Dimock v. Revere Copper Co.
Annotate this Case
117 U.S. 559 (1886)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U.S. 559 (1886)
Dimock v. Revere Copper Company
Argued March 22, 1886
Decided April 5, 1886
117 U.S. 559
A discharge in bankruptcy is no bar to an action on a judgment recovered against the bankrupt after his discharge in a suit, commenced before the bankruptcy, pending when the discharge was granted and founded upon a debt provable against him in bankruptcy.
This case comes here by a writ of error to the supreme court of New York, having been decided in the Court of Appeals,
and the record remitted to the supreme court that judgment might be finally entered there. The action was brought in that court on a judgment in favor of the Revere Copper Company, plaintiff, against Anthony W. Dimock, rendered in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for the County of Suffolk on the first day of April, 1875.
The defendant, Dimock, pleaded, in bar of this action a discharge in bankruptcy by the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts rendered on the 26th day of March, 1875, five days before judgment in the state court. The case being submitted to the New York supreme court in special term, without a jury, that court found the following facts, and conclusions of law thereon:
"As Findings of Fact"
"First. That the plaintiff is, and at the times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts."
"Second. That on or about the 13th day of January, 1874, the Revere Copper Company of Boston, Massachusetts, the plaintiff herein, commenced an action in the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts within and for the County of Suffolk, a court of general jurisdiction, against Anthony W. Dimock, the defendant herein, by the issue of a writ of attachment against the goods, estate, and body of the said defendant, and which said writ was duly served on said defendant, and the summons to appear in said action was duly served upon him personally, and that the said defendant thereafter duly appeared in said action by attorney; that the cause of action was an endorsement of said Dimock of two promissory notes made in the City of New York to the order of plaintiff by the Atlantic Mail Steamship Company and dated December 19, 1872."
"Third. That on or about June 23, 1874, the said defendant, Anthony W. Dimock, filed a petition in bankruptcy and was duly adjudicated a bankrupt in the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and that such proceedings
were thereafter had that on or about March 26, 1875, the said Dimock was discharged from all debts and claims provable against his estate, and which existed on the 23d day of June, 1874."
"Fourth. That such proceedings were had in the aforesaid action in the superior court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts that on or about April 1, 1875, the plaintiff duly recovered judgment in said action against the defendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninetyfive 15/100 dollars, ($3,595.15), and that said judgment was upon that day duly entered."
"Fifth. That no part of said judgment has been paid, and the whole thereof is now due and payable to the plaintiff."
"As Conclusions of Law"
"I. That the said proceedings in bankruptcy are no bar to the present action, and constitute no defense herein."
"II. That the plaintiff should have judgment against the defendant for the sum of three thousand five hundred and ninetyfive 15/100 dollars ($3,595.15), with interest from April 1, 1875, amounting to one thousand one hundred and fortytwo 96/100 dollars ($1,142.96), making in all four thousand seven hundred and thirtyeight 11/100 dollars ($4,738.11), together with the costs of this action, to be taxed, and an allowance, in addition to costs, amounting to the sum of seventyfive dollars."
The judgment rendered on these findings was reversed by the supreme court in general term, and that judgment was in turn reversed by the Court of Appeals, which restored the judgment of the special term. 90 N.Y. 33.