Role of Courts Supreme Court Cases

Article III of the U.S. Constitution outlines the scope of judicial power. Under Section 2, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts may hear cases arising under the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties made under their authority, among other matters. With a few exceptions, the Supreme Court is limited to appellate jurisdiction, reviewing cases previously heard by other courts. Federal courts may hear only actual, ongoing cases or controversies, which means that someone bringing a claim must have “standing” to sue. In general, they must have suffered a concrete injury for which a court can provide an effective remedy.

One of the most important and frequently exercised powers of federal courts does not appear in the text of Article III. This is the power of judicial review. Barely a decade into its history, the Supreme Court asserted in Marbury v. Madison that it holds the power to determine whether a legislative or executive action is constitutional. Many of the most famous Supreme Court decisions have relied implicitly on the notion that the Court is the ultimate interpreter of the founding document.

On the other hand, the Court has developed a doctrine of judicial restraint in the area of “political questions.” The six factors outlined in Baker v. Carr largely define this doctrine, which is based on the idea that courts should remain aloof from politics. Thus, a federal court should decline to hear a case that presents an issue heavily laden with political implications.

Hayburn’s Case (1792)

In general, judges should be extremely cautious in not intimating an opinion in any case extrajudicially.

Chisholm v. Georgia (1793)

Federal courts have the power to hear disputes between private citizens and states. (This decision was superseded by the Eleventh Amendment.)

Glass v. The Betsey (1794)

Every district court of the United States possesses all the powers of a court of admiralty, whether considered as an instance or as a prize court.

Hollingsworth v. Virginia (1798)

Since the Eleventh Amendment was constitutionally adopted, there cannot be exercised any jurisdiction in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Calder v. Bull (1798)

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state legislature contrary to the Constitution of that state is void.

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution rather than such ordinary act must govern the case to which they both apply. A law repugnant to the Constitution is void.

Fletcher v. Peck (1810)

The question of whether a law is void for its repugnancy to the Constitution is a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom to be decided in the affirmative in a doubtful case. The opposition between the Constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816)

The appellate power of the United States must extend to state tribunals when they take cognizance of cases arising under the Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States.

Cohens v. Virginia (1821)

A case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case.

Luther v. Borden (1849)

The question of whether or not a majority of those persons entitled to suffrage voted to adopt a constitution cannot be settled in a judicial proceeding.

Ableman v. Booth (1859)

The Supreme Court has appellate power in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, with such exceptions and regulations as Congress may make, whether the cases arise in a state court or an inferior court of the United States. When the decision of the state court is against the right claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a writ of error will lie to bring the judgment of the state court before the Supreme Court for reexamination and revision.

Ex parte Milligan (1866)

A citizen not connected with the military service and a resident in a state where the courts are open and in the proper exercise of their jurisdiction cannot, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than by the ordinary courts of law.

Mississippi v. Johnson (1867)

The legislative and executive departments cannot be restrained in their actions by the judicial department, although the acts of both when performed may be subject to its cognizance.

Georgia v. Stanton (1868)

A bill filed by one of the states to enjoin the Secretary of War and other executive officers from carrying into execution certain acts of Congress on the grounds that this would annul and abolish the existing government of the state calls for a judgment on a political question and cannot be entertained by the Supreme Court.

Ex parte McCardle (1869)

While the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is conferred by the Constitution, rather than acts of Congress, it is conferred with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress may make. Therefore, when Congress enacts that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the Circuit Courts in certain cases, the act operates as a negation or exception of such jurisdiction in other cases.

Missouri v. Illinois (1906)

The Supreme Court should only intervene to enjoin the action of one state at the demand of another state when the case is of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved. Only such principles should be applied as the Court is prepared to maintain.

Ex parte Young (1908)

While courts cannot control the exercise of the discretion of an executive officer, an injunction preventing the officer from enforcing an unconstitutional statute is not an interference with their discretion.

Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon (1912)

The enforcement of the constitutional provision that the United States shall guarantee to every state a republican form of government is of a political character and exclusively committed to Congress, so it is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.

Coleman v. Miller (1939)

In determining whether a question falls within the category of political non-justiciable questions, the appropriateness of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.

Reid v. Covert (1956)

Courts of law alone are given power to try civilians for their offenses against the United States.

Cooper v. Aaron (1958)

State officials have a duty to obey federal court orders resting on the Supreme Court’s considered interpretation of the Constitution.

Baker v. Carr (1962)

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government, an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Flast v. Cohen (1968)

Taxpayers had standing under Article III to invoke federal judicial power, since they alleged that tax money was being spent in violation of a specific constitutional protection against the abuse of legislative power.

Powell v. McCormack (1969)

Federal courts may interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. This does not violate the political question doctrine.

U.S. v. SCRAP (1973)

Standing is not confined to those who show economic harm, since aesthetic and environmental wellbeing are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society.

Goldwater v. Carter (1979)

A question is political and non-justiciable when it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.

Michigan v. Long (1983)

If a state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds, the Supreme Court will not review the decision.

Allen v. Wright (1984)

Federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers, and the dispute is traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)

A plaintiff claiming only a generally available grievance about government, unconnected with a threatened concrete interest of their own, does not state an Article III case or controversy. (Standing requires an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.)

Nixon v. U.S. (1993)

A lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch under the political question doctrine.

Raines v. Byrd (1997)

For standing, a plaintiff’s complaint must establish that they have a personal stake in the alleged dispute and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized to them.

Dickerson v. U.S. (2000)

While Congress has ultimate authority to modify or set aside rules of evidence and procedure that are not constitutionally required, it may not supersede Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (2006)

State taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.

Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)

A litigant to whom Congress has accorded a procedural right to protect their concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.

Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (2007)

Generally, a federal taxpayer’s interest in seeing that Treasury funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution is too attenuated to give rise to the kind of redressable “personal injury” required for Article III standing.

Bond v. U.S. (2011)

An individual had standing to challenge a federal law on the ground that it interfered with the powers reserved to states.

Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013)

Article III standing demands that an actual controversy persist throughout all stages of litigation.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016)

Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness.

Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)

Partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021)

A request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element necessary for Article III standing when a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021)

Only plaintiffs concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation have Article III standing to seek damages against that private defendant in federal court.

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