1. A decree of the district court of the United States
confirming a claim to land under a Mexican grant in California
contained a proviso that the confirmation to the claimant should be
without prejudice to the rights of the legal representatives of the
original grantee, or whoever might be entitled to the land under
him, and should enure to the benefit of any person or persons who
might own or be entitled to the land by any title, either at law or
in equity, derived from the original grantee by deed, devise,
descent, or otherwise. On appeal to the supreme court, the decree,
so far as it confirmed the original grant, was affirmed.
Held that this language of the supreme court did not annul
the proviso to the decree, but left it in full force, and that the
decree accordingly gave to parties holding under the original
grantee or the confirmee the same benefits which it gave to them in
the perfection of their title.
2. In August, 1846, the confirmee, V., executed an instrument
and delivered it to one H. wherein he uses these words, after
certifying that he had purchased the tract of land designated of
the original grantee: "I grant and transfer all the right which I
have in the land mentioned to H., who shall make such use thereof
as may be most convenient to him."
Held that the
instrument, construed by the Mexican law, in force in
California
Page 78 U. S. 567
at the time of its execution, was a conveyance of all V.'s
title, and not a mere license to H. to occupy the land.
3. In a deed of land from H. to D., the premises were described
as
"one mile square of land, English measure, containing six
hundred and forty acres, situated, lying and being in the district
of Sonoma and being part and parcel of all that certain tract of
land called Agua Caliente, formerly taken up by Lazaro Pefa, by a
grant from the government."
When this deed was offered in evidence, it was shown that the
grantee, D., at the time of his purchase from his grantor, H., took
possession of the tract thus conveyed and occupied it, and that all
the subsequent grantees under him, of whom there were several, at
the date of their respective conveyances took possession of the
same tract and remained in the open and notorious possession of the
same until they parted with their respective interests.
Held that the deed, accompanied by this evidence of
identification and occupation of the land, was properly
admitted.
4. The statements of a grantor of land, made after he has
conveyed the land to others, are inadmissible to invalidate his
deed.
This was an action of ejectment for a tract of land situated in
the State of California. Issues having been joined, the case was
called on for trial before a jury, and evidence was introduced by
the respective parties. After all the evidence on both sides was
concluded, the attorneys of the parties who had appeared in the
action stipulated that the jury should be discharged, and that the
issues be tried and determined by the court. The jury were
accordingly discharged, and the facts established were
substantially as follows: on the 14th day of October, 1839, one
Lazaro Pena presented a petition to the Commandant General of the
Department of California for a grant of land situated in the
present County of Sonoma, in that state, known by the name of Agua
Caliente, of which land Pena had been years previously in the
possession; and the commandant gave to him a provisional concession
of the land until he should petition the government for the proper
title. Afterwards, on the 13th day of October, 1840, Pena obtained
a grant of the land from Alvarado, then Governor of the Department
of California, and on the 8th day of October, 1845, this grant was
approved by the departmental assembly. Pending the
Page 78 U. S. 568
proceedings to obtain the grant the petitioner, Pena sold and
conveyed all his interest in the land to one M. G. Vallejo.
Subsequently, March 2, 1853, Vallejo presented a petition to the
board of land commissioners, created under the act of March 3,
1851, for a confirmation of his claim under the grant. By the board
his claim was rejected, but afterwards, on appeal, the District
Court of the United States for the Northern District of California
confirmed his claim. The decree of confirmation was entered on the
13th July, 1859, and was accompanied by the following proviso:
"Provided that this confirmation of the above land to the said
M. G. Vallejo shall be without prejudice to the rights of the legal
representatives of Lazaro Pena, the original grantee, or whoever
may be entitled to said lands under him, and said confirmation to
said Vallejo shall enure to the benefit of any person or persons
who may own or be entitled to said land by any title, either at law
or in equity, derived from the original grantee by deed, devise,
descent, or otherwise."
Afterwards, on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
this decree was affirmed
insofar as it confirmed the original
grant. The tract thus confirmed embraced the premises in
controversy.
On the 17th of January, 1863, Vallejo, for the consideration of
$3,000, sold and conveyed his interest in the entire tract to the
plaintiff Steinbach, and the deed was duly recorded under the laws
of California in the recorder's office of the county. On the 5th of
February, 1864, Vallejo executed for the like consideration a
second deed of the same premises, which was also duly recorded in
the same office.
Four of the defendants -- namely, G. W. Whitman, Martha C.
Watriss, C. V. Stewart, and J. B. Warfield, claimed each a portion
of these premises under Vallejo, through an instrument executed by
him to one Andres Hoeppener, on the 12th of August, 1846. The
original was in Spanish, and was endorsed on the espediente of
Pena. The following is a correct translation of the document:
"The undersigned certifies that he legitimately and formally
Page 78 U. S. 569
purchased from the citizen Lazaro Pena the tract of land of the
'Agua Caliente,' to which the preceding approval of the
departmental assembly of Alta California has reference. I grant and
transfer all the right which I have in the land mentioned to Don
Andres Hoeppener, who shall make such use thereof as may be most
convenient to him. And for the necessary purposes and uses I give
this at Sonoma, this 12th day of August, 1846."
"M. G. VALLEJO"
"Witness:"
"A. A. HENDERSON"
"J. P. LEESE"
It was at the time admitted that Pena had previously executed a
deed of the tract to Vallejo bearing date December 4, 1839, and
that at the time the deed from Vallejo to Hoeppener was executed,
Hoeppener received full possession of the premises from Vallejo,
and continued thereafter in the possession until the land was sold
by him.
The counsel for plaintiff objected to the reception of this
document in evidence on the ground that the same did not convey any
estate from Vallejo to Hoeppener, but was a mere license to occupy
which terminated and was extinguished when Hoeppener asserted title
to or attempted to convey the lands, which objection was overruled
by the court and the evidence admitted, to which ruling an
exception was duly taken.
The counsel for the defendants then, on the part of the
defendant Whitman, offered in evidence a deed from Hoeppener to
Carlos Glein dated December 1, 1847, together with various mesne
conveyances by which the title acquired by said Glein had passed to
and vested in said Whitman. In the deed from Hoeppener to Glein,
the land intended to be conveyed is described as follows:
"All that certain tract and parcel of land containing three
hundred acres, more or less, being a portion of the rancho named
Agua Caliente, as transferred to the said Andres Hoeppener by M. G.
Vallejo; the said three hundred acres being more particularly
bounded and described as follows, to-wit: on the west side by
Sonoma Creek, on the east side by the Napa
Page 78 U. S. 570
Hills, on the north by Yeltan's farm, and on the south by the
land of Ernest Rufus."
The defendants' counsel then proved on the part of the defendant
Whitman that Glein, at the time of his purchase from Hoeppener,
took possession of the tract thus conveyed (and which is the same
tract held and possessed by Whitman), and that said Glein, together
with all his successive grantees, including Whitman, at the date of
their respective conveyances, paid a valuable consideration
therefor and took possession of the tract and remained in the open
and notorious possession of the same until they parted with their
interests therein, but that Whitman had never parted with his
interest therein, and that, at the date of the conveyance from
Vallejo to Steinbach of his interest in the Agua Caliente rancho,
he (Whitman) was in the open and notorious possession of the tract,
claiming to own the same.
The plaintiff's counsel objected to the admission of this deed
in evidence because it did not import to convey the title to any
particular tract of land, that it created no legal estate, and was
therefore incompetent evidence to prove any issue made in this
action, and was irrelevant and immaterial.
The court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence, to
which ruling of the court exception was duly taken.
The counsel for the defendants then, on behalf of the defendant
Watriss, offered a deed from Hoeppener to J. J. Dopken dated
November 14, 1846, together with various mesne conveyances by which
the title acquired by the said Dopken had passed to and vested in
the said Watriss. In the deed from Hoeppener to Dopken, the land
intended to be conveyed is described as follows:
"One mile square of land, English measure, containing 640 acres,
situated, lying, and being in the district of Sonoma, and being
part and parcel of all that certain tract of land called Agua
Caliente, formerly taken up by Lazaro Pena by a grant from the
government and lately purchased from the said Lazaro Pena by M. G.
Vallejo, and granted by the said M. G. Vallejo
Page 78 U. S. 571
unto the aforesaid Andrew Hoeppener, together with all and
singular the advantages, profits, privileges, and appurtenances
whatsoever, right, title, and interest of the said Hoeppener, of,
in, and to the same, belonging or in any way pertaining."
The defendants' counsel then proved on the part of the defendant
Martha C. Watriss that Dopken, at the time of his purchase from
Hoeppener, took possession of the tract thus conveyed (and which is
the same tract held and possessed by the said Martha and described
in her answer) and that Dopken, together with all his successive
grantees, including the said Martha, at the date of their
respective conveyances, took possession of said tract and remained
in the open and notorious possession of the same until they parted
with their interests therein, but that Martha had never parted with
her interest therein, and that at the date of the conveyances from
M. G. Vallejo to Steinbach of his interest in the Agua Caliente
rancho, the said Martha was in the open and notorious possession of
the tract, claiming to own the same.
To the admission of which deed the counsel for the plaintiff
objected that the said deed, by reason of the indefiniteness of the
said description, was insufficient to convey title or to create any
legal estate, and that it was therefore irrelevant, immaterial, and
inadmissible; which objection the court overruled and admitted the
deed in evidence,
in connection with the testimony as to the
occupation of the particular premises, to which ruling an
exception was duly taken.
After the defendants had closed their testimony, the plaintiff's
counsel offered to prove, by statements made by Hoeppener in 1848,
that Hoeppener and Vallejo agreed that Hoeppener should teach
Vallejo's family music, for which Vallejo was to convey him the
rancho; that in the meanwhile, Hoeppener was to occupy it; that
neither Hoeppener nor Vallejo intended or considered the said
instrument as a conveyance, or more than a license to occupy; that
Hoeppener did not perform his agreement, but, after part
performance, abandoned it, and admitted that he had no claim to the
land. All which took place in the year 1847-1848.
Page 78 U. S. 572
The court refused to receive any testimony as to statements of
Hoeppener subsequent to the date of his conveyances to others and
excluded the testimony, to which ruling of the court an exception
was duly taken.
The plaintiff also proved that he paid to Vallejo for the two
deeds received from him, as above mentioned, a valuable
consideration at the time, and that he made the purchase of the
land and received the deeds without knowledge or notice actual or
constructive of any other conveyances of the premises or of any
interest therein by Vallejo except as given by the actual, open,
and notorious possession and occupation of the defendants, G. W.
Whitman, Martha C. Watriss, J. B. Warfield, and C. V. Stewart, as
above stated.
He also proved that, previous to the year 1857, Hoeppener, above
mentioned, died intestate and without issue, leaving a widow, Anna
Hoeppener, who was his sole heir; that on the 17th of May, 1858,
the said Anna, by a deed executed and delivered, for a valuable
consideration sold and conveyed to J. L. Green the tract of land
known as Agua Caliente, and which deed was recorded on the 10th of
July, 1863, in the proper recorder's office; and that Green, on the
2d day of January, 1864, by a deed duly executed and delivered, for
a valuable consideration sold and conveyed the same property to the
plaintiff, and that the deed was also properly recorded on the 22d
day of October, 1864.
The court gave judgment in favor of the four defendants above
named for the land which they severally had purchased and occupied
and in favor of the plaintiff against all the other defendants
except those against whom the action had been dismissed. From this
judgment the case was brought here on writ of error sued out by the
plaintiff.
MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The record exhibits five assignments of error, all founded upon
exceptions taken in the court below to the admission
Page 78 U. S. 573
or rejection of evidence. Of these the first is, in substance,
that the court permitted the defendants to give in evidence what it
is contended constituted, at most, only an equitable right, and
what was therefore no defense against the legal title asserted by
the plaintiff. The exception cannot be understood without a brief
examination of the titles under which each of the parties claimed
the lands in controversy.
The title of the plaintiff had its origin in a provisional
concession made by the Mexican government to Lazaro Pena on the
14th day of October, 1839. Pena was then in possession of the land,
and the concession was made to him with the reservation that he
should petition for the usual title from the political government.
On the 13th day of October, 1840, he obtained a grant in the usual
form from Don Juan B. Alvarado, then Governor of the Department of
California, for the land then known by the name of "Agua Caliente,"
embracing the land now in dispute, and on the 8th of October, 1845,
the grant was approved by the departmental assembly. Before it was
made, however, though after the provisional concession, Pena
conveyed all his interest in the land to Mariano G. Vallejo. In
1853, Vallejo instituted proceedings under the Act of Congress of
March 3, 1851, for a confirmation of the land to him, and it was
confirmed by the district court in 1859. The decree of confirmation
contained the following proviso:
"Provided that this confirmation of the above land to the said
M. G. Vallejo shall be without prejudice to the rights of the legal
representatives of Lazaro Pena, the original grantee, or whoever
may be entitled to said lands under him, and said confirmation to
said Vallejo shall enure to the benefit of any person or persons
who may own or be entitled to the said land by any title, either at
law or in equity, derived from the original grantee by deed,
devise, descent, or otherwise."
The record of the confirmation was subsequently brought into
this Court by appeal, and here it was adjudged that the decree of
the district court, insofar as it confirmed the original grant, be
affirmed. It was under this decree of confirmation that the
plaintiff claimed, both through
Page 78 U. S. 574
a deed of Anna Hoeppener, sole heir of Andres Hoeppener, an
alleged grantee of Vallejo, dated December 21, 1858, and secondly,
by a deed dated January 17, 1863, from Vallejo himself.
The defendants asserted ownership of the parcels of the rancho
"Agua Caliente," now in controversy, under an alleged grant made by
Vallejo to Andres Hoeppener, dated August 12, 1846, about ten
months after the grant to Pena had been approved by the
departmental assembly.
It thus appears that both parties claimed under Pena and
Vallejo, and a brief examination will show that the nature of their
titles was the same. If that of the plaintiff was a legal estate
(which it is not necessary to this case to decide), that of the
defendants was equally so. That the right of Vallejo on the 12th of
August, 1846, when he conveyed the property to Hoeppener, was not
perfect must be conceded. His claim had not been confirmed, and he
had no patent. He had nothing but the Mexican espediente. Of
course, the right which he conveyed was also imperfect. But when
afterwards the district court confirmed the land to him, the
confirmation enured to the benefit of his prior grantee. It was not
the acquisition of a new title, but the establishment of his
original right. And this was expressly decreed by the proviso
already quoted. By that it was adjudged that the confirmation
should enure to the benefit of any person or persons who owned or
were entitled to the land by any title in law or in equity derived
from the original grantee by deed, devise, descent, or otherwise.
If, therefore, Hoeppener or his grantees held any such title, it
was confirmed to them as truly as if he or they had been
petitioners for such confirmation. Now it is in virtue of this
decree of the district court that the plaintiff claims. He has no
standing without it. Asserting his rights through it, the law will
not permit him to repudiate any part of its provisions.
It is argued, however, that the proviso to the decree of
confirmation was annulled by the action of this Court. To this we
do not assent. The judgment upon the appeal was that the original
grant to Lazaro Pena was a good and valid
Page 78 U. S. 575
grant, and that the decree of the district court, insofar as it
confirmed the original grant, be itself affirmed. This was no
reversal of any portion of the decree of the district court. On the
contrary, it left that decree in full force to all its extent. And,
by relation, it was carried back to the inception of the title
confirmed. It is a well settled rule that where several acts concur
to make a complete conveyance, the original act is preferred, and
all others relate to it. [
Footnote
1] Mr. Cruise, in his work on Real Property, [
Footnote 2] says,
"There is no rule better founded in law, reason, and convenience
than this -- that all the several parts and ceremonies necessary to
complete a conveyance shall be taken together as one act and
operate from the substantial part by relation."
The proviso was therefore nothing more than a declaration of
what would have been the legal effect of the decree without it. If,
therefore, as is insisted by the plaintiff, the confirmation vested
in Vallejo the legal title, it at the same time vested a legal
estate in the grantees of Vallejo, or Pena, who held portions of
the land under conveyances from the confirmees.
The second exception taken in the court below is that the court
received in evidence an instrument of writing dated August 12,
1846, claimed by the defendants to be a grant of the land by
Vallejo to Andres Hoeppener, and this is the basis of the second
assignment of error. The bill of exceptions shows that the
execution of the instrument was duly proved, that it was endorsed
upon the espediente to Pena, that at the time when the deed was
made, Hoeppener received full possession of the land from Vallejo,
and that he continued thereafter in such possession until the land
was sold by him. It is argued that the deed was only a license to
occupy, and not a grant of the land; hence that it was revocable at
will, conferring a mere tenancy at will, and not a legal estate.
Certainly it is a very informal instrument, and were the rules of
the common law to be applied to it, there would be difficulty in
maintaining that it was a grant of the fee.
Page 78 U. S. 576
It is to be noted, however, that its character and effect are to
be determined by Mexican law. It was made before California had
been ceded to the United States. In inquiring what was the
intention and effect of the instrument, we are not, then, to be
guided by the rules of the common law or by the British statute of
uses. That it was more than a license to occupy is plain. Its
language is, "I grant and transfer
(cedo y transparo) all
the right which I have in the land mentioned, to Don Andres
Hoeppener, who shall make" (or have) "such use thereof as may be
convenient to him." These are not words of mere license. They
describe the subject of the grant, not as a possessory right, but
as "all the right" of the grantor "in the land." Full effect cannot
be given to all the words of the instrument unless it is held to be
a conveyance of all Vallejo's title. If the intent had been to
transmit less, why describe the subject as all right in the land?
It is argued that the words following the operative words of
transmission to Hoeppener,
viz.: "who shall make such use
thereof as may be most convenient to him," indicate that no more
than a license to occupy was intended. They do not appear to us to
warrant any such inference. They, or other words of like import,
are common in Mexican grants which have been held to be conveyances
of the entire estate of the grantors. [
Footnote 3] In the latter case the effect of such clauses
is considerably discussed. Instead of being words of limitation or
restriction, they seem rather intended to confer the largest
dominion. And in our law they have been held to enlarge into a fee,
a devise which, without them, would have been only a life
estate.
If there were any doubts respecting the deed, whether it was
intended as a grant or a license, they would be dispelled by
noticing the construction manifestly given to it by the parties.
This is an aid that may always be called in when the meaning of a
contract is ambiguous. [
Footnote
4] There was no
Page 78 U. S. 577
necessity for reducing to writing a mere license. Yet this
contract was in the form of a conveyance, reduced to writing and
endorsed upon the espediente. There was no necessity of livery of
seizin if the deed was a mere license, yet Hoeppener was actually
put into possession of the land by the grantor, and he or his
grantees retained the possession unchallenged, so far as it
appears, from August 12, 1846, until this suit was brought. Vallejo
never claimed any right until 1863, when he made a grant to the
plaintiff, not of the land, but of "all his right, title, and
interest" in it. In addition to all this, the plaintiff recognized
a possible right in Anna Hoeppener, the heir of Andres Hoeppener,
by taking a deed from her grantee, to whom she had conveyed her
"right, title, and estate" in the tract of land, in the year 1858.
These facts tend strongly to show that the parties understood
Vallejo's deed as conveying to Hoeppener absolute ownership of the
land described in it.
It is insisted, however, that even if the intent was to convey
the land, instead of mere license to occupy it, the instrument was
ineffectual, because informal. It is said that it did not contain
all the requisites of a valid Mexican grant. It is doubtful whether
this point was made in the court below. It does not distinctly
appear in the bill of exceptions that it was urged as an objection
to the admission of the deed. The objection appears rather to have
been that Hoeppener obtained by the deed a mere license, which
terminated when he asserted title to the land, or attempted to
convey it. Such was the reason stated for the objection in the bill
tendered by the plaintiff. But assuming that it is presented for
our consideration, we are of opinion the deed contains all that was
necessary to constitute an operative grant. That it was executed
and delivered, and that, in pursuance of it, Hoeppener was put into
possession by the grantor, are facts that are not controverted.
This is all that, under the civil law, is necessary to transfer
titles. Livery of seizin is the controlling fact. Admitting that
under the Mexican law a contract in writing was necessary to a
private conveyance, it is nevertheless true that the form of the
instrument was not
Page 78 U. S. 578
material. Any form would answer that manifested an intent to
convey. Here were words of grant
(cedo y transparo). The
word
cedo (I grant) is the ordinary word used in Mexican
conveyance to pass title to lands. [
Footnote 5] Though the earlier cases in California
asserted that the consideration or price of the grant must be
mentioned in the written contract, or, at least, that it must be
mentioned a price was paid, the later cases have asserted a
different doctrine. [
Footnote
6] It is quite clear that in no case could mention of a price
ever have been deemed necessary when there was no price -- when the
transaction was a gift. In such a case a writing without mention of
any consideration, coupled with livery of seizin, or delivery of
possession, would consummate the transfer. It would answer no good
purpose to review the authorities upon this subject. Suffice it to
say, that in view of the language of the instrument, of the facts
that Vallejo put Hoeppener into possession under it, and that the
grantee and his successors in the title remained in unchallenged
possession for more than seventeen years before this suit was
brought, we are constrained to hold that it amounted to a
conveyance of all right to the lands which Vallejo had.
The third assignment of error is founded upon the third
exception taken in the court below. It is in substance that the
court received in evidence a deed from Hoeppener to Carlos Glein
dated December 1, 1847. It was offered with sundry other
conveyances, by which the title conveyed to Glein became vested in
Whitman, one of the defendants in error. In the deed from
Hoeppener, thus received, the subject of the grant was described as
follows:
"All that certain tract and parcel of land, containing three
hundred acres, more or less, being a portion of the rancho named
'Agua Caliente,' as transferred to the said Andres Hoeppener by M.
G. Vallejo, the said three hundred acres being more particularly
bounded and described as follows, to-wit: on the west side by
Sonoma Creek, on the east side by the Napa Hills, on the north
by
Page 78 U. S. 579
Yeltan's farm, and on the south by land of Ernest Rufus."
In connection with the offer of this deed it was proved that
Glein, the grantee, at the time of his purchase, took possession of
the tract thus conveyed (the same now held by Whitman), and paid a
valuable consideration for it; and that all the succeeding
grantees, including Whitman, paid valuable considerations for their
grants at the times of their several purchases, and took possession
of the land, remaining in open and notorious possession while their
interests continued, Whitman still retaining his. It was also
proved that when Steinbach, the plaintiff, acquired his title to
the Agua Caliente rancho, Whitman was in the open and notorious
possession of the tract, claiming to own the same.
To the admission of this deed from Hoeppener to Glein the
plaintiff objected, for two reasons assigned at the time. The first
of these was that the deed did not import to convey the title to
any particular tract of land, and the second was that it created no
legal estate, and that it was therefore incompetent evidence for
any issue made in the action. Neither of these reasons is, in our
opinion, well founded. The first rests upon a mistake of fact. We
are unable to perceive that there was insufficient certainty in the
description of the land granted. It was identified by giving
natural boundaries for both its east and west sides, and by calls
for adjoining proprietors upon the north and the south. This was
enough. In regard to the second reason, we remark that the entire
deed is not before us. It is not found in the record, and there is
nothing, therefore, to show that it did not convey all the estate
which Hoeppener had acquired by the deed to him from Vallejo. If it
did not, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff in error to show the
fact by exhibiting to us the deed itself. We infer from the course
of the argument that the objection was intended only to reassert
that Hoeppener's title was a mere equity. The worthlessness of that
assertion has already been sufficiently considered.
The fourth exception is quite similar to the third. It is that
the court received in evidence, against the objection of the
plaintiff, a deed, dated November 14, 1846, from Andres
Page 78 U. S. 580
Hoeppener to J. J. Dopken, whose title subsequently passed to
Martha C. Watriss, another of the defendants. The deed was for six
hundred and forty acres, part of the rancho "Agua Caliente" granted
to Pena, confirmed to Vallejo, and conveyed by him, as above
mentioned, to Hoeppener. Standing by itself, the deed is indefinite
in its description of the land intended to be granted, and an
insufficient designation of the subject of the grant. But it was
not offered or received alone. It was made, as will be perceived,
while the country was under Mexican rule, and its offer was
attended by proof of what amounted to livery of seizin -- an actual
putting of the grantee into possession under it, and a maintenance
of that possession from 1846 until 1864, when this suit was
brought. It had been admitted, when the deed was received in
evidence, that Vallejo had put Hoeppener into possession of the
entire rancho, and that Hoeppener continued in possession until he
sold to Dopken, when he retired, and allowed his grantee to take
possession of the tract sold. This was a parol identification
followed by long possession unchallenged. Considering the looseness
of Mexican grants at that time, and the acquiescence for so many
years of the grantor and all claiming under him, we cannot say that
the deed, in connection with this other evidence, was erroneously
admitted.
The only remaining assignment of error is that the court refused
to allow the plaintiff to give evidence in rebuttal to prove that,
even if the deed shown by the defendants from Hoeppener did make
out an equity in his grantees, Hoeppener failed to perform the
conditions upon which Vallejo's grant was made to him, upon which
the equity rested, and therefore that the equity expired.
A few words will dispose of this. If the assignment correctly
represented what was the ruling of the court, it would be a
sufficient answer to it, that the deed from Vallejo to Hoeppener
was unconditional, and therefore that his title, and that of his
grantees, was not dependent upon the performance or nonperformance
of conditions. But the court made no such refusal as that of which
the plaintiff complains.
Page 78 U. S. 581
What the court did rule was that Hoeppener's statements, made
after he had conveyed the land to others, could not be admitted to
invalidate his deeds. Surely such a ruling requires no
vindication.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Viner's Abridgment 290, Relation.
[
Footnote 2]
Vol. 5, pp. 210-11.
[
Footnote 3]
Vide Hayes v. Bona, 7 Cal. 154;
Havens v.
Dale, 18
id. 362; and
Mulford v. Le Franc,
26
id. 88.
[
Footnote 4]
French v. Carhart, 1 Comstock 102, and cases therein
cited;
United States v. Appleton, 1 Sumner 502-503.
[
Footnote 5]
Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 108.
[
Footnote 6]
Havens v. Dale, 18 Cal. 366;
Merle v. Mathews,
26
id. 455.
