Scovill v. Thayer
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105 U.S. 143 (1881)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143 (1881)
Scovill v. Thayer
105 U.S. 143
1. Certificates of stock of an incorporated company issued in excess of the limit imposed by its charter are void, and the holder of them is not entitled to the rights, nor subject to the liabilities, of a holder of authorized stock.
2. He is not estopped to set up the invalidity of such unauthorized stock as a defense to an action by creditors against him, to recover the balance unpaid thereon, by the fact that he attended the meeting at which it was voted to issue the same, or that he received and held certificates therefor, or that the officers and agents of the company represented its capital to be equal to the amount of both its authorized and unauthorized stock.
3. When the company which issued stock beyond such limit has been adjudicated bankrupt, the holder of the unauthorized stock is not entitled to have the money paid thereon applied as a credit on the unpaid balance due on his authorized stock.
4. Subscribers to the stock of an incorporated company paid twenty percent on their shares, and entered into an agreement with the company that no further assessments should be made thereon, and certificates for full-paid shares were issued to them. The company was adjudicated a bankrupt, and to satisfy the claims of its creditors it became necessary to assess the unpaid stock.
1. That the agreement was in equity void as to creditors.
2. That before an action at law can be maintained by the assignees in bankruptcy against a stockholder to recover upon his unpaid subscription of stock, some proceedings in the interest of creditors are necessary in a court of competent jurisdiction, to set aside the agreement, and to make an assessment upon such unpaid stock.
3. That until an order of such court to that effect, and an assessment, or some authorized demand upon the stockholder to pay the balance due on his stock, no cause of action accrues against him in favor of the assignees, and the limitation prescribed by the second section of the Bankrupt Act does not begin to run in his favor.
On Nov. 25, 1870, the Fort Scott Coal and Mining Company was organized as a corporate body under the General Laws of the Kansas, with a capital stock of $100,000.
According to the laws of that state, any corporation might increase its capital stock to any amount not exceeding double its authorized capital.
Under the provision of this law the corporation, on April 19, 1871, increased its capital stock from $100,000 to $200,000. On Oct. 16, 1872, the corporation attempted, by taking the steps required by law for the lawful increase of stock, to increase its capital stock to $300,000, and on Dec. 27, 1872, to
make a further increase of $100,000. The nominal capital was thus raised to the sum of $400,000.
Nathaniel Thayer, the defendant in error, who was a holder of shares in the company, attended by proxy the meetings of the stockholders at which the third and fourth issues of stock were voted. After this attempted increase of the stock, the officers and agents of the company, by advertisements, billheads, and verbally, represented that its capital stock was $400,000.
Thayer was the holder of two hundred and eighty-five shares of the first two issues of stock. On two hundred of these shares he had paid to the company $20 per share, and on the remaining eighty-five he had paid $40 per share. He was also the holder of five hundred and eighty-five shares of the third and fourth issues, upon which he had paid the company $50 per share. No other payments were ever made by him on his shares of stock.
The other stockholders paid the same amounts on the shares of stock of the several issues held by them respectively. By agreement made at the date of the several issues of stock the amounts paid thereon were credited to the subscribers, and the balance unpaid credited by "discount," and certificates as for full-paid shares were delivered to the subscribers, and the stock account between the company and them balanced by such "discount."
On April 2, 1874, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the company in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The company was adjudicated a bankrupt on the eleventh, and the plaintiffs in error were appointed its assignees on the twenty-ninth day of that month. On March 31, 1876, the assignees filed their petition in that court, wherein they prayed for an order directing them to make an assessment and call upon the unpaid stock of the company for the purpose of paying its debts.
In their petition, the assignees represented as follows:
"At the date of adjudication in bankruptcy, the affairs of said company were in a very embarrassed and complicated condition, and much time has been necessarily consumed and considerable expense incurred in opposing claims attempted to be established
in said bankrupt court for failures on the part of said company to comply with contracts made by it. Many fraudulent claims for large amounts have been filed against said bankrupt, requiring time to oppose and defeat, which have been defeated. The litigated claims are now reduced to a small number, not covering more than ten thousand six hundred and one dollars and eighty cents. The property of the company on hand at the date of adjudication in bankruptcy has been disposed of as rapidly as seemed conducive to the interests of all concerned. The sale of a portion of the real estate has been delayed in the hope that the demand for land would increase, and your petitioners realize something out of it for the benefit of the creditors. Your petitioners believe, however, that any further delay in the disposal of the bankrupt's property would not be advantageous."
"Your petitioners had intended before making this application to have fully closed up the contest over litigated claims, disposed of assets of the company, and collected all its bills receivable, but find it is impossible to accomplish it without a longer postponement than is convenient or expedient."
The petition further averred that
"the amount of the liabilities of the bankrupt over and above the assets is $124,684, while the amount yet due and unpaid on the stock held and owned by said stockholders is $222,650."
By an amendment to their petition, the assignees represented as follows:
"That an assessment of seventy-six percent upon the par value of each share of stock in said company, if credited with the amount paid each stockholder heretofore, would equalize the burden upon the stockholders, and also bring into the hands of your petitioners a sufficient amount to pay the debts of the company."
Upon the filing of this petition, the court made an order that all the stockholders of the bankrupt company show cause on April 21, 1876, why the assessment and call prayed for in said petition should not be made, and that the assignees cause a copy of the order to show cause to be mailed to each stockholder at his usual place of residence and address, and also give notice by publication in the "Fort Scott
Daily Monitor," for at least ten days before the said April 21, 1876.
By order of the court, the hearing of the rule was postponed to June 10, 1876. R.S. Watson, a stockholder, had in the meantime filed exceptions to the rule, on behalf of himself and all other stockholders desiring to avail themselves thereof. On the date last named, the petition and amended petition of the assignees, and the exceptions thereto, came on for hearing, whereupon the court overruled the exceptions and decreed that an assessment and call be made upon the stock of the company of seventy-six percent, upon which should be credited to each stockholder any sums paid by him on his shares, and that the sum so assessed should be paid to the assignees on or before Aug. 1, 1876, and in default of payment they were directed to sue for and collect the same.
On July 17, 1876, the assignees made an assessment and call as authorized by the order and decree of the district court, and gave notice thereof to the stockholders; but before the assessment could be collected, Watson, the stockholder before mentioned, filed with the circuit judge a petition for the reversal of the order and decree of the district court authorizing the assessment and call.
It does not appear from the record upon what day this petition was filed. But on Dec. 4, 1876, the decision of the circuit judge thereon was transmitted to the district court, affirming its decree,
"with this modification: that the said district court enter an order allowing each stockholder of said bankrupt company who shall pay the amount of said assessment on his stock in ninety days from this twenty-ninth day of November, 1876, a credit on his or her proportion of the amount so assessed as was included in said assessment for the purpose of paying the costs of enforcing by suit the collection of said assessment."
The district court, on Dec. 4, 1876, entered a decree in conformity with the order of the circuit judge.
Thayer having failed to pay within the time limited by the court the assessment made upon him on account of his stock, although served with notice to do so, the assignees, on April 9, 1877, brought against him, in the Circuit Court of the United
states for the District of Massachusetts, an action at law to recover the sum of $27,160, the amount of the assessment on his unpaid stock.
The declaration alleged in substance the facts above recited.
The defendant filed two pleas, the first of which was a general denial of the allegations of the declaration, and the second set up the limitation of two years prescribed by sec. 2 of the Act of March 2, 1867, c. 176, and now embodied in the Revised Statutes as sec. 5057.
The case was submitted to the Circuit Court upon an agreed statement of facts. The court found for the defendant, holding, in an opinion which appears in the record, that the cause of action was barred by the limitation of two years pleaded. Judgment was therefore rendered for him. The plaintiffs below brought the case here, and assign for error the ruling upon the statute of limitations and the rendition of the judgment for defendant.