Petitioner Hildwin was convicted of first-degree murder by a
Florida jury. Since this crime is punishable by death or life
imprisonment, state law requires that a separate sentencing
proceeding be conducted, in which a jury makes an advisory
recommendation but the court makes the ultimate decision whether to
impose a death sentence, which it may impose after finding at least
one aggravating factor. The court must make written findings to
support its imposition of a death sentence. In Hildwin's case, the
jury rendered a unanimous advisory sentence of death, and the judge
imposed the death sentence, finding four aggravating circumstances
and nothing in mitigation. The State Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence, rejecting Hildwin's argument that the sentencing scheme
violates the Sixth Amendment because it permits the imposition of
death without a specific finding by the jury that sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist to qualify the defendant for
capital punishment.
Held: The Sixth Amendment does not require that the
specific findings authorizing the imposition of the death sentence
be made by a jury. Since the Court has held that the Amendment
permits a judge to impose a death sentence when the jury recommends
life imprisonment,
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.
S. 447, it follows that the Amendment does not forbid
the judge to make written findings authorizing the imposition of a
death sentence when the jury unanimously makes such a
recommendation. There is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
sentencing, even where the sentence turns upon specific aggravating
circumstances.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S.
79. The existence of an aggravating factor is not an
element of the offense, but is a sentencing factor that comes into
play only after a defendant has been found guilty.
Certiorari granted;
531 So. 2d
124, affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents us once again with the question whether the
Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the aggravating factors
that permit the imposition of capital punishment in Florida.
Petitioner, Paul C. Hildwin, Jr., was indicted for, and convicted
of, first-degree murder. Under
Page 490 U. S. 639
Florida law, that offense is a capital felony punishable by
death or life imprisonment. Fla.Stat. § 782.04(1)(a) (1987). Upon a
defendant's conviction of a capital felony, the court conducts a
separate sentencing proceeding, after which the jury renders an
advisory verdict. Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (Supp.1988). The ultimate
decision to impose a sentence of death, however, is made by the
court after finding at least one aggravating circumstance.
Ibid. If the court imposes a sentence of death, it must
"set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death
is based."
Ibid. In petitioner's case, the jury returned a
unanimous advisory verdict of death, and the judge imposed the
death sentence. In the order imposing the death sentence, the trial
judge found four aggravating circumstances: petitioner had previous
convictions for violent felonies, he was under a sentence of
imprisonment at the time of the murder, the killing was committed
for pecuniary gain, and the killing was especially heinous,
atrocious, and cruel. The trial judge found nothing in
mitigation.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, petitioner argued that
the Florida capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment
because it permits the imposition of death without a specific
finding by the jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist
to qualify the defendant for capital punishment. The court rejected
this argument without discussion, and affirmed petitioner's
conviction and sentence of death.
531 So. 2d 124
(1988).
*
In
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.
S. 447 (1984), we rejected the claim that the Sixth
Amendment requires a jury trial on
Page 490 U. S. 640
the sentencing issue of life or death. In that case, we upheld
against Sixth Amendment challenge the trial judge's imposition of a
sentence of death notwithstanding that the jury had recommended a
sentence of life imprisonment. We stated:
"The fact that a capital sentencing is like a trial in the
respects significant to the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . does not
mean that it is like a trial in respects significant to the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial."
Id. at
468 U. S. 459.
We did not specifically note that the death sentence may only be
imposed if the judge makes a written finding of an aggravating
circumstance. If the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to impose a
sentence of death when the jury recommends life imprisonment,
however, it follows that it does not forbid the judge from making
the written findings that authorize imposition of a death sentence
when the jury unanimously recommends a death sentence.
Nothing in our opinion in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U. S. 79
(1986), suggests otherwise. We upheld a Pennsylvania statute that
required the sentencing judge to impose a mandatory minimum
sentence if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant visibly possessed a firearm. We noted that the
finding under Pennsylvania law
"neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor
creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it
operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in
selecting a penalty within the range already available to it."
Id. at
477 U. S. 87-88.
Thus we concluded that the requirement that the findings be made by
a judge rather than the jury did not violate the Sixth Amendment,
because "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even
where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact."
Id. at
447 U. S. 93.
Like the visible possession of a firearm in
McMillan, the
existence of an aggravating factor here is not an element of the
offense, but instead is "a sentencing factor that comes into play
only after the defendant has been found guilty."
Id. at
447 U. S. 86.
Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment does not require that the
Page 490 U. S. 641
specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of
death be made by the jury.
The motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and
the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted, and the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Florida is
Affirmed.
* Petitioner did not present this issue to the trial court, but
raised it for the first time in the Florida Supreme Court.
Respondent therefore argues that the decision below rests on an
adequate and independent state ground. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, did not rest its decision on this procedural argument,
finding instead that there was "no merit" to petitioner's claim.
531 So. 2d at 129. In these circumstances, we have jurisdiction to
reach the merits.
See Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U. S. 320,
472 U. S. 327
(1985).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153,
428 U. S. 227
(1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would vacate the death sentence
in this case.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153,
428 U. S. 231
(1976), (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for
certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.
Even if I did not hold this view, I would dissent from the
Court's decision today to affirm summarily the decision below. I
continue to believe that summary dispositions deprive litigants of
a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits and create a
significant risk that the Court is rendering an erroneous or
ill-advised decision that may confuse the lower courts.
See
Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U. S. 9,
488 U. S. 11
(1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Rhodes v. Stewart,
488 U. S. 1,
488 U. S. 4 (1988)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc.,
485 U. S. 265,
485 U. S. 269
(1988) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Commissioner v. McCoy,
484 U. S. 3,
484 U. S. 7 (1987)
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). This risk of error is particularly
unacceptable in capital cases, where a man's life is at stake. I
dissent.