1. On the trial of an action at law, when the judges of the
circuit court are opposed in opinion on a material question of law,
the opinion of the presiding judge prevails; but the judgment
rendered conformably thereto may, with out regard to its amount, be
reviewed on a writ of error, upon their certificate stating such
question.
2. An officer of the Army of the United States, whilst serving
in the enemy's country during the rebellion, was not liable to an
action in the courts of that country for injuries resulting from
his military orders or acts; nor could he be required by a civil
tribunal to justify or explain them upon any allegation of the
injured party that they were not justified by military necessity.
He was subject to the laws of war, and amenable only to his own
government.
3. When any portion of the insurgent states was in the
occupation of the forces of the United States during the rebellion,
the municipal laws, if not suspended or superseded, were generally
administered there by the ordinary tribunals for the protection and
benefit of persons not in the military service. Their continued
enforcement was not for the protection or the control of officers
or soldiers of the army.
4. A district court of Louisiana -- continued in existence after
the military occupation of the state by the United States, and
authorized by the commanding general to hear causes between parties
-- summoned a brigadier general of the Army of the United States to
answer a petition filed therein, setting forth that a military
company had, pursuant to his orders, seized and carried off certain
personal property of the plaintiff, who alleged that the seizure
was unauthorized by the necessities of war, or martial law, or by
the superiors of that officer. Judgment by default was rendered
April 9, 1883, against him for the value of the property. When sued
in the circuit court of the United States, upon the judgment, he
pleaded that the property was taken to supply the army.
Held, on demurrer to the plea, that the state court had no
jurisdiction of the cause of action, and that the judgment was
void.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in the court below, the plaintiff in error here,
Neal Dow, was a brigadier general in the Army of the United States
during the late civil war, and in 1862 and 1863 was
Page 100 U. S. 159
stationed in Louisiana is command of Forts Jackson and St.
Philip, on the Mississippi River, below New Orleans. These forts
surrendered to the forces of the United States in April, 1862. The
fleet under Admiral Farragut had passed them and reached New
Orleans on the 25th of the month, and soon afterwards the city was
occupied by the forces of the United States under General Butler.
On taking possession of the city, the General issued a
proclamation, bearing date on the 1st of May, 1862, in which, among
other things, he declared that until the restoration of the
authority of the United States, the city would be governed by
martial law; that all disorders, disturbances of the peace, and
crimes of an aggravated nature interfering with the forces or laws
of the United States would "be referred to a military court for
trial and punishment;" that other misdemeanors would be subject to
the municipal authority, if it desired to act; and that civil
causes between parties would "be referred to the ordinary
tribunals." Under this proclamation, the Sixth District Court of
the City and Parish of New Orleans was allowed to continue in
existence, the judge having taken the oath of allegiance to the
United States.
In January, 1863, General Dow was sued in that court by Bradish
Johnson, the plaintiff in this case. The petition, which is the
designation given in the system of procedure in Louisiana to the
first pleading in a civil action, set forth that the plaintiff was
a citizen of New York, and for several years had been the owner of
a plantation and slaves in Louisiana on the Mississippi River,
about forty-three miles from New Orleans; that on the 6th of
September, 1862, during his temporary absence, the steamer
Avery, in charge of Captain Snell, of Company B of the
Thirteenth Maine Regiment, with a force under his command, had
stopped at the plantation, and taken from it twenty-five hogsheads
of sugar; and that said force had plundered the dwelling house of
the plantation and carried off a silver pitcher, half a dozen
silver knives, and other tableware, the private property of the
plaintiff, the whole property taken amounting in value to
$1,611.29; that these acts of Captain Snell and of the officers and
soldiers under his command, which the petition characterized as
"illegal, wanton, oppressive, and unjustifiable," were perpetrated
under a
Page 100 U. S. 160
verbal and secret order of Brigadier General Neal Dow, then in
the service of the United States, and in command of Forts Jackson
and St. Philip, who, by his secret orders, which the petition
declared were "unauthorized by his superiors, or by any provision
of martial law, or by any requirements of necessity growing out of
a state of war," wantonly abused his power, and inflicted upon the
plaintiff the wrongs of which he complained, and therefore he
prayed judgment against the general for the value of the
property.
To this suit, General Dow, though personally served with
citation, made no appearance. He may have thought that during the
existence of the war, in a district where insurrection had recently
been suppressed and was only kept from breaking out again by the
presence of the armed forces of the United States, he was not
called upon by any rule of law to answer to a civil tribunal for
his military orders and satisfy it that they were authorized by his
superiors, or by the necessities growing out of a state of war. He
may have supposed that for his military conduct he was responsible
only to his military superiors and the government whose officer he
was.
Be that as it may, or whatever other reason he may have had, he
made no response to the petition; he was therefore defaulted. The
Sixth District Court of the Parish of New Orleans did not seem to
consider that it was at all inconsistent with his duty as an
officer in the Army of the United States to leave his post at the
forts, which guarded the passage of the Mississippi, nearly a
hundred miles distant, and attend upon its summons to justify his
military orders, or seek counsel and procure evidence for his
defense. Nor does it appear to have occurred to the court that if
its jurisdiction over him was recognized, there might spring up
such a multitude of suits as to keep the officers of the army
stationed in its district so busy that they would have little time
to look after the enemy and guard against his attacks. The default
of the general being entered, testimony was received showing that
the articles mentioned were seized by a military detachment sent by
him and removed from the plantation, and that their value amounted
to $1,454.81. Judgment was thereupon entered in favor of the
plaintiff for that sum, with interest and costs. It bears date
April 9, 1863.
Page 100 U. S. 161
Upon this judgment the present action was brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Maine. The
declaration states the recovery of the judgment mentioned, and
makes
profert of an authenticated copy. To it the
defendant pleaded the general issue,
nul tiel record, and
three special pleas. The object of the special pleas is to show
that the district court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment
in question, for the reason that at the time its district was a
part of the country in insurrection against the government of the
United States, and making war against it, and was only held in
subjection by its armed forces. It is not important to state at
length the averments of each of these pleas. It will be sufficient
to state the material parts of the second plea and a single
averment of the third. The second plea, in substance, sets up that
as early as February, 1861, the state of Louisiana adopted an
ordinance of secession, by which she attempted to withdraw from the
Union and established an independent government; that from that
time until after April 9, 1863, the date of the judgment in
question, she was in rebellion against the government of the United
States, making war against its authority; that in consequence the
military forces of the United States engaged in suppressing the
rebellion took forcible possession of that portion of the state
comprising the District of the Sixth District Court of New Orleans,
and held military occupation of it until long after April 9, 1863,
during which time martial law was established there and enforced;
that the defendant was then a brigadier general in the military
service of the United States, duly commissioned by the President,
and acting in that state under his orders and the articles of war;
that by the general order of the President of July 22, 1862,
military commanders within the states of Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and
Arkansas were directed, in an orderly manner, to seize and use any
property, real or personal, which might be necessary or convenient
for their several commands as supplies, or for other military
purposes; that the defendant, in the performance of his duty as a
brigadier general, was in command of troops of the United States in
Louisiana; and that the troops by his order seized from the
plaintiff, then a citizen of that state, certain chattels
Page 100 U. S. 162
necessary and convenient for supplies for the Army of the United
States, and other military purposes; and that for that seizure the
action was brought in the Sixth District Court of New Orleans
against him, in which the judgment in question was rendered, but
that the district court had no jurisdiction of the action or over
the defendant at its commencement, or at the rendition of the
judgment.
The third plea also avers that for the purpose of suppressing
the rebellion and restoring the national authority, the government
of the United States, through its proper officers, declared and
maintained martial law in Louisiana from May 1, 1862, until long
after the 9th of April, 1863, and deprived all the courts in that
state, including the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, of all
jurisdiction, except such as should be conferred on them by
authority of the officer commanding the forces of the United States
in that state, and that no jurisdiction over persons in the
military service of the United States, for acts performed in the
line of their duty, was by such authority conferred upon that
court.
To the first plea, that of
nul tiel record, the
plaintiff replied that there was such a record, of which he prayed
inspection; and the record being produced, the court found in his
favor. To the special pleas the plaintiff replied that the district
court had lawful jurisdiction over parties and causes of action
within its district at the time and place mentioned, and to render
the judgment in question. To the replication the defendant
demurred, and upon the demurrer two questions arose, upon which the
judges in the circuit court were opposed in opinion -- namely, 1st,
whether the replication is a good and sufficient reply to the
special pleas, and 2d whether the Sixth District Court, at the time
and place mentioned, had jurisdiction of the parties and cause of
action, to render the judgment in question.
By statute, when the judges of the circuit court are opposed in
opinion upon any question arising on the trial of a cause, the
opinion of the presiding justice prevails, and judgment is entered
in conformity with it. Here the presiding justice was of opinion
that the replication was a sufficient reply to the special pleas,
and that the district court had jurisdiction over the parties and
the cause, and to render the judgment in question.
Page 100 U. S. 163
Accordingly, the plaintiff had final judgment upon the demurrer,
which was entered for $2,659.67 and costs; and the defendant has
brought the cause here by writ of error on a certificate of
division of opinion.
The important question thus presented for our determination is
whether an officer of the Army of the United States is liable to a
civil action in the local tribunals for injuries resulting from
acts ordered by him in his military character, whilst in the
service of the United States, in the enemy's country, upon an
allegation of the injured party that the acts were not justified by
the necessities of war.
But before proceeding to its consideration, there is a
preliminary question of jurisdiction to be disposed of. The Act of
Feb. 16, 1875, "to facilitate the disposition of cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States, and for other purposes,"
provided that whenever by the laws
then in force it was
required that the matter in dispute should exceed the sum or value
of $2,000, exclusive of costs, in order that the judgments and
decrees of the circuit courts of the United States might be
reexamined in the Supreme Court, such judgments and decrees
thereafter rendered should not be reexamined in the Supreme Court,
unless the matter in dispute should exceed the sum or value of
$5,000, exclusive of costs. 18 Stat. 315. It is therefore contended
that a judgment cannot be reviewed by this Court, upon a
certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the
circuit court, if the judgment be under $5,000; and the judgment in
the present case is under that amount. We do not think, however,
that this conclusion is warranted by the language of the act in
question. That act makes no change in the previous laws, except as
to amounts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, when the
amount is material. Where before $2,000 was the sum required for
that purpose, afterwards $5,000 was the sum. But before that act,
questions arising in the progress of a trial could be brought to
this Court for determination upon a certificate of division of
opinion, without reference to the amount in controversy in the
case. The original act of 1802, allowing this mode of procedure,
was always held to extend our appellate jurisdiction to material
questions of law arising in all cases, criminal as well as civil,
without
Page 100 U. S. 164
regard to the amount in controversy or the condition of the
litigation. Its defect consisted in the delays it created by
frequently suspending proceedings in the midst of a trial. To
obviate this defect, the first section of the Act of June, 1872,
was passed, requiring the case to proceed notwithstanding the
division, the opinion of the presiding justice to prevail for the
time being, and this feature is retained in the Revised Statutes.
Secs. 650, 652, 693. The benefit of the certificate can now be had
after judgment upon a writ of error or appeal. That is the only
material change from the original law. We have no doubt, therefore,
of our jurisdiction in this case.
This brings us to the consideration of the main question
involved, which we do not regard as at all difficult of solution,
when reference is had to the character of the late war. That war,
though not between independent nations, but between different
portions of the same nation, was accompanied by the general
incidents of an international war. It was waged between people
occupying different territories, separated from each other by well
defined lines. It attained proportions seldom reached in the wars
of modern nations. Armies of greater magnitude and more formidable
in their equipments than any known in the present century were put
into the field by the contending parties. The insurgent states
united in an organization known as the Confederate States, by which
they acted through a central authority guiding their military
movements; and to them belligerent rights were accorded by the
federal government. This was shown in the treatment of captives as
prisoners of war, the exchange of prisoners, the release of
officers on parole, and in numerous arrangements to mitigate as far
as possible the inevitable suffering and miseries attending the
conflict. The people of the loyal states on the one hand, and the
people of the Confederate States on the other, thus became enemies
to each other, and were liable to be dealt with as such without
reference to their individual opinions or dispositions. Commercial
intercourse and correspondence between them were prohibited, as
well by express enactments of Congress as by the accepted doctrines
of public law. The enforcement of contracts previously made between
them was suspended, partnerships were dissolved, and the courts of
each belligerent were
Page 100 U. S. 165
closed to the citizens of the other, and its territory was to
the other enemy's country. When, therefore, our armies marched into
the country which acknowledged the authority of the Confederate
government -- that is, into the enemy's country -- their officers
and soldiers were not subject to its laws, nor amenable to its
tribunals for their acts. They were subject only to their own
government, and only by its laws, administered by its authority,
could they be called to account. As was observed in the recent case
of
Coleman v. Tennessee, it is well settled that a foreign
army, permitted to march through a friendly country, or to be
stationed in it by authority of its sovereign or government, is
exempt from its civil and criminal jurisdiction. The law was so
stated in the celebrated case of
The Exchange, reported in
the 7th of Cranch. Much more must this exemption prevail where a
hostile army invades an enemy's country. There would be something
singularly absurd in permitting an officer or soldier of an
invading army to be tried by his enemy, whose country it had
invaded. The same reasons for his exemption from criminal
prosecution apply to civil proceedings. There would be as much
incongruity, and as little likelihood of freedom from the
irritations of the war, in civil as in criminal proceedings
prosecuted during its continuance. In both instances, from the very
nature of war, the tribunals of the enemy must be without
jurisdiction to sit in judgment upon the military conduct of the
officers and soldiers of the invading army. It is difficult to
reason upon a proposition so manifest; its correctness is evident
upon its bare announcement, and no additional force can be given to
it by any amount of statement as to the proper conduct of war. It
is manifest that if officers or soldiers of the army could be
required to leave their posts and troops, upon the summons of every
local tribunal, on pain of a judgment by default against them,
which at the termination of hostilities could be enforced by suit
in their own states, the efficiency of the army as a hostile force
would be utterly destroyed. Nor can it make any difference with
what denunciatory epithets the complaining party may characterize
their conduct. If such epithets could confer jurisdiction, they
would always be supplied in every variety of form. An inhabitant of
a bombarded city would have little hesitation in declaring the
Page 100 U. S. 166
bombardment unnecessary and cruel. Would it be pretended that he
could call the commanding general, who ordered it, before a local
tribunal to show its necessity or be mulcted in damages? The owner
of supplies seized or property destroyed would have no difficulty,
as human nature is constituted, in believing and affirming that the
seizure and destruction were wanton and needless. All this is too
plain for discussion, and will be readily admitted.
Nor is the position of the invading belligerent affected, or his
relation to the local tribunals changed, by his temporary
occupation and domination of any portion of the enemy's country. As
a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the
political relations of its people to their former government are,
for the time, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and
the protection and benefit of others not in the military service,
or in other words in order that the ordinary pursuits and business
of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws --
that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property, and
provide for the punishment of crime -- are generally allowed to
continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
as they were administered before the occupation. They are
considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent. But their continued enforcement is not for
the protection or control of the army, or its officers or soldiers.
These remain subject to the laws of war, and are responsible for
their conduct only to their own government, and the tribunals by
which those laws are administered. If guilty of wanton cruelty to
persons, or of unnecessary spoliation of property, or of other acts
not authorized by the laws of war, they may be tried and punished
by the military tribunals. They are amenable to no other tribunal,
except that of public opinion, which, it is to be hoped, will
always brand with infamy all who authorize or sanction acts of
cruelty and oppression.
If, now, we apply the views thus expressed to the case at bar,
there will be no difficulty in disposing of it. The condition of
New Orleans and of the district connected with it, at the time of
the seizure of the property of the plaintiff and the entry of the
judgment against Dow, was not that of a country
Page 100 U. S. 167
restored to its nominal relations to the Union, by the fact that
they had been captured by our forces, and were held in subjection.
A feeling of intense hostility against the government of the Union
prevailed, as before, with the people, which was ready to break out
into insurrection upon the appearance of the enemy in force, or
upon the withdrawal of our troops. The country was under martial
law, and its armed occupation gave no jurisdiction to the civil
tribunals over the officers and soldiers of the occupying army.
They were not to be harassed and mulcted at the complaint of any
person aggrieved by their action. The jurisdiction which the
district court was authorized to exercise over civil causes between
parties, by the proclamation of General Butler, did not extend to
cases against them. The third special plea alleges that the court
was deprived by the general government of all jurisdiction except
such as was conferred by the commanding general, and that no
jurisdiction over persons in the military service for acts
performed in the line of their duty was ever thus conferred upon
it. It was not for their control in any way, or the settlement of
complaints against them, that the court was allowed to continue in
existence. It was, as already stated, for the protection and
benefit of the inhabitants of the conquered country and others
there not engaged in the military service.
If private property there was taken by an officer or a soldier
of the occupying army, acting in his military character, when, by
the laws of war, or the proclamation of the commanding general, it
should have been exempt from seizure, the owner could have
complained to that commander, who might have ordered restitution,
or sent the offending party before a military tribunal, as
circumstances might have required, or he could have had recourse to
the government for redress. But there could be no doubt of the
right of the army to appropriate any property there, although
belonging to private individuals, which was necessary for its
support or convenient for its use. This was a belligerent right,
which was not extinguished by the occupation of the country,
although the necessity for its exercise was thereby lessened.
However exempt from seizure on other grounds private property there
may have been, it was always subject to be appropriated, when
required by the necessities
Page 100 U. S. 168
or convenience of the army, though the owner of property taken
in such case may have had a just claim against the government for
indemnity.
The case of
Elphinstone v. Bedreechund is an authority,
if any were needed, that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to
adjudge upon the validity of a hostile seizure of property; that
is, a seizure made in the exercise of a belligerent right. There it
appeared that a City of India had been captured by the British
forces, and a provisional government established, which
subsequently held undisturbed possession of the place. Several
months after its occupation, the members of the provisional
government seized the private property of a native, under the
belief that it was public property entrusted to his care by the
hostile sovereign. The native had been refused the benefit of the
articles of capitulation of a fortress, of which he was governor,
but had been permitted to reside under military surveillance in his
own house in the city, where the seizure was made. At the time,
there were no hostilities in the immediate neighborhood, and the
civil courts were sitting for the administration of justice, but
the war was not at an end throughout the country, and there was a
feeling of great hostility on the part of the people of the place,
which was only prevented from breaking out into insurrection by the
presence of an armed force. In these respects the position of the
place was similar to that of New Orleans and the adjacent country
under the command of General Butler. The property seized consisted
of gold coin, jewels, and shawls; and the owner having died, an
action for their value was brought by his executor against the
members of the provisional government who ordered the seizure, and
judgment was rendered against them in the Supreme Court of Bombay.
That court appeared to be controlled in its decision by the fact
that for some months before the seizure the city had been in the
undisturbed possession of the provisional government, and that
civil courts, under its authority, were sitting there for the
administration of justice. But on appeal to the Privy Council, the
judgment was reversed. "We think," said Lord Tenterden, speaking
for the Council,
"the proper character of the transaction was that of a hostile
seizure made, if not
flagrante, yet
nondum cessante
bello, regard being had
Page 100 U. S. 169
both to the time, the place, and the person, and consequently,
that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to adjudge upon the
subject, but that, if any thing was done amiss, recourse could only
be had to the government for redress."
1 Kn. 361. Here, the special pleas allege that the articles of
property taken by the military detachment under General Dow were
seized by his order, as necessary and convenient supplies for the
occupying army. It was a hostile seizure, as much so as that of the
property in the case cited, being made, like that one, in the
exercise of a belligerent right, upon the propriety or necessity of
which the municipal court had no authority to adjudge.
This doctrine of nonliability to the tribunals of the invaded
country for acts of warfare is as applicable to members of the
Confederate army, when in Pennsylvania, as to members of the
national army when in the insurgent states. The officers or
soldiers of neither army could be called to account civilly or
criminally in those tribunals for such acts, whether those acts
resulted in the destruction of property or the destruction of life;
nor could they be required by those tribunals to explain or justify
their conduct upon any averment of the injured party that the acts
complained of were unauthorized by the necessities of war. It
follows that, in our judgment, the District Court of New Orleans
was without jurisdiction to render the judgment in question, and
the special pleas in this case constituted a perfect answer to the
declaration.
See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S.
509;
Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S.
594; also
LeCaux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 594;
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 187; and
Coolidge v. Guthrie, 2 Amer.Law Reg.N.S. 22.
We fully agree with the presiding justice of the circuit court
in the doctrine that the military should always be kept in
subjection to the laws of the country to which it belongs, and that
he is no friend to the Republic who advocates the contrary. The
established principle of every free people is that the law shall
alone govern, and to it the military must always yield. We do not
controvert the doctrine of
Mitchell v. Harmony, reported
in the 13th of Howard; on the contrary, we approve it. But it has
no application to the case at bar. The trading for which the
seizure was there made had been permitted by the Executive
Department of our government.
Page 100 U. S. 170
The question here is what is the law which governs an army
invading an enemy's country? It is not the civil law of the invaded
country; it is not the civil law of the conquering country; it is
military law -- the law of war -- and its supremacy for the
protection of the officers and soldiers of the army, when in
service in the field in the enemy's country, is as essential to the
efficiency of the army as the supremacy of the civil law at home,
and, in time of peace, is essential to the preservation on
liberty.
Our decision upon the questions certified to us is that the
replication is not a good and sufficient reply to the special
pleas, and that the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, at the
time and place mentioned, had not jurisdiction of the parties and
cause of action to render the judgment in question. The judgment of
the circuit court must therefore be reversed, and the cause
remanded with directions to that court to enter final judgment for
the defendant on the demurrer to the replications, and it is
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE dissented from the opinion of the Court on
the point relating to the jurisdiction of this Court, but concurred
therewith on the remaining questions involved in the case.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD and MR. JUSTICE MILLER dissented.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD.
Officers and soldiers in the military service are not amenable,
in time of war, to process from the civil tribunals for any act
done in the performance of their duties, but if the injurious act
done to person or property was wholly outside of the duty of the
actor, and was willfully and wantonly inflicted, for the mere
purpose of oppression or private gain, the party by whom or by
whose orders it was committed may be answerable in the ordinary
courts of justice, except when the civil tribunals are silenced by
the exigencies of military rule or martial law.
Luther v.
Borden, 7 How. 1,
48 U. S. 46.
Private property, in case of extreme necessity, in time of
war
Page 100 U. S. 171
or of immediate and impending public danger, may be impressed
into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to the
public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the
owner and without antecedent compensation. Extreme cases of the
kind may doubtless arise, as where the property taken is
imperatively necessary in time of war to construct defenses for the
preservation of a military post at the moment of an impending
attack by the enemy, or to supply food or clothing to a suffering
or famishing army destitute of such necessaries and without other
means of such supplies.
Such emergencies in the public service have and may hereafter
occur in time of war, and in such cases no doubt is entertained
that the power of the government is ample to supply for the moment
the public wants in that way to the extent of the immediate public
exigency; but the public danger must be imminent and impending, and
the emergency in the public service must be extreme and imperative
and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any other source
of supply.
Exigencies of the kind do arise in time of war or impending
public danger; but it is the emergency only that gives the right,
and it is clear that the emergency must be shown to exist before
the taking can be justified.
United States v.
Russell, 13 Wall. 623.
Public convenience authorizes the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, subject to the condition that due provision is made
for compensation; and public necessity, in time of war or impending
public danger, may authorize the taking of private property without
any such provision, to supply for the moment the public wants, to
the extent of the public exigency, which cannot be supplied in any
other way. 2 Kent, Com. (12th ed.) 338.
Nothing but the emergency will warrant the taking, and it is
settled law in this Court that the officer who makes the seizure
cannot justify his trespass merely by showing the orders of his
superior, the rule being that an order to commit a trespass can
afford no justification to the person by whom it is executed.
Mitchell v.
Harmony, 13 How. 115.
Support to all the principles before enunciated is found in the
very able opinion of the Court, given by Chief Justice Taney, in
which he fully admits that private property may be
Page 100 U. S. 172
taken by a military commander to prevent it from falling into
the hands of the enemy, and that it may also be taken, in certain
extreme cases, for public use without just compensation. Reasonable
doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained; but he proceeds to
show, what is equally plain, that it cannot be done in the first
case unless it appears that the danger was immediate and impending,
nor in the second, unless it appeared that the necessity and
urgency were such as would not admit of delay.
Farmer v.
Lewis, 1 Bush 66.
Where a trader during war is engaged in trading with a portion
of the enemy country that has been reduced to subjection, and his
trading there is permitted and encouraged by the invading army, his
goods cannot be seized on the ground that he is engaged in an
unlawful trade with the enemy. In such a case, the officer seizing
the property becomes liable for the abuse of his authority, and the
owner of the goods is entitled to recover in trespass for the
damage suffered.
Harmony v. Mitchell, 1 Blatch. 548.
Judgment was rendered April 9, 1863, against the defendant in
the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, in an action of trespass
for the unlawful taking and conversion of the goods and chattels of
the plaintiff described in the schedule annexed to the writ.
Payment of the judgment being refused, the plaintiff brought an
action of debt on the same against the defendant in the Circuit
Court for the Maine District, where the defendant resides. Service
was made, and the defendant appeared and pleaded nul tiel record
and three special pleas, as follows:
1. That the court which rendered the judgment had no
jurisdiction of the case, for the reason that the military forces
of the United States, prior to the rendition of the judgment, took
forcible possession of New Orleans, and held such military
possession of the locality.
2. That the said court had no jurisdiction of the case, for the
reason that he, as a military commander, seized the goods and
chattels mentioned as supplies for the army.
3. That the said court had no jurisdiction of the case, for the
reason that he was a military officer, and that in taking the goods
and chattels he acted in obedience to the orders of his superior
officers.
These pleas, containing as they did new special matters,
properly
Page 100 U. S. 173
concluded with a verification, which made it necessary for the
replication, if in the general form as now allowed, to tender an
issue to the country. Instead of adding the similiter, the
defendant filed a general demurrer to the replication, and the
objection now is that the replication is defective in form, it
being too general to amount to a traverse of the new matters set
forth in the special pleas.
Two answers to that may be given: 1. that the form accords with
that given by the most approved text writers upon the subject,
Stephen, Plead. (9th Am. ed.) 60; 1 Chitty, Plead. (16th ed.) 606;
2. that the demurrer should have been special, in order to avail
the defendant. 1 Chitty, Plead. (16th ed.) 694; Stephen, Plead.
(9th ed.) 40.
Hearing was had, and the court, both judges concurring, found in
favor of the plaintiff, that there is such a record as that set
forth and described in the declaration.
Two questions also arose under the demurrer of the defendant to
the replication of the plaintiff filed to the three special pleas.
Those questions are as follows:
1. Whether the replication is a good and sufficient reply to the
three special pleas of the defendant.
2. Whether said Sixth District Court at the time and place
aforesaid had jurisdiction of the parties and the cause of action
alleged in the declaration.
Certificates of division of opinion between the judges of the
circuit court under a former act gave the supreme court
jurisdiction of the questions certified, but the universal rule was
that the supreme court would only consider the single question or
questions certified.
Ogle v. Lee, 2
Cranch 33.
Nothing could come before the Court under such certificate
except the single question or questions certified here by the
circuit judges, in respect to which they were divided in opinion.
Ward v.
Chamberlain, 2 Black 430,
67 U. S. 434;
Rev.Stat., sec. 652.
Jurisdiction acquired in that mode of proceeding was limited to
the points certified, and could not be extended by a certificate of
division to anything except what would be open to revision here
under a writ of error or appeal.
Davis v.
Braden, 10 Pet. 286;
Packer v.
Nixon, 408;
Wayman v.
Southard, 10 Wheat. 1,
23
U. S. 66.
Page 100 U. S. 174
Both of those questions were certified at the time and were duly
entered of record, and the act of Congress provides that whenever
such a difference occurs, the opinion of the presiding justice
shall prevail and be considered the opinion of the court for the
time being. Pursuant to that statutory regulation, the presiding
justice proceeded to state that he was of the opinion:
1. That the replication of the plaintiff is a good and
sufficient reply to the three special pleas pleaded by the
defendant.
2. That the said Sixth District Court of New Orleans did, at the
time and place aforesaid, have jurisdiction of the parties and the
cause of action to render the judgment set forth and described in
the declaration.
Having sustained the replication as a sufficient reply to the
three special pleas, he overruled the demurrer to the replication
and adjudged the special pleas bad and rendered judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of the prior judgment and lawful
interest.
Errors assigned in this Court are as follows:
1. That the court erred in finding that there is such a record
as that mentioned in the declaration.
2. That the court erred in ruling that the replication is a good
and sufficient reply to the three special pleas.
3. That the court erred in ruling that the Sixth District Court
had jurisdiction of the parties and the cause of action.
4. That the court erred in the rendition of the judgment.
Before discussing those matters, it becomes necessary to
determine the preliminary question whether this Court, under
existing laws, has jurisdiction to reexamine the judgment of the
circuit court in this case. Prior to the Act of the 16th of
February, 1875, all judgments or decrees of the circuit courts in
civil actions at common law or suits in equity where the matter in
dispute exceeded the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of costs,
might be reexamined in the Supreme Court by a writ of error or
appeal. 1 Stat. 84; 2
id. 244; 17
id. 196.
Alterations of great moment in the mode of removing certain
final judgments and decrees from the circuit court to the Supreme
Court had been made before the passage of that act; but the
Congress on that day enacted that
"such judgments and
Page 100 U. S. 175
decrees hereafter rendered shall not be reexamined in the
Supreme Court unless the matter in dispute shall exceed the sum or
value of $5,000, exclusive of costs."
18
id. 316.
Beyond all doubt, the exclusion of jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court is universal in respect to all judgments and decrees of the
circuit court where the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum
or value of $5,000. Words more fitting to express such an intent,
or more effectual to that end cannot be found in our language, and
it is equally clear that they will admit of no exception unless
they are emasculated of their universal meaning, and yet it is
suggested that the final judgment or decree of a circuit court may
still, if the record contains a certificate of the judges of the
circuit court that they were opposed in opinion upon any point in
the case, be reexamined in this Court even though the matter barely
exceeds the sum or value of $500, exclusive of costs, which is the
smallest amount cognizable in the circuit court in civil actions at
common law or in suits in equity.
When our judicial system was organized, jurisdiction was given
to the circuit courts, concurrent with the courts of the several
states, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or
value of $500 and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners
or an alien is a party or the suit is between a citizen of the
state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state.
More than ninety years have elapsed since that provision was
enacted, and yet no alteration has been made in it as to the amount
required to give the circuit courts jurisdiction in suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity. 1
id. 78; 18
id. 470; Rev.Stat., sec. 629.
Judges of the circuit court are required to certify, at the
request of either party or their counsel, any division of opinion
occurring between them on the trial or hearing of such a suit, and
the provision is that such certificate shall be entered of record.
Id., sec. 652.
Beyond doubt, either party may require such a certificate to be
entered if any such division of opinion occurred in any civil
action or suit in equity cognizable in the circuit court, no matter
if the amount in controversy only exceeds by one cent,
Page 100 U. S. 176
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500. Provision is made
that in admiralty causes, the circuit court shall find and state
the facts and conclusions of law separately, but the requirement
does not extend to suits in equity, from which it follows that if
the opinion just read is correct, the Supreme Court must reexamine
the facts as well as the law in every such final decree brought
here, even though the amount in dispute barely exceeds $500, merely
because the record contains such a certificate of division of
opinion, in spite of the express enactment of Congress that such
final decrees shall not be reexamined in the Supreme Court unless
the matter in dispute shall exceed the sum or value of $5,000.
Certificates of the kind, both in civil and criminal cases, when
made before judgment, as directed by the original act, were
certified under the seal of the circuit court to the Supreme Court,
and their effect was to suspend all proceedings in the cause which
would prejudice the merits until the mandate of the Supreme Court
went down and was filed. 2 Stat. 159.
Mere points were sent up under the sixth section of that act,
nor was the proceeding any bar in a civil suit to a writ of error
or appeal, subsequent to the final judgment or decree, to remove
the whole case into the Supreme Court for reexamination. Matters of
difference of opinion between the judges of the circuit court in
criminal cases are still required to be certified here before
judgment or sentence in that mode of procedure, without any change
whatever. Every day's experience proves that proposition, but
regulations of a very different character have been provided where
the difference of opinion occurs in civil actions or suits in
equity. 17 Stat. 196; Rev.Stat., secs. 650-652.
Whenever such a difference of opinion shall occur between the
judges of the circuit court in a civil action or suit in equity,
the provision is that the opinion of the circuit justice or circuit
judge shall prevail and be considered the opinion of the court for
the time being, but when the final judgment or decree in such
action or suit shall be entered, it is made the duty of the judges,
in case such a difference of opinion occurred in the trial or
hearing, to make the required certificate of the same -- in which
event it is provided that either party may remove
Page 100 U. S. 177
such final judgment or decree into the Supreme Court on writ of
error or appeal.
Like the original act, the Revised Statutes require that the
points in difference shall be stated by the judges and certified,
and that such certificate shall be
entered of record
without any requirement, as in the original act, that it shall be
certified under the seal of the circuit court to the Supreme Court
at their next session. Evidently no such proceeding is required, as
it is not contemplated that the certificate of division will ever
come before the Supreme Court for reexamination unless the final
judgment or decree is removed here by writ of error or appeal.
Id., sec. 652.
Existing laws require that final judgments in civil actions
shall precede the writ of error or appeal to remove the cause into
this Court for reexamination, no matter whether the questions for
revision are raised in the record by a bill of exceptions, a
certificate of division of opinion, an agreed statement of facts,
or by demurrer, or even by a special finding of the court or by a
special verdict. Jurisdictional limitation, prior to the passage of
the Act of the 16th of February, 1875, was that the matter in
dispute must exceed the sum or value of $2,000, exclusive of costs,
but that act raised the minimum of jurisdiction from $2,000 to
$5,000, as already explained, in all civil actions, the same
section providing that the certificate of division of opinion in
criminal cases shall be made as before, and be certified under the
seal of the circuit court to the Supreme Court. 18 Stat. 316;
Rev.Stat., sec. 650.
Circuit court judgments or decrees in civil actions or suits in
equity, in order that they may be reexaminable in the Supreme
Court, must be final, and the matter in dispute must exceed the sum
or value of $5,000, exclusive of costs, and they must be removed
into the Supreme Court by writ of error or appeal, and they cannot
be removed here in any other way which will give this Court
jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the judgment or decree.
Id., sec. 691; 18 Stat. 316.
Power to reexamine any judgment or decree of the circuit court
is not given to the Supreme Court unless the case comes within that
category, the act of Congress now in force providing that such
judgments and decrees, entered after the act
Page 100 U. S. 178
went into operation, "shall not be reexamined in the Supreme
Court unless the matter in dispute shall exceed the sum or value of
$5,000, exclusive of costs."
Prior to the Act of June 1, 1872, the certificate of division of
opinion gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to decide the questions
in difference without regard to the amount in dispute, as it
applied both to civil and criminal cases, and in both had the
effect to suspend action prejudicial to the merits until the
decision of the Supreme Court was received. It preceded final
judgment or decree, and was certified to the Supreme Court under
the seal of the circuit court. Such certificates in criminal cases
are still required to be certified in that way, and still give the
Supreme Court jurisdiction of the points certified, wholly
irrespective of the merits or of any other question in the case. 17
id. 196.
Since the passage of that act, the proceeding in civil cases and
suits in equity is altogether different, the office of the
certificate of division of opinion, like that of a bill of
exceptions, being merely to raise the questions in the record, the
requirement that it shall be certified under the seal of the
circuit court to the Supreme Court at its next session being
entirely omitted in the new regulation.
Bills of exception are required to place on the record what
rested in parol, and they are allowed in the circuit court
irrespective of the amount in dispute; but a writ of error will not
lie to remove the cause into the Supreme Court unless the amount in
dispute exceeds the sum or value of $5,000, exclusive of costs.
Where the amount in dispute is less than that amount, the review
takes place on a motion for new trial in the circuit court.
Differences of opinion between the circuit judges may be
certified by them when they sit together, irrespective of the
amount, and the effect is that the certificate becomes part of the
record; and if the amount in dispute is sufficient to give the
Supreme Court jurisdiction, the cause may be removed here by writ
of error or appeal for reexamination; but if the amount in dispute
is insufficient for that purpose, then the only remedy for the
losing party is a motion for new trial in the circuit court.
Page 100 U. S. 179
Other modes for raising questions for review in appellate courts
are well known, as, for example, it may be done by an agreed
statement of facts, or by demurrer to the declaration or a material
pleading, or by a special finding of the court, or by a special
verdict -- in all of which cases the final judgment or decree may
be removed into the Supreme Court by writ of error or appeal if the
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $5,000, exclusive of
costs; but if the amount in dispute does not exceed that amount,
the act of Congress is peremptory that it shall not be reexamined
in the Supreme Court.
Under the original act, the judges of the circuit court were
required to make the certificate and cause it to be certified to
the Supreme Court before final judgment was rendered, but under the
new act, the final judgment in civil cases is required to precede
the certificate; nor is there any requirement that the difference
of opinion shall ever be certified to the Supreme Court under the
seal of the circuit court. 17 Stat. 196.
None of these propositions, it is believed, can be successfully
controverted, and if not it follows to a demonstration that this
Court has no jurisdiction of the case to reverse or affirm the
decree of the circuit court, it appearing that the judgment of the
circuit court was only for the sum of $2,650.67. It seems absurd to
hold that jurisdiction exists in such a case, when the act of
Congress provides that judgments and decrees of the circuit courts
shall not be reexamined in the Supreme Court unless the matter in
dispute shall exceed the sum or value of $5,000, exclusive of
costs.
Suppose I am wrong in this, then it becomes necessary to
reexamine the question whether the Sixth District Court of New
Orleans had jurisdiction of the cause of action and of the parties
at the time the judgment described in the declaration was
rendered.
It appears that the plaintiff, who was a loyal citizen of New
York, owned a valuable plantation in the Parish of Placquemines,
situated on the right bank of the Mississippi River about forty
miles from New Orleans, and that the defendant, at the time of the
service of the writ and of the rendition of the judgment, was a
military officer in the service of the United States, stationed at
the Parapet, near the city; that on the 5th
Page 100 U. S. 180
of September, 1862, a small military detachment acting under the
verbal and secret orders of the defendant landed at the plantation
of the plaintiff and wrongfully, as alleged, took therefrom and
from his dwelling house there situated the goods and chattels
mentioned in the schedule annexed to the petition for redress, of
the value of $1,611.29. Redress being refused, the plaintiff
instituted the present suit to recover the value of the property
wrongfully seized and detained. Personal service having been made
and the defendant having neglected and refused to appear, he was
defaulted. Testimony was taken as to the circumstances of the
seizure and as to the value of the property converted, and the
court, after due consideration, rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of $1,454.81. Execution issued and the
sheriff returned that the defendant could not be found.
Satisfaction of the execution being refused, the plaintiff, on the
30th of March, 1866, instituted the present action of debt to
recover the amount of that judgment.
Apart from the technical defenses already considered, the only
defense is that the Sixth District Court of New Orleans had no
jurisdiction of the parties or of the cause of action to render
this judgment. Attempt is made to maintain that defense solely upon
the ground that inasmuch as the defendant was a military officer in
the service of the United States, he was not amenable to civil
process from a court of justice for the taking of the goods and
chattels of the plaintiff at the time and place when and where the
same were seized and carried away.
Support of that defense is attempted to be drawn from the fact
that the state, on the 26th of January, 1861, passed an ordinance
of secession and joined the rebellion, that war between the
Confederacy and the United States ensued, and that the war, at the
time the action was commenced and the judgment rendered, was still
flagrant and not ended. Military officers, it is contended, are not
subject to civil process under such circumstances, even though the
acts which are the subject of complaint constitute an abuse of
power and were perpetrated without authority.
War undoubtedly followed secession, and it is equally true that,
prior to May 1, 1862, New Orleans was occupied by the
Page 100 U. S. 181
Confederate forces. Rebel dominion in the city, from the passage
of the secession ordinance to the date last mentioned, was
complete. Vice-Admiral Farragut reached New Orleans on the 25th of
April, and as flag officer he demanded the surrender of the city;
but the surrender was not made. Transports conveying the troops
under the command of Major General Butler arrived on the first day
of May. Certain proceedings followed which are fully detailed in a
prior decision. Suffice it to say that this Court decided in that
case that the military occupation of the city by the Union forces
became complete May 1, which is the date of the proclamation
published by General Butler.
The
Venice, 2 Wall. 258,
69 U. S. 274.
There was no hostile demonstration then nor any subsequent
disturbance, and this Court unanimously determined that all the
rights and obligations resulting from such occupation and from the
terms of the proclamation might properly be regarded as existing
from that date.
Two clauses of the proclamation may be referred to as evidencing
the intent and public import of the document:
1. That "all the rights of property of whatever kind will be
held inviolate, subject only to the laws of the United States."
2. That "all foreigners who have not made oath of allegiance" to
the Confederacy "will be protected in their persons and property as
heretofore."
Wherever the national forces were successful in reestablishing
the national authority, the rights of persons and of property were
immediately respected and enforced. Persons of intelligence
everywhere will see that that proclamation was framed in the same
spirit and with the same intent as that which actuated Congress in
passing the first act to suppress insurrection. 12 Stat. 257, sec.
5.
Authority was given to the President by that act, under certain
conditions, to declare by proclamation that the inhabitants of a
state or part of a state were in a state of insurrection, and the
provision was that when that was done, all commercial intercourse
between such insurrectionary district and the rest of the United
States should cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of
hostility should continue.
The
Reform, 5 Wall. 628.
Page 100 U. S. 182
Certain states and parts of states were declared to be in
insurrection in the proclamation made by the President Aug. 16,
1861, and in that document he expressly exempted from that
condition all districts or parts of districts which might from time
to time be occupied and controlled by the forces of the United
States engaged in the dispersion of the insurgents. Intercourse for
commercial purposes was not prohibited with such places or
districts while so occupied and controlled. They were not regarded
as in actual insurrection, or their inhabitants as subject to
treatment as enemies. 12 Stat. 1262.
Commercial intercourse was never wholly interdicted, and the
regulations were framed in the same spirit of forbearance towards
the places and districts where the national authority was
re-established. "As far as possible," said Chief Justice Chase,
"the people of such parts of the insurgent states as came under
the national occupation and control were treated as if their
relations to the national government had never been
interrupted."
The Venice, supra.
Sufficient appears in the Code of Practice of the state to
support the proposition that the district courts of Louisiana were,
before the rebellion, courts of general jurisdiction, as it
provides that their jurisdiction extends over all civil causes
where the amount in dispute exceeds fifty dollars, and this Court,
in construing that provision, held that its legal import was to
render those tribunals courts of general jurisdiction in all civil
causes not embraced within the exception.
Fournequet
v. Perkins, 7 How. 160,
48 U. S. 169;
White v.
Cannon, 6 Wall. 443,
73 U. S.
450.
Judgment in this case was rendered in the Sixth District Court
of New Orleans, which was established before the rebellion and had
jurisdiction in all civil causes. Rev.Stats.La., title Judiciary,
sec. 72.
Enough appears to show that the Sixth District Court was created
by statute more than fifteen years before the insurrection, and
that it was in the full exercise of its jurisdiction when the
secession ordinance was passed; that it was never abolished or
suspended by any military or other order or power; that it was kept
open subsequent to the proclamation of General Butler, the judge
and clerk being in attendance from day to day,
Page 100 U. S. 183
as business demanded. "Civil causes between party and party,"
said the proclamation, "will be referred to the ordinary
tribunals." After General Shepley was appointed military governor
in August following, the Sixth District Court held its regular
sessions at the time and place fixed by the state statute. Early
after the capture of the city, the judge took the oath of
allegiance and resumed the proper functions of his office with the
recognition and approbation of the military authorities. From the
moment the judge of the Sixth District Court took the oath of
allegiance as required by the commanding general, June 14, 1862,
the court continued in the exercise of all its powers, the same as
before the rebellion, and was the only court that did until General
Shepley in the fall of that year appointed judges in the first,
second, and third judicial districts.
Military conquerors of foreign states in time of war may
doubtless displace the courts of the conquered country, and may
establish civil tribunals in their place for administering justice,
and in such cases it is unquestionably true that the jurisdiction
of suits of every description is transferred to the new tribunals.
United States v.
Rice, 4 Wheat. 246;
Cross v.
Harrison, 16 How. 164. But that concession proves
nothing in this case, as it is universally conceded that the mere
occupancy of the territory does not necessarily displace the local
tribunals of justice.
Pein v. Lachenmeyer, 45 N.Y. 27, 33.
They were not displaced in this case, but suffered to continue in
the exercise of their judicial powers, with the recognition and
approbation of the military commander.
Important differences exist between a foreign war waged for
conquest and a civil war waged to restore insurrectionary districts
to their allegiance to the rightful sovereign. Nor could the
commander of the department, after the date of the proclamation of
General Butler, seize private property as booty of war, or make any
order confiscating it.
Planters' Bank v. Union
Bank, 16 Wall. 483.
On the 17th of August in the same year, General Butler, as the
commander of the department, issued an order requiring the banks of
the city to pay over to the chief quartermaster of the army all
money in their possession belonging to hostile corporations or
hostile official persons. Payments were made
Page 100 U. S. 184
by the defendant bank pursuant to that order of a large amount
deposited by the plaintiff bank. Reimbursement having been refused,
the plaintiff bank brought suit to recover the amount, and judgment
was ultimately rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of
$24,713. Exceptions were filed by the defendant, and the cause was
removed into this Court, where the judgment was affirmed.
Two points were ruled by this Court: 1. that the order was one
which the commanding general had no authority to make, and that it
was wholly invalid; 2. that payment to the chief quartermaster did
not satisfy the debt.
In disposing of the case, MR. JUSTICE STRONG remarked that the
City of New Orleans was then in the quiet possession of the United
States forces; that it had been captured fifteen months before that
time and that undisturbed possession had been maintained ever after
its capture; that the order was not an attempt to seize the
property
flagrante bello, nor was it a seizure for the
immediate use of the army; that it was an attempt to confiscate
private property which, though it may be subjected to confiscation
by legislative authority, is, according to the modern law of
nations, exempt from capture as booty of war.
Concede all that and still the defendant rests his defense on
the proposition of his third special plea, that the Sixth District
Court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, because
he was a military officer in the Army of the United States, acting
under the orders of his superiors. But this is not the case of a
foreign war in which the courts of the enemy assumed jurisdiction
over an officer of the invading army. Nothing of the kind is
pretended, and if it were, it could not be supported for a moment.
Instead of that, the United States, throughout the active
hostilities, were engaged in putting down the insurrection and in
suppressing the rebellion with a view to the reestablishment and
complete restoration of the national authority. Throughout the
whole period of the civil war, the government maintained that the
ordinances of secession were void and that they did not and could
not have the effect to take a state out of the Union or to annual
its constitution or laws.
Page 100 U. S. 185
War followed insurrection, but all know that as soon as the
military forces of the United States wrested any portion of the
national territory from the rebellious authorities and acquired
full and complete control of it, the normal condition of affairs
became restored, as indicated in the first act of Congress upon the
subject and the proclamation of the President, which soon followed
the passage of that act.
Towns, provinces, and territories, says Halleck,
"which are retaken from the conqueror during the war or which
are restored to their former sovereign by the treaty of peace are
entitled to the right of postliminy, and the original sovereign
owner, on recovering his dominion over them, whether by force of
arms or by treaty, is bound to restore them to their former state.
In other words, he acquires no new right over them either by the
act of recapture or of restoration. . . . He rules not by any newly
acquired title which relates back to any former period, but by his
antecedent title, which, in contemplation of law, has never been
devested."
Halleck, Int.Law, 871.
When a town, reduced by the enemy's arms, is retaken by those of
her own sovereign, says Vattel, she is restored to her former
condition and reinstated in all her rights. Vattel (ed. by Chitty)
395.
Pressing emergency in time of war may authorize the seizure of
private property before providing for compensation, but, to justify
the taking without the consent of the owner, the necessity must be
apparent, leaving no available alternative.
Four months before the marauding expedition, acting under the
verbal and secret orders of the defendant, entered the plantation
and dwelling house of the plaintiff during his temporary absence
and seized the goods and chattels mentioned, the City of New
Orleans had fallen into the undisturbed possession of the Union
forces under the command of General Butler, who never authorized
the defendant to perpetrate the acts of plunder charged in the
declaration. Evidence of necessity in this case is wholly wanting,
without which the acts charged in the declaration cannot be
justified.
Sellards v. Zomes, 5 Bush, 90.
Beyond doubt he might have appealed to the commanding
Page 100 U. S. 186
general for an order that the suit should be discontinued; but
he did not, and it may be that his reason for not doing so was that
he knew if he did, a court of inquiry would be ordered. Public
order was fully restored in the city, and the courts were open, and
every person was in the full enjoyment of the protection promised
in the military proclamation issued four months before, when the
Union forces entered the city. Process in due form of law was
issued, and, personal service having been made, the defendant, if
he had any defense, was bound to appear and plead it.
Actual insurrection in that locality had ceased, and the
military control of the Union forces was substantial, complete, and
permanent, and, being such, it drew after it the full measure of
protection to persons and property consistent with the fact that
the war outside and in other localities had not terminated. Rebel
authority was replaced by the national authority, and all the
inhabitants were in the enjoyment of the protection and rights
promised in the military proclamation then in force.
Hostilities having ceased in that locality, the defendant was
not engaged in any active military operations. His military duties
did not prevent his attendance at the court to make his defense. No
evidence is exhibited in the pleadings showing any condition of
affairs, military or civil, excusing the defendant from refusing to
obey a judicial summons, and if the court had no jurisdiction, he
should have appeared and so pleaded. Having neglected to do that at
the time, he cannot now attack the judgment collaterally in a suit
brought upon it in another jurisdiction. When the jurisdiction has
attached, the judgment is conclusive for all purposes, and is not
open to inquiry upon the merits, and if conclusive in the state
where it was pronounced, it is equally conclusive everywhere in the
courts of the United States. 2 Story, Const., sec. 1813;
Christmas v.
Russell, 5 Wall. 290,
72 U. S. 302;
Mills v.
Duryee, 7 Cranch 483.
It is not even suggested that the military authorities ever
interfered to prevent the suit, and as matter of fact it is known
that no such interference ever took place. Instead of that, the
clear inference is that the defendant preferred to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court where the suit was brought,
Page 100 U. S. 187
rather than subject himself to a military court of inquiry, and,
if so, it was his own choice and he cannot now be permitted to
attack the judgment which was rendered in consequence of his own
negligence to appear and plead his defense.
Confirmation of the proposition that it was the duty of the
defendant to appear and plead his defense is derived from the act
of Congress passed for the protection of those prosecuted for any
search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed,
or acts omitted to be done under and by virtue of any order of the
President or under his authority or under color of any law of
Congress, the provision being that
"such defense may be made by special plea or under the general
issue in the insurrectionary districts in which the national
authority had been restored by undisputed possession and
control."
12 Stat. 756, sec. 4.
By the fifth section of the same act, it is provided that all
civil suits and criminal prosecutions of the character described in
the fourth section in which final judgment may be rendered in the
circuit court may be carried by writ of error to the Supreme Court,
whatever may be the amount of the judgment. At the date of the
rendition of the judgment in question, the United States had
undisturbed possession and control of the territory embraced within
the jurisdiction of the Sixth District Court, which was fully
recognized by the military governor of the state as a tribunal
having full jurisdiction of all civil causes arising within the
judicial district. If the defendant could be justified under the
fourth section of that act for the alleged trespass charged against
him, the same section made it his duty to appear and answer to the
judicial summons, and make his defense by plea.
Reported cases in great numbers and of high authority support
the proposition that a military officer, except when war is
flagrant or when the courts are silenced by the exigencies of
military rule or martial law, is subject to judicial process for
the abuse of his authority or for wrongful acts done outside of his
military jurisdiction.
Mortyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161,
175.
Trespass for false imprisonment was brought in that case against
the Governor of Minorca, charging that he, the governor, had beat
and wounded the defendant and imprisoned him for
Page 100 U. S. 188
the space of ten months without reasonable or probable cause.
Plea, the general issue. Trial in the Common Pleas, and verdict for
the plaintiff in the sum of 3,000. Exceptions were filed by the
defendant, and he sued out a writ of error and removed the cause
into the King's Bench, where Lord Mansfield gave the opinion of the
court, all the other judges of the court concurring. He held that
trespass would lie for an abuse of power, and he supported the
conclusion of the court by stating a case that occurred in early
time, while he was at the bar, in which a captain in a train of
artillery sued the military governor of Gibraltar, who had
confirmed the sentence of a court-martial by which the plaintiff
had been tried and sentenced to be whipped. His Lordship brought
the action, and he says that the governor was ably defended, and he
added that nobody ever thought that the action would not lie.
Two other cases were mentioned by that great magistrate which
were tried before him in the circuit, one of which was a suit
against a military captain and the other was a suit against an
admiral in the navy, both of which resulted in favor of the
plaintiff. Errors were assigned in the principal case, and the
report shows that the questions were elaborately argued, and that
the judgment of the lower court was unanimously affirmed.
McLaughlin v. Green, 50 Miss. 453, 462;
Bellamonte
Case, 2 Salk. 625;
Way v. Yally, 6 Mod.Rep. 195.
Examples of the kind in the courts of the parent country are
quite numerous, and in every case the alleged wrongdoer was put to
his justification, and if it appeared that the wrongful act was
done without lawful authority, the plaintiff recovered compensation
for the injury. 1 Smith, Lead.Cas. (7th ed.), par. II, 1035.
Where the captain of a company imposed a fine upon a soldier and
issued a warrant for its collection under which the soldier was
imprisoned, and it appeared that the statute conferred no authority
upon the captain to issue warrants for the collection of fines in
such cases, it was held, in an action of trespass brought by the
soldier against the captain, that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover.
Mallory v. Bryant, 17 Conn. 178; 6 Waite, Actions
and Defenses, 49.
Acts of military officers within the scope of their
jurisdiction
Page 100 U. S. 189
are protected, while such as are in excess of their jurisdiction
are actionable.
Id., 107.
When and where the civil power is suspended, the President has a
right to govern by the military forces, but in all other cases, the
civil power excludes martial law and government by the war power.
Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370; 7 Waite, Actions and
Defenses 314.
A soldier cannot justify on the ground that he was obeying the
orders of his superior officer if such orders were illegal and not
justified by the rules and usages of war and such that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know that obedience would be illegal
and criminal.
Riggs v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 87;
Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331,
7
U. S. 337;
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 2 Bush
(N.Y.) 570.
It follows that the military commander, after the capture of New
Orleans, had no right to seize private property as booty or to
confiscate it, for the reason that hostilities had ceased and the
courts were open.
Planters' Bank v. Union
Bank, 16 Wall. 483; 7 Waite, Actions and Defenses,
315.
Without proof of a direct order from the commandant of the
place, the defendant cannot justify his acts as having been
authorized by his superior officer, even if that would afford a
justification, for, as Dr. Lushington said in a celebrated case, if
the act which he did was in itself wrongful and produced damage to
the plaintiff, he, the plaintiff, must have the same remedy by
action against the wrongdoer whether the act was his own,
spontaneous and unauthorized, or whether it were done by the order
of the superior power. Agents in such cases are responsible for
their tortious acts, but the government is morally bound to give
them indemnity, the rule being, as the court held in that case,
that "the right to compensation in the party injured is paramount
to that consideration."
Rogers v. Dutt, 13 P.C.C. 209,
236;
Wilson v. Franklin, 63 N. C. 259.
It is not to be questioned, said Phelps, J., that if a military
officer transcend the limits of his authority and take cognizance
of a matter not within his jurisdiction, his acts are void, and
will afford no justification to those who act under him.
Darling v. Bowen, 10 Vt. 148, 151. Conclusive support to
that proposition, if any be needed, is found in several English
Page 100 U. S. 190
cases of undoubted authority.
Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt
65, 87.
During the argument, reference was made to the military order of
the 16th of August, 1862, which purported to authorize commanders
in certain states to seize property, real and personal, necessary
or convenient for their commands or other military purposes; but it
is clear that that order had no application in localities within
the peaceable possession of the Union forces, for several reasons,
either one of which is sufficient to show that it is a mere
afterthought:
1. It could not apply to New Orleans because, if it did, it
would contradict and supersede the proclamation of General Butler,
in which he promised that all the rights of property of whatever
kind should be held inviolate.
2. Because it has been solemnly decided by this Court that a
military commander of that district, after the said proclamation,
could not seize private property as booty of war.
Planters'
Bank v. Union Bank, supra.
3. Because the record shows that the whole district had been
restored to the Union, and that all the inhabitants were in
cheerful submission to the federal Constitution.
4. Because there was no more necessity for seizing private
property as supplies than there would have been if the Union forces
had been encamped in any one of the great loyal cities of the
North.
Concede the correctness of these suggestions and two conclusions
follow: 1. that this Court has no jurisdiction to reverse or affirm
the judgment of the circuit court; 2. that if this Court has such
jurisdiction, then the judgment of the circuit court should be
affirmed.
Attention was not called to the question of jurisdiction in the
court below, nor is it probable that the result would have been
different if it had been, as the universal practice in the circuit
court is to favor appeals and render every facility to promote a
reexamination of the judgment unless the right has been denied by
some express decision of the Supreme Court or by some explicit and
unambiguous congressional regulation.
Page 100 U. S. 191
MR. JUSTICE MILLER.
Concurring with my brother CLIFFORD that this Court is without
jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not exceed
$5,000, I am content to rest that point on what he has said.
I also believe that the judgment of the circuit court should be
affirmed, for a single reason, which I will state in as few words
as possible.
It is apparent that, very soon after the capture of New Orleans
by our forces, the administration of justice as between individuals
was remitted to the civil courts. The proclamation of General
Butler shows that it was his purpose that such rights as required
for their determination judicial proceedings should be asserted in
the ordinary tribunals, with as little interruption and as little
interference by the military authority as possible. Evidence of
this is to be found in the fact that, without any change in the
judge, who had taken the oath of allegiance, the Sixth District
Court of New Orleans was continued in the exercise of all its
functions, which, under the proclamation, included the adjudication
of "civil causes between party and party." It exercised
jurisdiction both by the general law of Louisiana and the express
proclamation of the commanding general. The locality was a part of
the United States. The parties were citizens of the United States.
No active military operations were then carried on within that city
or against it, and for the very reason that its possession had been
perfectly secured by the loyal forces, the civil courts were
restored to the exercise of their ordinary functions in cases
between man and man, or, as the proclamation expresses it, between
party and party. The condition, therefore, was very different from
that when military forces invade and occupy a foreign country,
which, before any treaty of peace or the declaration of any purpose
to annex it to the territory of the conqueror, is held in armed
hostility to its former sovereign and solely by the strong hand. In
such a case, submission of the inhabitants can only be maintained
by the military power, and to subject that power to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the subjugated country is to abdicate
all control over it.
But in New Orleans, it was far otherwise. Our military forces
were rightfully there, and in their own country, among
Page 100 U. S. 192
citizens of the United States, subject to the same paramount
authority, and owing allegiance to the same government. Those
citizens had been only a few months in insurrection, and they were
invited to submit themselves again to the same laws and to have
their contested rights decided by the same courts, and, in this
case, by the same judge.
In this condition of affairs, Johnson, who was a resident and
citizen, against whose loyalty no charge is made, filed in that
court his petition, in due form of law, setting forth that certain
persons had, with force and violence, committed a trespass on his
home and taken therefrom personal property of the value of several
thousand dollars, and charging Dow with being guilty of this
trespass.
The usual process of summons was personally served on Dow, and
on his failure to appear or answer, either by himself or attorney,
a default was entered, and a judgment rendered for the value of the
property taken. This judgment remaining in full effect, the
plaintiff, to enforce the payment of it, brought the present suit
in the circuit court of the United States for the District of
Maine, where Dow resides.
The defense -- the only defense which could be relied on -- is
the alleged total and absolute want of jurisdiction in the Sixth
District Court over the case.
But surely that court did have jurisdiction of an action of
trespass. The plaintiff was not only competent to sue, but entitled
to a remedy in that court if the cause of action was such as he
declared. It is not denied that the trespasser, had he not been a
member of the military forces of the United States, would have been
liable to suit and bound to answer. But it is said that because Dow
was an officer of those forces, he was not bound to answer.
When a proper plaintiff brings an actionable case before a court
which has jurisdiction of it and due service of process is made, I
hold it to be a principle of universal prevalence that the question
of the defendant's personal exemption from such process or
jurisdiction must, by plea or some other appropriate mode, be
brought before the court. I know of no exceptions to this rule,
which is laid down by all the works on pleading from Chitty to the
present time. There is no other way in
Page 100 U. S. 193
which the court can know of the exemption if it be not
unnecessarily stated in the plaintiff's pleading. The court, as the
case stands, has jurisdiction, and must pronounce the judgment of
the law. If the party sued deems proper for any reason to stay away
or remain silent, he does so at the peril of having a judgment
rendered against him which cannot be assailed collaterally.
Much is said of the evil of dragging military officers into the
courts under such circumstances. But the military power can make
such general orders as will protect itself against an abuse of the
right which it has expressly recognized. So the idea that Dow ought
not to have been compelled to leave his post at Fort St. Philip to
defend this suit in New Orleans is of little force. If he had to be
found at the fort for service of process, he could easily have
employed a lawyer to put in his plea in abatement that he was
acting under military authority, and therefore not liable to the
suit.
Every man is liable to be sued wrongfully or without cause, but
he is, by the very genius of our laws, bound to submit to this evil
and make defense. Why should not this class of men, who of all
others possess most despotic power, be required to show the
authority by which they exercise it?
If I am not mistaken in these principles, I see no escape from
their controlling influence in the case before us. It is too well
settled to admit of controversy that a judgment rendered by a court
having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the
suit can only be impeached by some direct proceeding to avoid it,
and that when an action on it is brought in any other court, no
defense can be interposed which should have been made in the former
suit. General Dow could not, therefore, set up in the circuit court
as a bar to the judgment the same matters that he should have
pleaded in the court which rendered and was bound to render it.
It is impossible in discussing this matter that memory should
fail to recall a very famous case of historical interest, involving
many of the same principles, which occurred about half a century
before this, and of which the same city was the theater.
During what has been called the siege of New Orleans, at the
close of the last war with Great Britain, the commanding
Page 100 U. S. 194
general of our forces declared martial law in that city. This
was unpleasant to many citizens and to others who claimed to be
foreigners domiciled there at the time. Some of these, becoming
restive under its restraints, made publications of a seditious
character in the newspapers, for which they were arrested by order
of General Jackson. When Judge Hall, of the proper civil court,
issued a habeas corpus for their release, the general tore up the
writ and sent the judge by force beyond his lines. Within a very
few days after this, the victory of the 8th of January, 1815, was
achieved, and on the receipt of the news of the treaty of peace,
the declaration of martial law was revoked. Judge Hall, on resuming
his judicial functions, issued a process against General Jackson
for contempt of court in his action in reference to the writ of
habeas corpus.
That distinguished man, though in the midst of the adulation
consequent on the great victory, did not act as the defendant in
this case did, by paying no attention to the process, but came to
the court in citizen's dress, attended only by a single member of
his military family and with his legal adviser. He offered to read
the same paper which his counsel had read against issuing the
process for contempt, and when the court declined to hear it,
submitted himself to its judgment. At this there was such a
demonstration of ill-feeling in the crowded courtroom that the
judge said he could not proceed, and would adjourn the court. But
the noble defender of the city declared that he was equally ready
to defend the court, and begged that the judge would proceed
without fear to do what he might think his duty required. A fine of
$1,000 was entered up against the general, which he paid at once,
and used his authority, which was needed, to disperse the mob, who
were inclined to violence against the judge.
I confess I have always been taught to believe that Judge Hall
was right in imposing the fine, and that General Jackson earned the
brightest page in his history by paying it and gracefully
submitting to the judicial power. Such I believe is the judgment of
history and of thoughtful judicial inquirers, though a grateful
country very properly refunded to her favorite general the sum he
had paid for a necessary but unauthorized exercise of military
power. I have no doubt that General
Page 100 U. S. 195
Dow had good reasons for all he did, and I think he would have
acted more wisely if, respecting the courts in the proper exercise
of their functions, he had made his defense at the right time
before the appropriate tribunal.