1. Where a bill was filed in the circuit court by the district
attorney in the name of the United States to vacate a patent for
lands, but no objection touching his authority to bring the suit
was made and a duly certified copy of a letter whereby he was
directed by the Attorney General to institute the requisite
proceedings was filed here,
held that the decree for the
complainant will not be reversed on such an objection raised here
for the first time.
2. The patent in question, bearing date May 31, 1870, and issued
to a railroad company in professed compliance with the terms and
conditions of the grant made by the acts commonly known as the
Pacific Railroad Acts covers lands which, the bill alleges, contain
valuable quicksilver and cinnabar deposits, and were known to be
"mineral lands" when the grant was made and the patent issued. This
Court, being satisfied that the material allegations of the bill
are true, that as early as 1868 and since cinnabar was mined upon
the lands, and that at the time of the application for a patent
their character was known to the defendant, the agent of the
company, who now claims them under it, affirms the decree canceling
the patent and declaring his title to be null and void.
Page 107 U. S. 527
3.
Quaere what extent of mineral, other than coal and
iron, found in lands will exclude them from the said grant, and can
the United States maintain a suit to set aside a patent if, before
it was issued, the lands therein mentioned were not known to be
mineral, and if so, what are the rights of innocent purchasers from
the patentee?
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
John M. Coghlan, District Attorney of the United States for the
District of California, on behalf of the United States, brought in
the court below the bill in this case against Charles McLaughlin
and The Western Pacific Railroad Company to set aside a patent of
the United States bearing date May 31, 1870, and conveying to the
company the northeast quarter of section 29, township one north,
range one east, of Mount Diabolo meridian.
This patent was made under the acts of Congress granting to the
Union Pacific, Central Pacific, and Western Pacific Railroad
Companies the alternate sections of public land within certain
limits on each side of their respective roads, and authorizing the
issue of patents for the same when the work should be done and the
sections ascertained. There were excepted out of this grant, among
others, such §§ or parts of §§ as were mineral lands.
The bill alleges that the quarter-section in question is, and at
the time of the grant was, mineral land, and as it was known to be
such, the patent therefor was issued by inadvertence and mistake
without authority of law.
The patent itself is not in the record as an exhibit or as a
part of the evidence. The railroad company, though made a
defendant, was not served with the subpoena and did not appear.
McLaughlin, the only defendant who appeared, defends as purchaser
two degrees removed from the company. Instead of a general
replication to his answer, the reply is an amendment to the
original bill. A decree was rendered for the complainant, and he
appealed.
Page 107 U. S. 528
The whole record is so imperfect and the case so obscuredy
presented that we feel tempted to dismiss it. Waiving, however,
these objections, there is enough to enable us to consider the two
principal errors assigned by the appellant. The first is that there
is no sufficient evidence that the suit was instituted under the
authority of the Attorney General, according to the principle
established in
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S.
61. To this it may be answered that the objection was
not raised below, as it was in that case; that the case is argued
here on behalf of the government by the Assistant Attorney General,
who files a certified copy of the order of the Attorney General
directing the District Attorney to bring the suit in the Circuit
Court, as requested by the Secretary of the Interior. We think the
decree, under these circumstances, can hardly be reversed now, on
this ground, taken here for the first time.
The other objection to the decree in favor of the United States
is that the evidence does not establish that the land in
controversy was mineral land when the patent was issued.
An examination of the evidence on this subject convinces us that
the circuit judge was right in holding that it was. It is
satisfactorily proven, as we think, that cinnabar, the mineral
which carries quicksilver, was found there as early as 1863; that a
man named Powell resided on the land and mined this cinnabar at
that time, and in 1866 established some form of reduction works
there; that these were on the ground when application for the
patent was made by defendant McLaughlin as agent of the Western
Pacific Railroad Company, and that these facts were known to him.
He is not, therefore, an innocent purchaser. Concurring as we do
with the circuit court in the result arising from the evidence, we
do not deem it necessary to give in this opinion a detailed
examination of it.
This being the first case of the kind in this Court, a class of
cases which may possibly be indefinitely multiplied, it is to be
regretted that it was not more fully presented in the circuit
court. Many interesting questions might arise in this class of
cases not proper to be considered in this case. For instance, the
nature and extent of mineral found in the land granted or
Page 107 U. S. 529
patented which will bring it within the designation of mineral
land in the various acts of Congress, in which it is excepted out
of grants to railroad companies, and forbidden to be sold or
preempted as ordinary or agricultural lands are.
Suppose that when such land has been conveyed by the government
it is afterwards discovered that it contains valuable deposits of
the precious metals unknown to the patentee or to the officers of
the government at the time of the conveyance, will such subsequent
discovery enable the government to sustain a suit to set aside the
patent or the grant? If so, what are the rights of innocent
purchasers from the grantee, and what limitations exist upon the
exercise of the government's right? We can answer none of these
questions here, and can only order that the decree below be
Affirmed.
