QUESNEL v. MUSSY, 1 U.S. 449 (1789)
U.S. Supreme Court
QUESNEL v. MUSSY, 1 U.S. 449 (1789)
1 U.S. 449 (Dall.)
Quesnel
v.
Mussy
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
September Term, 1789
The Defendant was brought before the Court on a Habeas Corpus, when the following facts appeared; That this suit
had been instituted against him by Mr. Vanuxem, under the authority of a special Letter of Attorney from the Plaintiff, who resided in one of the United States; that the day after judgment had been obtained, another person arrived with a general Power of Attorney from the Plaintiff, and that this person, without consulting Mr. Vanuxem, settled with the Defendant, to whom he gave a general release in the name of his constituent. It appeared, also, that the latter Power of Attorney was only authenticated by proof of the hand writing of the party, and of the subscribing witnesses, before the Mayor of this city.
Lewis moved that the Defendant might be discharged by virtue of the release.
Du Ponceau objected, 1st, That the authentication of the general Power of Attorney was not agreeably to the Act of Assembly: and, 2ndly, That a general power is not a revocation of a Special one.
Lewis answered, that the question was not, whether a general power is a revocation of the special one; but whether it was a sufficient authority for granting the release. Of this, he said, there could be no doubt; and, with respect to the mode of authentication, he observed, that the Act of Assembly relates only to powers executed in a foreign country, and leaves the matter here to common law proof.
The Court were of opinion, that the general power was sufficient for the purpose of the release; and, having directed the person acting under it, to enter an acknowledgment of satisfaction on the record; they ordered the Plaintiff to be discharged.
U.S. Supreme Court
QUESNEL v. MUSSY, 1 U.S. 449 (1789)
1 U.S. 449 (Dall.)
Quesnel
v.
Mussy
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
September Term, 1789
The Defendant was brought before the Court on a Habeas Corpus, when the following facts appeared; That this suit
had been instituted against him by Mr. Vanuxem, under the authority of a special Letter of Attorney from the Plaintiff, who resided in one of the United States; that the day after judgment had been obtained, another person arrived with a general Power of Attorney from the Plaintiff, and that this person, without consulting Mr. Vanuxem, settled with the Defendant, to whom he gave a general release in the name of his constituent. It appeared, also, that the latter Power of Attorney was only authenticated by proof of the hand writing of the party, and of the subscribing witnesses, before the Mayor of this city.
Lewis moved that the Defendant might be discharged by virtue of the release.
Du Ponceau objected, 1st, That the authentication of the general Power of Attorney was not agreeably to the Act of Assembly: and, 2ndly, That a general power is not a revocation of a Special one.
Lewis answered, that the question was not, whether a general power is a revocation of the special one; but whether it was a sufficient authority for granting the release. Of this, he said, there could be no doubt; and, with respect to the mode of authentication, he observed, that the Act of Assembly relates only to powers executed in a foreign country, and leaves the matter here to common law proof.
The Court were of opinion, that the general power was sufficient for the purpose of the release; and, having directed the person acting under it, to enter an acknowledgment of satisfaction on the record; they ordered the Plaintiff to be discharged.
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