. If Congress
had intended in either enactment of the Revised Statutes to impose
the same duty on parts of musical instruments which it imposed on
musical instruments, it
Page 132 U. S. 459
would have been easy to impose that duty on "musical instrument
of all kinds, and parts of the same."
It is very clear to us that the fact that the articles in
question were to be used exclusively for a musical instrument, and
were made on purpose for such an instrument, does not make them
dutiable as musical instruments.
The contention of the plaintiff is thought to be supported by
the fact that, in the case of
Foote v. Arthur, tried in
the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York early in
the year 1880 and unreported, it was held that a completed violin
bow was a musical instrument, and subject to duty as such under the
statute, and by the fact that the Treasury Department acquiesced in
that decision under the advice of the Attorney General of the
United States. It is sufficient to say that the pieces of ivory in
question were not violin bows and that, whatever the true view may
be as to violin bows, the same considerations applicable to them do
not apply to the articles in question here.
Attention is called by the plaintiff to the fact that the
provision in the Revised Statutes, as enacted in 1883, in regard to
manufactures of ivory imposes the duty of 30 percent
ad
valorem on all manufactures of ivory "not specially enumerated
or provided for in this act." But those words have no bearing on
the present case, because the pieces of ivory in question are not
specially enumerated or provided for in the act of 1883.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the
circuit court, with a direction to grant a new trial.