B executed and delivered to C his bond in 1855 or 1856 to convey
to him a tract of land for a consideration named. C entered into
possession, borrowed money of R., paid the consideration money in
full, and made valuable improvements on the place. At C's request,
the conveyance was made to R, in 1858, to secure him. Four years
later, R, having in the meanwhile been paid in full by C, conveyed
the property to a woman without consideration and then married her.
After some time, the married couple separated. The wife then
brought ejectment to recover possession from C (who during the
whole time had remained in possession), and obtained a verdict and
judgment on the verdict for possession. Thereupon C took a new
trial as of right under the laws of Illinois, and in 1883 filed his
bill in equity against the wife to compel a conveyance of the land
to him.
Held:
(1) That C's remedy was in equity.
(2) That he had not been guilty of such laches as would close
the doors of a court of equity against him.
(3) That the evidence in the record was sufficient to support a
decree in complainant's favor.
Laches cannot be imputed to one in the peaceable possession of
land under an equitable title for delay in resorting to a court of
equity for protection against the legal title, since possession is
notice of his equitable rights and he need assert them only when he
finds occasion to do so.
A grantee in a deed is not affected by declarations of a
grantor, made after the execution and delivery of the deed, unless,
with full knowledge of them, he acquiesces in or sanctions
them.
In equity. Decree for complainant. Respondent appealed. The case
is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the court.
About the year 1855 or 1856, W. D. Bowers executed to the
appellee, Cory, his bond in writing for the conveyance of
Page 129 U. S. 388
certain lands in Mason County, Illinois, the consideration being
the sum of one thousand dollars, payable in two equal installments
on the first day of October, 1857, and 1858, with ten percent
interest from the date of sale. Cory went into possession under the
purchase on or about May 1, 1856, during which year he prepared and
sowed in wheat about seventy-five acres. In 1857, he erected a
house on the premises, and before the wheat crop of that year was
cut, he moved into it with his family. During the next year he
prepared for cultivation forty additional acres. He has cultivated,
more or less, these lands ever since he first took possession of
them. All the improvements thereon, including the fencing, as well
as the taxes (except those for the year 1880), were regularly paid
by him. On the first day of October, 1858, Bowers and wife conveyed
the lands to Elisha Ruckman, of New Jersey, who was a first cousin
of Cory and a man of large means. This was the first time Bowers
had heard of Ruckman. Until the delivery of the above deed, he knew
of no one except Cory in the transaction for the sale of the
lands.
On the 24th of April, 1862, Ruckman, by deed executed in New
Jersey, conveyed the lands to Margaret Hopping, a single woman, to
whom at a subsequent date, January 25, 1864, he was married.
Sometime after their marriage, but at what time does not appear,
Ruckman and his wife separated, and they were living apart when she
brought in the court below an action of ejectment against Cory for
the recovery of the lands. In that action -- the date of the
commencement of which is not shown by the record -- she obtained a
verdict and judgment, but Cory elected to take, and did take, as of
right, a new trial, as provided for in the statutes of Illinois.
Rev.Stat.Ill. c. 45. Thereupon he instituted the present suit
against Mrs. Ruckman (her husband having died) for the purpose of
obtaining a decree requiring her to convey to him by sufficient
deed, all her right, title, and interest in these lands. The claim
for such relief is rested by the plaintiff upon these grounds: that
the lands were purchased by him from Bowers, and paid for (except
as to a small part of the price
Page 129 U. S. 389
stipulated) with money borrowed for that purpose from Ruckman;
that without the knowledge or request of Ruckman, and solely for
the purpose of securing him in the payment of the amount so loaned,
he caused Bowers to make the conveyance directly to Ruckman; that
although such conveyance was absolute in form, it was intended to
be, and was only to operate as, a security for the debt due from
him to Ruckman; that the latter, without his knowledge or consent
and without a good or valuable consideration to sustain it, made
the deed of 1862 to Margaret Hopping; that only recently -- namely,
by said action of ejectment -- did she assert any title under the
deed to her; that his debt to Ruckman on account of the borrowed
money has long since been discharged in full, and that nevertheless
the defendant refused to convey to him and was inequitably
prosecuting her action of ejectment for possession. The court below
gave the plaintiff the relief asked by him.
1. The contention that the plaintiff has a plain, adequate, and
complete remedy at law cannot be sustained. It is not certain that
he can successfully defend the action of ejectment. Besides, only a
court of equity can compel the surrender of the legal title held by
the defendant and invest the plaintiff with it.
2. Nor has the plaintiff been guilty of any such laches as would
close the doors of a court of equity against him. He was in the
peaceful occupancy of the premises for some years prior to any
assertion of title upon the part of the defendant under the deed of
1872. If he had not been all the time in the possession of the
premises, controlling them as if he were the absolute owner, the
question of laches might be a more serious one for him than it is.
The bringing of the action of ejectment was, so far as the record
shows, the first notice he had of the necessity of legal
proceedings for his protection against the legal title held by the
defendant. As proceedings to that end were not unreasonably
delayed, we do not perceive that laches can be imputed to him.
Laches are rather to be imputed to the defendant, who, although
claiming to have been the absolute owner of the lands since 1862,
took no action
Page 129 U. S. 390
against the plaintiff until the ejectment suit was instituted.
Mills v. Lockwood, 42 Ill. 111, 118. "Laches," the Supreme
Court of Illinois has well said,
"cannot be imputed to one in the peaceable possession of land
for delay in resorting to a court of equity to correct a mistake in
the description of the premises in one of the conveyances through
which the title must be deduced. The possession is notice to all of
the possessor's equitable rights, and he needs to assert them only
when he may find occasion to do so."
Wilson v. Byers, 77 Ill. 76, 84.
See also Barbour
v. Whitlock, 4 T.B.Mon. 180, 195;
May's Heirs v.
Fenton, 7 J. J. Marsh, 306, 309.
3. Reference is made to the depositions of several witnesses,
including the plaintiff, who testified in his own behalf, in which
are detailed statements made by Ruckman at different times after
1862, in reference to the title to these lands. This evidence, it
is contended, and properly so, was incompetent under the well
established rule that
"a grantee in a deed is not affected with the declarations of
the grantor made after the execution and delivery of the deed
unless, with full knowledge of such declarations, he acquiesces in
or sanctions them."
Higgins v. White, 118 Ill. 619, 624;
Steinbach
v. Stewart, 11 Wall. 566,
78 U. S. 581;
Winchester & Partridge Mfg. Co. v. Creary,
116 U. S. 161. But
the question remains whether the decree cannot be sustained by such
evidence in the record as is competent and relevant. We think it
can. At any rate, after a careful sifting of the proof, and giving
due weight to all the facts and circumstances that may properly be
considered, we do not see our way clear to disturb the decree.
There are no other questions in the case that we deem it
necessary to notice.
The decree is affirmed.