An appeal will not lie from a decree of the circuit court which
adjudged to none of the libellants in a collision suit who had
distinct causes of action against the vessel at fault a sum
exceeding $5,000.
A collision occurred in the harbor of Baltimore, Maryland,
between the steamer "Knickerbocker," owned by the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Company, and the barge "J. J. Munger," owned by
Jeannette Maxon. The barge was loaded with grain belonging to the
partnership firm of J. & C. Moore & Co. Both the barge and
her cargo were injured in the collision, and the owner of the barge
united with the owners of the cargo in a libel against the steamer
to recover the damages they had respectively sustained. The suit
thus begun terminated in a decree in the Circuit Court for the
District of Maryland in favor of the owner of the barge for
$1,471.20, and in favor of the owners of the cargo for $3,709.13.
The railroad company, as the claimant of the steamer, prayed an
appeal to this Court, which was refused by the circuit court on the
ground that the value of the matter in dispute between the steamer
and the respective libellants was less than $5,000. The company now
asks a mandamus from this Court requiring the Circuit Court to
allow an appeal.
A collision occurred in the harbor of Baltimore, Maryland,
between the steamer
Knickerbocker, owned by the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Company, and the barge
J. J. Munger,
owned by Jeannette Maxon. The barge was loaded with grain belonging
to the partnership firm of J. & C. Moore and Co. Both the barge
and her cargo were injured in the collision, and the owners of the
barge united with the owners of the cargo in a libel against the
steamer to recover the damages they had respectively sustained. The
suit thus begun terminated in a decree in the Circuit Court for the
District of Maryland in favor of the owner of the barge for
$1,471.20 and in favor of the owners of the cargo for $3,709.13.
The railroad company, as the claimant of the steamer, prayed an
appeal to this Court, which was refused by the circuit court on the
ground that the value of the matter in dispute between the steamer
and the respective libellants was less then $5,000. The company now
asks a mandamus from this Court requiring the circuit court to
allow an appeal.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is impossible to distinguish this case in principle from
Oliver v.
Alexander, 6 Pet. 143;
Stratton v.
Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4;
Spear v.
Place, 11 How. 522, and
Rich v.
Lambert, 12 How. 347, under which for half a
century it has been held that when in admiralty distinct causes of
action in favor of distinct parties, growing out of the same
transaction, are united in one suit, according to the practice of
the courts of that jurisdiction, distinct decrees in favor of or
against distinct parties cannot be
Page 106 U. S. 6
joined to give this Court jurisdiction on appeal. In
Seaver v.
Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208;
Paving Company v.
Mulford, 100 U. S. 147, and
Russell v. Stansell, 105 U. S. 303,
this rule was applied to analogous cases in equity.
The cases of
Shields v.
Thomas, 17 How. 3;
Market Company v.
Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, and
The Connemara, 103 U. S. 754,
relied on in support of the present application, stand on an
entirely different principle. There, the controversies were about
matters in which the several claimants were interested collectively
under a common title. They each had an undivided interest in the
claim, and it was perfectly immaterial to their adversaries how the
recovery was shared among them. If a dispute arose about the
division, it would be between the claimants themselves, and not
with those against whom the claim was made. The distinction between
the two classes of cases was clearly stated by Chief Justice Taney
in
Shields v. Thomas, and that case was held to be within
the latter class. It may not always be easy to determine the class
to which a particular case belongs, but the rule recognizing the
existence of the two classes has long been established.
Neither is the case of
The Mamie, 105 U.
S. 773, an authority in support of this application.
That was a suit by the owners of the pleasure yacht
Mamie
to obtain the benefit of the act of Congress limiting the liability
of the vessel owners. Rev.Stat. secs. 4283-4289. The aggregate of
the claims against the yacht was $65,000, but no single claim
exceeded $5,000. The theory of the proceeding authorized by this
act of Congress is that the owner brings into court the fund which
he says belongs to all who have claims against him or his vessel
growing out of the loss, and surrenders it to them collectively in
satisfaction of their demands. If he succeeds, all the claimants
have a common interest in the fund thus created and are entitled to
have it divided between them in proportion to the amount of their
respective claims. With this division the owner of the vessel has
nothing to do. He surrenders the fund and calls on all who have
claims against him growing out of the loss to come in and divide it
among themselves. The controversy in the suit is not in respect to
his liability to the different parties in interest, but as to his
right to surrender the
Page 106 U. S. 7
fund and be discharged of all further liability. His dispute is
not with any one claimant separately, but with all collectively. He
insists that his liability in the aggregate does not exceed the
value of his interest in the vessel; that they must pay all their
several demands amount to. He does not seek to have it determined
how much he owes each one of them, but to what extent he is liable
to them collectively. The difference between what he admits his
liability to be and the aggregate amount of the demands against him
is the amount in dispute. In the case of the
Mamie, this
difference was more than $5,000 dollars, and we consequently took
jurisdiction.
It follows that the circuit court properly refused to allow the
appeal, and the petition for a mandamus is therefore
Denied.
