When the case below is tried by a court without a jury, its
findings upon questions of fact are conclusive, and this Court can
consider only its rulings on matters of law properly presented in a
bill of exceptions, and the further question, when the findings are
special, whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain the
judgment rendered.
When the statutes of a state provide a board for the correction
of errors and irregularities of assessors in the assessment of
property for purposes of taxation, the official action of that body
is judicial in character, and its judgments are not open to attack
collaterally.
A party who feels himself aggrieved by overvaluation of his
property for purposes of taxation and does not resort to the
tribunal created by the state for correction of errors in
assessments before levy of the tax cannot maintain an action at law
to recover the excess of taxes paid beyond what should have been
levied on a just valuation.
This case has once been before this Court, and is reported at
105 U. S. 105 U.S.
305, to which reference is made for the facts up to that time.
Subsequent to that decision, the plaintiff Stanley was permitted to
amend his complaint. The ground of the relief sought for, as stated
in each count of the amended complaint, except the fourth, was as
follows
"And plaintiff says, upon information and belief, that the said
pretended assessment was illegal and void. That under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, said shares of stock
were not liable to assessment and taxation by state authority,
except so far as permission to make such assessment was given by §
5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United
Page 121 U. S. 536
States, which provides that nothing therein shall prevent all
the shares in any association from being included in the valuation
of the personal property of the owner or holder of such shares in
assessing taxes imposed by authority of the state within which the
association is located; but that the legislature of each state may
determine and direct the manner and place of taxing all the shares
of national banking associations located within the state, subject
only to the two restrictions, that the taxation shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens of such state, and that the shares of
any national banking association, owned by nonresidents of any
state, shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located
and not elsewhere."
"And plaintiff further says, upon information and belief, that
the said assessors did intentionally, by a rule prescribed by
themselves, assess or assume to assess the said shares of stock in
said National Albany Exchange Bank at a greater rate in proportion
to their actual value than other moneyed capital generally, in the
hands of individual citizens of the State of New York. That the
rule adopted by said assessors was to assess all shares of stock in
state and national banks in said city at par, irrespective of their
actual or market value, making the requisite deduction for real
estate owned by said banks. That such rule necessarily resulted in
imposing upon the shares of said National Albany Exchange Bank a
greater rate of taxation than was assessed upon other moneyed
capital generally. That there were in said sixth ward of said city
at the time of said assessments, several hanks, state and national,
and that the actual value of the stock of said banks varied, that
of the shares of stock in the said National Albany Exchange Bank
being considerably less than the stock of most of the other banks
in the said city."
"That there was a large amount of moneyed capital in said City
of Albany and in said sixth ward, in the year aforesaid, in the
hands of individual citizens of the State of New York, and that
such moneyed capital was generally assessed at a less rate than the
said shares of stock in said National Albany
Page 121 U. S. 537
Exchange Bank. That the rule adopted as aforesaid by said board
of assessors was not authorized by the laws of the State of New
York, and was in violation of the provisions of § 5219 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, and that, for the reasons
above set forth, the said pretended assessment was illegal and
void, and the money thereby collected was wrongfully collected and
paid into the county treasury, and belongs of right to the said
Chauncey P. Williams and not to said county."
After this amendment was made, but before the trial, the
plaintiff in error discontinued the action as to the 5th, 6th, 7th,
10th, 11th and 12th counts, as to which the statute of limitations
had not run, and the case was retried before the court, without a
jury, a jury trial having been waived by the parties, upon the
counts remaining in the complaint,
viz., 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th,
8th, 9th. Judgment for defendant, excepting as to the fourth
count.
Judgment for plaintiff on the fourth count. 15 F. 453. This was
the count to recover the taxes collected on the shares of one of
the shareholders,
viz., Chauncey P. Williams, who had made
proof before the assessors that he owed debts exceeding the amount
of his assessment, which question had been presented and disposed
of by the previous determination of this Court.
105 U. S. 105
U.S. 316.
Page 121 U. S. 542
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The act of Congress, in providing for taxation of the shares of
national banks, by authority of the state in which such
institutions are situated, imposes two restrictions upon the
exercise of the power -- namely, that the taxation shall not be at
a greater rate than upon other moneyed capital in the hands of
individual citizens of such state, and that the shares of any
national bank owned by nonresidents of the state shall be taxed in
the city or town where it is located. Rev.Stat. § 5219.
In
People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539,
this Court held, with reference to taxation thus authorized, that
the prohibition against discrimination has reference to the entire
process of assessment, and includes the valuation of the shares, as
well as the rate of percentage charged, and therefore that a
statute of New York which established a mode of assessment by which
such shares were valued higher in proportion to their real value
than other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals was in
conflict with the prohibition, although no greater percentage was
levied on such valuation. If this were not so, a rule of
appraisement, applied to shares of national banks, different from
one applied to other moneyed capital might lead to such varied
valuations as to materially affect the amount of taxes levied,
although the same percentage should be charged on the valuations.
There must be a uniform rule of appraisement of value, and the same
percentage charged on the values determined, to meet the
requirements of the statute.
This action is founded upon alleged disregard of this
requirement by the assessing officers of the County of Albany, New
York. The plaintiff, Edward N. Stanley, is a citizen of Illinois,
and claiming to be assignee of certain shareholders of the National
Albany Exchange Bank, located at Albany, in New York, sues to
recover the amount of certain taxes alleged to have been illegally
collected from them upon their
Page 121 U. S. 543
shares in that bank during the years from 1874 to 1879, both
inclusive, and paid into the Treasury of the County of Albany. The
original complaint contained several counts, all of which, except
the fourth, were substantially the same, except as to the names of
the stockholders and the amounts assessed and collected. They
alleged the assessment by the Board of Assessors of the City of
Albany of the shares held by the assignors of the plaintiff, acting
under color of an Act of the Legislature of New York passed April
23, 1866, being chapter 761 of the laws of that year at $100 a
share, being the par value thereof, after deducting therefrom such
sum as was in the same proportion to such par value as was the
assessed value of the real estate of the banking institution to the
whole amount of its capital stock, and the collection of the amount
levied, and its payment into the Treasury of the County of Albany.
They also alleged, upon information and belief, that chapter 761 of
the Laws of 1866 was in conflict with the laws of the United
States, and especially with the provisions that taxation by state
authority of shares of stock in banking associations shall not be
at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in
the hands of individual citizens of such state, for the reason,
among others, that the said act of New York did not permit debts of
the owners of the bank stock to be deducted from the value thereof
in its assessment, although such deduction of the debts of the
owner was at the time, and is still, permitted and required by the
laws of New York to be made from the value of every other kind of
personal property, and moneyed capital other than bank stock, in
assessing the same for the purpose of taxation.
They also alleged, upon information and belief, that the
assessment of the shares of stock of the said banking association
by the board of assessors was at a greater rate than their
assessment upon shares of stock of banks organized under the laws
of New York, and located in the same ward of the city, and was at a
greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital in the
hands of individual citizens of the state. For these reasons, the
plaintiff alleged that the assessment of the shares of stock, and
the levy of the tax thereunder, were
Page 121 U. S. 544
illegal and void, and that the money received therefor was
wrongfully collected and paid into the county treasury, and
belonged of right to the shareholders, and not to the county.
The fourth count differed from the others in averring that the
assignor of the plaintiff named in this count, Chauncey P.
Williams, had presented to the board of assessors an affidavit
stating that the value of his personal estate, including his bank
stock, after deducting his just debts and property invested in the
stock of corporations or associations liable to be taxed therefor,
and his investments in the obligations of the United States, did
not exceed one dollar, and requested the board of assessors to
reduce his assessment to that amount, but that the board had
refused to make such reduction, and that thereupon said Williams
applied to the supreme court of the state for a writ of mandamus to
compel the assessors to make the reduction; that the supreme court
denied the application, on the ground that the act of the
legislature did not permit such reduction, but required the
assessment of the bank stock at its full value; that the court of
appeals of the state, on appeal, affirmed the decision and judgment
of the supreme court; that the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and held that the
statute, chapter 761 of the laws of the state of 1866, in that it
did not permit a reduction for indebtedness from the assessment of
bank stock, which by the laws of the state was required to be made
from the assessment of every other kind of personal estate and
moneyed capital, was in conflict with the laws of the United
States.
The answer of the defendant consisted in a specific denial of
the several allegations of the complaint, with an averment that the
assessments were duly and regularly made by a board of assessors
having jurisdiction of the matter. In a supplementary answer, the
defendant also set up that the assignment of the amounts in suit to
the plaintiff was improperly and collusively made for the purpose
of giving the court jurisdiction.
The action was twice tried, at both times by the court without
the intervention of a jury, by consent of parties.
Page 121 U. S. 545
On the first trial, which took place in October, 1880, the
plaintiff recovered the whole amount upon the first ground stated
-- that the Act of New York, c. 761 of the Laws of 1866, was in
conflict with the act of Congress in not permitting in the
assessment of the value of the stock of the bank a reduction for
the debts of the holder. The second ground of objection to the
validity of the assessment -- that it was at a greater rate than
was assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens -- was not considered. The case was then brought to this
Court for review. After full consideration, we held substantially
this -- that the statute of New York was in conflict with the act
of Congress so far as it did not permit a stockholder of a national
bank to deduct the amount of his just debts from the assessed value
of his stock, while by the laws of the state the owner of all other
personal taxable property was allowed to deduct such debts from its
value; but that neither the statute nor the assessment under it was
for that reason void. If the stockholder had no debts to deduct,
the mode of assessment adopted was not invalid as to him; he could
not complain of it, nor recover the taxes paid pursuant to it. If
he had debts, the assessment without a deduction for them in the
estimate of the taxable value of the stock was only voidable. The
assessing officers, in making the assessment, were acting within
their authority until duly notified of the debts which were to be
deducted. In such case, therefore, the duty devolved upon the
stockholder to show to the assessing officers what his debts were,
and to take such steps as were required by law to obtain a
correction of the overassessment. We therefore decided that for the
taxes colleted upon the assessment alleged in the fourth court the
plaintiff was entitled to judgment; this Court having held, in
People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539,
that assessment invalid, for the reason that the assessors had not
allowed any deduction for the debts of the stockholder, but that
for the taxes collected upon the assessments alleged in the other
counts no recovery could be had; the stockholders there mentioned
not having produced any evidence that they had presented to the
assessors an affidavit of the amount which they would be entitled
to deduct
Page 121 U. S. 546
from the assessment of their shares, if the same rule had been
applied to the assessment of bank shares which was applied to the
assessment of other personal property, or any evidence that they
owed anything whatever to be deducted, or that they had taken any
steps under the laws of New York to correct the overassessment
complained of. The judgment of the circuit court was accordingly
reversed, and judgment ordered for the plaintiff upon the fourth
count, and for the defendants on the other counts.
Supervisors
v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305,
105 U. S.
316.
Subsequently, upon the attention of the court's being called to
the fact that there was evidence in the case upon the allegation
that the assessment of the shares of stock in the National Banking
Association was at a greater rate than was assessed upon shares of
stock in banks organized under the laws of New York, and located in
the same city, and at a greater rate than was assessed upon other
moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the state,
upon which the court below did not pass, the judgment was so far
modified as to permit that court, in its discretion, to hear
evidence on that point, and, if necessary, to allow an amendment of
the pleadings to present it properly.
When the case was remanded, on application to the circuit court,
all the counts except the fourth were amended. The substance of the
amendments consisted in allegations that the assessors, by a rule
prescribed by themselves, assessed the shares of the National
Albany Exchange Bank at such greater rate; that the rule adopted
was to assess all shares of stock in state and national banks in
the City of Albany at par, without regard to their actual or market
value, making the requisite deduction for real estate owned by the
banks; that this rule necessarily resulted in imposing upon the
shares of the National Albany Exchange Bank a greater rate of
taxation than was assessed upon other moneyed capital generally;
that there were in the Sixth Ward of the city at the time of the
assessments, several banks, state and national, and that the actual
value of the stock of the banks varied, that of the shares of stock
in the National Albany Exchange Bank being
Page 121 U. S. 547
considerably less than that of the stock of most of the other
banks in the city.
Several of the counts were afterwards abandoned, those remaining
applying only to the taxes of the years 1873, 1874, and 1875. The
case came on for a second trial in March, 1883, and, after hearing
the proofs, the court filed its findings of fact on the issues
presented by the pleadings, and gave judgment for the plaintiff on
the fourth count, and for the defendants on the other counts. To
review this judgment the case is brought to this Court on a writ of
error.
Several of the assignments of error presented for our
consideration are to rulings of the court below upon the evidence
before it; to its finding of particular facts, and to its refusal
to find other facts. Such rulings are not open to review here; they
can be considered only by the court below. Where a case is tried by
the court without a jury, its findings upon questions of fact are
conclusive here; it matters not how convincing the argument that
upon the evidence the findings should have been different. Thus,
the principal finding of the court is
"that the plaintiff has failed to establish the allegations in
said complaint, that the several assessments herein referred to
were at a greater rate than was assessed upon other moneyed capital
in the hands of individual citizens of this state."
And the first assignment of error is that the court erred in
deciding that the plaintiff failed to establish the allegations
mentioned, and the greater part of the oral argument of the
plaintiff's counsel and of his printed brief was devoted to the
maintenance of this proposition, which is nothing more than that
the court below found against the evidence -- a question not open
to review or consideration in this Court. Only rulings upon matters
of law, when properly presented in a bill of exceptions, can be
considered here, in addition to the question, when the findings are
special, whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain the
judgment rendered. This limitation upon our revisory power on a
writ of error in such cases is by express statutory enactment. Act
March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. c. 86, § 4; Rev.Stat. § 700.
The same answer will apply to the exceptions taken to the
Page 121 U. S. 548
refusal of the court to make certain additional findings. If
error was thus committed, it was in not giving sufficient weight to
the evidence offered -- a matter determinable only in the court
below.
To recover in this case, the plaintiff was required to prove,
under the decision when the case was first here, that
"the assessors habitually and intentionally, or by some rule
prescribed by themselves, or by some one whom they were bound to
obey, assessed the shares of the national banks higher, in
proportion to their actual value, than other moneyed capital
generally."
The court below specially found the negative of this; that the
assessors did not at any of the times in question, habitually or
intentionally, or by any rule prescribed by themselves, or by
anyone whom they were bound to obey, thus assess the shares of
national banks.
The counsel for the plaintiff insists, however, notwithstanding
this finding, that the inference of such habitual assessment at a
higher rate follows from the findings that within the City of
Albany there were nine banks, and that the actual value of the
shares in all of them except one exceeded their par value, varying
in that respect from 10 to 70 percent premium, and yet the value of
all was assessed at par. The actual value of shares of the National
Albany Exchange Bank was 35 percent above par, and the actual value
of the shares of some of the other banks was above and some below
that figure. The court found that the method pursued by the
assessors was generally satisfactory to the owners of national bank
stock in the City of Albany, with the exception of a few
stockholders in the National Albany Exchange Bank, and that such
method was pursued by the assessors with no purpose or intention of
unduly assessing shares of national banks, but simply because it
was thought by them to be the most satisfactory one to the owners
of such property, and the best in itself. A different method might
have led to perplexing difficulties, owing to the great
fluctuations to which shares in banking institutions are subject,
their value depending very much on the skill and wisdom of the
managers of those institutions.
Page 121 U. S. 549
Intelligent men constantly differ in their estimate of the value
of such property, and the stock market shows almost daily changes.
Presumptively, the nominal value is the true value; any increase
from profits going, in the natural course of things, in dividends
to the stockholders. This method, applied to all banks, national
and state, comes as near as practicable, considering the nature of
the property, to securing, as between them, uniformity and equality
of taxation; it cannot be considered as discriminating against
either. Both are placed on the same footing. In
Mercantile
National Bank of New York v. New York, 120
U. S. 138,
120 U. S. 155,
recently decided, this Court said:
"The main purpose of Congress in fixing limits to state taxation
on investments in the shares of national banks was to render it
impossible for the state, in levying such a tax, to create and
foster an unequal and unfriendly competition by favoring
individuals or institutions carrying on a similar business and
operations and investments of a like character. The language of the
act of Congress is to be read in the light of this policy."
The method pursued could in no respect be considered as adopted
in hostility to the national banks. It must sometimes place the
estimated value of their shares below their real value, but such a
result is not one of which the holders of national bank shares can
complain. It must sometimes lead also to overvaluation of the
shares, but, if so, no ground is thereby furnished for the recovery
of the taxes collected thereon. It is only where the assessment is
wholly void, or void with respect to separable portions of the
property, the amount collected on which is ascertainable, or where
the assessment has been set aside as invalid, that an action at law
will lie for the taxes paid, or for a portion thereof.
Overvaluation of property is not a ground of action at law for the
excess of taxes paid beyond what should have been levied upon a
just valuation. The courts cannot, in such cases, take upon
themselves the functions of a revising or equalizing board.
Newman v. Supervisors, 45 N.Y. 676, 687;
National Bank
of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N.Y. 49-52;
Bruecher v.
Page 121 U. S. 550
Village of Port Chester, 101 N.Y. 240, 244;
Lincoln
v. Worcester, 8 Cush. 55, 63;
Hicks v. Westport, 130
Mass. 478;
Balfour v. City of Portland, 28 F. 738.
In nearly all the states, probably in all of them, provision is
made by law for the correction of errors and irregularities of
assessors in the assessment of property for the purposes of
taxation. This is generally through boards of revision or
equalization, as they are often termed, with sometimes a right of
appeal from their decision to the courts of law. They are
established to carry into effect the general rule of equality and
uniformity of taxation required by constitutional or statutory
provisions. Absolute equality and uniformity are seldom, if ever,
attainable. The diversity of human judgments and the uncertainty
attending all human evidence preclude the possibility of this
attainment. Intelligent men differ as to the value of even the most
common objects before them -- of animals, houses, and lands in
constant use. The most that can be expected from wise legislation
is an approximation to this desirable end, and the requirement of
equality and uniformity found in the constitutions of some states
is complied with when designed and manifest departures from the
rule are avoided.
To these boards of revision, by whatever name they may be
called, the citizen must apply for relief against excessive and
irregular taxation, where the assessing officers had jurisdiction
to assess the property. Their action is judicial in its character.
They pass judgment on the value of the property, upon personal
examination and evidence respecting it. Their action being
judicial, their judgments in cases within their jurisdiction are
not open to collateral attack. If not corrected by some of the
modes pointed out by statute, they are conclusive, whatever errors
may have been committed in the assessment. As said in one of the
cases cited, the money collected on such assessment cannot be
recovered back in an action at law, any more than money collected
on an erroneous judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
before it is reversed.
When the overvaluation of property has arisen from the adoption
of a rule of appraisement which conflicts with a constitutional
Page 121 U. S. 551
or statutory direction, and operates unequally, not merely on a
single individual, but on a large class of individuals or
corporations, a party aggrieved may resort to a court of equity to
restrain the exaction of the excess, upon payment or tender of what
is admitted to be due. This was the course pursued and approved in
Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U.
S. 153. In that case, it appeared that the officers of
Lucas County, Ohio, charged with the valuation of property for the
purposes of taxation, adopted a settled rule or system, by which
real estate was estimated at one-third of its true value, ordinary
personal property about the same, and moneyed capital at
three-fifths of its true value. The state board of equalization of
bank shares increased the valuation of them to their full value.
Upon a bill brought by the Merchants' National Bank of Toledo
against the treasurer of the county in which the bank was
established, to enjoin him from collecting taxes assessed on the
shares of the stockholders, payment of which was demanded of the
bank under the law, it was held that the rule or principle of
unequal valuation of the different classes of property for taxation
adopted by the board of assessment was in conflict with the
Constitution of Ohio, which declares that
"Laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys,
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or
otherwise, and also all the real and personal property according to
its true value in money,"
and worked manifest injustice to the owners of shares in
national banks, and that the bank was therefore entitled to the
injunction against the collection of the illegal excess, upon
payment of the amount of the tax which was equal to that assessed
on other property. That decision was rendered upon a disregard by
the assessing officers of a rule prescribed by the constitution of
the state, but the same principle must apply when their action in
assessing the shares of national banks is in disregard of the act
of Congress. The plaintiff below did not think proper to resort to
this method of obtaining relief, which would have given him all he
was entitled to, if in fact his shares were assessed at a greater
rate than was assessed on other moneyed capital, because of their
illegal overvaluation.
Page 121 U. S. 552
It only remains to notice the exceptions taken to the exclusion
of the testimony offered, that the law of New York required an oath
or certificate to be annexed to the assessment roll substantially
different from the oath actually annexed, and the claim that the
plaintiff has a right to recover the taxes assessed in 1873 and
collected in 1874. The exclusion of the testimony as to the alleged
defect in the assessment roll was correct, under the stipulation of
the parties that the plaintiff would not claim a right to prove any
failure of the assessors to take the proper oath. A defect in the
form of the oath annexed, if there be one, could have no bearing
upon the question at issue. The claim for the taxes assessed in
1873 is open to similar objections to those presented against the
claim for the taxes of the other years. If the assignors of the
plaintiff had any just grounds of complaint to the assessment as
excessive, they should have pursued the course provided by statute
for its correction, or resorted to equity to enjoin the collection
of the illegal excess, upon payment or tender of the amount due
upon what they conceded to be a just valuation.
It follows that the judgment of the court below must be
affirmed, and it is so ordered.